

A closer investigation than Burnham's of the Machiavellian principles will lead to the recognition that they have been derived not from discovered permanent and universal laws operating in all societies but from the observable facts that characterize the capitalist form of society. To discover these capitalistic laws is to discover some of the secrets of capitalism's strength and persistency, but not the permanency of exploitation and class rule. This whole endeavor serves either as an apology for capitalism which, after all, appears now to be doing only what is unavoidable, or it expresses the psychological state of despair that spreads in the turmoil of crisis when the first actions against capitalism are themselves still of a capitalistic character.

The Machiavellian-ideology is finally nothing but the political expression of the prevailing fetishism of commodity production. In capitalism it is only at the point of exchange, on the market, that the social character of production can assert itself. The result of the market and price fluctuations, which determine the fortunes and misfortunes of individuals, is that the social movement of the producers takes on the form of a movement of things which rule the producers. Here the process of production masters man, instead of being mastered by him. The idea of the impersonal and automatic character of the economic order created by the exchange mechanism is carried over to other fields of human activity. It reappears in the "political laws" of Machiavellianism, which also supposedly control the behavior of men, and in the unalterable "laws of organizations" which subject men to their rule. But just as the exchange relations, which control men, are of man's own creation, so the political laws and the laws of organization, too, are of man's own making. If men made them, they can unmake them. If, by virtue of their own actions, men are now mastered by economics, politics and organizations, they may come to master directly and consciously their social problems by different actions.

The development of Machiavellian theory reflects the whole historical development of capitalism itself. Every particular stage in this development gave a particular twist to Machiavellianism, but it remained throughout, merely a special way of expressing the ruling capitalist ideology. The fetishism of commodity production and the false consciousness to which it gives rise cannot be ended short of the abolition of capitalism. Capitalism, however, is disintegrating. The present vogue of Machiavellianism is explained by the fact that the market mechanism, the basis of capitalist ideology, has ceased to function as it did before. With the growth of monopoly and with increasing state-control, it becomes more and more difficult to reconcile the old ideology with the new facts of social life. The modern Machiavellians try to overcome the difficulty by a change of terminology. What hitherto has been expressed largely in economic terms is now expressed once more in political language. Although it does not matter what kind of terminology is used, there still exists indecision as to which one to choose. And this brings us back to Burnham who, in his earlier *Managerial Revolution*, tried to find the economic meaning of contemporary fascism, but is now

quite ready to disregard all but the political and organizational aspects of this "new" and also "very old" Machiavellian movement.

III

From his newly acquired Machiavellian point of view, Burnham analyzes first the nature of the present historical period. It is still the Managerial Revolution. This revolution, he says, "was in fact anticipated and its general course predicted by the modern Machiavellians more than a generation ago." This, of course, is not so. All that Mosca, Michels, and Pareto "predicted" was that there always will be rulers and ruled, and that a truly socialistic society is an impossibility. This view, as everyone knows, was shared by the great majority of people in all nations. It was challenged only by those who opposed capitalism.

This Machiavellian "prediction," furthermore, has been proven "true" only for people who assert that the political and economic changes in the twentieth century were of an anti-capitalist nature that have led to new social relations and a new form of society. Without this assertion the "prediction" would be meaningless. It would amount to saying that capitalism consists of rulers and ruled. Nobody ever doubted that. However, Bolshevism, Fascism, and Nazism are transformations of capitalist society which have left intact its basic relationship, that is, the divorce of the workers from the means of production and the consequent exploitation of the many by the few. These transformations cannot prove the impossibility of socialism and the correctness of the Machiavellian point of view. They were designed from the first either to safeguard the existing basic capitalist relationships or, in backward nations, to install them more securely in order to counteract the onslaught of imperialism. The Machiavellian "prediction" consists of nothing more than the empty statement that socialism is not possible because it is not here.

For Burnham, a social revolution has the restricted meaning of a "comparatively rapid shift in the composition and structure of the élite and in the mode of its relation to the non-élite." Yet even in this restricted sense one cannot define the present fascist movement as a revolutionary movement for, though in shifts the composition and structure of the élite, it does not alter the mode of the relation of the élite to the non-élite. Because this latter relation is not changed, Burnham has to confine himself to the more superficial aspects of the conditions for social change. He names as the "principal" one the contradiction between the institutions and the technology of society. This contradiction in his view, however, is merely the result of the incapacities of the old élite; they arise not from the social relations of production but from the degeneration of the ruling class which, instead of being self-confident and realistically brutal, becomes cultural philosophical and interested in the pursuit of sensuous pleasures. And also because this élite refuses to assimilate the new up-starts clamoring for power.

The new *élite*, now in formation, will include elements of the old. But the *new élite* — specifically, the managers of industry and professional soldiers — will dominate society and determine future events. The whole content of the “social revolution” now in progress consists, for Burnham, in the fact that the managers have gained more power in determining the policy of particular enterprises, trusts, and cartels than they possessed previously, and in the fact that because of the war the professional soldier came to the fore. However, as Robert S. Lynd has put it, “behind the fiction of the ‘manager class’ . . . stands the same old power. ‘The voice is Jacob’s voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau.’” The soldiers and managers of Burnham’s “world revolution” together with all other capitalistic groups and interests are not out to make a revolution; rather, they strive to prevent a possible revolution against the capitalist world. Of course from a Machiavellian, that is, from a capitalist point of view, the change of the *élite* is everything and the real social movement nothing, for capitalistically one can assert oneself only in a “revolution” which involves no more than a change of the *élite*. In a revolution which attempts to end the “circulation of *élites*”, Machiavellianism cannot serve as a guide to action. It is for this reason that a proletarian revolution can never be “Machiavellian.” It can, however, appreciate Machiavelli as a bourgeois revolutionist in politics. But Burnham’s “modern Machiavellians” do not think and act as Machiavelli did, that is, as a revolutionary force out to destroy a conservative force. Their world is not Machiavelli’s “real world of space and time and history”. They are merely apologists of capitalism, for the bourgeois revolution is long past. Today a revolutionary movement is exclusively of the non-*élite*, or it is not revolutionary. The theory of the non-*élite*, however, is still best developed in Marxism. And thus the line of revolutionary thinking does not lead from Machiavelli to Mosca, Michels and Pareto, but from Machiavelli to Marx.

Democracy is the second problem Burnham deals with. Historical experience forces us, he says, to conclude that democracy, in the sense of “self-government”, is an impossibility. The psychological tendencies and technical conditions of social organization, as shown by the Machiavellians, reduce democracy to a myth, formula, or derivation. As a myth it helps, of course, to make the ruling minority secure and to prevent the disintegration of the social structure. As a formula, democracy is used today to strengthen the international trend towards Bonapartism. But it is wrong to think, he adds, that Bonapartism violates the formula of democracy; it is rather the logical and historical culmination of the democratic myth.

Democracy can, however, be defined in other terms than that of self-government. It can be defined, Burnham says, as a system in which “liberty” exists, that is, “juridical defense” or the “right to opposition.” So defined, democracy is not a myth. In this sense it is a necessary condition of scientific advance and the only effective check on the power of the governing *élite*, for only power can restrain power.

This definition is, of course, the necessary one for Machiavellianism. Without it, the theory of the “circulation of *élites*” would have no base to rest upon. If there were not the right to opposition, there would be no *new élite* able to oppose the old. And also the “pluralistic view” of history would suffer greatly if there were not a number of “social forces” in society, fought or used by the opposing *élites*. And thus it turns out that a “true Machiavellian” must defend “liberty” as against the centralistic tendencies in the prevailing society. Behind Burnham’s reasoning still stands the same old *laissez faire* ideology.

“Liberty” is possible only, he says, if no single force among the various “social forces” enumerated by Mosca becomes strong enough to swallow up the rest. To be sure, he admits that present-day development tends to destroy the basis for social opposition. Nevertheless, he is not “yet convinced that freedom . . . is impossible.” Private-capitalist property rights in the instruments of production, even under trust and monopoly conditions, he says, “were a sufficient fragmentation of economic power to provide a basis for liberty.” Complete state control of all economic power destroys this basis. But one does not need to defend the first in order to prevent the second, for there are other means than capitalist property rights to prevent centralization. The state itself, Burnham suggests vaguely, could be decentralized or organizations along syndicalist and corporative lines could be instituted.

To make the defense of Machiavellian “democracy” more to the taste of the non-*élite*, Burnham discovers finally that “through a curious and indirect route by way of freedom, we return to self-government, which we were unable to discover by any direct path.” The existence of an opposition in society, he says, indicates a cleavage in the ruling class. In a society with public opposition, the conflict within the ruling class cannot be solved within the ruling class itself. Since rule depends upon the ability to control the existing social forces, the opposition seeks to draw forces to its side. It must promise certain benefits to various groups and, when in power, it must keep some of these promises. And thus the “masses, blocked by the *iron law of oligarchy* from directly and deliberately ruling themselves, are able to limit and control, indirectly, the power of their rulers.” This tricky business is, of course, only another formulation of Hegel’s “cunning of reason” and of Adam Smith’s “invisible hand.” And under certain circumstances these ideas contain some truth, for the absence of regulation is itself a kind of regulation, and the various limitations that beset the actions of the ruling class give to its behavior a certain direction. Yet it is plain nonsense to say that the masses control their rulers because they are controlled by them.

To make promises and to keep promises are two different things. At times the former “Marxist” in Burnham recognizes that “the general pattern of social development is determined by technological change and by other factors quite beyond the likelihood of human control.” At other times, however, he forgets that there are objective limits to the actions of men and

the actions of élites. At any rate, he does not trouble himself to find out in what situations the life-conditions of the non-élite may be improved by way of the struggle between the out-élite and the in-élite, and under what conditions the struggle of élites is unable to affect the life of the masses in other ways than negative ones. But without such concrete investigations, the idea of the "indirect rule" of the masses can serve only ideological purposes. It sweetens the "bitter truth" that masters there must be, and it soothes the conscience of the élite which, after all, appears now as the servant of the people.

We come now to the last question raised by Burnham: Can politics be scientific? The question itself he finds ambiguous. Before it can be answered, he says, it must be resolved into several more precise questions, 1) can there be a science of politics and society, 2) can the masses act scientifically in political affairs, and 3) can the élite, or some section of the élite, act scientifically?

The first question he answers with yes, for all that is needed here, he says, is the recording and systematization of observable events, from which generalizations and hypotheses can be derived and which can be tested through predictions about future events. That a social and political science is possible he demonstrates with academic researches in such fields as mortality, diseases, certain economic facts, suicide, crime, literacy and so on. The work of the Machiavellians and some findings of Marx he also offers in support of his affirmative answer.

One cannot deny that the application of scientific method to social problems has yielded some results. Indeed, as Peguy once said, under capitalism one knows more and more about less and less. Science has increased the knowledge of details. But this knowledge, too, largely serves the ruling class and the society it calls its own. Like everything else in capitalism, science is partly real and partly ideological. Since this is so it is not "neutral" but, like any other activity, machine, or organization it has the twofold purpose of making social life secure in order to make the life of the ruling classes secure. It can function only in this double sense or it is rejected as subversive and thus as "unscientific." To be sure, in certain fields of scientific investigation the two-fold character of science, though never totally absent, is almost completely hidden. But in regard to political and social questions, it is not science that rules but class interests.

The second question—whether or not the masses can act scientifically—Burnham answers in the negative. To think scientifically, he says, means to consciously select real goals and to take the proper practical steps for reaching those goals. Scientific procedure, he says, in answer to his last question, is possible for sections of the élite. The ignorance of the masses as to the methods of administration and rule, the fact that they must spend their energies on the bare making of a living, a lack of ambition and ruthlessness and so on, prevents the masses from acting scientifically. It is different

with the élite. Comprising sections smaller than the large mass groups, the members of the élite know all about administration and rule; they do not have to make their own living and have the time to cultivate their political skill. They are ambitious and ruthless and thus able to proceed logically.

For Burnham it is a "realistic goal" to stay in or to enter the élite. "Real means" to reach this goal are force and fraud. As far as politics is concerned, other goals and other means are non-logical, for society is forever condemned to be divided between rulers and ruled. The criterion for logical behavior is success. Individuals, he says, can "by deliberate scientific means, rise into the very top rank of social and political power." But they must take the appropriate steps to secure their power and privilege. They must not fall victims to myths but proceed scientifically as previously described. A "logically acting" ruling class is a blessing for the ruled, for there is often "a certain correlation between the interests of the rulers and the interests of the ruled." Such ruling élite will not fail to keep its ranks open. This too, benefits some of the ruled and "permits a greater expansion of creative social energies." To keep the ranks open is "liberty" and this "liberty" is a safeguard against bureaucratic degeneration . . . and a protection against revolution."

The gist of Burnham's writing consists of a plea, directed at the ruling class in the so-called democratic nations, to learn from the example of Bolshevism, Fascism, and Nazism what to do and what not to do in order to stay in power. The "Machiavellian way" is to defend "freedom". It is, however, also a way to destroy it. If it can do both equally well, it is independent of a particular form of society or a definite historical period. It is therefore merely inconsistent of Burnham to maintain that a true Machiavellian should adapt his actions "to the broad pattern of social change established by factors beyond deliberate human control." If these "broad pattern" change a liberal into a fascist society, a Machiavellian must also change from a defender to a destroyer of "freedom." But if his actions are determined by social changes independent of the actions of men, then, whatever a Machiavellian does will be determined not by his "scientific" and deliberate activity, but instead, this so-called "scientific" and deliberate activity will be determined by uncontrollable social changes. Burnham's argument, finally, boils down to his admission that, though the Machiavellians do not know what makes for social change, they have learned nevertheless that all previous changes did not alter the fact that some people ruled and others were ruled. Therefore, the smart man will be a liberal with the liberals and a fascist with the fascist, but he will always try to be on top.

Although, according to Burnham, "logical actions" open the way into the élite, they do not insure leadership. In order to use and control the masses, the leaders must stoop to their level of non-logical thinking. "The political life of the masses and the cohesion of society," he says, "demand

the acceptance of myths." The leaders must profess belief in myths — in short, they must lie, for of course they know better. Since it is hard to lie continuously, the liars often fall victim to their own lies. The deceivers deceive themselves. They cease to be "scientific" and in consequence the whole society suffers. The "most shattering crisis of recorded history," which we are experiencing today, is an example of what happens when an elite ceases to be scientific with the lie. However, all is not yet lost. Burnham still believes that our society will "somehow" survive, because out of its present crisis a new elite of better scientists and greater liars may emerge who perhaps can stabilize society once more.

All that can be said about Burnham's "science" is that it yields no more than a few ordinary observations as to the "character" of the elite and a re-statement of the long-known difference between reality and ideology. The "logic" of the elite and the "non-logic" of the masses is of course identical with the relationship between owners and non-owners of the means of production. The appropriation of the means of production by a special class, the division of labor, and the expansion of production and commerce generally created a particular social relationship which gave rise to the prevailing ideology. Because the means of production are not directly the producers' tools for making a living, but stand apart from and opposed to them as *capital*, people believe that capital is needed to secure the existence of society. The workers find it necessary for their existence. The capitalists are convinced that without them, work and life could not be carried on. Because class-division prohibits the direct coordination of social production to social needs, the indirect and round-about coordination which is seemingly brought about by way of the market, or by way of "planning" for class purposes, creates the illusion that the market or the "planners" are necessary conditions for the social life. In reality, however, not even that "order" which can be discovered in capitalism is brought about by way of exchange or by way of monopolistic planning, but — and in spite of these factors — by underlying social forces of production which the bourgeois mind refuses to understand. It is brought about by the development of the social forces of production which lead to crises and which help to overcome them, but which make it increasingly more difficult to solve social problems by way of existing class relations. The needs of society and the interests of its rulers have diverged more and more, until society finds itself constantly in crisis conditions. Unable to solve this contradiction basically by ending the class relationship, it appears to the bourgeois mind as a mere, though continuous, political struggle for power positions. Hence the modern Machiavellians. If for Pareto the ordinary capitalist competition was a "circulation of elites," the "revolution" of which he speaks is only the ordinary crisis occurring in capitalism.

The prevailing ideology results from existing class relations. It holds sway over both rulers and ruled. In capitalism the rulers have the advantages. That is why they rule. They have them by virtue of their control

of the means of production. To make this control secure, their rule is extended over the means of destruction. The workers have nothing but their labor power and, at times, their powerless organizations. Their behavior is necessarily "non-logical" because, lacking the means to reach objectives favorable to themselves, they have no such objectives. Their acceptance of the ruling ideology indicates their lack of power. The ruling class, on the other hand, has all the power. It can afford to adhere to any ideology. Generally, it accepts the obvious one which grows out of the existing social relations. It can also be "scientific," that is, recognize where its real power lies. It can be aware of the function of ideology and also of the fact that ideologies are perishable. But whether the rulers are "scientific", or "deceived deceivers", in any case they have the power and exercise it in their own interests. At times, of course, they may trust too much to the force of ideology, or neglect necessary ideological "reforms", or fail to coordinate ideology properly with military and economic instruments of class rule. And then they may be pushed aside by other politicians riding in on the crest of movements, breaking through the actual and ideological boundaries that enclose the masses. Or the entrenched rulers may be forced to share their power with the upstarts who are ready to replace them.

The "logic" of the rulers is, however, no more than a function of their power, just as the "non-logic" of the masses stems from their lack of power. If the situations were reversed, so would the distribution of "logic" between rulers and ruled be reversed. A successful revolution by a suppressed class will "prove" that the defeated did not act "scientifically." The new class in power will have "logic" on its side. So it has been in all bourgeois revolutions in which one group of exploiters was pushed out of power by another group. The bourgeois era was the "era of enlightenment", or "rationalism." Yet it did not solve the problems of society, not even the problems of the bourgeoisie. In the name of "science" it spread a new kind of chaos all over the world.

The controllers are controlled by socio-economic forces beyond their comprehension. They are not merely "deceived" by their own home-made myths, but subjected to the social anarchy which they cannot end without ending their own existence as a ruling class. Being powerless in the face of the real problems which plague society — despite all their power over the masses — the rulers, too, find refuge in ideology which some of their spokesmen now prefer to call "science."

If the evidence of the past shows anything, it shows that man has changed many things — his surroundings, his life conditions, and himself. Until now he has left undisturbed the class division of society. To do away with this relationship pre-supposes the removal of many obstacles in the way of a rational society, foremost among them an insufficient social productivity. However, more and more of these obstacles are disappearing; the time seems near when another decisive social change may be brought about. It

is because of this that the ruling class strives harder than ever to safeguard the class nature of society. But the more "scientific" it becomes in order to secure its own existence, the more it disrupts the conditions of class rule. Yet its enormous offensive against the further development of sociality makes it appear stronger than ever before. The powerless in society are more than ever conscious of their weakness, they bend their heads still lower. The frightened intellectuals rush forward to swear new allegiance to the dominant powers. In order to maintain some sort of self-respect they do not hesitate to represent their fear as "scientific insight." Yet all the while, the contradiction between class rule and social needs is growing.

The means of production are still in the hands of the ruling class. But to keep them there, the means of destruction are now placed in the hands of the masses. With such means at their disposal, they can now have objectives. They can become "logical" and "scientific." In times of great social crisis ideologies wear away quickly; new ones can hardly be developed fast enough to take full possession of men's minds and to cover up and make bearable the reality of present-day existence, which has as its ends death and destruction. It is quite possible that favorable circumstances, or the force of circumstance, may allow, or force, the masses to act in accordance with their own interests. If they do, they can abolish classes, for history is made not by some men, but by all men. If some men try once more to reduce for their own narrow purposes the coming mass movements directed against existing powers, they may once again succeed. Yet they cannot succeed in terminating the social crisis which has its basis, finally, in nothing but the neglected need for abolishing class relations in order that the existing productivity may be utilized for the welfare of all. But then again they may not succeed, because the gap between their narrow goal and the real social necessities is already too wide. It may prove impossible to end the present slaughter of men by men in any other way than by the abolition of all special interests and privileges. Whatever happens, there is no single valid reason for assuming that classes cannot be abolished. Instead there are many valid reasons for believing that the abolition of class relations will solve some of the present's most urgent problems.

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SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS OF RUSSIAN RESISTANCE

The purpose of this essay is to discuss some of the psychological, social and political factors involved in the problem of Russian resistance. Those factors have been either completely neglected, inadequately treated or incorrectly correlated in the numerous articles and books purporting to deal with this problem. In general, the rationalizations and fallacies are based upon various premises which can be organized into four parts. (1) The Army and Party purges and mass executions which so shocked the world now turn out to have been dictated by stern necessity in order to rid the country of fifth columnists. Thanks to these purges and in contrast to other nations, Russia found herself free to concentrate upon the military struggle and not worry about the home front (Joseph E. Davies, Pierre Van Paassen and others). (2) The *élan* of the Russian fighting masses, to which all correspondents have attested, is proof positive that the Russian is a free man who supports his regime; slaves, as Max Lerner puts it, do not fight like that. The fierceness of Russian resistance is explained in large measure by the social and economic gains which the Russians have achieved since the October Revolution (Wm. Henry Chamberlin, A. Yugow, Maurice Hindus, John Scott). (3) It may be true that there have been hardships, privations, and vast decimations of Russian masses during the periods of industrialization and collectivization, but all those were unavoidable means to a necessary end, namely, the complete militarization of the nation. In view, then, of the subsequently successful defense of the country against the invading Nazis, the whole economic and political procedure was "worth it." (Joseph E. Davies, Simeon Strunsky, Maurice Hindus, Harry Elmer Barnes, Ralph Barton Perry.) (4) From a purely military standpoint (materiel, strategy, leadership, etc.) the Russian army was very well prepared to meet the Germans; they were not caught by surprise and they knew for a long time that they had to fight the Nazis (Max Werner, Pierre Van Paassen, John Scott, Anna Louise Strong). Let us examine these statements.

First, as to the absence of fifth columnists, etc.: Uncritical apologists of the Russian regime are performing a rather dubious service in making their ridiculous statements. The Russian themselves have made statements to the contrary. To cite a few examples, (a) Stalin has warned the country against "disorganizers of the rear, deserters, panic-mongers, spies and diversionists." He warned moreover, that such destructive elements were to be found even in the Red Army itself; (b) Voroshilov complained of saboteurs

in the Moscow factories; "Izvestia" demanded the most severe punishment for saboteurs, and "Pravda" attacked "grafters, cowards, and traitors" within the Communist Party, as well as those in power who were responsible for depriving the Russian masses of "fuel, food, shelter, medicine and proper transportation"; (c) recently the Moscow radio has reported high treason at Krasnodar in connection with Gestapo atrocities at the Kuban capital; and we are now informed that General Vlassov, former head of the Soviet Military Mission from 1936 to 1939, holder of the Order of Lenin and Red Banner, who was in charge of the Valkov front, was backed by the Nazis in Smolensk as a Red Quisling.

There is nothing unusual about perfidy; every country in the world has its share of fifth columnists. The people of the democratic countries take it for granted that there are disruptive elements in their midst since they have learned to accept the fact that the democratic process, in permitting opposition opinions, runs the risk of generating seditious forces. The complete absence — if that were at all possible — of a fifth column in a dictatorial country would merely indicate that it had an exceptionally vigilant police force and effective concentration camps capable of handling not only fifth columnists but all honest opposition as well. The classic non-sequitur was offered years ago by Leon Trotsky in his polemic against Karl Kautsky. The famous Social-Democrat was complaining about the silencing of other working-class parties by Bolshevik terror; and the former head of the Red Army replied that in contrast to capitalist countries, there were no social, political or economic conditions in the Soviet Union which could bring forth parties opposed to the Bolsheviks. The persuasive finality of the Cheka squads in dealing with oppositionists apparently never occurred to Trotsky.

Our totalitarian liberals, having been propagandized for over fifteen years by both the Russian government and the American Communist Party to the effect that all those countless thousands who have been liquidated by means of trials, purges and concentration camps were "traitors, wreckers, spies, etc.," still continue to believe that every last "Trotskyist and Bucharinist dog" has been exterminated, and that therefore, the Soviet Union is singularly free from fifth columnists. Pierre Van Paassen, for example, who surely must be aware that no dictatorial regime can succeed in completely annihilating its opposition, seems to find an exception in the case of Russia. There is, he says, no more opposition to the Stalin regime. The reason for this would seem to be the superiority of G. P. U. methods over those of the Gestapo. If this is his explanation (and even Russian writers still employ the expression the *dictatorship* of the proletariat), he is guilty of closing the discussion at the very point where it should be initiated. What are those personal, social, economic or political factors which make it necessary for the U. S. S. R. to maintain the largest secret police force in the world? By refusing to transcend the limitations of G.P.U. power in solving

profound national problems, Van Paassen merely shows that his political orientation in this case entails only force and suppression. He is guilty of still another logical fallacy. He says, for example, that Hitler could find no Laval or Weygand to do his bidding among the Russians. Of course not, but not for the reason Van Paassen gives, namely, that the Russians, unlike the French, have no fifth columnists among them, especially among the ranks of their leading political and military figures. France and Russia are not comparable phenomena. Van Paassen commits the very common error of treating a nation as an entity, instead of evaluating specific national problems as they relate themselves to the type of economy, for instance, to relationships among classes, historical traditions, the racial and religious temper of various sections of the population, the political philosophy of government leaders, etc. Such an illogical approach to the problem, even by an ardent defender of Russian policies, is as fruitless as that of the many hostile critics of Russia (Sidney Hook, Dorothy Thompson and others) who argued during the period of the Nazi-Soviet pact that such an agreement was quite natural since Germany and Russia were, in all essentials, identical regimes, when nothing could have been farther from the truth. Crude analogies are no substitute for political analysis.

Hitler must find it difficult to make a deal with a Red Quisling simply because any Russian counterpart of a Laval, for instance, would have little appeal to the Russian masses. What could he, an agent of Nazism, offer people who had been propagandized for a quarter of a century on the subject of capitalism as a perpetually encircling and hostile enemy, a system which always threatened to bring back the hated Czaristic and White Guard landlords who would once again divide, enslave and pillage! The older capitalistically-minded kulaks, hostile to the Soviet regime, were liquidated long ago. The later wealthy and middle-layer peasants, who have profited tremendously from the nationalized economy like their urban counterparts, the Stakhanovites, and highly-paid trust executives, would not be attracted to any foreign "liberator" who had been painted in press, radio, drama and literature as avaricious and bestial. Finally, it should be pointed out to Van Paassen and others that no Quisling in any country has succeeded in gaining significant support among his countrymen. No one knows that better than Joseph Stalin who tried to foist both a "people's government" and a Kuusinen upon the Finns, and who as a result suffered not only a political and diplomatic defeat, but a cynical rebuff from his own people.

Second, there is the question of the Russian whose fierce fighting bears evidence to his being a free man, a supporter of his regime, and a defender of his social and economic gains, etc.. (a) It is interesting to see how otherwise rational men who can discuss the social, economic and psychological reasons behind mass warfare will suddenly stop dead in their analyses when they have to deal with the Russian fighting man. He is treated as though he were unique. The usual motivations adduced to explain why men fight, such as self-preservation, nationalism, racism, religion, pugnacity, frustra-

tion, xenophobia, fanaticism, adventure, etc., apparently do not apply to the Russians.

The innocent man on the street, having been completely demoralized by the spectacle of unchecked Axis aggression, as well as of democratic vacillation and capitulation, began to feel "instinctively" that perhaps most men preferred the security of enslavement to the responsibilities of liberty. If he happened to be sufficiently sophisticated, he could find corroboration for his feelings in the writings of many psychoanalysts who, like Erich Fromm, explain the "masochistic" or "escape" potential in contemporary man's psyche. He was surprised and encouraged, therefore, when he re-discovered an obvious fact of human nature, namely, that there are still men in this world not to be intimidated by Hitler's psychological warfare, secret weapons and legendary invincibility. This man in the street had also temporarily forgotten (under the additional influence of uninformed pacifist propaganda and political isolationism reinforced by an anti-British bias) to notice and draw correct deductions from the defense of the British people who had withstood the might of the German offensive for two years.

The average citizen in this country made another mistake. Using his own democratic privileges as a criterion and erroneously informed that only free men fight (at least defensively, since he could see that the Nazis who were supposed to be slaves could fight very well on the offensive), he was naturally surprised to witness the Russians fighting so furiously. They were also living, he had been informed, under an iron dictatorship. He began to feel that some things called for an explanation. (b) As a matter of fact, it should be obvious to anyone with even a superficial knowledge of world history that men have fought under every type of regime throughout primitive, ancient, medieval and modern society. This is another way of saying, therefore, that not only have men fought for a multiplicity of reasons but that slaves and serfs have given their lives serving masters or their own deluded impulses, just as free men have died serving their own libertarian principles. Russian serfs fought not only under benevolent czars but also under tyrants like Ivan the Terrible. They fought in the Napoleonic Wars, they were bled white for three years during the First World War fighting under a corrupt leadership, and now they fight under a dictatorship just as Germans and Japanese fight under theirs.

If one is really interested in discovering what makes a nation fight, he must discard the usual vague or blanket generalities about a whole country. He must approach the question in terms of economic classes, political programs, group relations, etc. Perhaps the Russian problem can be understood more clearly if we look at the American scene. Why does the American fight not only on his own soil as the Russian does but thousands of miles away from his own land? He fights, first of all, because he has no choice in the matter; he is drafted. It is no secret that millions of Americans in the armed forces alone are unaware of the ideological implications of this war. This is amply substantiated by correspondents reporting from all

theatres of war. A soldier, for example, may be an ardent supporter of the Republican Party; may even believe that the war could be more effectively prosecuted if Wendell Willkie were President. But this loyalty as an American is not questioned. Fighting with him may be another American who not only opposes Roosevelt politically, but has for many years fought the very system he is nonetheless defending; he is a socialist or an anarchist, who believes that the capitalist system must be abolished, that all governments are forces of coercion and oppression. But if we could view the battle and watch these men fighting and dying, we could not distinguish the pro-Roosevelt Democrat from the liberal, laborite, anarchist or Willkie supporter.

On the Russian battlefield men are fighting who support the political philosophy of "Communism". One group supports Stalin, another believes that military and political affairs could be managed more effectively if Commissars A, B and C were removed, and Comrades X, Y and Z given command; still another group subscribes to a reform communism, arguing that if only the Stalinist bureaucracy could be eliminated the democratic potentialities of the masses could be fully realized; but they regard Hitler as a still greater threat to their country at the moment. Still another group believes that Russia's economic and political salvation lies only in a return to some form of democratic capitalism or mild socialism; perhaps a modern Miliukov or a Kerensky would be the answer. But still they believe that the Nazis must be crushed and driven from Russian soil before anything else can take place. In neither of the examples given can one detect either political partisanship or ideological heresies.

What then becomes of the contention that men fight only when they support their regime? Probing beneath this over-all picture of general ideological groupings and taking into account the class or caste stratification, one finds more specific answers to the question of why Russians fight. The fighters of any nation can be divided into three groups: those with definite interests to preserve, those with no other choice before them, and those who have been so propagandized that they know only what they have been told, regardless of their actual interests. Among those in Russia having definite stakes are the ruling classes; the leading party functionaries; the heads of the G.P.U., the trusts, the collectives, the trade-unions; the administrative bureaucracy, the army chiefs, the prominent technicians, engineers, etc. Among those who see no alternative for themselves are the various political oppositionists and the millions of long-suffering, self-sacrificing workers and peasants. What do they stand to gain by not fighting, assuming that they have had the luxury of leisure and the free man's intellectual training for weighing alternatives? Even if they hate the regime of Stalin, a Hitler victory is certain to bring absolute slavery, starvation and death. In other words, the simple law of self-preservation provides the motive for their actions. The third group would be represented primarily by the youth of the nation which has been steeped in the virtues of party loyalty, self-sac-

rifice, fanaticism and devotion to the ideals of state-socialism. The same process can be seen in both German and Japanese life.

Not only has the Russian child been subjected to formal types of definite instruction. He has also absorbed the propaganda which has been dinned into the ears of his peasant parents for more than twenty years; namely, that Russia is surrounded by capitalist enemies, that there is an irreconcilable conflict between capitalism and communism which the former intends to resolve only by bloody war, and that the rigors of industrialization are unavoidable by-products of successfully defending the country. Admitting great suffering on the part of the masses, the government defends itself by saying there is no alternative so long as the capitalist nations, incapable of organizing their own economies, will be driven to further imperialist aggression against the Soviet Union in order to solve their own problems.

When war was finally unleashed against the Russians, it gave apparent validity to Stalin's predictions. All propaganda of this type was a perfect complement to certain nationalistic traits long associated with the Russians — stoicism, toughness and fearlessness. The Germans only appeared ridiculous in the eyes of the Russians with their attempts at psychological "blitzing," for Russians have a long history of suffering and courage. The alacrity with which they met the attack of the Germans (in spite of military and bureaucratic blunders admitted by the regime itself) was in sharp contrast to the apathy and cynicism which were widespread during the period of the Nazi-Soviet pact and the Russian-Finnish campaign.

William Henry Chamberlin, A. Yugow and others insist that one of the most important reasons for the fierceness of Russian resistance is the fact that although the Russian masses enjoy less personal and civil liberty than they did under the czar, they have greater social democracy, i. e., there is more equality of opportunity for the common man. There are striking contradictions in these writers' positions. For example, in the concluding chapter of Yugow's "Russia's Economic Front for Peace and War" which explains the Russian struggle in terms of social and economic gains, he refutes his position taken in previous sections which describe bureaucratic tyranny, class exploitation and dictatorial mismanagement. And Chamberlin in "The Russian Review", Autumn 1942, after describing the "very wide variations in salaries and wages", and the distribution of the "perquisites of office for the men of the ruling class, etc." presents the surprising conclusion that "old barriers of wealth, class and race have been swept away." Is it not fair to assume, then, that old barriers have merely been superseded by new ones, and that nothing new has been presented to explain why *Russians* fight? In other words, men in any country and under any political government will fight if they are personally involved. Chamberlin, however, offers other well-argued reasons to explain Russian resistance, such as nationalism, religion, etc., as well as the political-military factor of the collectivized economy's acting as a force in mobilization, discipline and com-

mon effort. It is Yugow who leans rather heavily upon the socio-economic gain theory. It is pertinent at this point to refer to the position of the Trotskyists (a variation of this theory), that the Russian masses are fighting against a possible restoration of private property relations characteristic of capitalist society, that they are struggling to defend Russian nationalized property. This the Trotskyists call the economic basis of a workers' state — inconsistently, however, since at the same time they admit that the Russian masses are denied the rights and privileges which derive from nationalized property.

If one accepts the Chamberlin-Yugow thesis, one subscribes to a rather gloomy and cynical view not only of Russians but of human nature in general: men can be galvanized into action for bread alone, since they are denied civil and individual liberty. They fought under the czar for a little bread, and they fight for Stalin apparently for the same reason, the only difference between the two being a quantitative one. According to this thesis, the older generation which remembers the period of the pre-Bolshevik Revolution should not fight at all, because such students of Russian history and economy as Mark Kninoy, Elias Tartak and Manya Gordon, maintain that in terms of pure economics the Russian masses were far better off under the czars than they are under the present regime.

Actually, no such interpretation of human nature is justified when one takes into account what is revealed as a new note in contemporary Russian literature. Vera Alexandrova, and Helen Iswolsky who have been studying Russian novels, plays and poetry, report a constant emphasis upon factors in no way related to those political, economic and industrial problems so dear to the hearts of pre-war Russian poets and dramatists. What is still more startling, moreover, is that the Party-man as protagonist is no longer the dominant figure in Russian plays. There is a note of constant reproach by the great mass of non-politicalized people, especially the peasantry who have been let down, neglected and betrayed by the urban intelligentsia, the bureaucrats, the "infallible" leaders, and all those who to them seem responsible for having brought such conditions upon the country. The ruling strata have become aware of those millions for whom they have had the utmost contempt, those same millions who are now fighting the invader. It is the height of political expediency, therefore, for the ruling strata not only publicly to recognize their benefactors, but to admit their own administrative derelictions.

What, then, instead of the usual political and industrial theme, is emphasized throughout Russian literature? Aside from the hostility, frustration and newly-recognized importance of the non-communist masses, there is a constant underlining of those aspects of human behavior which, for lack of a better term, may be called "spiritual." They are the expressions of human conduct which manifest themselves during periods of nation-wide catastrophe and common danger. They are ideas, feelings and activities

associated with such purely human experiences as fortitude, compassion, faith, self-preservation and kinship. Such are the themes of contemporary Russian literature. The conclusion, then, which seems to be clearly indicated is that contrary to those who explain Russian resistance in terms of social and economic gains, one must emphasize the qualities of the human spirit. Man does not live by bread alone, at least not in Russia. Here is a situation in which ironically *it is not the pre-war factors of the Russian regime which explain the élan of the masses, but the war itself which has released those powers*. One must keep this idea constantly in mind in evaluating the non-military factors adduced by such writers as Chamberlin, Hindus, Lerner and Fischer to explain Russian resistance.

After all, not very much light is being thrown upon the problem when we are informed that there has been a great development in nationalism or religion, for example, among the Russians. Such terms as nationalism and religion must be used within a specific historical framework. Nationalism today is different from that of the 18th and 19th centuries and must be defined differently in each country. Nationalism in Russia, in Italy, in Switzerland and in the United States are not comparable. Furthermore, each person of these countries understands the concept in terms of his own spontaneous and individualized experiences or in the degree to which he has been indoctrinated by his government. Once the premise of the *spiritual* factors is accepted, we begin to comprehend the distinctive quality of that type of nationalism which follows logically from it. It is a nationalism far removed from chauvinism, arrogance, pride or superiority; it is that close attachment which people feel for their homes, their land, and the thousand and one psychological associations clustering about their relatives, friends and fellow-countrymen. It is a nationalism which generates comradeship, solidarity and that self-sacrificing cooperation which explains the feverish productivity in factory and farm. Such manifestations of group behavior are not to be confused with the nationalistic propaganda developed by the Russian government consisting of chauvinistic proclamations celebrating czaristic generals and feudal tyrants.

Whether the Soviet government's motive was purely internal politics, in which case Stalin would be exploiting the mass spirit and catering to the conservative tendencies within the ruling strata, or whether the motive was international power politics, in which case Stalin would be reassuring his allies and placating those hostile forces within both England and the United States who might jeopardize his Lend-Lease material if Russian policies could in any way be construed as still having a threatening communist internationalism — in either case, it is a nationalism which bespeaks a government's attempt to cement cohesiveness, and it is not the spontaneous cooperation of endangered masses facing a relentless invader. According to William Henry Chamberlin, one of the most important reasons for the successful military resistance of the Russians is the scrapping of the "more utopian aspirations of the first period of the Bolshevik Revolution." The present

army, in other words, is nationalistic, not internationally-minded; and with this nationalism Chamberlin and others note certain concomitant features: rigid discipline, a sharp differentiation between officers and men, and a complete absence of class-war ideology. In thus divorcing the military factor from the economic, social and political forces affecting all phases of Russian life, he subscribes to an approach which is fruitless in a study of any country, especially Russia, where the relationships in the early years of the Revolution between the Red Army and the civilian masses were entirely different from those in any other country in the world. In essence he states that, given all those internal developments that have taken place since about 1928, we have the kind of army which one would expect, namely, a military expression of social and economic inequality, of bureaucratic privilege and political isolationism. Why, moreover, such an army should be superior to one defending the principles of equality, liberty and international fraternity is not explained. Surely Chamberlin cannot deny the formidable striking power of the Red Army between 1918-1921, nor would he dismiss lightly the tremendous potentialities which an actual revolutionary army would have today, possessed of the political weapons of international socialism.

The same sociological and political approach which we used to discuss the concept of nationalism is valid in analyzing the new wave of religious feeling among the Russians. Here, too, is a personal and social expression which may be a psychological escape, or an endless source of spiritual power in the face of human tragedy; but no matter how we define it, we must differentiate it from that kind of religious worship and organization which has existed since the Bolshevik Revolution under different conditions varying from governmental persecution and atheistic contempt to mild indifference. This has been religion on the defensive, and not that aggressive manifestation of the human spirit which writers on the Russian scene are describing today. Again, as in the case of mass nationalism, the government as an administrative gesture toward mass unity seems to be making very definite efforts to further this religious development. Other political motives would be: to influence religious opinion in the democracies, to counteract anti-communist sentiment throughout Catholic countries, and to supplement its other political and racial activities in connection with various Pan-Slavic movements throughout the Balkans.

Third, as to those who justify the famines, purges and mass decimation associated with the rapid tempo of industrialization and forced collectivization as unavoidable concomitants in establishing the country on a successful military basis, etc. In this group there are many people who only yesterday were in the forefront of prominent libertarian groups condemning the employment of "ruthless", "inhuman" and "tyrannical" means to attain "dubious" ends. Today the picture has changed. Strangely enough, the mere fact of the successful Russian resistance to the German onslaught has furnished sufficient reason for their change of mind. For example, Harry Elmer Barnes in an article, "Realism on Russia" ("The Progressive", Aug., 1943)