

it will become ever more evident that the force of industrial power transcends all political powers. The misuse of the new instruments for political purposes will finally become impossible.

For this reason, a political conception such as that of "turning the imperialist war into a civil war" has become outmoded.

The new slave state of the fascists no longer stands on a bourgeois level, but neither does it represent an advance. Every unrestricted push into the field of possible operations that arises from the further unfolding of industrialization goes beyond the traditional concept of the interrelatedness of economic and politics. Thus the war does not open up any political perspectives that are worth being pursued.

This war will not lead to a revolution; it is in itself one form of the "totalitarian revolution" now in progress. However, the present totalitarian unity of revolution, counter-revolution and war is not a revolutionary war in the traditional sense. The fascist attempt to liquidate the revolution is only a prelude to the liquidation of the state and thus of class society. To secure its rule for any length of time fascism would need to establish by war a totalitarian slave state embracing the whole world. But today we are far from a single world monopoly. There is little point in thinking about the consequences of the end of imperialist competition and its resulting dynamism, the "totalitarian world revolution." Imperialist competition and the struggle against it are the problems of today.

The totalitarian world system finds its pattern in the imperialist exploitation of colonies. But the present war does away with the traditionally accepted differences between colonial and independent industrial territories and with the consequent difference in status of their workers. The world fights today not for or against freedom but to settle the question of what proportional quota of lower and upper slaves, slave-drivers, and statesmen should fall to the various peoples in the coming monopolistic world system. As Churchill expressed it in December 1941: "An adequate organization should be set up to make sure that the pestilence can be controlled at its earliest beginnings."

In its ultimate results the slave state created by external war is not different from the state that grows out of civil war. In total war, war and civil war become a unity. The differences of origin disappear in the totalitarian terror.

In sum total, equality in the totalitarian system means the following:

- a) equality through state-controlled labor relations, e. g. end of professionalism, the introduction of forced labor, etc.
- b) equal pressure on everyone to belong to the same organizations
- c) standardization of consumption and way of life, e. g., the same radio

programs, newspapers, books, movies, etc., etc.

d) a relatively greater equality of opportunity

e) compulsory participation in certain public works, e. g., work service, harvest help, work in youth organizations, in the army, etc.

The inequality introduced by conquest pervades every phase of the trend towards equalitarianism. By enforcing a new form of the "international division of labor" the fascist state arrests and counteracts the processes that have a tendency to end the social division of labor.

There is a lot of talk about unity, but the speakers start from various and conflicting interests. It is characteristic of the race ideas of the Nazis, in the first place, that they propose to breed not one race, but more than one. We, however, take our departure from the unity of the material fields of operations provided by the complete industrialization of society, which is destructive of all class distinctions and of all political rule. We point to the variety of possibilities inherent in these material fields. One single plan controlling the many contradictory private interests is the goal of the monopolists. For that purpose they try to conserve the contradictions between private interests while in the meantime destroying step by step the social structure upon which such private interests are based. For the furtherance of the workers' homogeneous interests, which survive the destruction of private interests, not one but many plans are needed.

*Alpha*

## WHAT DESTROYED DEMOCRACY?

### AN ANALYSIS OF CAPITALIST TECHNOLOGY

The declaration of war in August, 1914, unquestionably marked the beginning of a severe crisis for the socialist movement which is still going on. It did not immediately become apparent that this crisis was anything more than a dispute about tactical problems or a different interpretation of the theory originally presented by Marx — that it might be, in fact, the consequence of an error in the theory itself.

Lenin always described himself as an orthodox Marxist in contrast to the militants of the Second International whom he called traitors. He always based himself on the works of Marx and Engels in his vigorous and bitter criticism of his opponents in the movement. And his program of the conquest of power was taken directly from the democratic theories of Marx.



The bolsheviks' conquest of power and their carrying out of their program should have marked, indeed, the end of the socialist crisis by demonstrating the soundness of their doctrines and of their critical attacks against reformism. Nothing of the kind happened, however. It is no exaggeration to maintain that on the contrary their coming to power only deepened the crisis of socialism.

Why? Because the bolsheviks did not exert power without having abandoned their original program. One need only compare Lenin's program on the eve of October, 1917, with what the Soviet state became after a few months' experience in order to see that the latter was almost the antithesis of the former. It is true that Lenin had always warned that it would not be possible to achieve socialism in Russia without the support of the Western European countries nor without victorious proletarian revolutions in the leading industrial countries. Yet neither the revolutionary defeats in other countries nor the more and more totalitarian orientation in socialist Russia can be explained by chance.

Certain events can help us clarify this subject a little. First there is the ultimate success of fascism, then of National Socialism, and the kind of irresistible development which dragged both the democratic and the non-democratic countries of Europe towards a more and more forcible tightening of the social disciplines and towards an exaggeration of the powers of the more and more powerful and totalitarian state.

Totalitarianism succeeded where socialism had failed. Where socialism had succeeded, it could maintain itself in power only by abandoning the democratic program in favor of dictatorial methods. There must be some simple element, some connection which explains this.

The general and complete defeat of the Marxist parties on the European continent is not explained, and cannot be explained, merely by tactical mistakes. There must have been a failure in adapting the doctrine.

And this ought not to surprise us. A few years hence, one hundred years will have elapsed since the appearance of the *Communist Manifesto* in which Marx and Engels exactly predicted the inevitable impasse toward which the contradictory development of capitalism was heading. And it was during the following two decades that the penetrating analyses of Marx's *Capital* were elaborated. In truth there is no other example in the social sciences of a deduction more completely confirmed by the test of a long period of time. In a time when things change from day to day with increasing rapidity, is it not extraordinary that we had to wait so long before the theory could be subjected to valid criticism even in a strictly limited sense?

When one examines reality today, which contrast appears most clearly between theory and facts?

The founder of scientific socialism disclosed, in the imperfections of the capitalist form of production, the elements of a socialist synthesis that would have been the dynamic inheritor of the material progress and intellectual culture which bourgeois society fostered and favored in the period of its vitality and development, but which it only thwarted in its senility. Thus it became necessary to establish, on the technical structure created and developed by capitalism, certain social relations which would be more equitable and better adapted to material progress and to transform political democracy to social democracy.

Today the liberal capitalism which was analyzed and condemned by Marx is unquestionably dead, but the new regime which succeeded it is not socialism. It is a state capitalism which can be described as a pluto-bureaucratic system.

This new regime appears, furthermore, as the normal outcome, the logical result of the, in a way, organic development of the capitalist mode of production.

One might object that this is indeed entirely natural and does not contain any contradiction to the Marxist doctrine since the capitalist relations of production have not been changed and the existing rule of property is still the rule of private property. But this would not be exact. For it is impossible not to see that the rule of property is modified slowly but surely in the modern state; the interests of private ownership give way more and more to the collective interests, but to those of the dominant social group, not to those of society as a whole.

Just as in feudal society military command and administration of justice were the natural functions of landed property, so in capitalist society the management and command of industry became the natural functions of capital. A century and a half ago the bourgeois was not merely the holder of a more or less voluminous heap of shares and titles. He was the proprietor and the head, in the full sense of the term, of an industry, a business, or whatever enterprise he himself managed. In the great majority of cases today the capitalist is content to be simply a *rentier*, without any real connection with production. The bourgeois capitalist has withdrawn himself from production and has become socially useless. He has yielded his place to the technician. Management has been separated from ownership. Property has ceased to be the dominant element in present-day production. The dominant social group is still largely composed of capitalists but more and more intermixed with technicians and production and state officials.

Nevertheless the social organization of today has a connection with that of yesterday, a potent connection — that of technics. Totalitarianism seems to be the logical consequence of the technics developed by liberal capitalism.



It is here that the contradiction with theory appears. The technics developed by capitalism were always considered by Marxism as a rational application of science. With due regard for the better use that could be made of them, and for the waste resulting from the anarchy of individual enterprise, technics were still assumed to be independent of the form of production. Marxism has always maintained that capitalist technics could be taken over and utilized by socialism.

Yet it seems to me that there is more than a coincidence between the technics of the great modern states and the totalitarian tendency of their political and social regimes. They seem to be connected by a relation of cause and effect.

Capitalist technics are not those technics commonly imagined which are supposed to have increased human forces tenfold, and which could, if utilized for a human and rational end, greatly diminish man's toil. They have of course allowed some great achievements, but only under certain conditions. Capitalist technics have been conceived and developed as a function of foreign markets to be exploited; they have been, in other words, an instrument created and developed for the needs of imperialism. And they have become an imperialist instrument which in its present form can no longer be used except for imperialistic purposes.

If one tries to discover the general characteristics of capitalist technics, one inevitably finds the tendency to develop more and more the quantity of the means of production, of machinery in relation to the number of people that use it; the tendency to concentrate more and more of this machinery in a decreasing number of bigger and bigger enterprises; and one finds, lastly, a tendency to increase unceasingly the speed of the circulation of products, to decrease the interval between the moment when the first elements of the article are put into production and the moment when it is finished and delivered to the consumer.

On the one hand, these technics were possible only through the existence of immense, foreign, non-capitalistic markets which could be exploited with complete security. On the other hand, the development of the productivity resulting from these technics has never reached the proportions dreamed of by many.

It is well-known that non-capitalist foreign markets have gradually faded away because the earth's surface is restricted and because the new countries conquered for the blessings of capitalist "civilization" have finally transformed themselves into competitors of the old capitalist countries. Thus it will not appear extraordinary to maintain here that technics ought to be seriously reconsidered if they are to be harmoniously adapted to the needs of existing markets which they will suit very poorly from now on.

It is not so well known, though, that modern production consumes much more labor than is generally believed. It has been proven that when enterprises had reached a certain size they no longer had the same proportional output that could previously have been legitimately expected, and that there resulted a kind of diminishing return. And similarly, an ever increasing speed has certain results very economical from the point of view of capital, which must circulate, but which, at the same time, costs more in expenditure of labor.

Nor is this all. In order to demonstrate the increase of the productivity of labor, the usual procedure is to compare, for two given periods, the relation between the quantity of workers employed and the quantity of commodities produced in any sort of enterprise. For example, one reads currently that a certain shoe-factory, which employed  $X$  quantity of workers for producing  $Y$  quantity of pairs of shoes twenty years ago, today employs the same quantity of workers for producing ten times as many shoes. Yet this form of comparison, often used in the propaganda of all parties of the extreme left, is completely devoid of scientific precision.

In order to arrive at a less inexact comparison it is necessary at least to take into account the length of the working day, the intensity of labor, and the quality of the product. If a person buys a pair of shoes for half the price of those he now wears, he will have effected a real economy only if those shoes are of the same quality and will stand the same amount of wear. If the quality is inferior, and the shoes stand only half of the amount of wear, the economy will be zero.

On the other hand, the comparison which takes account only of the shoe-factory — the last link in a long chain of enterprises providing for raw materials, supply of energy, manufacture of machine-tools, assembly of parts, and transportation — is an insufficient comparison.

The visible development of technics depended on the division of labor within the single factory and within society. Within the factory there has been a subdivision of productive activities into a "series" of functions, and, besides the working personnel, there has developed a staff of supervisors, controllers, engineers, accountants, office workers and shippers who are not generally included in the productive staff although their labor is nevertheless indispensable for modern production. A proportional part of the workers who were working in shops twenty years ago are now employed in the auxiliary workshops and offices of businesses. Within the social organism, the commercial functions have been separated from industrial functions, financial functions from commercial functions, the organization of transportation from the organization of commerce. A gigantic army of officials, salesmen, railway operators, commercial travellers and advertising agents, and so forth, has arisen under our eyes. Part of the workers who once worked in the shops are now employed in making machine-tools, producing electrical power, adding, subtracting or multiplying numbers, designing plans and



posters, selling in the stores, etc. The work of all those employees and officials is not accounted for in the work needed for production, though without them production could not have proceeded on the same scale.

Besides the particular equipment of the private factory there exists a whole collective machinery — production of energy, water supply, waste disposal, railroads and rolling stock, roads, bridges, canals, locks, ports and vessels, postal and telegraph services, docks and warehouses, etc., etc. — machinery quite as necessary for the birth of a pair of modern shoes as the hammer and pliers of the primitive cobbler. For the transformation of the humble workshop of the artisan or the manufactory into big automatic factories depended on the formation of markets of corresponding magnitude, and on adequate social services.

Another example could be found in the price-curve. Disregarding monopoly prices, every increase in the productivity of labor must be translated more or less rapidly into a decrease of prices. The enormous technical development of the last century should have resulted in a considerable decline in the general price index because competition has played its part and monopoly prices remained an exception. In fact, there has been a decline in the general price index for a century, but the index has fallen comparatively little, especially if one considers that the prices generally studied for comparisons of this kind are wholesale prices, on which the costs of renewing and further developing the collective machinery have little influence since a great part of the taxes are paid either directly by individuals or indirectly on retail prices.

Finally, if it were correct that the technics of machinery had extraordinarily developed the productivity of labor, the older capitalist European countries should long since have had an output which would have made it possible for them to produce more than they consumed, and to flood the world with their products without receiving goods in exchange. There has been nothing of the kind. The capitalist countries of Europe supplied the world markets with their finished goods but only to the extent that the world markets provided them with raw materials, food stuffs, and all kinds of consumer goods.

For the purpose of dispelling the myth of the high productivity of capitalism it would be sufficient to find an equality of exchanges between the old capitalist countries of Europe and the new countries of the world. Such equality would mean that the capitalist countries of Europe, whose living standards were not even those demanded by a minimum of humane consideration, produced no more than they consumed. But that equality did not exist. For a long time the imports of the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands were higher than their exports. That is, the national production of those countries was not sufficient for their consumption. They consumed more than they produced. If the standard of living, though too low, of these countries was still higher than that of the new countries

with the exception of the United States, it was not because of the high productivity of their technics, but because of their imperialist *rentes* which allowed them to import more and to exports less.

Capitalist technics are closely linked to foreign exploitation. Close the exploitable foreign markets and national technics will not be able to fulfill their economic functions on a national scale. Now it is understood that a socialist regime worthy of the name could not organize itself on an imperialist basis. Thus it would be obligatory to modify the technical structure of national production in order to direct it towards a strict economy of human labor and national resources,, foreign trade being restricted to providing exotic materials and such as are not included in the national production or that can actually be produced more economically abroad.

There is perhaps an even more cogent reason which might require a revision of technics in a socialist state. That is the disastrous consequence for culture in general of the social division of labor which has been developed by the technics of the capitalist mode of production. Throughout the age of manufacture, and for the whole period of modern industry, the capitalist mode of production has not ceased to generate and deepen a hierarchical division of functions and to separate manual from intellectual labor to the greatest detriment of both.

More and more the workers have been transformed into an army of manual laborers, without initiative and without thought, whose sole task has been to repeat incessantly a certain number of identical and automatic gestures. Thus they have lost all habit of thought and of a conscious and intelligently directed personal activity. From being manual laborers in the field of production, they have become manual laborers in the trade unions and political parties, as well as in civil life, waiting for slogans and directions from above, from their leaders who have become the technical experts of political action.

The managing and controlling personnel have gradually formed themselves into superior hierarchical ranks, detached from the capitalist proprietors, who are without any socially useful functions, but separated as well from common manual laborers. By their occupation with the tasks of organization and direction, the technicians have acquired a natural and functional tendency to regard the workers as mere hands whom it is possible and legitimate to manipulate and rationally utilize for the general interest with no other criterion than that of the efficiency of their labor. They suffer the distortion common to all those who hold a part of the power. They play with the human material in the same detached and inhuman manner in which the officer directs from his place of command the military operations on an extended front.

All kinds of functionaries participate in this mental attitude to the extent that they become conscious of their organizing and directing role



in the modern state and of the social superiority which their "intellectual" function gives them, superficial as it is.

And if the "hands" of production have become the hands of the trade unions and parties, the technicians of production have become at least candidates for the role of technicians of political life. At all events the essential change in the character of the dues-paying membership of trade unions and parties has placed their leading officials in the position of technical experts charged with the task of initiating and preparing their activities; and the personal interests and mental attitudes of these party and union officials tend to fuse with those of the technical experts of production.

Thus there appears in both the economic and political life of modern society an organic tendency to become a technocracy. A French sociologist, a member for a certain time of the Socialist party, described for the first time, with intelligence and precision, the corporative principle as a normal social form resulting from the social division of labor. It is particularly interesting to note in this context that Durkheim was a democrat writing in a period when there was not the remotest thought of fascism. Yet in his objective study of the technological bases of production he had arrived at the idea that the social forms best adapted to them would be those most strongly organizing their functions. He did not even mind the possibility that the distinction between intellectual and manual laborers might translate itself in the long run into some kind of a biological or racial distinction.

It must be mentioned here that the French sociologists have all been more or less influenced by A. Comte, who in his works recommended giving the direction of the state to the bankers and to the intellectuals representing the "spiritual" power. Comte himself was a follower of Saint-Simon and thus one of the socialist parties of France has always been impregnated with non-democratic doctrines of a corporative character.

Karl Marx was fully aware of the dangers of specialization and pointed them out several times. But they appeared to him to have a social rather than a technological origin. He carefully investigated the means of cancelling the effects of the separation of manual and intellectual labor, and particularly recommended a polytechnical education. However insufficient the device recommended by Marx may appear today, it serves to put into even greater relief the general indifference towards the whole problem since the death of Marx.

One must admit that the socialists or sociologists who have recommended the corporative principle, or recommend it today, are completely logical as soon as one accepts the technical organization which we inherited from liberal capitalism. In fact, one must be prepared either to accept this technical organization by developing, rationally, the social relations that it implies, or be willing to organize a real democracy by engaging in the technical revolution which it presupposes.

Democracy of course is not a monster exacting the sacrifice of progress. What is at stake here is, on the contrary, a revision of the ways and means of technics in order to eliminate from them everything that was done only in the interests of capitalism, not for the end of human progress, and to reorganize the methods of labor which will increase its output and diminish the strain and length of the working day.

The present crisis of the socialist movement arose from the cleavage between the democratic conception of social progress and the dictatorial practice pursued, willingly or not, by the various organizations of the workers.

The end of the second major imperialist war will probably offer new opportunities of struggle for the socialist movement of Europe. It depends on the conscious orientation of the militants whether the struggle results in new failures — least unfavorably in new types of "red" fascism — or in the establishment of a new, socially, and intellectually progressive democracy.

Julien Coffinet

## THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OF TOTALITARIANISM

Had one listened to them all, as the gravedigger observed of a field of battle, not one ought to have been dead.

Michelet

The following remarks are concerned less with the factual contents of the book in question\*) than with its contribution to the anti-totalitarian fight that lies ahead of the present generation. The descriptive part of the book contains first-rate information on almost every important aspect of National Socialism with the exception of the topics *culture and education, the agrarian market and the food estate, and war financing* (pp. 221, 349), which are specifically omitted. It is based almost exclusively on German sources; the annexed *Notes* contain more than nine hundred references to a slightly smaller number of distinct items. This feature alone should secure for Neumann's book an outstanding place in the current literature on totalitarianism.

### WHY BEHEMOTH?

It seems a bad omen that the author has chosen to name his book after one of the monsters of the Babylonian-Jewish eschatology. First of all, the

\*) Neumann, Franz. *Behemoth. The Structure and Practice of National Socialism*. Oxford University Press. New York, 1942 (XVII and 532 pp.; \$4.00)



*Behemoth* ruling the land is no greater a plague than the *Leviathan* ruling the sea, and the rule of both will remain unbroken until the day of judgment. In the second place, the title of the book does not suggest a scientific investigation of the essential characteristics of the so-called "new order" of totalitarianism. It rather leads us to expect a new contribution to that common run of anti-Nazi literature which paints pre-Nazi society all white and Nazism all black without even asking how far the victory of totalitarianism was prepared by trends and forces already operating within the preceding phases of capitalist, monopolist, and imperialist society. "To call the National Socialist system *The Behemoth*" means, in the author's own words, to describe it as "a rule of lawlessness and anarchy which has 'swallowed' the rights and dignity of man, and is out to transform the world into a chaos."

We shall see at a later stage that this is indeed the ultimate attitude of the author towards the subject of his study. Yet there is the redeeming feature that he does not thereby blind himself to the continuity of the trends prevailing in present Nazi society and its historical prelude, the so-called Weimar Democracy. In an introductory section he discusses the reasons for *The Collapse of the Weimar Republic*, and he returns to this topic in a number of subsequent chapters dealing with *Racism in (pre-Nazi) Germany, Democracy and Imperialism, The Political Status of Business in the Weimar Republic, The Bruening Dictatorship and the Cartel, The Failure of Democratic Planning, and The Working Class Under the Weimar Democracy*. In all these chapters, and in the discussion of many other specific questions throughout the book, he deals with a process which he quite aptly describes on one occasion as the growth of National Socialism "in the seed-bed" of the Weimar Republic (413).

The reader should be careful, however, not to be misled by such critical outbursts. They are counter-balanced by at least as many testimonies to the positive accomplishments of Weimar, and their real aim is not to refute but rather to restore, in a critically purified form, the violently shattered respectability of the designs and achievements of the Weimar politicians. We shall return to this point below. For the moment we are content with calling attention to the fact that the author is most prone to describe the Nazi system as "the system of the Weimar democracy, stream-lined and brought under authoritarian control" in those cases in which he claims for the Weimar regime a share of such outstanding performances of Nazism as its elaborate system of *social security* (431-32) and the success of its *war economy*. Thus we read on p. 351 the following amazing statement:

"The contribution of the National Socialist party to the success of the war economy is nil. It has not furnished any man of outstanding merit, nor has it contributed any single ideology or organizational idea that was not fully developed under the Weimar Republic."

As every one knows, one of the main causes of the victory of Hitler was the fact that the Weimar Republic was not able to guarantee the social

security of the laboring masses. It is equally well-known that whatever ideological contributions to the war economy may have been "fully developed under the Weimar Republic," its present success is due to that tremendous efficiency which it did not attain under the pre-Nazi regime, and not even during the first years of the Nazi regime itself.

How can we explain such surprising statements on the part of an undoubtedly well-informed writer? For an answer we must deal in greater detail with certain characteristics of the author's methodological approach and with the form in which his theoretical results are affected by his political outlook. By so doing we do not want to object, on principle, to the so-called intrusion of the partisan spirit into scientific investigations of this kind. In the present all-embracing conflict of irreconcilably opposed forces, the claim to complete detachment becomes a mere pretence. Under these conditions it appears as a sad commentary on the completeness of the defeat of the traditional socialist movement that for fully nine years after 1933 there has been no major attempt on behalf of the defeated party to re-open the apparently decided struggle in the field of theoretical thought. So far as Neumann's critical analysis of the totalitarian society represents an attempt at filling that deplorable gap in the current anti-totalitarian literature, we have no quarrel with his socialist bias. Though we do not agree with his particular point of view, we welcome the fact that the necessary task has been approached at last.

### THE LEGAL MIND

The first remark to be made with respect to the methods applied in the book is that the author, unfortunately, is possessed to an extraordinary degree by what is commonly described as the legal mind. In this sense his critical attack on Nazism reminds one strongly of those two Manifestos by which in 1850, in the words of Marx, "the two defeated factions of the Montagne, the Social Democrats and the Democratic Socialists, endeavored to prove that even though power and success had never been on their side, they themselves had forever been on the side of the eternal right and of all other truths". The only difference is that according to the changed spirit of the time the primary concern of the author is no longer the principle of eternal justice but that of positive law. He complains that "the position of the *party* within the Nazi state cannot be defined in terms of our (!) traditional constitutional jurisprudence" (74) and that "no one knows whence the constitutional rights of the *leader* are derived" (84). He contends repeatedly that "National Socialism is incompatible with any *rational political philosophy*" (463). It lacks not only a "rational political theory" but even "*an anti-rational one*", and this for the simple reason that "*a political theory cannot be non-rational*" (464). He likewise denies "the existence of *law* in the fascist state" because, as he says, "law is conceivable only if it is manifest in general law, but true generality is not possible in



a society that cannot dispense with power" (451). Last but not least Nazism's political system is not a *state* (467) and "it is doubtful whether National Socialism possesses a *unified coercive machinery*" (468).

"The very term '*state capitalism*' is a *contradictio in adjecto*", and "the concept of state capitalism cannot bear analysis from the economic point of view" (224). Assuming that in spite of all such legal deficiencies Germany should be victorious in the present war, how will it be possible, he asks, for a future German government "to *justify* her influence in Middle Europe" (182)?

For further illustrations of the peculiar reasoning of the legal mind we refer to Neumann's juristic proof of the continued existence of "*free labor*" in Nazi Germany after the complete destruction of the right of both individual and collective bargaining (337-340), and to the beautiful conclusion that the "individual measure" replacing the rule of "general law" in the period of monopoly capitalism though it destroys the only conceivable form of existence of "law" (451), yet at the same time does not destroy "*the principle of equality before the law*" because "the legislator is faced with an individual situation". (445) (Reviewer's emphasis).

## IDEOLOGY VERSUS HISTORY

Fully one third of the book (pp. 37-218) is devoted to an analysis of the legal and political ideologies of the Nazi movement. It is extremely difficult to understand the purpose of this ideological analysis for the author's theory. It would seem that the real subject matter is sufficiently covered by the second part of the book, which deals with the "new economy" and the "new society". Every possible aspect of the Nazi system, including its legal and political structure, is fully discussed in this latter part of his analysis. The only form in which an independent study of the ideological slogans, which in his language constitute the "Political Pattern of National Socialism", might add to the interest of the book would be by a historical analysis of the growth and functions of their various elements. This seems to have been, indeed, part of the author's intention. He takes his departure from a fairly convincing description of the various phases of the historical process by which the ambiguous (half-democratic, half-"collectivist") principles of the Weimar Republic were replaced by a series of new principles in turn predominant in the successive phases of the Nazi state. He shows the interesting interplay by which each phase of Nazi ideology, as soon as it had fully served its purpose, was replaced by an entirely different ideology. Thus the ideology of the "totalitarian state" was thrown overboard in 1934 to make way for the new ideology of the "movement state". In a similar way the "racial theory" which had justified the "liberation" of Germans from foreign sovereignty and the incorporation of European territories largely inhabited by Germans was forthwith rejected, and replaced by the new ideologies of "living space", "geopolitics" and "the

racial empire", when changed conditions required the conquest of such unquestionably non-German territories as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia.

Yet only a small portion of the author's discussion of the "Political Pattern" of Nazism is presented in that genuinely historical manner. Although the author himself affirms that all we can learn from the mutually contradictory and rapidly changing ideologies of Nazism is that they are all equally irrelevant, he goes on to regard them as "the best clue to its ultimate aims" (37), and to base his own analysis of the Political Pattern of National Socialism on various elements of its ideology. Just as Proudhon once described his pseudo-Hegelian method as a procedure by which "history is told not in the sequence of time but in the sequence of ideas", so Neumann announces that the categories which he proposes to develop in his study on Nazi ideology "do not necessarily correspond to definite stages in the growth of National Socialist ideology, although some of them coincide" (38). Thus he loses himself, and bewilders his readers, in a lengthy discussion of logically and factually meaningless ideas, and it happens quite often that in this process he himself inadvertently falls for an outright fascist idea.

## THE NATIVE RETURNS

The true meaning of the Behemoth-theory becomes clear in the Second and Third Parts of the book where the author lays bare the operation of the material and social forces that in his view determine the structure and development of the Nazi society. It is here that we are met by what at first seems to be an inexplicable contradiction.

In dealing with the "new economy" of National Socialism the author reveals himself as a staunch supporter of the unadulterated capitalist character of Nazi society. He wages a fierce war against all those theorists who before and after the victory of Nazism in Germany described the "new" totalitarian system as a system of brown bolshevism, of state capitalism, of bureaucratic collectivism, as the rule of the "managers", in short, as "an economy without economics" (222). In his resolute defense of the capitalist character of fascism he does not even spare the arch-prophet of the whole heresy, the foremost economic theorist of the Social Democratic party, Rudolf Hilferding (223). Neumann shows that in spite of the transition from free competition to monopolistic rule and an increasing interference of the state, the present German economy has retained the essential features of a genuine capitalist economy. It is based, now as before, on private ownership in the means of production guaranteed by the state, the only difference being that this auxiliary guarantee of private property is no longer the contract but the administrative act of the government (260). Though it has adopted the new features of a "monopolistic economy" and, in part, of a "command economy", the German economy of today has remain-



ed a capitalist economy. "It is a private capitalist economy, regimented by the totalitarian state" (261).

Despite the increased importance of the totalitarian state power it is still the profit motive that holds the machinery together. The only distinctive feature of the present setup is that in a completely monopolistic system profits can no longer be made and retained without the totalitarian power. "If totalitarian political power had not abolished freedom of contract, the cartel system would have broken down. If the labor market were not controlled by authoritarian means, the monopolistic system would be endangered; if raw material, supply, price control, and rationalization agencies, if credit and exchange-control offices were in the hands of forces hostile to monopolies, the profit system would break down. The system has become so fully monopolized that it must by nature be hypersensitive to cyclical changes, and such disturbances must be avoided. To achieve that, the monopoly of political power over money, credit, labor, and prices is necessary" (354).

An entirely different view is held by the author with respect to the corresponding developments in the political and social structure of the Nazi state. One would expect that the state, which was an indispensable implement of the society of free (capitalist) producers even in its early beginning, would become an even more important instrument of the ruling class at the time of its full development. In a sense this is what the author said himself when he pointed to the increasing dependence of the monopolistic machinery of present-day capitalism on political power. Yet he adds that the particular usefulness of the Nazi state for the aims of the present monopolistic system is derived from the fact that this state is no longer a state in the traditional sense of the term but is rather a state in dissolution. The astounding achievements of the new German economy — the abolition of unemployment, the increase in production, the development of synthetic industries, the complete subordination of economics to the needs of war, the rationing system before and during this war, the success of price control — all these universally acclaimed achievements of the Nazi economy were realized at the very time, when according to Neumann's paradoxical theory, the German state no longer possessed the essential characteristics of a state, and its formerly united ruling class had dissolved into a number of independent "ruling classes" composed of the leading strata of the party, the army, the bureaucracy, and industry.

A partial explanation can be found in the fact that the author is not prepared to accept the Marxian concept of the state for that form of government which preceded the present Nazi state. In his view the aims of monopoly capitalism were not aided and abetted by the bureaucracy of the Weimar Republic. They were rather controlled and restrained by the alleged tendency of every public bureaucracy "to serve the general welfare" (79) and, more particularly, by the forces of political democracy that were represented by the Social Democratic party and the trade unions (260). "The complete subjug-

ation of the state by the industrial rulers could only be carried out in a political organization in which there was no control from below, which lacked autonomous mass organizations and freedom of criticism" (261).

This theoretical attitude of the author has a most important practical implication. If the main cause of the present unsatisfactory state of affairs is the collapse of that system of checks and balances by which the wild and insatiable forces of monopoly capitalism were controlled and restrained at the time when there was still a real "state", the first thing that is required after victory to destroy the scourge of Nazism is to restore the genuine political democracy of the Weimar Republic. Yet under the changed conditions of the present time this alone is not sufficient. "That much the Marxist and National Socialist criticism of liberalism and democracy have indeed accomplished", says the author on p. 475 in an unexpected last-minute tribute to his two chief antagonists:— "Political democracy alone will not be accepted by the German people".

K. K.

## THE MARXIAN DIALECTIC AND ITS RECENT CRITICS

### INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the European labor movement, the war, and the growth of fascism all over the world reduced the "market value" of Marxian theory almost to zero. Anti-Marxism, however, is still in vogue. In "democratic nations" it has been extended from the "right" to the "left". Some of the new critics oppose the "old" Marxism only in certain details, such as the estimation of class forces, the elasticity of capitalism, and a number of organizational and tactical problems. Others agree with the fascists that Marxism, being a by-product of *laissez-faire* capitalism, necessarily disappears with the latter. Though some of these critics stress the economic-political, and others the philosophical, aspects of Marxian theory, all agree that Marxism is both a false and an outdated doctrine.

Because Marxists regard the dialectical theory as the consciousness of a practice that is to change the world, their critics feel that if the dialectical theory is destroyed, all other elements of Marxism are likewise demolished. Thus, whenever the economic and political ideas of Marx have been assaulted, his dialectical materialism has also been attacked. For instance, when the *Revisionists* of the old socialist movement turned against Marx because the "real" development of capitalism seemed to contradict the Marxian theories, they also turned away from dialectical materialism to naturalistic and idealistic philosophies. The new anti-Marxian literature, too, is deeply saturated with both disappointment and malicious joy. More than all the