

sion, largely copied from the Russian, they must have known how slim the chances were. To destroy the ruling group in Russia, the army must first be destroyed. To revive nationalism in the Ukraine, the Ukraine must first be "liberated". Today it is more difficult to revive nationalism than it has previously been to suppress it.

Because of its friendly relations with the Red Army, the German *Reichswehr* was certainly well informed about Russia's military position. Even during the last war Russia's army commanded great respect. It is held by a number of historians that Germany lost the war only because of her preoccupation with the Eastern Front. Why then in face of all this did the Nazis risk the war? Hitler himself enumerates the following reasons:

1) *An Anglo-Russian bloc was in the making. Sir Stafford Cripps was trying, and seemingly successfully, to turn Stalin against Germany. The ambiguity of Stalin's policy came to light in Russia's attitude towards the anti-German government in Yugoslavia. The Balkan war was instigated by both England and Russia.*

2) *The price Russia demanded for her collaboration with Germany was too high and ever-increasing. She took more than had been arranged for in Poland, Finland, Rumania and the Baltic. Stalin's appetite, as demonstrated by Molotov during his Berlin visit, was insatiable.*

3) *Russia increased her army at her Western front continuously, thus forcing Germany to do likewise, which greatly hampered all other German operations and endangered Germany herself.*

Hitler did not deny, however, that for him the pact with Russia was from its very inception only a momentary expediency to destroy England's policy of encirclement. "I considered myself entitled", he said, to "set the strongest power in the East, by especially solemn declarations, at rest concerning the limits of our interests." There is no need for disputing Hitler's arguments. Russia certainly did everything he blames her for and possibly more that he does not know about. Here Stalin acted in exactly the same manner that Hitler himself did. For Stalin, too, the pact was merely a momentary expediency to be broken at any opportune moment. If Hitler tried to come to an understanding with Britain, why should Stalin not try to do likewise? As far as "appetites" are concerned, it is doubtful that the "limits of interests" of which Hitler spoke to Stalin included most of the Balkan down to the Dardanelles. The Bukovina which Stalin took in addition to Bessarabia was rather small compensation for Hitler's Balkan "interests". And if Stalin took some important parts of Finland, he thereby only enabled Hitler to take entirely without cost the rest of Finland. The Red Army assembled for the same reason on Russia's Western borders that Hitler's divisions stood ready on Germany's Eastern front. What Hitler says against Russia is exactly the same thing that Stalin can say against Germany. Both are speaking the truth. Capitalist nations are never lying when they proclaim their enmities. They are always lying when they speak of eternal friendships and inviolable trust.

However, it was Germany that broke the treaty first. The non-aggression pact had served its purpose. It had served its purpose earlier for Hitler than for Stalin. The question may arise: could Stalin have not known that, pact or no pact, sooner or later the Nazis would fight Russia? Of course he knew of that possibility. But such arguments are beside the point. Stalin said that

*"by concluding a non-aggression pact with Germany we secured for our own country peace for a year and a half and the opportunity of preparing its forces to repulse Fascist Germany should she risk an attack on our country despite the pact."*

Thus he admits as openly as Hitler that the pact was made to better prepare for the possible war with Germany, in case Hitler should change his mind. But Stalin's mind, too, is not fixed; it might also have changed. All the bolshevik "treachery" of which Hitler speaks, may also be interpreted as just so many steps to safeguard Russia against the day when Hitler should re-discover his "civilizing" mission. All the "treachery" of which Stalin may accuse Hitler can also be interpreted as so many German steps to insure themselves against the "resumption of the bolshevik world-revolution", that is, against Russian imperialism. In the capitalist society any preparation for security is a preparation for war. Security and aggression are only two words for the same thing.

It was clear after Munich that war was inevitable. The great question was only where and when it would start. That it would involve all nations was also clear. Not so clear, however, were the combinations of the opposing power blocs. There was the danger that England and France, out of the same considerations that forced Stalin into his non-aggression pact with Hitler, would make some sort of agreement with Germany that would start the war in the East instead of in the West. There was the danger that France and England would allow Hitler — for the time being — to march into the Ukraine; there was the greater danger that Hitler would march without their consent. Would the Allies really storm the *Siegfried* Line just to stop Hitler's march into Russia? And if they should try "to hang their washing" there would they succeed? Would Japan not take advantage of such a situation and attack in the East to get in Siberia what she failed to get in China? In that case would America really start a war against Japan? Would she not prefer instead to let Japan increase her strength at the expense of Russia and thus leave the "Open Door" in Asia open for the entry of American imperialism? Would England not wait to attack Germany until Russia was sufficiently weakened, in order to kill two birds with one stone? These dangers were not merely speculative. For had not Russia been excluded from Munich? Did not the policy of "collective security" fail to win the ears of the bourgeois diplomats? In the face of all these dangers what would be better than to turn the whole situation around? Peace with Germany would start the war in the West. It would put Russia in the position that England apparently tried to occupy. And then, doubtful as it was that the British would take the *Siegfried* Line,

just as problematic was German success against the Maginot Line. Japan would not dare to attack Russia at peace on her Western front. She would involve herself further in China thus bringing on a crisis with the United States. If America entered the war, there would still be time to change to the side of the Allies. Then Germany as well as Japan could be attacked. With America's help victory might be assured in the Far East, and in the West with the help of France and England. Out of the second world war Russia might emerge if not strengthened, at least not weakened. She would have been able to hold her own.

It is hard to see how Stalin could have chosen any other course than he did. Even if the worst should happen, that is, a quick German victory over England which might prevent America from entering the war, there was still reason to believe that Germany would be quite busy for years to come organizing the new Europe and preparing the next war against the United States. Of course in that case, peace with Germany would have been an expensive proposition. Russian concessions to Germany would have been enormous, but if freely given, might have prevented a German attack. Germany would once more have been the mediator between Russia and the rest of the world and would have preferred peace for precisely this reason — that her new position would bring her greater profits than a devastating war. All this, to be sure, in order to become reality, presupposed a peace between German Europe and the rest of the world. But with such a peace, Russia's independence would not necessarily be threatened and hence Stalin's regime not necessarily endangered. Risky as such a situation would be, it would still be a lesser risk than a war with Germany under conditions as they existed in the fall of 1939.

Unfortunately for Stalin and Russia, there was neither a quick German victory over England, nor a quick entrance into the war in an effective way on the part of the United States. The unexpected results of the German *Blitzkrieg* on the one hand, and the German weakness in her dealings with England on the other, overthrew all political perspectives that could have been considered before the onset of the war. Russia, instead of being secure in the East and in the West, was now exposed on both sides as never before. However, Hitler might not have attacked Russia if he had been able to come to terms with England and thus, for the time being, with America. He would probably have waited at least another year to reorganize the Continent for the purpose of another and greater offensive. Thus Rudolph Hess flew to England to offer peace not, as is generally assumed, by telling Churchill that Germany would attack Russia instead of taking more from England, but to tell him that Germany would not attack anywhere, that the European Continent which she now possessed was about the "limit of her interests". Those proposals were made much earlier, immediately after the Balkan campaign, but Hess's arrival in England was to indicate that Hitler was really serious and willing to stick to his proposals.

Because of the fact that an understanding had already been reached between America and England to continue the war under any circumstances, Churchill could "prophetically" announce that Hitler's next victim would be Russia. He could "quickly", a few hours after the entry of German troops in Russia, outline a "new policy" that proved his "genius" able to make proper decisions in the twinkling of an eye. And thus it appeared that Roosevelt adopted Churchill's attitude towards the new situation, when in reality Churchill merely followed out the orders of his master's voice.

The Russian-German war is first of all America's product. It was Roosevelt who turned out to be the true leader of the "Communists"; who made them, as R. M. Yoder has said, "go to bed convinced that no aid should be granted imperialistic England only to wake up singing 'God Save the King'." And it only speaks for the fairness of Roosevelt when he now, although belatedly, discovers that the Russian *Constitution* really corresponds to the *Four Freedoms* for which American democracy is fighting. And as behooves the proper wife, Mrs. Roosevelt, in her column "My Day", speaking of E. Lyons's book, "The Red Decade", that exposes the ways and means of Bolshevism in the U.S., describes the red-baiting attitude of its author as thoroughly un-American, for America has always stood in favor of social changes. The "Waves of the Future" now shine in so many colors that one can easily forget to swim.

Rudolf Hess could not have gone to Churchill with a Hitler proposal that the Nazis would turn against Russia instead of continuing their fight against England, for the march into Russia, on the basis of the newly created European situation, would be no more and no less than the continuation of the war against England and America. The invasion of Russia is an attempt to make impossible once and for all a final German defeat. It puts England in greater danger than she has hitherto faced. It is a more forceful attempt by the Nazis to tear Britain away from the United States, to make her accept the Nazi rule in Europe. Through Russia, Iran and Iraq can be reached, Turkey can be brought into the German fold without a fight, the Near East can be brought under German control with minimum effort and the way to India can be opened.

The conquest of England would be just as costly to Hitler, if not more costly, than the Russian invasion. The conquest of England would have been a barren one. Not so success in Russia, for this would enable the Germans to begin seriously breaking up the Empire without exposing herself too much anywhere on the Continent. The conquest of the Caucasus, Iran, and Iraq, would immediately yield all the oil that Germany could ever use. It would minimize to a greater extent the effect of the Anglo-American blockade against Europe. And most important of all, the fiction of an independent England would be maintained.

The breaking up of the Empire, the conquest of Egypt and India, could take place in a manner less costly to the capitalist society as a whole.

Rulers would change, not the rule of the "master race" itself. The chaos to be expected in the wake of Britain's collapse could be prevented. America would now be hampered in the fulfillment of her imperialistic desires precisely by reason of being Britain's ally. She would, in turn, prevent all other nations from taking from the Empire while the taking was good. The only nation really able to profit by the maintenance of Britain's fictitious existence would be Germany. The breaking up of the Empire would prove to the British that they were unwise when they chose Roosevelt instead of Hitler. Political changes could be expected in England, changes that might throw Britain into Hitler's lap without any effort on his part. Or rather, the effort exerted in the conquest of England but expended in the Near East and Russia instead would now have yielded not only England, but Russia and the Near East, too. And if even now the British should not come to terms, the final invasion of England, if unavoidable, could now be made with much greater guarantee of success. This general perspective is much more reasonable, however risky, than the mere satisfaction of the emotional desire of subduing Britain physically and at once.

How well the United States was aware of this line of reasoning that prevailed among the Nazis came to light in Roosevelt's opening of the Red Sea for American shipping, in the great and ever-increasing amount of war materials sent to the Near East, in the training of American soldiers in desert-fighting, and last but not least in the "Retreat" that the American ambassador Stinehardt purchased for himself and his staff outside of Moscow, safeguarded against air attacks and equipped with everything for a long siege, months before the German invasion of Russia started.

This German strategy, furthermore, made it conceivable that in the Far East, Japan, lured by the Siberian prospects, might be induced to turn away from her expansionist policy directed southward. America might thus remain unchallenged in the Pacific and be more inclined to reconsider the Nazis "share-the-world-plan". If America would sacrifice England, Germany would sacrifice Japan. German propagandists were the most successful in re-awakening the world to the new "Yellow Peril". The relations between Japan and Germany cooled of at that moment when her relations with America seemed to have reached the breaking point. Once more both America and Japan felt their difficulties might be solved without going to war. The occupation of Indo-China was a precautionary move, as was the new China offensive, and before that the non-aggression pact between Moscow and Tokio. Whatever Japan may do, however, in the final analysis her destiny is determined by the outcome of the war between German Europe and America. Japan will have to go as the wind blows.

To prevent a German attack on Russia, there was just one policy for Stalin to follow, and that was to strengthen Germany in the eyes of England and America. Thus the ridiculous pro-German propaganda of the "Communists", and the fight to keep America out of the war. It is quite amusing to compare the Bolshevik utterances in regard to the war and to Germany before the Nazi invasion of Russia and afterwards. This

is just as amusing as comparing Roosevelt's attitude towards Finland's fight against Russia unsupported by the Nazis and against the same Finnish fight against Russia with the support of the Nazis; just as funny as Churchill's accepting Roosevelt's *Four Freedoms* that guarantee national self-determination, and at the same time imprisoning 7000 people of India for expressing agreement with the *Four Freedoms*; just as funny as the American isolationists' desire both to protect Britain and to keep out of the war, for the first necessitates the reverse of the second; and finally just as funny as Hitler's latest aspiration to bring socialism to Russia — real socialism, not the fake socialism of the Bolsheviks.

However, behind all these cheap propagandistic reversals are very important strategical maneuverings. As long as Germany appeared strong, and as long as she appeared secure on the basis of the non-aggression pact with Russia and in the face of her military successes, there was a chance that England might come to terms with Hitler in recognition of the hopelessness of her situation. Thus the war might have been terminated. This is why Sir Stafford Cripps never came to see Stalin until it was too late. Molotov bluntly refused to receive the British delegate, "for political reasons", as he said. Only an Anglo-German agreement could prevent the war that Russia feared, never an Anglo-Russian agreement. Thus Russia maintained, literally to the last moment, that a German-Russian war was simply inconceivable. Russian appeasement of Germany became frantic. After the Balkan campaign, and the final recognition that for the time being Germany could not be stopped in Europe, Stalin did everything in his power to show his friendly feeling towards Nazi Germany. He refused to recognize any longer the national existence of Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Yugoslavia, but he did recognize the anti-British government of Rashid Ali in Iraq. In addition, deliveries to Germany increased enormously. But there were no further German demands on Russia. Probably all of them would have been fulfilled. There was no German ultimatum as has been alleged. There was only Rudolf Hess and his mission, and that failed. Roosevelt's answer had been given in unmistakable terms: the Atlantic patrol and the occupation of Iceland.

Hess's peace offer undoubtedly contained a guarantee of the integrity of the British Empire and her fleet. Any other proposal would have been simply idiotic, but whatever the German policy is, it is not idiotic. A peace that merely maintains the British Empire can mean nothing to America and nothing to an English ruling class that still believes in a chance to win the war despite all previous reversals. America does not defend Britain as such, but she defends Britain solely to prevent the unification of Europe under German dominance. The "defense of Britain" is only incidental. Hess brought no bargain for America, not even for an England assured of America's help "to the end", for the very existence of a German Europe means the slow but certain destruction of British world rule. It means the possible degrading of the United States from the first to the

second world power. However, as the *United States News* (7/18, 41) wrote:

*"It is necessary for an understanding of President Roosevelt's strategy to understand the stake of his struggle as he sees it. That stake, essentially, is to decide who is to be the boss of the world in the future — Germany and her satellites, or the United States and her friends".*

Roosevelt's strategy brought the Nazis into Russia. After the Balkan campaign, Molotov could only believe more firmly in his earlier lie "that a strong Germany is an indispensable condition for durable peace in Europe", for now that the hypocritical wish had become a painful reality, the world simply had to be convinced of Germany's invincibility and peaceful inclinations. But the American imperialists refused to accept Stalin's point of view just to keep the Nazis out of Russia. Churchill, who knows America's responsibility only too well, advised his new friend Stalin in a letter (7/26, 41) to direct his requests for help to America rather than to Britain, for "the extent and character of the aid Britain gives to Russia depends to a considerable degree upon the assistance Britain receives from the United States."

The fact that the German-Russian war is first of all a war between Germany and the United States, explains, in part, the course of the war itself. England was not going to make her own position still more difficult by risking an invasion in the West to help Russian defense. America was not ready to participate in such an adventure. But without an A. E. F. there would be no B.E.F. What if a new B.E.F. should again be defeated? It might well mean the end of the Churchill government and a return of the "appeasers". Why should Churchill risk what Hitler did not dare? A possible failure might not only overthrow the Churchill cabinet, but weaken England in every other respect too. Her chance of getting better terms from Hitler, if coming to terms with Hitler should prove unavoidable, would be lessened. Her dependence upon America would become still greater and thus also the losses implied in the alliance with the United States. The only sound policy for Britain to follow is to keep her own forces intact, to avoid losses wherever possible, and to keep her bargaining power strong in regard to both Germany and the United States. After all, America might lose the war without losing anything, but England will lose even in victory. The weaker she finds herself on the day of peace, the more she will have to lose. The war can only be won — this much seems clear — with an all-out effort on the part of the United States. Unless such an effort is made, only an act of despair could make England send troops to France and Spain to open up a Western front.

The Russian war was of course highly desirable. It might weaken Germany sufficiently to make her propose a peace that would give better guarantees for the continuation of British rule than anything hitherto suggested. It might keep her occupied long enough to drain her resources sufficiently to assure success to a final Anglo-American invasion of the Con-

tinents. A successful invasion necessitates enormous forces and endangers the fleet, so vulnerable to air attacks and so necessary to invasion. But only joint-activity, joint-responsibility with America could induce England to risk that much. America, however, was not ready and Hitler did not wait.

It is nonsense to believe that the Allies refused effective aid to Russia merely to satisfy the desire of some reactionaries to see the two totalitarian nations tear each other to pieces. No two nations would destroy each other just to please the rest of the world. To refuse aid to Russia is to help Hitler to victory, but it is Germany, not Russia, that threatens the interests of Anglo-American capitalism. A war of mutual exhaustion might have been conceivable under conditions as they existed prior to 1939. But now, with all the European resources in German hands, it even became questionable that the Russian would hold out for very long. It is true that the industrial superiority of Western Europe does not exclude military failures. There are "accidents" in history; there have been "miracles". Yet no sane person would base his policy on the expectation of new miracles. If aid to Russia was slight, it was probably for no other reason than the simple one that the Allies found no way to make it more effective.

It is also wrong to assume that little aid only was forthcoming because of the fear that a Russian victory might in the end turn out to be just as bad as a German victory. There is no basis for such reasoning. In relation to Europe Russia occupies about the same position that China does to Asia. It is not enormous China that represents the "Yellow Peril", but Japan. In Europe it is not Russia but Germany that threatens to dominate. Like the danger of China, so the danger of Russia is of the future, a future that may never arise if the present German-Japanese threat is removed. Through force of circumstances, and not because of the absence of imperialistic inclinations, has Russian imperialism thus far been largely a failure. Her attempts in China yielded small results; her gains in Europe have been presents from the hands of Hitler,— who turned out to be an "Indian giver". Whatever the course of the war, Russia will emerge from it weaker than she entered. In the event of final victory for the Allies, her decimated army will meet millions of fresh American and English troops on German and Asiatic soil. There will be no Russian expansion either to the East or to the West. Because Russia had to play a major part in the war, she will be forced to play a minor one at the peace conferences. The head of the American mission to Moscow, W. A. Harriman, was certainly right when he said (10/10, 41):

*"that AFTER THE WAR we will find Russia much more interested in nationalism than internationalism, and a nationalist Russia is a Russia we can well become intimate with."*

The Allies recognized quite early how little help they were able to give. British and American observers looked upon Russia as a hopeless case not only from the beginning of the present war, but even prior to

the outbreak of German-Russian hostilities. Although the war started at the end of June, the London *Economist*, for example, was already convinced at the end of May "that Hitler will soon control the raw material resources of Russia". On July 11th, 1941, American newspapers reported "form unimpeachable British sources, that the Churchill war cabinet is convinced that the Red Army must win now or be lost for good."

If the British overestimated Russia's strength and underestimated that of Germany prior to the war, they were inclined to think differently after the Fall of France and the Balkan campaign. However, Russian resistance caused them to change their minds once more. To keep Russia going, they were now willing to do anything, which was not much. After three months of fighting, the Nazis had captured or inactivated about 50 per cent of Russia's industrial capacity and weakened the Red Army almost beyond repair. Unless the trend of events unexpectedly turns again, it is difficult to believe that the Russians will be able to keep on fighting much longer. It is not German but Russian industry that is a shambles. The prolongation of the war will thus progressively favor the Nazis. The road of supplies from abroad is largely closed, and what is still open is of little importance. The Russian winter, on which great hopes are staked, cannot alter anything on its own account. Even the old army of the Kaiser was able to withstand three Russian winters in succession. As things stand at this writing, it seems almost certain that the Allies are in the process of loosing the third phase of the world war — the one now fought in Russia.

We shall not be disappointed if further developments should prove this assumption wrong. We do not profess to know the actual strength of either the Russian or the German army. We do not know what reserves exist. We know as little as anybody else what will happen next on the Russian front. All that we know is what everyone can see: the fact of German success and the admittedly dangerous position in which the Russians find themselves. On the basis of these facts, it seems more reasonable to expect a Russian defeat — or at best another temporary stalemate — than the collapse of the German war machine.

The very reluctance on the part of the British to open up a Western front, the very reluctance of Roosevelt to declare war on Germany, seems to indicate the present hopelessness of the Russian situation. If it is true, as General Wavell said, that "the Germans must be beaten on their own soil, exactly the way Napoleon was beaten," the proper time for an invasion would have been during the height of the German-Russian war. Of course General Wavell also pointed out that for such purposes "we certainly need American manpower, just as we did in the last war"; yet, if the Russians had any chance of winning, it would be incomprehensible that merely the unpreparedness of America should have delayed an invasion. If Russia represented a real danger to Germany, it should not have been too difficult to make the Western attack with the help of the combined Anglo-Am-

erican fleet. After all there are millions of English soldiers at hand, enormous quantities of war materials accumulated, and there are enough American troops to initiate a new A. E. F.

The hesitance of the Allies to risk an invasion may be explained by their fear that such a contingency would possibly lead to a Hitler peace offer which the Russians might accept. The surest way to keep the Russian fighting was not to attack in the West. There will not arise the question of a new Hitler-Stalin pact as long as Hitler can be reasonably sure that he can force a military decision and thus settle the Russian question "once and for all". Without a Western invasion, Stalin must keep on fighting to the last, in the hope of making the Germans realize that they would be far better off to accept a new truce instead of seeing the war to the end. What would really happen, however, depend upon events on the battlefields. And there the Nazis were once more victorious.

But even now, with the Germans hammering against Moscow, one still can not be too sure of what will happen next. There exist a number of possibilities, any of which may be realized. It is not impossible that the Stalin regime will be able to maintain itself even after the fall of Moscow. But its collapse and the installation of a new regime willing to come to terms with Hitler are also possible. It is also not impossible that Stalin himself, in order to save his own regime, will conclude a separate peace. Yet whatever may occur, it will not count for very much. Even if parts of the Red Army should succeed in withdrawing to the East; even if war materials should reach Russia; even if there is a chance of re-organizing the Russian forces for a new Spring offensive — all these possibilities do not effect the immediate realities of this war. The "final" victory over the Nazis is pushed too far into the future to have much meaning even for the Russians. In view of this situation a Vichy-peace might prove to be the "lesser evil". If it indicates anything, the fact that the Russians have thus far not changed their "line" again shows that all the advantages are still on the side of the Nazis.

That the Allies recognize that for all practical purposes Russia may be considered lost also comes to light in the new and sudden change in Japanese-American relations. As long as it was not clear which way the war on the Continent would turn, neither Japan nor America was willing to act. We have pointed out that Japan's attitude was a very ambiguous affair. The Moscow-Tokio pact, the occupation of Indo-China, in fact the whole policy of Japan, could work in two ways, for and against Germany. Which way it will finally work depends on the fortunes of the German-American struggle.

The Moscow-Tokio pact strengthened Japan in regard to both America and Germany. Japan could operate more freely in Asia and with a greater measure of independence. The German-Russian war was also, in part, an answer to the Moscow-Tokio pact. It robbed Japan once more of

her new position of relative independence. With Russia's defeat, Japan stands alone in the Pacific against the combined Anglo-American forces. She must either come to a still closer cooperation with Germany or consider herself lost. As long as Russia existed as a real power, America was to a certain extent handicapped in her Asiatic ambitions, for as little as the Japanese-American interests in Asia can be harmonized, just as little are the Russians willing to leave Asia to the Americans. As long as a number of rivals fought for the same thing, there was always a chance to go with one of them against another. The Russian defeat excludes such an opportunity. Thus Japan feels herself completely "encircled" at that moment when she faces a single enemy. Churchill has made it clear in his declaration that England would be on America's side in the event of a war between America and Japan; that, in this respect, too, there are no longer rivalries between Britain and the United States; that Britain would be willing to sacrifice her Asiatic interests to America but not to Japan.

Since America has shown her unwillingness to sacrifice England, Germany is determined to hold on to Japan. Yet until Russia was brought down, all expectations that Japan might march into Siberia because of the German-Russian war, that she might stop American shipments to Russia, were not fulfilled, because it would have been utterly stupid to enter the war on the side of the Axis while Russia still had a chance of keeping alive. Japan's government of reconciliation with America functioned only as long as there existed a chance that the Germans might be stopped. Now, however, it depends on Germany's strategy whether or not Japan will attack Russia in the Far East. A Vichy-peace with Russia might prevent this. An outbreak of hostilities between Japan and America might induce the Russians to participate on the side of America.

It is now clear that Russia's defeat was essential for Germany, not only for a new attempt to pry Britain loose from America, but also to continue, if necessary, the war against the United States in the battlefields of the Far East and in the Pacific. The complete destruction of Russia's power was necessary in order to accomplish either a temporary peace or to secure the continuation of the war that still leaves all the advantages to the Nazis. Thus the Russian collapse might well release the long prepared American-Japanese war.

### America — Germany — Japan

It could be argued that even now the Japanese may try to escape their most unhappy situation. This would, however, amount practically to suicide. America, like Germany, would prefer to deal with her enemies piecemeal. If avoidable, it would be foolish for the Japanese to give America that opportunity. It is much more to be expected that an all-out war of America against Germany will lead to a Japanese declaration of war on the United States, not because the Berlin-Tokio axis provides for it, but because any other policy would spell the end of Japan as an independent

capitalist power. Aware of the unavoidability of this conflict, America may for this reason be the first to attack.

Japanese imperialism cannot retreat. It can adopt a waiting-policy only as long as Germany, or America, or both, deem it best to maintain peace in the Pacific. Japan can exist only by continuous expansion. To offer her, as Mr. Hull does, "spheres of interest" in the Asiatic trade is to offer her nothing. It is not "trade" with which America is concerned. If it were "trade" she would prefer Japan to China, for her business with Japan is the better one. "Trade problems" are not the issue; the whole of American commerce in China and Japan is of little significance. Free-trade in the former sense of the term has long since come to an end, it cannot re-appear. Trade, today, implies the direct possession of large territories, or it implies military force able to dictate to weaker nations. The only trade possible today is that exercised by the Japanese army in China, by the German armies in occupied Europe. All that America has thus far offered Japan is plain starvation. All that it will ever be willing to offer is the maintenance of a powerless Japan at the mercy of the United States. Starvation of Japanese capital, a stoppage of imperialist expansion, is equal to real starvation, for, unless socialism arises in important and decisive areas of the world, starving Japanese capital means to murder her population. To give Japan what she must have for her capitalistic existence means for America to give up her most important sphere of imperialistic expansion. And in this connection, Chiang Kai-shek appears as what he actually is, a tool of American imperialism, but not the "liberator" of "his people". For the "liberation" of the Chinese people can never proceed with the help of England, America, or Germany, but only in the form of a struggle against all capitalist nations and against capitalism in China itself. But such a liberation would not be a "national liberation". It is "too late in history" to expect a recurrence of national wars such as shook the world a hundred years ago. Within the framework of capitalism "national liberation" means the choice, if one has the choice, between different imperialist power blocs, each of them equally capable of preventing self-determination of the people they "protect". National issues are mere subterfuges to hide the real imperialist notions of the great powers. It will thus be the task of socialism, not to do what capitalism failed to do, namely to assure national independence for the various countries, but to do away with the whole problem in its traditional as well as in its imperialistic form.

It is capitalism that rules in the United States. It will not sacrifice its own interests just to help those of the Japanese. People who are so delighted that the paper-cities of Japan can be destroyed over night are as capable of "unselfish acts" as the Japanese who celebrate with pomp and circumstance the Fifth Anniversary of their organized slaughter of the Chinese population.

No permanent agreements can be reached between America and Japan. The only obstacle to a Japanese-American war was the existence of the Red Army. With the latter out of picture America may force the war,

for she will not be able — for some time to come — to do much in Europe. The possible direct connection between Japan and Germany must be prevented. It may well be that the greatest proportion of American war efforts will be directed against Japan, in an attempt at a quick victory, that will free America for more efficient action against the Nazis. But concentration upon the issues of the Pacific may also indicate a dawning recognition on the part of the American Administration that it is too difficult a task to beat Hitler in Europe; that it would be wiser to operate where operations yield better results.

As far as South America is concerned America has displayed no hesitation, as Roosevelt's recent *coup d'état* in Panama so strongly reveals. America may cease to hesitate in Asia, too, and thereby demonstrate that her struggle is not directed against "Nazi-Germany", but for the greatest possible control over the world economy. Of course, in the long displayed hesitancy to declare war on Germany there is also hidden the desire to leave a way open for retreat, if retreat should become unavoidable. After all, Germany is fully aware of the fact that America is at war with her. The "Hypocrite" and the "Rattlesnake" have already declared war a dozen times. The German population has long since been made acquainted with the fact, and no "psychological effect" detrimental to the Nazis can any longer be expected through the mere formality that accompany openings of hostilities. It seems to be mere "politeness" on the part of the Nazis to help maintain the illusion that both nations are still nominally at peace. The lack of a war declaration hurts nobody but the United States. It hinders the necessary centralization needed for modern warfare. It is explainable only by the Roosevelt Administration's own uncertainty as to what course to pursue. Thus, the greatest support the Nazis have yet found in the United States has been provided by Roosevelt's own strategy. It is quite understandable that the Administration should complain so bitterly about "sabotage" on the part of the isolationists. Yet one may be sure that even if there had not been a single isolationist in America, the situation would have been just as it is. The isolationists perform a real service for the Roosevelt Administration by opposing war measures that Roosevelt otherwise would have to oppose himself. If the isolationists had not existed, Roosevelt would have been forced to invent them, because of the fact that the discrepancy between his imperialist ambitions and the possibility of realizing them is still too great.

The isolationist bloc means for Roosevelt what *hara-kiri* means for the Japanese: it "saves face". All possible defeats that he may suffer or has suffered, he can put easily on the shoulders of his "opponents". This is the secret of the persistence of American democracy even under an "Emergency". Yet all "steps towards war", i. e., "short of war", thus far taken have shown that the isolationists in America are entirely powerless, unable even to influence events. It is also certain that if war is finally declared, the great bulk of the present isolationists will become ardent interventionists. Like the English appeasers they will accept the new situation not because

their "patriotism" is greater than their "convictions, but because their real interests cannot be divorced from the interests of American capitalism as a whole. A defeat of America will hit both interventionists and isolationists equally hard. The only isolationist act thus far undertaken was Representative Fish's attempted gesture to introduce the issue of a war declaration in Congress. The war mongers and the peace-mongers both recoiled in utter terror, not because they doubted that Congress would declare war—for this Congress declares anything that Roosevelt wants them to declare—but because of the certainty that Congress would declare war if forced to make a stand.

### German Europe

We are not so sure as Hitler claims to be that the Russian war is practically over. We do not know enough about the actual conditions in Germany and in the occupied countries. However, with the exception of Norway, where large parts of the population have opposed Nazi rule, and of Yugoslavia, where remnants of the army are still fighting, it seems that the opposition in Nazi-occupied territories consists of no more than the activities of professional provocateurs and isolated nationalist or bolshevist fanatics. The masses remain apathetic. We do not know the real attitude of the Vichy-government, nor the real situation in Italy. This ignorance, however, we seem to share with Roosevelt and Churchill, as both—to judge by their actions — also do not know whether to see in Vichy-France a potential friend or a potential enemy. It seems clear, however, that France cannot be transformed into a "real friend" without a successful invasion and defeat of Germany.

Notwithstanding all the difficulties that will accompany the reorganization of Europe, Hitler proclaimed before the start of the great October offensive, that if victory should be won, the basis for a durable peace will have been laid down. For a long time the Nazis have hinted at the calling of a European Congress for the coordination and pacification of the Continent. If Europe should indeed become an entity under Nazi dominance, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to defeat Germany on European soil. What, then, are the chances for a Nazi-dominated United States of Europe?

It must first be noted that the Nazi pattern of domination provides for both employment and abolition of national issues. Useful as national rivalries and race-issues are for the diplomatic and military conquest of a country, as soon as the latter is accomplished, the frictions originally fanned must be dampened. This is often difficult, as may be seen from the trouble that arise in the occupied nations. Political and economic positions have to be reshuffled over and over again, until each nation has that administration that serves the Nazis best. Of course the larger plans in this respect do not answer the changing needs from day to day, and thus contradictory moves are always possible. But their occurrence does not eliminate the general policy that the Germans follow in their attempt to bring Europe under complete control.