

is in general, he said, merely one of drawing closer to "these or those countries which are not interested in disturbing the peace". With which Italian fascism, just as in the minds of certain German pacifists, marches up as a defender of the "peace".

The change of front on the part of bolshevist foreign policy was therefore the consequence of the change of front on the part of German foreign policy. The Russians were zigzagging between the imperialistic Great Powers in order to put thru their "peace policy"; that is, in order to bring about and support that coalition of powers which at any given moment may appear the most reliable for warding off a military attack on the SU and for isolating any aggressive powers--today, Germany and Japan. France, on her part, as the main pillar of the bankrupt Versailles system and, standing next door to Germany, the most directly menaced by Hitler, became one of the main champions of understanding with Russia. She was able to plan her great counter-moves against the new German foreign policy, if not without casualties, still on the whole in accordance with the recipe of a preventive military encircling of Hitler Germany (Poland is a big hole in this ring). In the autumn of 1934, on France's initiative, Russia was invited by 30 states to join the League of Nations. The invitation was opposed by only three of the small European States, which could still afford to preach the rescue of capitalist morality from Bolshevism: fascist Portugal, half-fascist Holland and democratic Switzerland. Pravda of Sept. 18, 1934, gave as the grounds for the invitation into the League of Nations, the fear on the part of the inviting capitalist Powers that "the anti-soviet plans of the adventurist elements among the imperialists might be the prelude to a new world war directed also against a number of imperialist Powers". Izvestia, however, explained on the previous day that the capitalist world is divided into two groups: one which at present wants peace, and another which is looking for the war adventure. The Powers adhering to the League of Nations were henceforth, after the withdrawal of Japan and Germany, regarded as the peace group (Italy-Abyssinia!). Stalin, on his part, explained that with the adherence of Russia, the League of Nations could have a certain braking effect "for postponing or preventing the occurrence of warlike actions". Litvinov, finally, pointed in Geneva to the international cooperation of the SU with the predominant part of the capitalist Powers on the economic, artistic, social, scientific, and political fields, a co-operation which had now been crowned by the common goal of the "organization of peace".

After the impotence of the League of Nations in all questions of assuring the peace and preventing any warlike attacks in all the years of its existence had by

this time been revealed to even the rosier of the pacifist-optimists, the pacifistic effectualness of the League was at last discovered by the Bolsheviks. Behind their peace protestations there certainly stands a knowledge about the facts. But they are carrying on in capitalist diplomacy, and it demands that offensive as well as defensive military alliances be clothed with pacifist phrases.

While the entry into the League of Nations has brought the Russians a great number of further diplomatic successes, among which the politico-commercial rapprochement with England is rated as one of the most important, practically it has above all legitimized the co-operation between Russia and France. For one thing, Russia was concerned with the continuation of the security policy on her western boundary, so that as early as December 1934 negotiations were started with a view to the eastern pact, which was to be guaranteed primarily by France. These endeavors, which for the present have miscarried, owing to resistance of Germany and Poland, the Russians have not yet given up. The real, essential point of joining the League of Nations is, however, the alliance with France, which doubtless is based upon a military agreement and provides for mutual security against a German aggression.

But, true to the very methods of imperialist diplomacy, Bolshevism from the earliest times of its existence has had two irons in the fire. For a long while the Comintern was this second iron. That, however, is past. Today the Russians are concerned with keeping their hands free for new readjustments of their foreign policy, for broadening and altering their alliance front between the imperialist Powers themselves. This has been confirmed in the first place by their east-asiatic policy, insofar as their dealings there have been with Japan. Since the beginning of the Manchurian advance, they have endeavored to come to an understanding with Japan (sale of the Eastern Railway for a song) and to bring about the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. But the European policy of the SU is likewise a policy of attempts at rapprochement with its principal adversaries of the moment. The former co-operation between Russia and Germany is unforgotten in Moscow; unforgotten the speculation on the plans of the bourgeois wing of the Reichswehr generals, which still represents Schleicher's conception of a co-operation with Russia (the imperialistic German bourgeoisie has no desire to conquer a "colonizing land" in the East; it is looking for imperialistic goals). The Bolsheviks are counting upon a possible break-thru of these forces in Germany, Molotov declared at the 7th Soviet Congress in January 1935 that "we had and have no other desire than to continue maintaining good relations with Germany. Everyone knows that the Soviet Union is filled with a

profound impulse to develop its relations with all States, those with fascist government not excluded". The "ultra-nationalistic race theories" of the National Socialists, Molotov emphasized, "naturally" form no hindrance to the development of the russo-german relations, and added: "Altho we have no very high opinion of these 'theories', we do not conceal our respect for the german people as one of the greatest peoples of the present epoch". The question is merely as to "what precisely is at the basis of the foreign policy of present-day Germany", namely, the question whether Hitler's conception of german foreign policy still holds.

The Inner-Political Presuppositions of the Latest Phase of Russian Foreign Policy

The actual line of russian foreign policy at any given time is thus in large measure determined by the momentary constellation of the imperialist Powers. The measure in which the Bolsheviks carry on this foreign policy depends, however, on their inner forces. And these in turn have recently been subject to significant shifts.

The regime of bolshevist absolutism has passed a critical point. In accord with its origin and its conditions of social equilibrium, in the first period of its development, it supported itself decisively upon the russian working class. The proletariat appeared as the politically and economically privileged (even tho very modestly privileged) class. The absolutistic regime of Bolshevism supported itself predominantly upon the industrial class in order to form a counter-weight to the peasantry, which numerically constituted an unprecedented majority, and in order to build up the industrial state-capitalism at forced tempo. The industrializing of Russia, however, made it possible, in turn, to destroy the private capitalism of the peasants and to collectivize the land. An agrarian collective capitalism arose which, on the one hand, was capable of defending its own interests as against the state apparatus as well as against the working class, and which, on the other, was able to become the supporting foundation for the state apparatus itself.

With the successes of the policy of the second five-year plan, the Bolsheviks have announced the transformation of Russia from an agrarian into an industrial country. Between the years 1928 and 1934 the russian proletariat increased from 17.3 to 28.1 percent of the total population. The number of collective peasants mounted from 2.9 to 45.9 percent, while the number of individual peasants declined from 72.9 to 22.5 percent. The working class, to be sure, still constitutes a minority of the population. However, it is not only highly organized industrially; it also turns out today the predominant part of all soviet

products. This preponderance, however, compels the absolutistic regime of the Bolsheviks to draw up the agrarian class as its main support, to shift the center of gravity of the state apparatus to the weaker side, so as to maintain the equilibrium of the two classes and thereby, for the absolutistic peak of the pyramid, the possibility of governing.

The russian collectivized peasantry becomes the privileged class of the Soviet Union. While the industrial ascent of Russia down to the year 1928 was accomplished at the expense of the peasantry, the collectivizing itself was accomplished at the expense of the proletariat. The billions invested for the sake of russian agriculture had to be withdrawn from the industrial sector of the russian economy, and are in themselves sufficient to explain in large part the tense social situation in which the russian proletariat found itself in spite of all five-year-plan successes. The doing away with bread cards and the succeeding rise in the price of bread was a present to the collectivized peasants, to whom in 1932 Stalin had promised "well being". In the last four years, the government has expended about five billion rubles for organizing the machine and tractor stations, a sum which had to be raised by russian industry. The money indebtedness of the collectives to the State down to the year 1933, amounting to a total of 435 million rubles, was struck off the books at the end of 1934, the money accordingly presented to the peasants as a gift.

Ostensibly, the collective enterprises, as even the Menshevikess Domanevskaya has now discovered, are of socialist character. Stalin had, however, as early as the 17thth party congress, declared that the petty-bourgeois equalitarianism of the communes must be liquidated. The agricultural collectives are guilds, which leave considerable play to the collective ownership of the peasant. In Feb. 1935, at the congress of the collective peasants, model statutes drafted by Stalin for the collective enterprises were adopted. These statutes have deeded the land to the collective enterprises for all time, as was declared by the secretary of the Moscow party organization (v. Rundschau, 1935, No. 28). The nationalized soil has been made the private possession of the peasant collectives. "Every collective peasant feels now," the secretary said further, "that the general assembly of the members of a collective economy is master over the collective-economy property, that no 'plenipotentiary' of any sort can exclude him from the collective economy, that he has an equal voice in determining the common affairs of the collective economy." The sharpest tones were adopted in condemning the "absolutely inadmissible blundering intrusions into the life of the collectives" on the part of "certain party organizations", to whom it was made

clear that "people who infringe the collective-economy statutes cannot be tolerated either in the party apparatus or that of the soviets". The collective peasants, unrestricted masters of their properties, were accordingly released from the tutelage of the party organs. The "leading role of the proletariat" over the peasantry was thereby definitively abolished.

And as it has been economically, so also politically. Hand in hand with this astounding reform of the collectives went the abolition of the formal disadvantaging of the peasantry on the political field. The 7th soviet congress introduced equal, direct and secret suffrage and thereby a sort of "soviet parliamentarism" by means of which the weight of the peasantry can be thrown into the scale in all cases of voting. The future soviet congresses will therefore, just like the congresses of the parliaments which are subordinated to them, be dominated by peasant majorities. The peak of the bolshevist state apparatus thereby frees itself from the pressure of the proletariat, a pressure which it once needed in its apparatus but which would now necessarily turn out to be too dangerous for it. For in spite of all dictatorial securities, the soviet regime after all exists only on condition of utilizing the country's mass forces, to which it has to render account simultaneously and between which it has to manoeuvre.

The transition of the bolshevist system of absolutism on to the peasantry as its main support meant, however, the deprivileging of the party strata of proletarian origin. It represents, moreover, such a break with the party tradition that it could not come off without producing inner convulsions in the party apparatus, regardless of the fact that this party had already been purged dozens of times. Stalin was obliged once more to oppose his party in order to break its conservatism. He did this with the usual bolshevist ruthlessness, in that he introduced, if not the gradual and complete dismantling of the party apparatus, yet after all the further depoliticizing of the party. If the predominance of the proletarian class in soviet absolutism consisted in the factual superiority of the party apparatus over the state apparatus, while Stalin combined and dominated both, the predominance of the peasantry in the soviet system will bring it about that the state apparatus takes a position above the party apparatus.

So far, this fundamental upheaval has brought forth two measures of the greatest significance. The first was the liquidation of the union of old Bolsheviks; that is, the destruction of the center of the "proletarian"-revolutionary tradition of the CPR. (According to bourgeois press reports, Krupskaya was also taken into custody.)

The second of these measures was the reorganization (as it was shamefacedly expressed) of the Young Communist League. Heretofore, this League was organized according to the "production principle" like the CP itself and anchored in the factories. It rated as one of the party's most spirited weapons in the factories and played an important part there as organizer of the shock brigades, as gatherer of the state loans, etc. It was a lively political instrument of the bolshevist party; perhaps the liveliest, for the youth organization was always at the same time a center of the most various oppositions and an exponent of "bolshevist self-criticism", of which nothing more has been heard for some time. As the relatively weakest link of the party, the Young Communist League had to knock under first. As early as Feb. 22, 1935, hence directly following the 7th soviet congress, which elevated the peasant class to the throne, its "reorganization" was decided upon. This decision was complied with by the June plenum of the central committee of the youth organization. The social-democratic standpoint, that the youth organization has no political, but only educational functions, was here converted into fact. The youth organizations in the factories are being broken up. The YCL is being redistributed into seven sections: working-class youth, peasant youth, young pioneers, students, school children, leading YCL organs, juvenile work of the state and trade organizations. Politically, the YCL is thereby liquidated, and the field that is left to it is the youthful idyl: "Like a provident gardener," writes Pravda in an editorial around the middle of June, "it is called upon to bring up millions of people, to form their view of the world, to instruct, to nourish and to cherish them."

The Liquidation of the Comintern

With the accomplishment of this inner-political turn--the political NEP-turn of Stalin's--the last traditional restraints have fallen which had previously still existed with respect to bolshevist foreign policy by reason of the existence of the communist parties in Europe. The co-operation of russian state-capitalism with the monopolistic and in part openly fascist imperialism is henceforth unimpeded by any exterior consideration whatsoever. The embarrassing revolutionary phraseology can finally be discarded.

Hitherto, the "world revolution" was at least on paper recognized as the first and most essential guarantee against an intervention on the part of imperialist Powers. Practically, the Bolsheviks relied, however, exclusively on their diplomacy and on that institution which was rendered possible with its aid: the highly organized and technicized Red Army. The late acting president of the soviet of people's commissars, Kuibushev, has even

clothed this undisguisedly in words. In January 1935, at the third soviet congress of Moscow, he stated: "While we are fighting for peace on the international arena, we must nevertheless consider that the best assurance against a war, against an intervention, is as before the increasing might of the armed defender of our Fatherland, the Red Army of Workers and Peasants".

Even before this time, the proletarians who joined the communist parties in good revolutionary faith and took upon themselves the martyrdom of the fascist terror no longer counted among the Bolsheviks. In general, they were remembered with declarations of sympathy or protest resolutions which were not allowed to affect in the slightest degree the policy of concluding pacts of peace and friendship between the "Fatherland of all Workers" and their fascist oppressors. Occasionally, however, the hired writers of the Bolsheviks also expressed their sentiments more openly. Thus, on the occasion of the conclusion of the new non-aggression pact with Italy, Peri wrote in the Rundschau (1933, No. 33) with a shameless cynicism of which the equal would no doubt be hard to discover: "On the part of our italian brothers in arms who are suffering in the penitentiaries and on the islands of exile, the fact that their torturers are compelled to deal with the representatives of that revolutionary order for whose triumph the noblest of our comrades have offered up their freedom will be interpreted as an incentive to resistance and to struggle." The communist worker had accordingly long been abandoned when the Comintern was still conducting the "anti-fascist" pseudo-struggle against those Powers which were already tied up in the closest manner with the Soviet Union.

With the latest franco-russian pact, however, in which it was no longer a question of a diplomatic agreement, but of direct military co-operation, the leaders of Bolshevism were obliged to give up even the appearance of a "revolutionary" equivocalness. Obviously, the French insisted upon guarantees against a disturbance policy on the part of the CP of France. Stalin gave them. He assured Laval, on the occasion of his visit to Moscow, that France is naturally obliged to adopt measures in the interest of her military defense. Izvestia wrote on May 16: "The task of the public opinion of both countries is the support of the policy of their governments, which is the policy of peace and of defense."

The pact with France was followed by that with Czechoslovakia, which forthwith adhered to the franco-russian pact by reason of her menaced position between Hitler Germany and contested Austria. The Izvestia presented the grounds for this new alliance (until 1934 no diplomatic relations had existed between the two countries)

in the following words: "German fascism, in order to conceal its policy of conquest, may fashion a theory according to which the slavie peoples supply the manure of history. But the Soviet Union, while taking no stock in any sort of pan-slavic masquerades, vouches in every manner that it deems the defense of the slavie peoples, who are in danger of being attacked, as no less well grounded and worthy of support than is the defense of France".

Since the remaining apparatus of the Comintern parties no longer has any life of its own, the readjustment of their policy to the new situation was not accompanied by the slightest inner difficulties. The policy of military alliances with capitalist States required the liquidation of the disturbance policy of the Comintern parties in the countries in question. Moscow carried out this liquidation, which presages the early end of the european CP's in general. The way to this end is twofold. In the first place, it was necessary that the french and czech parties should swing into the line of national defense. That occurred promptly. Of course, the french CP was faced with the difficult task of combining this line with the traditional anti-militarism of the french working masses. It spoke cautiously and diplomatically. "The mutual assistance embraces the corresponding measures for the defense of peace", wrote Magnien on May 16 in L'Humanite. "In order to preserve the peace, a Bolshevik should do everything", declared Vaillant-Couturier, two days later in the same sheet. He compared the pact with the New Economic Policy (NEP). It was a question, he said, of gaining time in order to postpone the war and protect "our socialist Fatherland". No other reasons, he added, are discoverable in the words of Stalin. Furthermore, it was protested that the CPF remains the defender of the french soldiers and wants to win the army. Practically, however, all that remained to do was to demand that the fascist and reactionary officers be driven out of the army, since one could not after all confide to them the serious defense of the USSR.

In Czechoslovakia, where nationalism on the one hand and the social-democratic tameness of the CP on the other were considerably greater, the matter was rendered easier. Sverma, a newly elected parliamentarian of the CPCz, declared on May 24 at a CP meeting in Prague that the czech communists, in case the czechoslovakian army would fight consistently against german imperialism, would support this struggle and come out for the army. He declared himself in favor of maintaining the independence of the czech nation, which could be assured by an army purged of fascists.

In order to make this "defence-of-the-fatherland" policy

effectual in the policy of the allied capitalist nations, in harmony with the designs of soviet diplomacy, the Comintern would once more have to seek out the corresponding parliamentary field. That meant practically that the Comintern parties had to be annexed to the Social Democracy of the countries in question. The united front with the heads of "social fascism" became all of a sudden the one and only line-true watchword of the various CP's. In France there arose the "front commun", releasing waves of enthusiasm and fake activity. If the negotiations as a whole did not proceed so smoothly as might have been expected, this was owing to the fact that differences arose regarding the question of the extension of this front. While the CP wanted to draw in even the left-bourgeois parties (if coalition anyhow, then all the way to the democratic bourgeoisie!), the Social Democrats opposed to this their traditional No, and thus acquired among the french workers the reputation of being the most radical, the "leftest" of all the parties. However, Blum, at the congress of his party in Muhlhausen (June 1935) could not deny "that the declarations of Stalin are in accord with the decisions adopted regarding the national defense by the french Socialist Party in Tours three years ago and consequently served the future organizational unity of socialists and communists. In case of a german invasion, all proletarians would rise against the outer enemy, for the defeat of France would mean the defeat of Russia". (NZZ of June 13.) It is quite conceivable that Moscow will even decree the direct liquidation of its european offshoots, if things go still farther. If the Bolsheviks succeed in winning an indirect influence upon the social-democratic parties, without being responsible for them, that will be the most favorable to the plans of Moscow in the present world situation. (This tendency to combine by moving to the side of the Social Democracy is not confined to the Muscovites, but is running thru all the various bolshevist currents. The Trotskists of France, of Switzerland, etc., are already in the Social Democracy, and in other countries they are working in a similar direction. The CPO of Schaffhausen (Switzerland) accomplished its union with the SPS at the beginning of July 1935.)

The procession to the Social Democracy has been followed by the swiss CP without reserve. After a campaign in opposition to the social-democratic and trade-union "crisis initiative", shortly before the vote was taken it issued a call for support of this initiative. The situation, naturally, had "fundamentally changed". The SPS had, to be sure, proposed an extensive elimination of Parliament for the carrying thru of the initiative, but the Federal Council (Bundesrat) had in mind still more extensive full powers for itself. So the CPS preferred, in accordance with the approved social-democratic recipe of the lesser evil, the half to the three-quarter dictatorship. This

tumble was followed by the offer of a united front to the SPS, which in turn was followed by preparations for the dissolution of the red-union opposition (RGO) in Basel. The SPS set five conditions; among others, the liquidation of the RGO and other such separate CP organizations, suspension of all attacks upon the social-democratic policy, particularly upon the social-democratic functionaries in the administrative apparatus, and unconditional assent to the swiss "Plan of Labor". The CPS had as a matter of course to subscribe to all this. It was even obliged to swallow the ironic remark of the SPS executive committee to the effect that at any rate no co-operation with bourgeois parties was involved, such as had been demanded by the french comunists.

Just as down to the year 1932 it was "social fascism", so at the present time the "united front" has become the axis of all CP policy. Bela Kun, in a long article in No. 11 of the "Communist International", analyzed the tactic and the successes of the various CP's on the occasion of the united-front demonstrations on May 1. As to the german question, he expatiated as follows: If the majority of the SPG executive committee in Prague is really trying to support the imperialist war policy of Hitler Germany, in order to get back into the game, then there is need for establishing a much closer contact between the communists and the left members and groups of the SPG, for the creation of "lively examples of the united front" and for strengthening the broad mass pressure upon the SPG executive committee in Prague". These interesting disquisitions demonstrate, first, that the CP must be in very poor standing with the german workers, for otherwise it would not turn to the SPG executive committee after it had declared, following Hitler's victory: The SPG remains the principle enemy. They prove, furthermore, that the Comintern is here "fighting" merely for a bit of influence upon the remaining props of a social-democratic apparatus which history has already shown the door, an apparatus which at the time the Kun article was written was putting an end to the struggle of the "Leftists" for their share of the million marks in the possession of the party's executive committee, in that it threw these latter out of its enterprise for compensating its own services with respect to the german workers. Besides, at the present time the german secret police (Gestapo) has gone a long way in wiping up the illegal SPG apparatus, made further numerous arrests and thus reaped the harvest which had been prepared for it by two spies in the central committee of the SP in Germany. At the moment the SPG central committee, according to our certain information, no longer has any connections whatsoever toward Germany, and has decided not to attempt making any for some months to come.

Conclusion

Thus the foreign policy of the Soviet Union has logically, growing out of the original situation of the Russian revolution, ended up as a link in the system of imperialist alliance policy. Corresponding to the momentary needs at the different halting places along this way, it has directed the communist parties, on the back of the European proletariat, up to the point at which their political liquidation in favor of the national-reformist policy of the Social Democracy has already become merely a question of form. This is not taking place without the recent illusionary working up of the "united-front" enthusiasm of a European proletariat which in the present period of universal counter-revolution and reaction has run hopelessly into the blind alley of national limitation. Its further course can only be a further bit-by-bit collapse. A sound class-reaction against the continuing ideological and practical decline is at the moment not yet visible in the European countries even in the most modest beginnings. It appears that Social-democratism and Bolshevism must continue their work of destruction of any proletarian force of action even to the bitter end before the proletarian turn becomes at all possible. But the world situation is overloaded in such a way with economic and political difficulties, counter-forces and contradictions that this proletarian turn will in the long run unavoidably come about. The ruins of all "old" labor "movement" will make the path of the resurgent an incomparably painful one, but they will also finally leave it clear.

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CURRENT TRENDS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Despite the gradual trend toward equalization of the economic-social structure of Europe, the distinction between industrial capitalist Western Europe and overwhelmingly agricultural Eastern Europe is still apparent. Czechoslovakia reaches into both divisions. Its western part is highly industrialized and its history is closely interwoven with that of middle Europe, while its eastern part embraces the typical agrarian characteristics of eastern Europe. This contradiction between the East and West constitute one important problem of Czechoslovakian politics and economy.

The other problem is that of nationalities. Czechoslovakia is not a unified national state. It is inhabited by approximately ten million Czechoslovaks (Czechs and Slovaks because of different historical background do not yet constitute a unity, although that tendency exists), three and one quarter million Germans, 700,000 Magyars, 400,000 Ukrainians, and 60,000 Poles. The "national antagonism", especially between the Germans and Czechs, is fundamentally but the conflict between more or less independent capitalist groups for a share in the state control, as well as over internal and foreign markets. The larger part of the proletariat as well as the petty bourgeoisie was dragged into this conflict. This national competition seems to be refuted by the interlocking of German and Czech capital in the monopolistic organizations, but in reality the struggle is merely resumed on another plane, within the monopolies.

The economic differences of West and East, and national disunity, existed before the founding of the republic, but the difficulties arising out of the breakup of the old Austrian economic entity developed with the republic. In the old Austria, which formed an economic unity with balanced industrial and agrarian production, industry was centered chiefly in the Sudete countries. (Sudeten: mountain-chain). Excepting that part which found a sale in foreign markets, Austrian industry found a market for its goods in the agricultural belt. What is now Czechoslovakia supplied over 50 percent of all the industrial production of the old Austria - some industries as high as 100 percent. After the breakup of the empire, Czechoslovakian industry retained but a fourth of the former markets, as the other offshoots of the Austrian empire immediately raised tariff walls under whose protection they started their own industries. The export to these former countries, thus impeded, formerly the exclusive domain of Bohemian industry, now also had to meet the sharp competition of the great capitalist countries in these territories, whose position here was now consider-

ably improved. The relative over-industrialization of Czechoslovakia determined economic policies and influenced the relations between the different bourgeois factions.

A number of problems also result from the international position of Czechoslovakia. Deriving its existence as a state from the Versailles treaty, and its basic imperialist setup, any shifting of the then existing powers affects it closely. Czechoslovakia's vulnerable position and its economic implications complicate further the problems arising from its international position and, consequently, also the internal political situation.

All these problems, however, are secondary to the general social antagonisms that also rock the foundations of the other capitalist states. The causes of the apparent confusion in the social conflicts of Czechoslovakia lie in the interlocking and interaction of the general conditions of the world crisis with the special conditions peculiar to the founding and development of the Czechoslovakian state.

The wave of international crisis reached Czechoslovakia from one to one and a half years later than the surrounding countries. Then it progressed sharply and rapidly. First hit and hardest was the export industry, situated almost entirely in the Northwestern border territories inhabited by Germans. In contrast, the industries in the interior largely supplying the internal markets have held up fairly well. Recently published statistics estimated unemployment in thirteen districts preponderantly German, with a total population of 1,068,629, at 119,265; while thirteen districts preponderantly Bohemian, with 1,178,834 inhabitants gave only 51,949 unemployed. Unemployment in the German border districts was more than twice that of the Bohemian, namely 11.15 percent as against 4.4 percent.

But even the unequal force with which the crisis struck various sections of industry failed to halt the trustification efforts that had been initiated as early as the pre-war period in the Sudeten countries. After the war, this trend continued and by 1933, in the midst of the crisis, there were 538 registered cartels. The vertical organization of industries by the banks has proceeded even more rapidly. Four to five Prague banks, through direct ownership or large investment in the most important industries, control four-fifths of the total Czechoslovakian production.

The growing power of the monopolies is increasingly manifested in politics. Banks and other business concerns, over the heads of the "peoples' representatives", try to use the state apparatus for their momentary interests. For example, it is no secret that the success of the

greatest bank, "Zivnostenska banka", which controls the greatest industrial concern is mainly due to the fact that the financial and trade policy of the state was in the hands of its representatives who ruthlessly subordinated the economic policy of the state to its immediate financial interests. Similarly the agricultural ministers used their office to further the interests of the well concentrated agrarian industry.

In contrast to the era of liberal capitalism, when the state is almost exclusively the instrument of political power of the bourgeoisie, monopoly capitalism now seizes it increasingly for its immediate economic purposes. Thus the state exerts its full force upon capitalist production and distribution in order to keep their contradictions within bearable limits and, simultaneously, furthers the monopolistic trend. In a small way as yet this expresses itself in the economic legal measures of the past years, i.e., the wheat monopoly, compulsory lumber syndicate, etc.

Almost at the outset of the crisis, following the elections, a coalition government was formed, consisting of Czech Agrarians, National-Democrats, People's Party, National Socialists (Benes), the Czech and German Social-Democrats and the German Land League. The government tried to counteract the growing difficulties with the usual deflationist methods; (salary reductions for government employees, reducing the budget, etc.), which, of course, merely intensified the crisis. From the first, the government, due to its heterogeneous composition, could not reckon on more thorough measures. When the advancing crisis nevertheless indicated the necessity of such measures, open disagreement broke out in the coalition. The group urging a devaluation of the crown to revive the export trade had a majority but met stiff resistance by the National Democrats, representing finance capital and the importers of foreign raw materials who felt their interests endangered by currency devaluation. Before the passing of the devaluation laws, this group demonstratively withdrew from the government. The remaining government parties now formed a closer coalition of agrarian and reformist parties. Resulting from this close co-operation were a number of "planned economy" reforms (grain monopoly, public works, public works programs, etc.), which was to culminate in a sort of state capitalism (for example, the nationalization of mines.)

The new reformistic practice of the labor parties now found its ideological expression in the theories of "planned economy". A theoretical re-orientation further became necessary with the collapse of the German (in Germany) social democracy, the chief representative of

the traditional reformism of the Second International. In order to win the vacillating masses of petty bourgeoisie and farmers for the interests of the reformist labor movement, a "class-coalition" was sought in the formation of a bloc surrendering all class characteristics for the purpose of effecting the structural (state capitalist) reform of capitalism. The labor movement, demoralized by the collapse of the middle European labor parties, through this program was to be shown a new way out, while at the same time a mass basis for the struggle against Fascism would be formed.

The National-Socialist victory in Germany had far-reaching consequences for the internal and external politics of Czechoslovakia. It now found itself adjacent to a state from whose imperialist urge for expansion it had everything to fear. Its immediate reaction to provocative advances of Germany was a closer support of French imperialism and, consequently, of Russia (diplomatic recognition, non-aggression and military assistance pact) as well as closer connection with the states of the little entente. A further effect on foreign policy was clouding of diplomatic relations with Poland which had established friendly relations with German imperialism.

The ideological result of Hitler-German activity was an intensified nationalism by the Czechoslovakian bourgeoisie which could operate under the mask of anti-fascism. In the reformist labor parties, Hitlerism resulted in a panicstricken flight to the institutions of the "democratic" state as refuge from the fascist wave. The anti-fascist struggle represented no struggle between groups fighting for their definite capitalist interests, but a struggle for the preservation of certain governmental principles. Followed to its logical conclusion this conception leads to the support of a war of prevention "in order to bring freedom (at the point of French and Czech bayonets) to Germany".

Internally the Hitler overturn in Germany led to the dissolution of the German National-Socialist Labor Party and the German National Party. The leaderless and partyless fascist masses sought and found cover in the German Turnerbund whose social structure and aims most closely approximated those of the dissolved parties and thus was best fitted to act as a substitute organization for the old swastika parties. Its membership was fairly identical with that of the two outlawed parties, in addition to a powerful reserve of youthful elements that had been radicalized and thrown into politics by unemployment and the crisis. The political character of the Turnerbund was indistinguishable from that of a swastika party. Hypernationalism, anti-Semitism and close petty bourgeois connections characterized both. This similarity to the

old fascist parties threatened to result in the prohibition of the Turnerbund as well, so a form of organization equally capable of carrying on the fascist campaign and yet sufficiently camouflaged to avoid dissolution under the anti-fascist laws had to be found. The most essential fascist activities were to be carried out illegally, in underground agitation, whispering campaigns, etc.

The needs of Czech fascism thus found expression in the organization of the Sudete Home Front (SHF) which soon boasted of a following greater than that enjoyed by the former National-Socialist organizations. In contradiction to swastika traditions, the SHF professed a burning love of democracy and international peace; innumerable loyalty demonstrations for the Czechoslovak state were organized and every connection with the forbidden parties, and especially with the Third Reich was avoided. Thus equipped the SHF was the more active in advocating the ideology of its predecessors although in diluted form but enriched with the freshly imported "people's community religion" and a leader cult centered around one Konrad Henlein, a Turnerbund functionary who was being primed as a Sudete German Hitler.

The new foreign policy of Russia after the Nazi revolution in Germany led to a change in the communist tactics in the countries of Russia's allies. In Czechoslovakia this tactic met with difficulties as the government Socialist parties emphatically refused union with the Communists; on the other hand, the united front here would have signified the Communist endorsement of the government which so far seemed inopportune to them. But concessions in this direction have already been made by the CPC.

In May 1935, when the diplomatic bonds between Russia and Czechoslovakia were tightened by a military assistance pact, the CPC declared itself ready to co-operate with the bourgeois parties in parliament and to defend the capitalist state. Parliamentary Representative Sverma on May 24, 1935 declared: "...German Fascism can be defeated only thru class war within Germany and, by war, thru armed force. The Czechoslovak Communists in case of consistent war by the army against German imperialism would support that war and the army". "We are for the maintenance of independence of the Czechoslovak nation", he added, "which can be guaranteed by a strong army, freed of Fascist elements in which workers enjoy all political privileges. We demand the restoration of the suffrage to the members of the army. We urge the Socialist parties to form an oppositional united front to carry on the fight against Fascism. We will support the Socialist parties in the government in all measures intended to combat Fascism, and to secure

concrete advantages for the workers. In foreign policy we will support everything intended to support the peaceful foreign policy of the Soviet Union and to frustrate the war plans of Hitler-Germany."

The complicated transitional character of the general social situation is reflected in the results of the last elections (May 1935). The total result is undeniably a swing to the right. Also, the difference of social development in German and Czech Czechoslovakia becomes more apparent. While conditions among the Czechs seem to have remained about the same, among the Germans there occurred a complete political overturn. The tremendous growth of the Sudete German Home Front to the strongest party in the state formed the real sensation of the elections and gained importance far beyond the boundaries of the state.

The swing to the right is seen in the loss of votes and parliamentary seats of the proletarian parties which altogether now have 14 seats less than formerly. Compared to 41.6 percent of all seats held formerly, they now control only 35.6 percent. The full developments are not so apparent in these totals as a study of the individual national groups reveals.

Changes among the Czechs, despite the sixth year of crisis, are so insignificant that the stability of the old party system seems to be exceptional when compared to international developments in general.

In contrast to the largely German border territories, the inner part of Czechoslovakia, especially Slovakia, is but little industrialized. Such industry as exists is largely for domestic consumption and was hardly affected by the crisis. Besides, industry in the Czech interior has experienced an entirely different development from that of the border districts. The latter are part of the west European economy which had its decisive development in the last half of the 19th century. Now, as formerly during its rise, industry in the border districts follows the decline of Europe's capitalist west. But the agricultural Czech interior belongs to the European east which experienced a period of industrialization after the war. Political independence, the accompanying tariff and trade barriers, now separating the old economic units, led to the development of an economy serving various political and military interests arising out of the new setup that centered more in the interior and the east. This industrial development further moderated the effects of the crisis on this section of Czechoslovakia which had suffered least from the first because of the structural nature of interior and eastern economy. Also, the munitions industry located in the Czech districts and operating at high capacity for years reduced unemployment of the Czech

workers. Consequently, the fascist ideology, the ideology of capitalist decline, remained negligible among the Czech masses.

Thus the comparatively insignificant effects of the crisis on the Czech districts produced no radical change in the traditional party system. However, the crisis still had enough effect in the Czech districts to cause the formation of rudimentary fascist groups that already have expressed themselves in the elections. Czech fascism so far consists of two tendencies: the National Union (Marodni sjednoceni), and the Fascist Party of Gajda.

The reasons for the growth of Fascism, however, are in the economic conditions of the Sudete-German districts. The crisis here manifested itself in an extraordinary impoverishment of the masses. The decline of the highly developed export industry of the border districts struck down the whole economy and social life. The ruin of the export industry involved that of all other branches of production. Important production centers of finished goods, textiles and glass are veritable industrial cemeteries. Even better situated districts such as the soft coal mines in the northwest and the connected industries show a severe decline and unemployment problem. Some industries have been idle for years with no hope of resuming operations. The industrial shifts of the post-war period on the continent, and overseas the tariff, valuta and autarchic policies of most countries have destroyed a whole series of industries. Frequently the paralyzed plants are broken up and transferred to other countries (textile industry), a part of the border industry is moving into the interior leaving an army of unemployed without hope ever to be re-employed, certain only of continuing life under the most miserable conditions.

But those remaining employed fare little better. The wages, already low before the crisis (among the lowest in all Europe), have so far been reduced to an average 50 percent. Short-time employment is the rule, (one day a week in many plants and others close down for weeks on end), and contributes to lowering the living standard of the employed almost to the level of that of the unemployed.

The chief strength of the fascist movement, its very foundation, consists of the mass of the impoverished petty bourgeoisie and peasantry. The decline of the export industry, partly of a pettybourgeois nature, poor business in general, reduced purchasing power of the masses, taxation, etc., brought small tradesmen, merchants, and the craftsmen to the verge of ruin. The young intelligentsia found no more room in the declining

economy and saw every opportunity of rising barred to it. The German small farmers in the less fertile border districts were injured by the agrarian measures of the in favor of large farmers government. These groups that usually turn to the state for help in a crisis had scant hope from a state that furthered the rising Czech competition that threatened them.

The Germans in Czechoslovakia see the solution to their troubles in Fascism. The Sudete German party has had a degree of success unprecedented in fascist history. It polled 70 percent of the German vote, not only thru reduction of the other bourgeois parties, but thru great inroads into the support of both proletarian parties. The confidence of Henlein's followers in finding what seemed to them new and basic methods for their relief thru the People's Commonwealth (Volks-gemeinschaft), social and national utopias, public works program to employ 300,000 Sudete-German unemployed, and similar proposals, gave an immense impetus to their propaganda. Their apparently revolutionary demand for a change in the political, economic and cultural setup was opposed by the Social-Democrats with the conservative slogan of the defense of democracy in the state and a few social-political crumbs. In view of the terrible misery of those affected, that meant merely the retention and defense of their misery. Consequently large parts of the working class, tired of the unsuccessful reform policy of the Social-Democrats, and the sterile phrase-mongering of the Communists, set their hopes in the new rising movement whose spirit and far-reaching demands promised a decided improvement in their lot. Only with all these contributing factors was it possible for the Sudete-German Home Front to overcome the strong socialist traditions and to become the strongest party of Czechoslovakia.

The election results of the Communists also demand attention. There are a number of differences between the CCP and those of the other European countries. The Czech Social Democracy from which it sprang in pre-war times already had been one of the rightest parties of the second international, supporting the position of unconditional co-operation with all classes of the nation. There was practically no Marxian opposition in its ranks. After 1918, following the national revolution which retained all other features of capitalism, a radical tendency developed which, however, lacked a fundamental, revolutionary orientation. It was similar to the Independent Socialist Party tendency in Germany though stronger reformistic and nationalistic tendencies existed here. But while the third international has split the Independent S.P. in order to exclude the too reformistic elements, shortly after it accepted the whole Czech Left bag and

baggage. Junction of the Czech with the German Communists of the country, ideologically more advanced owing to a different historical background, added little to theoretical unity and clarity though a degree of uniformity in concepts and tactics took place thru the years. The lack of theoretical clarity among the party membership formed the basis for frequent serious internal crises that convulsed the party structure until the strong party bureaucracy succeeded in enforcing the strong discipline and rules of Bolshevik organization. Yet, to this day, the party apparatus must compromise with the ideological backwardness of the membership. Thus the policy of the party central committee consists of constant shifting between the now reformistic, now radical desires of the membership on the one hand, and the pressure of the Comintern for defense of the state interests of Soviet Russia on the other hand, though Russian interests more and more tend to support the reformism of the party. This shifting soon became the characteristic of the whole policy of the CCP which evaded all fundamental decisions of theory or practice.

In distinction to the Social-Democracy, the Communist movement in Czechoslovakia is not organized into national groups, but embraces members of all nationalities in one unit. The peculiar national composition of Czechoslovakia explained previously, expresses itself in the thought and action of the various groups and only with due consideration to this can the Communist election results be correctly estimated.

The Communists secured a total increase of 96,289 votes as compared to 1929, or 12.78 percent. As the number of votes had increased by 11.45 percent, the percentage of increase was only 1.33 percent.

The growth of the Communist, almost entirely in eastern Slovakia and Karpatho-Russia, can be traced to the almost complete absence of industry. Even agriculture there is very backward. Conditions generally approximate those of the Balkans and a number of east-European states. The greater part of the population suffers much as a result of the backward social conditions and the ruthless exploitation and oppression by the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie.

Although the remnants of feudalism had been removed by the land reform--the expression of the bourgeois revolutionary character of the Czech national revolution--and the Czech peasantry had become conservative, sufficient vestiges of feudal conditions remained in the east to maintain the desire for a bourgeois reconstruction of agriculture. The smallness of the farms, infertility of the soil, dependence on the few but all-powerful landed proprietors, and the backwardness of their productive methods, coupled with ad-

ministrative oppression (taxes, tax foreclosures, political chicanery, etc.,--this part of the country is treated almost like a colony) have created misery that is almost unbearable. Communist success here is due primarily to the protest of the peasant population against these conditions. In addition it is the expression of the agrarian-revolutionary ferment of the peasantry of this as well as other eastern countries as the Communist Party unreservedly supports all interests of the peasant population. To the Karpatho-Russian peasants, as to the Russian peasants, the Communist party appears as the sole leader of their social and national struggle.

In Czechoslovakia the crisis appeared later than in the other countries, and earlier in the border districts than in the interior and eastern parts of the republic. The political effects were the later and unequal process of fascization. Following the later outbreak of the crisis, it may be assumed that the low point will be reached at a later period than in other countries. The momentary stabilization of the crisis in Czechoslovakia has obviously not occurred at its lowest point. A further, possibly sudden, collapse is to be expected, especially in the Czech districts. The political effect of a further collapse undoubtedly will be a greater and more effective fascization of the country.

The rise of a real fascist movement among the Czechs must intensify the problem and danger, but also the difficulties, of Fascism in the republic. So long as Fascism was essentially the affair of the minority nation, the decisive policies of the government were but little influenced by it. With the rise of fascism in the majority nation, all internal problems (above all, that of the relationship of the two main nationalities, which may result in a struggle to determine the dominance of the two fascist movements) renewed and intensified will become the order of the day.

The conquest of the state by the monopolistic great-bourgeoisie proceeds more rapidly than the formation of a mass basis for the petty bourgeoisie. The horizontal and vertical trusts embrace owners of both nations and all fractions and constantly expand their operations. In the International Industrial Association (SVAZ PRUMYSLNIKU) for example, the bourgeoisie has an instrument equally potent politically as economically thru which, forced by economic necessity, it demands with increasing insistence absolute control of economy and the state, violently demands the abolition of democratic vestiges and forces thru more and more measures for the fascist reorganization of the state. The time is rapidly approaching when the bourgeoisie with its trusts can exercise unlimited control of the state and thru it dictate its political

and economic measures. But even in the unified dictatorship of monopoly capital, the rivalry of the two national capitalist groups and the different capitalist fractions (industrial, agrarian and finance capital) will continue. The conflict for a share in the fascist rule will flame anew in the economic associations and the state bureaus and administrations. In this struggle, the various national groups of capitalists will seek allies among the petty bourgeoisie of their own country ruined by capital concentration and crisis. Nationalism is the inevitable basis for a fascist mobilization of the petty bourgeoisie in Czechoslovakia. To large sections of the petty bourgeoisie, the maintenance and extension of their reduced basis for existence will appear possible only at the expense of the other nationals. Thus the intensified crisis will widen the gulf between the two large nations of the state and finally two strong fascist mass movements will confront each other in an embittered struggle. But as fascism indicates the greatest centralization of state power in the hands of the ruling class, and every independent movement within the regime that conflicts with the interests of the ruling fascism becomes a menace for the whole dictatorship, fascism is confronted with the insoluble problem of chaining the very forces it is constantly forced to unchain. Just as the growing class antagonisms constantly force the fascist state to adopt more rigorous measures to maintain its supremacy, so the growing and diverging forces of the nationalities will necessitate increased pressure by the state. The exact manner in which Fascism will try to reconcile the national conflicts with absolutist state centralization cannot be foretold as yet. A part probably will be played by the state bureaucracy whose great power, uncontrolled chicanery and ruthlessness already indicate its possible position.

In general, fascization is a manifold contradictory process that will be even more complicated and difficult of comprehension in the Czechoslovak state of conflicting nationalities than elsewhere. The working class is inactive and helpless in relation to the task of revolutionizing the capitalist system. It confronts the powerful new problems with the traditional methods, organizations and ideologies that arose from almost entirely different conditions, and which are completely insufficient to stop the onslaught of the class enemy. The greatest and deciding part of the working class is still in the camp of reformism. Attempts to change the policies of the reformist parties among the Czechs are not apparent, while but a weak tendency in this direction is noticeable among the Germans. What oppositional activity exists within the German Social Democracy is very indefinite and is rather a sign of disintegration of the old ideology than a new orientation. Among all these efforts, the group known as the "Socialist Action" has assumed the most definite forms and gained the most influence. Although

