

Documents on the Pan-American Agency of the Comintern: Revised and Enlarged Edition

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Documents on the Pan-American Agency of the Comintern

Revised and Enlarged Edition

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2022

Preface to the Revised and Enlarged Edition

In July 2021 the editor put out the third revised and enlarged edition of a publication under the changed title: “Documents on the Pan-American Agency of the Comintern.” On that occasion, the latter part of Part 2 was enlarged. Subsequently, in April 2022 the editor published a companion to the above-mentioned publication, that is, *Documents on the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the Comintern*. This time, the former part of Part 2 was enlarged and the new Part 2 was the authorized version of “The Early Comintern in Amsterdam, New York and Mexico City.”

Therefore the editor has replaced the earlier version, with the authorized one, of Part 2 in this present work. The editor has also taken the occasion to correct minor mistakes such as mistypings.

December 2022

Akito YAMANOUCI

Professor Emeritus of Kyushu University

Preface to the First Edition

Since 2004 the editor has carried on research on the Pan-American Agency of the Comintern. In May 2007 the editor put out a publication of scientific research results, “Basic Research on the Pan-American Agency of the Comintern.” It was regarded as the first step to the comprehensive research on the Pan-American Agency. In order to get the whole picture of the Agency, 35 key documents were carefully compiled, edited and printed in Part 2 of it. Next, in March 2014 the editor put out an interim publication of scientific research results, “Comprehensive Research on the Pan-American Agency of the Comintern.” Further light was thrown on the Agency’s activities in Canada and its financial reports. 14 documents were added and in total 49 documents were printed. Finally the editor has completed comprehensive research on the Agency in two books in Japanese ⁽¹⁾ and articles in English and Japanese ⁽²⁾.

Consequently this time the editor has put out a publication in English under the changed title: “Documents on the Pan-American Agency of the Comintern.” 2 more documents are added and in total 51 documents are printed in Part 1. This is the third revised and enlarged edition. Part 2 is a revised and enlarged (particularly in the latter half in relation to Part 1) version of the above-mentioned article in English. Its attention is focused more on the matters concerned with the elucidation of problems and the evaluation of activities than on the detailed explanation of facts.

July 2021

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JAPAN

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- (1) A. Yamanouchi, *The Early Comintern and Japanese Socialists Residing Abroad: A Transnational Network* (Kyoto, 2009) [in Japanese]; id., *The Way to the Third International: S.J. Rutgers and the Founding of the Comintern* (Fukuoka, 2021) [in Japanese].
- (2) A. Yamanouchi, “The Early Comintern in Amsterdam, New York and Mexico City,” *The Shien or the Journal of History* (Faculty of Humanities, Kyushu University), No. 147, III.2010, 99-139 [in English]; id., “The Forming of the Communist Party of Canada and the Pan-American Agency of the Comintern,” *ibid.*, No. 152, III.2015, 51-106 [in Japanese].

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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

In reference to **Part 1** (Documents on the Pan-American Agency of the Comintern):

- 1) This Part is composed of 10 categories of key documents related to the Pan-American Agency of the Comintern, each of which is arranged in chronological order.
- 2) All the documents except for the two are from the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (РГАСПИ) in Moscow. The reference number of them, for example, “РГАСПИ, ф. 495, оп. 18, д. 65, лл. 70-73” is abbreviated to “РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/70-73.”
The two documents are from the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in Washington, D.C. The reference number of them, for example, “Records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation [1908-1922], RG 65, Bureau Section Files No. 202600-1644-1, NARA” is abbreviated to “Records of FBI, BS202600-1644-1.”
- 3) Plain typing and grammatical errors are corrected without notice.
- 4) The phrases in square brackets are annotations by the editor of the present work. Editorial notes are put at the end of each document.

In reference to **Part 2** (Supplementary Research Results):

- 1) In quoting from Part 1 of the present work, the editor/author notes the reference numbers such as “**Doc. 1-1**” and, in principle, rewrites all amounts of money in the same form.
- 2) In quoting from Part 1 of *Documents on the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the Comintern*, the editor/author notes the reference numbers such as “**A-Doc. 1-1-1**.” For readers’ information, the editor/author inserts the list of those documents at the end of Part 2.
- 3) The phrases in square brackets are annotations by the editor/author.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A.B.	American Bureau
CEC	Central Executive Committee
CGT	Confederación General de Trabajadores
CLPA	Communist Labor Party of America
CPA	Communist Party of America
CPC	Communist Party of Canada
CROM	Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana
ECCI	Executive Committee of the Communist International
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
IISG	Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis
ILP	Independent Labour Party
IWW	Industrial Workers of the World
KAPD	Kommunistische Arbeiter-Partei Deutschlands
KPD	Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands
MCP	Mexican Communist Party
MID	Military Intelligence Division
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration
OBU	One Big Union
(P.)A.A.	(Pan-)American Agency
(P.)A.C.	(Pan-)American Council
RL(U)I	Red Labor (Union) International
SLP	Socialist Labor/Labour Party
SPC	Socialist Party of Canada
UCPA	United Communist Party of America
USPD	Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
WES	Westeuropäisches Sekretariat
WPC	Workers' Party of Canada
РГАСПИ	Российский государственный архив социально-политической истории

LIST OF PSEUDONYMS

Pseudonym	Person's Name
Allen, Henry	Cohen, Maximilian
Andrew(s), Joseph	Hourwich, Nicholas I.
Atwood, Henry	Harrison, Caleb
Baldwin, B.	Tyverovsky, Oscar
Ballister	Minor, Robert
Benjamin, A.	Cohen, Maximilian
Bray, A.	Jansons, Karlis
Carr, John	Katterfeld, Ludwig E.
Carter	Fraina, Louis C.
Charlie	Jansons, Karlis
Corey, Lewis	Fraina, Louis C.
Damon, David	Ruthenberg, Charles E.
Dean, Jenny	Pearl, Jeannette D.
Dixon, Joseph	Browder, Earl R.
Duffy	Wagenknecht, Alfred
Flynn	Lindgren, Edward I.
Harper	Heiman (Hyman), Julius
James	Reich, Jakob
Jansen, Karl	Jansons, Karlis
Joseph	Dirba, Charles
Kelley	Katayama, Sen
Kiyoda, H.	Katayama, Sen
Littlebit/Lilbit/Lillebit	Fraina, Louis C.
Marshall, James A.	Bedacht, Max
Paley, M.	Levine, Herman M.
Ramírez, Jesús	Phillips, Charles F.
Raphael, A.	Bittelman, Alexander
Rocha, José	Phillips, Charles F.
Sasha/Sascha	Stokes, Rose Pastor
Scott, Charles E.	Jansons, Karlis
Seaman, Frank/Francis	Phillips, Charles F.
Skála, Josef	Fraina, Louis C.
Stirner, Alfred.	Woog, Edgar
Tanner, David	Phillips, Charles F.
Thomas	Reich, Jakob
Thompson	Fraina, Louis C.
Trotter, G.L.	Rutgers, Sebald J.
Yavki	Katayama, Sen

Part 1

Documents on the Pan-American Agency of the Comintern

1 S. Katayama (and L.C. Fraina) in Mexico City to the ECCI/Comrades in Moscow

- 1-1 10.03.1921** [Yavki=Sen Katayama] (New York) to Comrades [in the Comintern, Moscow]
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/70-73 (4×; typed duplicate); 495/18/65/74-76 (typed duplicate)]
- 1-2 22.04.1921** [Katayama] (Mexico City) to M. Kobezky [of the Small Bureau of the ECCI]
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/14-16 (3×; typed and signed); 521/1/17/2-4 (typed duplicate)]
- 1-3 22.04.1921** Sen Katayama (Mexico City) to Comrades [in the Comintern, Moscow]
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/11 (1×; typed and signed); 495/18/65/134 (typed duplicate)]
- 1-4 25.04.1921** Sen Katayama (Mexico City) to Comrades, the Third International (Moscow)
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/20-21 (2×; typed and signed); 495/18/65/150-151 (typed duplicate)]
- 1-5 26.05.1921** Yavki (Mexico City) to Comrades [in the Comintern, Moscow]
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/25 (1×; typed and signed); 521/1/17/15 (typed duplicate)]
- 1-6 26.05.1921 & 05.06.1921** [Katayama] (Mexico City, Mexico) to Comrades [in the Comintern, Moscow]
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/29-34 (6×; typed and signed); 495/18/65/190-195 (typed duplicate); cf. 521/1/17/15]
- 1-7 11.06.1921** [Katayama] (Mexico City) to Comrade [in Moscow]
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/14 (1×; typed duplicate)]
- 1-8 01.08.1921** [Katayama] (Mexico, D.F.) to N. Bukharin
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/61 (1×; typed duplicate)]
- 1-9 24.08.1921** [Katayama] (Mexico, D.F.) to E.C. of Communist International
[РГАСПИ, 521/1/17/96-101 (6×; typed duplicate)]
- 1-10 05.09.1921** Report of American Agency. Kata[yama]/Fra[ina]/American Agency, C.I. to the Small Bureau of the Executive Committee
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/36-41 (6×; typed and signed); 495/18/66/98-103 (typed and signed); 495/108/10/24-29 (typed draft)]
- 1-11 24.09.1921** [Katayama] (Mexico, D.F.) to G. Zinoviev
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/11/122-124 (3×; typed duplicate)]
- 1-12 28.09.1921** Kata[yama]/Fra[ina] to the Small Bureau, Comintern
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/42-46 (5×; typed and signed); 495/18/66/327-331 (typed duplicate)]

- 1-13 10.10.1921** Kata[yama]/Fra[ina]/American Agency to the Small Bureau, Comintern
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/47-50 (4×; typed and signed); 495/18/66/156-159 (4×; typed draft dated 04.10.1921); 495/18/66/237-240 (typed; no date)]
- 1-14 08.12.1921** L.C. Fraina to the Small Bureau [of ECCI]
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/22/11-11a (2×; typed and signed)]
- 1-15 02.01.1922** Louis C. Fraina to the Small Bureau [of ECCI]
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/22/1-4 (4×; typed and signed); 495/18/66/241-244 (typed duplicate)]

10.03.1921 [Yavki=Sen Katayama] (New York) to Comrades [in the Comintern, Moscow]
[ПГАСПН, 495/18/65/70-73 (4×; typed duplicate); 495/18/65/74-76 (typed duplicate)]

New York, March 10, 1921.

Dear Comrades:

Since I made my last report many things happened more or less distressing, but the American Bureau has already accomplished something for the cause that you shall soon know yourselves. The detailed reports of the work of the American Bureau and the Council will show you that we are working in very difficult environment all due to the party splits.

You will see in my two speeches, the one at the meeting of the C. E. C. of the C. P. and the other at the C. P. Convention, how I have tried to pursue a conciliatory policy toward the C. P. realizing the urgency of our work and the C. P.'s cooperation, while at the same time not yielding any principle embodied in your instructions. As you see in the communications that were exchanged between the American Council and the American Bureau and the C. E. C. of the C. P. how the C. E. C. made the expulsion of Comrade Allen [Maximilian Cohen] a test case for its own power toward the American Council. The C. E. C. of the C. P. has, however, yielded, although somewhat reluctant to our demand and submitted to our interpretation of the instructions, especially concerning the close cooperation. Comrades, I wish you to take note of our present controversies on the close cooperation and expulsion of party member, because it will give you a chance to look into the inside view of the C. P. leaders. They involve the matter of principles and at the same time show you what the party leaders are most interested in. I put on this point my possible emphasis, because I found out my mistake in the judgement of the C. P. leaders by hearing their arguments and discussions and their reports as well at the recent party convention. Until that time I had opinion that they are very good theoreticians on the communism and good interpreter of the thesis and other documents of the Third International. We all thought so, at least in America. But they are, after all, a petty theoretician incapable of understanding the depth of the meaning, consequently their inability of practical application of the principles on the wider field. They are, indeed, a good communist in so far as they understand the literal meaning of the documents given by the Third International. Their understanding and interpretation are often negative and passive and lack positive and active, hence miserably fail in practical world. This attitude of the C. P. leaders is very well attested in the party work or rather no work during the past 18 months. See the work of the recent party convention! What have they accomplished in the way of positive and active interpretation and application of those important documents! The present leaders' mind is stiff somewhat fossilized and so no flexibility at all. Look at the unity question. The C. P. stand is right and logical through and through. The party leaders strenuously stick to the Moscow mandate, particularly to the membership basis; so far so good but they forget the spirit of the mandate and entirely ignore the very urgency of the unity itself. Again the C. P. is an almost ideal underground organization in this continent and has very good discipline from top to the very bottom. So far very good, but the party's good quality pretty liable limit there and its activity ends also. The C. P. maintains its integrity and compactness by an extreme centralization, by expulsion and intimidation and by keeping members in dark ignorance. There is no free discussion, development and initiative in thought and action among the rank and file, because the iron grip of the C. E. C. kills the positive and active spirit of the members in general. The above criticism may sound too severe, if it is made with hostile spirit. But the Communist Party of America is too good to be buried entirely in the dark hole.

I doubt very much that the present C. P. leaders' capacity to link two sides of the communist

movement, emphasized in the thesis of communist International — legal and illegal together, so to develop them in the U. S. as to build a powerful extensive and intensive movement up fully capable of revolutionizing the entire workers of the country. The present C. P. can be made the very basis of the communist movement of America. It is almost perfect underground organization. Recent party hatred and party squabbles embittered both sides, and consequent unrestness [restlessness] among members necessitated tightening of the already rigid iron discipline. It can be considered to be an abnormal condition. But the C. P. needs its practical and legal side strongly emphasized, so that the party may grow more and more. The work of the Red Labor Union International was the first lesson to the C. P. on linking two phases of the communist movement, legal with illegal. I had a very hard experience to show the C. P. leaders the importance of combination of two. It took me five long weeks to establish even a semblance of the cooperation.

As to the U. C. P. I have very little to say. You may meet soon some of the selected. The present U. C. P. lacks real leadership, as you see by its still retaining some of comrades, whose statement of brazen falsehood is well known to the Communist world. One of comrades of long standing tells me that the present U. C. P. leaders are careless and loose on the matter of accounting in general and in principle as well as in practice. It is the chief weakness of the U. C. P. I might here insert few facts that may interest you to know. 1. At the time of the split the so-called minority- [Charles E.] Ruthenberg and [Issac E.] Ferguson principally carried away the entire C. P. fund under the advice of Julius Heiman. These comrades of note say: It is a Bolshevik Policy as their justification of the conduct, which the present writer consider a grievous mistake. 2. The U. C. P. finding itself in minority on the membership basis coined an ignominious charge against the C. P. that it manipulated the membership. The charging the C. P. dishonesty by the U. C. P. is the greatest cause of party hatred and bitterness, and it cannot be pacified by anything but justice. 3. The present deadlock is largely due to the unsound policy of the U. C. P. It cannot be denied.

The U. C. P. needs the strong leadership in men of principle and integrity to check and safeguard the party from going to [be] opportunistic.

So much for the party affairs. The Unity report and the proposal for the unity was formulated by two opposing factions, consequently it cannot be more than a compromising proposal. This is the reason why I write here my own views on the present parties

Finally the whole policy of the American Council was reorganized at the arrival of F[raina]. on January 16. But on account of none arrival of expected fund we were compelled to cut down our expenses. Scott [Karlis Jansons] will write you the financial matter for which I wish you give your kind attention. Owing to the many circumstances we have not yet taken up other matters, but I expect to take up the work in the south soon. With my hearty greeting, and sincere regards to you all.

Yours for the cause!

22.04.1921 [Katayama] (Mexico City) to M. Kobezky [of the Small Bureau of the ECCI]
[ПГАСПИ, 495/108/11/14-16 (3×; typed and signed); 521/1/17/2-4 (typed duplicate)]

Mexico City, Mexico, April 22, 1921,

Comrade M. Kobezky [М.В. Кобецкий];

Dear Comrade;

When I wrote you about the subject you asked me to investigate concerning the documents you sent to me, I said that according to the materials I was sending you then I can not find any very serious fault with [Linn A.E.] Gale or with the documents, but I may change my opinion when I go there and investigate myself.

Objectively speaking the documents speak the truth of the matter, that's, M. Roy abused the credentials of M.C.P. [Mexican Communist Party] Man of his ability and experience, he knew very well, when he carried the M.C.P. Credentials from here, that he was representing neither a Communist Party of real power nor the proletariat of Mexico in a true sense of the word or otherwise. Thus M. Roy must have had in his mind when he got the credentials one sole aim of getting his admittance with it to the Second Congress of Third International, nothing else. And his manner of living and also the source of that living stated in the documents are true. The facts are admitted even by his professed friends to-day. I must, therefore, conclude that those protests entered by three organizations against Roy are undeniable, at the best his conduct in this should be said as a Jesuitical, "End justifies means." By the way, I may quote here in order to endorse my opinion, a statement of comrade Jesus Ramirez [Charles F. Phillips], who associated with Roy, and praises him as to his personality and candidness admitted to me that the manner and aim of his getting the credentials here were dishonest, and that he ought not have done it. It would be fitting here for me to inform you that Comrade Jesus Ramirez was engaged by Comrade Littlebit [Fraina] while both were in Europe and at the present time Ramirez is working with me.

As to those organizations that entered on the protest against Roy under the question are excepting the I.W.W. at the present as well as in the past no better if not worse, than the organization that Roy made use of or rather abused. As to Linn Gale I rather not say much at the present moment. Gale was the man who made three organizations enter the protest against Roy, whose arch rival Gale was. Gale's unpopularity in America and also American colony in Mexico City is especially among comrades well known, but at the same time Gale's unfailing energy and strenuous activities although while in Mexico is admitted equally both his enemies as well as his friends. No doubt Gale is a great worker and fighter with his pen and tongue aided by his faithful almost slavish yet industrious wife [Magdalena E. Gale], whose financial support out of her own toil has been the very strength in Gale's activities. These are the facts admitted by all, who knew Gale.

As to the true character and personality of Gale Judgement varies. Some of his enemies say that he is an out right provocateur, while others say a man suffering of neurotic and still others a hyperbolic mania. To me Gale is a typical American young upstart, able, pushing, aggressive, hasty and careless often compromising to his own sole interest. The type we saw in [H. Gaylord] Wilshire in '90th of last century and you can find many to-day as in Fryn [Elizabeth G. Flynn], [Bessie] Morgan, [John] Reed and M. Eastman, the last two come out the best of the same types. Gale is the worst of all perhaps, but unfortunately I never met Gale. What I say here is all either second hand out of his Magazine articles.

Gale was expelled by the Mexican Government some days ago. Comrades here told me that he was to be deported to the U.S.A., but by a man who has certain influence in the Mexican government made it deport Gale to Guatemala, but the G. government did not admit Gale, so he is now in Mexico

City under the arrest. Immediate cause or a pretext of the Mexico government to deport Gale was the article of his appeared in the Gale's magazine, March issue (I will send you with this), but it is said and rightly too that Gale was expelled under the very pressure of the U.S.A. Government. This can be well surmised by an additional fact that the Mexico's national policy toward the Washington Government under the present ruler is now a practical submission, as it was shown by the recent declaration of the government. Thus Gale is considering internationally a victim of imperialism and capitalism. Saddest of all for him is that he has a very few followers in Mexico and too many enemies, he has to entirely depend upon his own resources. Indeed I can not find a single comrade, who can be relied on among his followers.

As to the Communist Parties, - so-called Gale's and Roy's - both are really not a party by any means. Both consists of handful people respectively. Both have a few good comrades. Comrade Ramirez counted to me three in his party.

However two parties exist in names, So I am trying to get a new start under one name. It seems not so hard as it is in the U.S.A.

The above are my report to your request sent me last year.

I remain yours comradely;

[signed:] Sen Katayama.

1-3

22.04.1921 Sen Katayama (Mexico City) to Comrades [in the Comintern, Moscow]
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/11 (1×; typed and signed); 495/18/65/134 (typed duplicate)]

Mexico City, Mexico, April 22, 1921,

Dear Comrades;

The preliminary work that we have done up to [the middle March,]⁽¹⁾ the last of our delegates left New York, latter part of March, is now known to you through our report and comrade Dixon [Earl E. Browder] and others. Since then we have done very little owing to the financial hitches that we met. But it's now all straitened out by Littlebit's trip to Germany. I was very sorry this happened. I left New York on March 18th, leaving the work there in the hands of Scott who is now dealing with the unity. I am in constant touch with him by wire communication we are trying to do our best on this and other matters.

The affairs in Mexico, especially in this Capital, are nothing but hopeful and workers are more susceptible to the new movement that we just began, that's, the Red Lab-Union International than we met at the U.S.A. Our workers are yet few but they are quite good and able for the tasks we have before us. We sent one young comrade to the May Congress, who sailed on April 19th, who shall report you the condition more fully than I can.

We printed the [John T.] Murphy Pamphlet (ten thousand copies) going to issue first number of little weekly in Spanish on Saturday (23d of April, 1921) and Comrade Lozovski's pamphlet is translated and now retyping the Mss for the printer.

With this I am submitting to you my part of the financial report up till March 16th inst. And also a temporary budget for the work that I intend to begin in this country, our budget is necessarily temporal in nature, because Littlebit is not here and Scott is in the States, consequently we can't start the real Agency work. But I hope before long we shall be able to establish ourselves here so that we can carry out effectively our work assigned by you.

I remain yours for the cause,

[signed:] Sen Katayama.

(1) The words put in square brackets are handwritten only in the duplicate.

25.04.1921 Sen Katayama (Mexico City) to Comrades, the Third International (Moscow)
[ПГАСИИ, 495/108/11/20-21 (2×; typed and signed); 495/18/65/150-151 (typed duplicate)]

Mexico City, Mexico, April 25, 1921,

Dear Comrades,

Third International, Moscow,

It is only little over three weeks, since I came here, but the affairs here are much simpler than in the U.S.A. We have organized the provisional Mexican Bureau of the Red Labor Union International and sent one delegate to the May congress, while quite many unions are already affiliated to the R.L.U.I. Every day some unions are in a process of swinging toward the R.L.U.I. [sic] translated into Spanish and [sic]

As I reported to you previously that we have published Murphy Pamphlet and the first issue of the "Workers" (El Trabajadores) in Spanish.

There are two Communist Parties in Mexico at least in names. The two parties have been fighting each other as in other countries.

As soon as I came here I have got in touch with the representatives of both parties[.] I sent a letter to both parties, which I send you with this[,] and several times I had conference with them. On the 23d inst. we had a conference with the representatives of both parties and they had finally agreed for the unity. They agreed to call a convention signed by both parties jointly as I have proposed to them a sort of the bases for the unity resolution, which I am sending to you with this. Thus the Mexican affairs are practically settled within a less than a month.

With the U.S. affairs it is quite different. There the movement is well under the way, consequently splits and party squabbles and fight and hatred etc. Just now they are having many difficulties in the matters of the necessary unity. When you sent a message to American Branch of the Agency, being I was away them, so Scott took charge of the matter, of course I supported him, but he was not careful in his report, consequently we have made some mistake at the very start in Scott's presenting our draft to two parties. When he was created himself an impasse by his too insistentness [insistence] on C.P. I for the first time got from Scott your order,- Agency has full power amalgamation two companies. Amalgamation must be completed June first otherwise new company will be formed disregarding old ones. No special form amalgamation decided by home office. Decision final. Representative to home office only acceptable amalgamated corporation. This cable was sent to me on April 24, 1921. To-day (April 26, 1921) Scott sent me the following cable as your answer to Scott's or Fraina's request to your approval to our draft on the unity that we sent you sometime ago. The cable in question reads as follows;- Received following from main office [ECCI]; authorized by board of directors to state Agency has no authority to press five conditions. Equal basis and chairman joint stock meeting with voice but no vote enough and all is necessary. Other conditions are not pertaining to preliminary arrangements and are subject to decision of joint stock meeting. Josef Andrews [Nicholas I. Hourwich] and Marshall [Max Bedacht] Co. If Scott sent me the first order from you and consulted me before he acted, namely, his presenting the draft to two parties we could have called a convention long before this but it went wrong way and such a trouble and delay.

However with your additional order, that's, second cable above quoted we are very certain that two parties will unite by all means, because your not giving the convention chairman, that's, the Agency a customary right of the casting vote as it is always the case in America when it happens a tie vote will

shift the entire responsibility of unity on the two parties and at the same time will make us, the Agency retain an impartiality and equilibrium of the convention proceeding. With this advisory and, I should say, a friendly office of Agency's chairmanship we may be able to guide the coming convention to a successful goal! That is my interpretation of your two, apparently contradictorily one with the other, cables. If I am not mistaken in the interpretation, then the Agency's "Full power amalgamation" should be understood to be of persuasive, conciliatory and guiding power that should be fully exercised by the chairman to see the opposing elements in the unity convention, the very fact that after the first of June they shall be disregarded, and a new one will be formed, in which task the Agency shall have full responsibility and the work, although it is not specified in the first cable but from the very nature and existence of the Agency under your authorities specifically charged with the work of organizing communist parties in Mexico, Canada and entire Latin America. Thus by a well grounded inference we should go on the work of new organization. This will be the inevitable outcome and at the same time a sort of threat to the two parties in the deliberation at the convention. I am not in a position to know what other members of the Agency will consider my interpretation of the entire situation of the matter yet, but I am sure they too will agree with mine.

As to my immediate future course I have few days ago told Comrade Scott that I shall come back to the States at once, although it will be little risky to do so at the present moment, although I left the States without any trouble, I have to return by some method that cannot be explained here. They want me to be there and like to be there too[,] only trouble is how to get in safely.

One thing troubles me very much is the work here, we have just begun although it is of a small beginning, yet a good and hopeful beginning. I have a young comrade, J. Ramirez, it requires my presence very much. However, I am very much needed there across the border. With a day or two I may leave here for the North.

So far we have not received almost any literatures or periodicals from you, I hope you will look after the matter and send us as much and many as possible. We shall be very much obliged to you.

I remain yours for the cause,

[signed:] Sen Katayama.

P.S.

On the 27th of April, 1921, I received a cable from Scott, "Joint call agreed upon and signed by all concerned stop your presence no more required."

I am very glad that they agreed so far and I am sure they unite in the coming convention without much trouble.

[signed:] S. K.

1-5

26.05.1921 Yavki (Mexico City) to Comrades [in the Comintern, Moscow]
[ПГАСИИ, 495/108/11/25 (1×; typed and signed); 521/1/17/15 (typed duplicate)]

Mexico City, Mexico, May 26, 1921,

Dear Comrades;

As I reported to you previously our work here has been getting in a good shape. The Provisional Mexican Bureau of the Red Labor Union International has been doing a very good propaganda work, many unions have affiliated with the R.L.U.I. We thought it a time to start some propaganda outside the City of Mexico, so we sent out two of our best comrades to make tour of two weeks at four important industrial centres of the country.

Our organ, "The Worker," has been getting ever wider circulation and receiving encouraging comment from the rank and file of union members.

On the 16th inst. suddenly our comrade Jesus Ramirez was arrested without any reason at all. Well, I was to free from my room and hide myself, and am still with rather bad expecting action of being caught! So far I am safe as I am writing you this report.

In spite of my specific order and sincere advice of mine R.'s wife without even arranging her own private affairs surrendered herself to the police authority to be taken to her husband. This unwise conduct on the part of her upset the matter and one of comrades were got into trouble and arrested and even his wife got into a difficulty on account of her husband's endorsing the house rental contract. We don't blame her of hasty conduct but pity and after all sympathize at her present situation.

Since then those comrades we sent to the country as propagandist were captured and we fear some of them already deported. Now altogether 12 or 14 are arrested at first under a pretext that they partook the invading the Parliament House and planted a red flag in the platform. But those arrested were nothing to do with the matter at all. Now, however, the government declared that it is the policy of the government that all the foreign Red agitators will be deported from the country under the constitutiona[l] clause 33, which gives the President of the Republic to order deportation of any undesirable foreigners, without trial at all.

The workers are not idle they are protesting against the deportation orders and sent some strong protest and petition to the Press, but without avail. Unions one after another that are affiliated with the R.L.U.I. passing a vigorous protest against the deportation of comrades. It is rumored that our workers are going to take a still more effective method of their protest.

Such being the case our work is somewhat retarded while. But we have been issuing the weekly right along. The no. 6 will come out next Saturday. And we intend to continue as long as we can.

My colleague in the U.S.A. promised to send some enforcements but failed to do so, so it is impossible for me to do much under the present circumstances. However, I will stand firm and do my very best to fight against the Imperialism of America, whose puppet the Mexican government is. Be assured of this fast that Mexican workers are already awakening and they are more revolutionary than those of America, I mean, U.S.A.

I look for your speedy enforcement and support!

Mexican comrades and specially I send you our heartiest greetings!

I remain for the cause of International Revolution!

[signed:] Yavki

1-6

26.05.1921 & 05.06.1921 Yavki (Mexico City) to Comrades [in the Comintern, Moscow]
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/29-34 (6×; typed and signed); 495/18/65/190-195
(typed duplicate); cf. 521/1/17/15]

Mexico City, Mexico, May 26, 1921,

Dear Comrades;

As you may have seen in the columns of our organ, "El Trabajador," our work here has been getting in a good shape, since I have come here at the beginning of April last. The Provisional Mexican Bureau of the Red Labor Union International has been doing a very effective propaganda work. Many unions have affiliated with the R.L.U.I. We thought it a time to start some propaganda works outside the Capital, so we sent out two of our best members of our organization to make tour to the four of the most important industrial centres of the country for two weeks. The said two comrades left for Tampico on the 12th of May.

The organ of the Provisional Mexican Bureau of the Red Labor International, "El Trabajador," has been getting ever wider circulation and receiving encouraging comments from the rank and file of trades union members throughout the country.

On May 16th, Comrade Francis Seaman [Charles F. Phillips] was arrested without any reason. On that evening I met Natalia Mjaloeva [Наталья А. Михайлова] at the house of certain comrade's. In spite of my specific order and sincere advice, she next morning without even arranging her own private affairs and without notifying any one surrounded herself to the police authority simply to be taken to her husband! This unwise and uncomradely conduct on her part upset the our situation. One of our trusted friends got into trouble and finally arrested, I presume, caused by the above incidence. And, moreover, the trusted comrade's wife and mother of two young children also got later on into trouble, simply because of Natalia's wilful neglect! We do not, however, blame her of the hasty and unthoughtful conduct, but we pity her! After all we greatly sympathize for her present situation.

Few days later those two comrades we sent out to the country on the propaganda tour were captured. We fear that one of them already deported out of the country. Now altogether 12 comrades were arrested by the order of the President of the Republic, at first under the pretext of their being the partakers in the act of invading the National Parliament House and planted Red Flag there. But those arrested are nothing to do with the matter at all. Now, however, the government declared that it is the policy of the government that all the foreign red agitators be deported from the country under the constitutional clause 33, which gives the President of the Mexico right to order deportation of any undesirable foreigner, as considered by the President himself, without due process of law, that is, without any trial.

Meanwhile workers are not idle one union after another got up a vigorous protest against the deportation of comrades and all the radical labor organizations such as I.W.W. and others making protest against the deportation of foreign agitators. The I.W.W. of Mex. amidst the deportation of the chief editor of their official organ being on the way of his deportation voted to affiliate with the Red Labor Union International. The said editor, comrade M. Paley [Herman M. Levine] is the member of the Provisional Mexican Bureau of the R.L.U.I. It shows the spirit and aspiration of the Mexican workers.

Such being the situation we are just now placed, our work outside of the City of Mexico is somewhat retarded for the time being, but we have been issuing the Bureau organ, "El Trabajador" without stopping. Number 6 will come out next Saturday (May 28) and we shall continue to publish as long as we can.

My colleague in the U.S.A. promised long ago to send some enforcements but so far I do not

get them, so it is impossible for me to do much work under the present circumstance however, I will stand firm and do my best to fight against the Imperialism of the United States of America, whose puppet the Mexican Government is. Be assured of this fact that the Mexican proletariat is speedily approaching the dawn of the social revolution and they are more revolutionary than that of the U.S.A.

I look for your speedy enforcement and support!

The Mexican comrades and I send you our hearty greeting!

I remain for the cause of International Revolution!

June 5, 1921,

Dear Comrades;

The forgoing report was made from a dark den in the Chinese quarter of this City where I was temporarily located. Naturally I was rather depressed with vague fear of something may happen at any moment. Fortunately, however, I am so far safe, a week ago I moved to somewhat safer and more comfortable place under the kind care of one of comrades, from where I am now making this second report, on our present situation;

While these foreigners arrested have been deported to different destinations, not, however, according to their nationalities, some are now on the way to south. Particularly Seaman, his wife and [Sebastián] San Vicente are, I believe on the way to Panama. None of three is Panaman; Seaman is American, his wife Russian and San Vicente is Spaniard. Three comrades, namely, Paley, Allen and [W.F.] Fortmeyer, are now in the U.S.A. The first two are already set free so we heard, but the last, who has never been active for the cause was deported and detained by the American authorities yet. We do not understand why he was deported and why is he yet detained! Comrade [José] Rubio was sent once to the American border, but his being Spaniard again brought back to this capital and again sent to Vera Cruz, from where he is to be deported to Spain. He is now at the said port (June 8). The rest I do not know as to their fate.

I say while foreigners, who worked for the cause of proletariat, were deported from Mexico, that claimed to have been in a labor or socialist government, the awakened Mexican proletarians are being busy with their organizing works. Occasional bomb throwings have been reported from time to time, but mostly conflicts between Catholics and radical element of the workers, instigated either by misguided syndicalists or some mean yellow politicians' schemes simply to discredit the ever growing communist movements and the Red Labor Union International, which recently started with a remarkable successes everywhere. The highly indignant bourgeois public at the bomb outrages are pacified by the governmental declaration that it will thoroughly investigate the matter. And already weakened bourgeois public seemed satisfied with this announcement! In order to crush radical movements of all shades the ruling classes are trying to incite Catholic people into religious hatred against the liberal tendencies and the catholic leaders are attempting to amass the Catholic workers into the conservative camp to fight against the radical proletarians. But this artificial division of proletarians will not succeed here in Mexico, because the ever increasing economic pressure in the forms of unemployment and high cost of living on the workers are in same way felt equally by both Catholic, Protestant and atheistic proletarians.

As to the Provisional Mexican Bureau of the Red Labor Union International on account of arrest and subsequent deportation of the Bureau members consultative and deliberative works have been lacking somewhat but the main work at the present time limited to publishing the organ; "El Trabajador." It has been appearing regularly with increasing circulation and good influence. Some of important pamphlets are to be published into Spanish and comrades are translating them, which will be ready to send soon to the printer. It is fortunate for us to realize a fact that the recent pressure on the communist movement so far at least limited to only those foreigners prominent in the movement and those Bureau members of the Mexican comrades are so far unmolested and they are exerting their energy doubly on the Bureau work. I am glad to say that for the first time the Mexican communist movement has been, since the arrest of foreign leaders, carried on by the Mexican comrades alone and that they are exceptionally doing well.

Mexican proletarians, as those of other Latin American countries, are deeply imbued with syndicalistic notions or more concretely influenced by anarchistic ideas, while Marxian socialism is not known among the proletarians, and far less so communism and Bolshevism. The names of Kropotkin, Bakunin and Maratesta are very well known among Mexican workers, but those of Marx, Engels and other socialists are hardly known among them. But the Russian Revolutions are well known to the Mexican proletariat. Consequently Bolshevik and Bolshevism are now very popular among the workers. Even the yellow union organ, "La Lucha" has been right along printing the communist literatures, such as the Communist Manifesto of the Third International and Zinov[i]ef's article and many others, simply because to satisfy the very demands of the workers in the Mexican Federation of Labor [Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana (CROM)]. In Mexico labor, socialist or communist meetings are conducted on the most liberal fashion. The floor is given to every one and any kind argument is expounded on the meeting. Lately discussions on the merit and demerit of socialism[,] anarchism and communism are the most fascinating topics. Older workers are generally the defenders of anarchism and syndicalism, while the younger proletarians are always on the camp of communism and Bolshevism. It is very encouraging to see that communist banner of Mexico is borne more and more enthusiastically by the young proletarians of Mexico.

The Communist Youths of Mexico has a splendid leadership in Comrade Jose C. Valades, the member of the Provisional Mexican Bureau of the Red Labor Union International, and chief editor of "El Trabajador." When I came here the Communist Youths have had 40 or 50 members in the City of Mexico, which gradually increased to 180 in the beginning of May and now they tell me altogether 800 members. It is increasing pretty rapidly. They have their own monthly organ, called, "Juventud Mundial." And lately sending out their own special organizers all over the country. Just today came back one of those organizers from Puebla, the one of two textile industrial centres of Mexico, where there are nearly twenty thousand textile workers in this place, while there are twenty-five thousand workers in Orizaba. There was no Communist Youths Branch in Puebla; all the workers are of Catholic religion, and home of conservative unions. At this place the C.Y. organizer established a C.Y. Branch of 25 members. This is the work of only few days! The branch pledged to take 50 copies of El Trabajador each issue.

Our Communist Youths are well disciplined and enthusiastic workers. They pay a monthly due of 80 cents each and lately started the Saturdaying, so that every member is to contribute a day wages without fail. It is obligatory for every member. Thus they are able to send two organizers. It will be the youths, who will build up a strong Communist movement in Mexico. All the older workers are either tinged with syndicalistic ideas or in despair on account of faithlessness of the labor leaders, who again and again betrayed them into the hands of bourgeois interest in the past, as twenty thousand workers of Mexico City were led by the anarchist leaders to fight for [Venustiano] Carranza against his opponents! Such leaders loosing the confidence of proletarians can not command their respect. It is clear that the communist movement conducted in the sane and upright manner will surely gain the respect and support of all the sensible proletarians in this country. And that nuclei and centres of the healthy communist movement of Mexico are the communist youths', who are already becoming rapidly class conscious and able workers and communist agitators. We are told by many reliable comrades that there are many communists and communist sympathizers throughout the land, but owing to the petty splits and party or rather factional quarrels and partisan hatred and above all the lack of any recognized communist centres the real communists and sympathizers have been unable to get together and organize themselves into a party, but they will come out openly and join the movement as soon as the communist youths establish the communist centres throughout the country, which they are already on the very task. Thus the Communist Youths of Mexico have serving for the great cause of upbuilding the communist party and its movement. It is voted at one of recent Communist Youths meetings to call a convention with an express purpose of organizing the Communist Party of Mexico, since the expulsion of all the foreign communist leaders the both old communist parties almost disappeared from the active field with their leaders. They exist only in name. At least they have done nothing since the loss of their leaders. That is

undeniable fact. Anyway either of them not strong as a propaganda factor. With the Communist Youths plan of the Communist Party the rank and file of the both parties of old will gladly come to join the new party, thus we shall be able to unite the scattered communist forces throughout the country into one compact party, so as to be able to accomplish our desired end in the near future.

Again and finally I assure you my foreign comrades that Mexican proletarians are already awakened to the necessity of social revolutionary movement. The left wing of the Mexican Federation of Labor, which is at the present time affiliated to the Gompers' American Federation of Labor, has been growing in number of membership and in strength, while the General Confederation of Workers [Confederación General de Trabajadores (CGT)], of red labor unions is in its stead growth. So that Mexico will be prepared soon for the final act that must come sooner or later in this or in every country.

I close this brief report with the best wishes and heartiest greeting to you all those who are working for the same great cause!

Yours etc.

[signed:] Yavki

P.S. I am pleased very much to say that my colleague sent me three enforcements, that were here for two weeks; after many anxieties and troubles I was able at last to utilize them since last Wednesday (June 8th). I am now, thus, better prepared to meet any emergency and shall be able to vigorously fight against oppressions to so advance our cause here. I am very much grateful to my friend in the States for his sending the timely enforcements!

[signed:] Y.

11.06.1921 [Katayama] (Mexico City) to Comrade [in Moscow]
[ПГАСПН, 495/18/66/14 (1×; typed duplicate)]

Mexico City, June 11, 1921,

Dear Comrade;

On May 26 I sent you my hurrying report on the situation here, while I was in state of uneasiness and much anxiety as to my immediate future. For the past weeks I have been staying at a better and safer place. I shall be able, thus, to do my duties, at least I hope so. I can not tell as to the future, especially in this trying time. Now whatever happens to me the work I have started here shall go on unmolested and vigorously too. We have now almost laid a solid foundation of our movement in the heart of many communist youths, who will carry on the work.

In a week or so I shall be able to send you more minute and somewhat concrete report on the Mexican situation, and moreover, I am trying to get in touch with some of S. America, especially Uruguay and Chile, where we have pretty good C.P. movement and also Guatemala. All of these we have our connections. I am trying to get some concrete report on the condition of things there.

The C.P. movement in Canada is going nicely as my colleague wrote me some time ago. There we placed a very able young comrade to build up the movement, so within a short while we shall have a pretty good foundation to work with. I do not so far hear from Argentina. A couple comrades, husband and wife, we sent there wrote me on the way from the border state, since I should have received their letter, but unfortunately our addresses became since the middle of May last utter[ly] useless, it will take some time to get a proper connection with them. Things in Argentina are very interesting and hopeful judging by the bourgeois press reports. Mexico is especially ripe for our effective propaganda in every way. And I am trying to utilize the situation I have before me.

I remain yours for the cause,

On the left side of the top the following is handwritten: "Sent R[ussia]."

01.08.1921 [Katayama](Mexico, D.F.) to N. Bukharin
[ПГАСПН, 495/18/66/61 (1×; typed duplicate)]

Mexico, D. F., Mexico, August 1, 1921,

Comrade N. Bukharin:

Dear Comrade;

With this I am sending you a short review on the labor movement in Japan, which I am sure you are interested to know. Our workers in Japan are doing very well as they yet inexperienced in the propaganda work.

As to Communist movement our comrades organized the C.P. in April and sent the documents to N.Y., which I am sure they sent to you. The latest news we got from Japan says that two of our best comrades sent from N.Y. were arrested and one of them may also arrested. But the Jap. authorities stopped the press to report all news concerning the Bolsheviki so last one or nearly two months we do not know what other comrades doing, however, we are sure of their activities, as long as they are not captured. One of comrades who went back is now connected with the miners' Federation. So that every thing moving all right in Japan. As you shall see by reading my report that the Japanese workers are doing pretty well for the movement.

As to the work here about [a] month ago Lilbit and Stela [Esther; Mrs. Fraina] arrived, since we are attending at our business. Everything seems favorable for our work here. American oil magnates stopped the work so many thousand workers are out of work. We just issued manifesto to them to organize them. Yucatan socialist party is going to hold convention on 15 inst. We are going to issue a manifesto and solicit them to affiliate with 3rd. There is a strong left wing movement in the S.P. so we are certain they will come to us. The Communist Youth League is just now holding Congress in this city. They have voted to help to organize the C.P.M. [Communist Party of Mexico] and appointed a committee for the immediate work. I addressed a letter to the Congress held at Orizaba last month of the Mexican Federation of Labor. It was favorably reported in the socialist paper 31 Democrata [*El Demócrata*] of this city. They have too a quite good left wing on which we are working on.

I suppose you are getting our little El Trabajador (weekly organ of Mexican Bureau of red labor international). Another weekly "31 [El] Obrero Comunista" will come out on the 4th inst. and on the 15th inst. "Revista Comunista" (a monthly) will be published. We have just printed the Program of Communists by N.B. and also the State and Revolution will be published next week. The Communist Program is selling pretty well.

Within a week so I shall send you a fuller report on our work here, meanwhile goodbye. Please give my best regard to all! I remain yours for the cause,

24.08.1921 [Katayama] (Mexico, D.F.) to E.C. of Communist International
[РГАСПИ, 521/1/17/96-101 (6×; typed duplicate)]

Mexico, D.F., Mexico, August 24, 1921,

To E.C. of Communist International:

Dear Comrades;

Since the arrest and deportation of comrades, who were engaged with our work in the middle of May last I had to reorganize our work under rather difficult circumstances, for I was to hide myself and to work with one or two Mexican comrades. The direct contact with few best comrades, the real Mexican comrades, gave me very good chance to know the real conditions here which otherwise I did not have a chance until that time, because for the first six weeks I have done every thing through comrade Ramirez. Such being the case what I am going to write you are my own personal experiences with the Mexican comrades.

I presume that you got my short reports of April 25, in which I said that we have organized a Provisional Mexican Bureau of the Red Labor Union International and published Murphy Pamphlet and also started the organ of the Mexican Bureau "El Trabajador"; and of May 12th ⁽¹⁾ in which I gave general feature of our financial conditions and the work has been in a fair shape and making a slow but steady progress. With it I also submitted a provisional budget for the Mexican Bureau, and on May 26, I made a hurrying report on the arrest and deportation of our comrades, which supplemented by a somewhat fuller report on the matter and the general conditions on our work and Mexican conditions dated on June 5.

Beside the Mexican Bureau work, I have written several letters of propaganda purpose. On May 15 I sent out to the Central and South America notifying the organization of the Agency in Mexico and communications and material be sent here (the letter attached with this). On the 25th of June I wrote a letter to the Local Congress of the Mexican Federation of Labor at Puebla soliciting them to join the Red Labor Union International, which made a very good effect on the members assembled and on the workers of Puebla generally. On July 1st another letter I wrote to the National Congress of the Mexican Federation of Labor at Orizaba, on the Red Labor Union International which was presented and read by one of members of the Mexican Bureau, the President of the Mexican Railway Federation. The both letters I am sending you with this and other papers. And on August 1st I wrote a letter to the Congress of the Socialist Party of Southeast of Mexico assembled at Izamal, Yucatan. We sent the letter by Comrade [Roberto] Celis, who will remain coming two months in Yucatan and work for the Red Labor Union International and organizing Communist nuclei there already he has reported to us that one of important unions affiliated to the Red Labor International.

As to the publications "the Worker" has been coming out regularly. The next issue will be number 17. State and Revolution by Lenin and Program of Communists by Bukharin both will be published within a week or so and three other books are in the hands of printer. The Communist Worker[,] a propaganda weekly will be issued to-day its second number and we expect to publish a theoretical Communist Monthly next month.

As to the concrete features of the Communist movement the deportation of the foreign socialist or communist leaders last May gave me a knowledge of the real condition of things. Two opposing communist parties disappeared like a shadow with the deportation of their respective leaders. Thus what I put my effort in trying to unite two communist parties proved to be an utter waste! At the same time I found out that most of older workers are more or less influenced by anarcho-syndicalistic ideas, consequently they deadly opposed to political party, hence the communist party. But younger people

among the workers are more interested in the communist movement than the older workers. This features I found in the Communist Youth organization.

The Association of the Communist Youths of Mexico was organized in January 1920. Although it sent a delegate to the Berlin Congress of the Communist Youths, yet the Mexican organization spent the whole year a very precarious existence with a handful members, mostly led by some anarcho-syndicalists. But the beginning of the present year it was reorganized by a real and able Communist comrade [José C. Valadés] and its organ "Juventud Mundial" has been published regularly in an improved form and the members became very much interested in the communist propaganda work. Membership has been increasing ever since and groups were organized one after another, which to-day number some 14 with due paying membership of about eight hundred and they have two small printing shops, one in Orizaba and the other in this City.

The Communist Youths here are well disciplined and most of good workers, so after consulting with the leaders of the Communist Youths we have decided to build our future Communist Party of Mexico with senior members of the Youths and moreover, asked the Communist Youths to help the organizing the C.P. of M. I wrote a letter to the Communist Youths, which has been talking of calling a congress soon, asking them to appoint a committee for the organizing Communist Party of Mexico. Then when Comrade Thompson [Fraina] arrived here we have decided to issue a manifesto [to] the Communist Youth Congress and Comrade T. [has] drawn up the Manifesto which I send with this.

The Congress of the Communist Youths met on the first of August and appointed an organizing committee for the Communist Party, and now they are deliberating on the work. The report of the Communist Youth Congress is also with this. The representative of the A.A. shall work for the present organizing committee in conjunction with other organizers which will be soon appointed and sent to different parts of the country. The Communists' Congress will be called at Orizaba sometime next September or October.

Thus our work is making slow but sure progress toward the goal. Of course there are many difficulties that confront before us. In the first place we lack workers. In the past Mexico never have had any efficient Communist agitator or organizer. The founders of two communist parties, Roy and Gale were not by any means an experienced Communist neither left any follower who was called a communist. Handful men hung round the so-called Communist Party with an expectation of getting some outside help. It is not any fault on the part of the rank and file but it is fault of leaders, who have no ideas of party work at all.

In the next place as an anarcho-syndicalist influence the political party is despised and minimized by the labor leaders. It is not altogether fault of anarcho-syndicalists, because political parties in Mexico are thoroughly corrupted and are almost all of them existed to be abused by the leaders. In fact they are organized by them to satisfy their own personal end. The members of parties are a mere tool of leaders. They have neither party obligation nor benefit of the party. These features are profitably pointed out to the workers by the anarcho-syndicalists to their own benefit. It is, therefore, our chief task to show the workers the differences between the existing political parties and our Communist Party. The workers in general are not anarcho-syndicalist, they are really not so much influenced by the anarcho-syndicalists as many might think by mere superficial observation.

In the third place as a general Mexican workers are not well educated as some of American and European workers, especially this is the case with the vast majority of peasants, who are exploited by the big landlords. The Mexican workers and peasants were subjected to the hardships for many years on account of revolutions. Especially the peasants were the very victim of the successive revolutions. They were looted and robbed by Generals and soldiers. It is said that there are over two thousand Generals in Mexico to-day, who are looking for some chances to make themselves fame of exploit and after the personal gains. Thus there are exceptionally many political as well as military parasites in Mexico, consequently the workers and peasants are more and more exploited.

In the fourth place the Mexican industries are owned by foreign capitalists, mostly by American and English capitalists. Thus Mexican workers are more mercilessly exploited and robbed by these

foreign employers. The American and English bosses are really a slave driver of the poor Mexican workers. Unfortunately those intelligent native workmen, are bought by the foreign bosses to exploit the common Mexican workers. This most tragic feature is displayed everywhere in a backward country where the foreign domination is established either economic or political sphere as in India and Cuba. The better qualified workers among the natives, who ought stand for their own countrymen and fight against the foreign oppressors prove to be the greatest traitors to the cause of proletariat. Thus so far over sixty thousand oil workers of Mexico are not yet organized with exception of few thousands. By the way the Mexican Bureau of the Red International has been just started to organize the oil workers in conjunction with the General Federation of Workers, Mexico, D.F. and I.W.W. The G.F.W. issued the Manifesto to the oil workers of Tampico, which I shall send you with this ⁽²⁾.

Now over against the above difficulties mentioned we have some hopeful sides:

1) The Mexican workers and peasants are revolutionary. They do not shrink from fighting. They have had sufficient experiences in the immediate past. They have disappointed in the past revolutionary experiences. They were abused by the revolutionary leaders and deceived them with false promises and trampled down under feet when they got the power by the very revolution. But this very fact gives us a very good propaganda reason for the social revolution in the future. We can readily point out to the workers and peasants the real differences between the political revolutions and social revolution and convince them foolishness of fighting in the political revolutions as they have done in their past, because they fought and killed for the sole benefit of the revolutionary leaders making themselves easy victims. And at the same time the coming social revolution is the only revolution that they should by all means fight for their own benefit. Thus we have a very good ground for the constructive revolutionary propaganda in Mexico.

2) While revolutionary spirit is rife among the workers and peasants of Mexico[,] the big landlords and foreign capitalists are the brutal exploiters. Every revolution makes in change of ownership of big landed properties. Each and every revolutionary leaders at the start declare to the peasants that they shall confiscate the big landed properties for the people. But they do confiscation of those big landed properties not for the peasants but for their own benefit only. Thus peasants have been again and again deceived by the revolutionary leaders. It is highly gratifying to know that the Mexican peasants have lately awakened and realized the foolishness of their fighting for the selfish revolutionary leaders and in some counties they are actually confiscating the big landed properties among themselves. Falling a leaf tells the coming of Autumn! We are very much encouraged by recent application of peasants from the country near the City of Mexico in the effect that they desire to form a Communist section of the Communist Party of Mexico among the peasants themselves.

3) Mexico to-day has more freedom of speech and assembly than her neighbour, the U.S.A. The present government often advertised as a socialist government. In fact there are self-styled socialist ministers in the present cabinet. In the state of Yucatan the socialist party of the Southeast of Mexico dominates the government. Thus we have a comparative freedom of the Communist propaganda here. Our organ of the Red Mexican Bureau, "El Trabajador" and the new weekly "El Obrero Comunista" have both mailing privilege, which means that we have a legal existence here while America has not. The dictatorship of the proletariat is freely discussed pro et con at the open meeting and the proceedings of such meetings are reported fully in the city bourgeois newspapers. This feature gives us supreme opportunity to advertise and propagate the idea and principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

4) The anarcho-syndicalists of Mexico since the appearance of the organ of the Mex. Red Bureau "El Trabajador" became restless and fighting against the dictatorship of the proletariat. They [were] terribly afraid of loosing their foot hold among the Mexican workers. Recently they organized a body called "Light and Life" [Luz y Vida] to combat against the communist movement especially against the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This shows that how the communist movement is spreading among the rank and file of workers and peasants.

5) In Mexico socialism is comparatively a new thing and communism is practically unknown among the workers and peasants until the Russian November Revolution. There are countless literatures

of anarcho-syndicalism. Kropotkin, Bakunin, Proudhon and Malatesta are well known as well as their writings, which are cheap so accessible to common workers. But socialist literature are very rare in Mexico. It is almost impossible to get them. The communist literatures are still more scarce to get them. Some prominent books are translated into Spanish but they are published in Spain and by the bourgeois book makers, intended for the well [*sic*] to do classes. The State and Revolution by Lenin costs three pesos equivalent to \$1.50 in American money. Russian Communist literatures are the very subject of the exploitation by the Spanish bourgeois publishers. Marx and Engels are not well known to the Mexican proletarians, only they are advertised by anarcho-syndicalists to their own benefit, consequently true Marxism has been never known to them so far. Although the Russian Bolshevik Revolution has been well known among the workers and peasants yet the communist principle is not understood by them. But this gives us a good opportunity to preach it at this time, because it will attract the attention of the workers and peasants of the newness of the subject.

Finally such being the present condition in this country we shall be able to organize the Communist Party of Mexico with a fair prospect of success.

Yours for the cause,

(1) This report of May 12 is not found out (or it may be undelivered).

(2) Cf. "Manifest to the Tampico Oil Field Workers," in: ПГАСИИ, 521/1/17/112-115 (the sender was neither stated except "we," nor signed; typed draft).

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05.09.1921 Report of American Agency. Kata[yama]/Fra[ina]/American Agency, C.I. to the Small Bureau of the Executive Committee
[ПГАСПИ, 495/108/11/36-41 (6×; typed and signed); 495/18/66/98-103 (typed and signed); 495/108/10/24-29 (typed draft)]

Report of American Agency

The Small Bureau of
the Executive Committee,

Dear Comrades:

Supplementing previous reports, we send you a specific report on the Communist Party in Mexico:

The arrest of the active comrades here in middle of May (includ[ing]-Seaman, and previously Gale) and their deportation from Mexico as foreign agitators, our work was temporarily completely broken up. Com- K. himself was forced into hiding for a short time. Then the hunt slackened, Comrade F. arrived, and the work started all over again, and practically from the beginning.

The arrests and deportations served one useful purpose: it revealed the real situation here, the full truth of which was not given in Moscow last year nor to the Agency. There was no real Communist Party here, in spite of the existence of two "Communist parties." These two parties, the heads of which were foreigners, had no real membership and were really vehicles of personal struggles. Comrade K. in April had tried to unite the two "Communist parties," when, with the deportation of their leaders the two parties completely disappeared!

Up until the arrests and deportations the Agency work here in connection with building a party was on a wrong basis, since the Agency worked through the two "Communist parties" which really did not exist. It was impossible to secure real information. The efforts to unite the two parties was utter waste.

But now, aware of the actual situation and that it was necessary to start from the beginning, the work proceeded on a real basis.

The fact that the two "Communist parties" were simply personal affairs had prejudiced many against a Communist Party. Our problem, was to offset this personal factor and try to develop a party out of the masses, not out of a few leaders.

On surveying the field we found that the only Communist group with a definite organization and membership was the Mexican Federation of Communist Youth. This Federation was organized in July 1920, sent a delegate to the Berlin Communist Youth Congress, but spent six months in a very precarious condition, mostly led by some Anarcho-Syndicalists. In February of this year the Youth Federation was re-organized largely through the work of one or two real Communist comrades. At this moment the Federation of Communist Youth has a membership of over 500 which pay regular dues (an important fact, since in the two "Communist parties" there was no such thing); its membership is concentrated in Mexico City, Orizaba, Pueblo and Guadalajara. It publishes a monthly organ,

International Youth, with a circulation of two thousand (we are helping financially to improve and enlarge the paper - we shall give twenty five dollars a month if the Federation raises another twenty five dollars). The Federation, however, is not yet tactically quite clear, as witness its theses adopted at the Congress early in August, where they decided against participation in elections, and were very unclear concerning politics (Theses attached - Appendix No. 1 ⁽¹⁾). However, this is characteristic of Mexico; and we shall overcome it.

The important thing is that the Youth Federation is definitely organized, disciplined, of fundamental Communist tendency and has good workers, not being the sport of any one or two leaders. Accordingly, after consultation with the Youth comrades, we decided to make the Federation of Communist Youth the starting point for the organization of a Communist Party.

We are not, however, repeating the mistake made in Spain, where the Youth Federation automatically transformed itself into a Communist Party. Our purpose is simply to use the Youth Federation to speak as an organization, not in the name of a private group.

Accordingly we issued a Manifesto on these lines to the Congress of the Communist Youth held early in August (Manifesto attached, Appendix No. 2 ⁽²⁾). We asked the Congress to appoint a Committee which would be an Organization Committee for the Communist Party (making it clear that we did not intend that the Youth Federation should give up its identity). The plan is to add members from other Communist groups to this Committee, and start a mass movement for the formation of a Communist Party.

The Organization Committee for the Communist Party has issued a Manifesto outlining its plans (Manifesto attached, Appendix 3 ⁽³⁾).

We do not intend to call the Congress until possibly December. We act in this way because we do not want to start any mush-room affair that will disappear one or two months after it is organized - if that happened, it would set back our work for years. We want time for a definite, systematic Communist organization (which they have never had here), to organize Communist groups to be represented at the Congress, to actually have organizations represented at the Congress and not simply a congress of private individuals (the favorite method of organizing parties in Mexico).

The work must necessarily proceed slowly. Material and workers are lacking. There was never in Mexico any efficient Communist agitators or organizers. Roy and Gale left no Communist followers. We have established a Class to train Communist agitators and organizers which is conducted by one of the best Mexican comrades. The workers with Communist tendencies were never organized or called to party work - and that is the first consideration.

We shall not be very severe on the Communist understanding of the Communist groups who are to organize the Communist Party, providing they are honest and actually represent workers. That is to say, we shall for the present deal gently with the Anarcho-Syndicalists, trusting that once they are in the party the party work itself and the influence of the Executive Committee of the Communist International will change their opinions. But we shall so organize the Congress that the best Communist elements will dominate.

The Organization Committee works in close contact with the Agency, all its acts, decisions and manifestoes being first submitted to us for approval. In this respect, the active Mexican Communist comrades are excellent, showing no resentment about "dictation" and eager to learn.

In order to carry on the work of agitation and organization for the Communist Party, Mexico has been divided into six districts, to each of which a comrade will be sent to dispose of literature, organize Communist groups, etc. Five of these comrades will leave in a few days; one already is in Yucatan, where the Socialist Party controls the government and is social-reformist; there has been a split there and a new party organized which has affiliated with the Communist International and accepted the "21 points." These comrades will also organize Communist nuclei in the labor unions, from which at present our best elements are to be drawn.

The city workers in Mexico number about half a million, and of these probably not more than 200,000 are factory workers (out of a population of 16,000,000). That indicates how important a factor the peasants are (they were the backbone of the recent revolutions). We are accordingly including in the work of the Organization Committee the formation of Communist local among the farm workers - two have already been organized.

In connection with work in the various Socialist parties here, that is very difficult, since they one and all have no organized membership and meetings, being mostly groups of leaders (often Generals and other military men). A general agitation is being carried on against these parties, and when the opportunity offers we shall make it concrete. The Socialist Party of Yucatan will shortly hold a Congress, and a declaration has been sent to the Congress urging affiliation with the Communist International (Appendix 4 ⁽⁴⁾); there is no hope of affiliation, but a Left Wing may be developed. One of the important unions in Yucatan has decided for affiliation with the Red Labor International.

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In addition to the labor union organ, The Worker, two other periodicals are being issued:

[1] El Obrero Comunista (Communist Workers) issued weekly. This appears as the organ of the Organization Committee of the Communist Party. It is edited by a Mexican comrade. Two issues have appeared to date, but it is capable of improvement. These two issues are too theoretical. That is necessary in the work of building the Communist Party; but we urge continuously to the editor that the paper must become more an organ of struggle, get down to the workers, express their immediate struggles, problems and developments.

2) El [La] Revista Comunista (Communist Review) issued monthly. The first issue, containing a report of the Third Congress and the speeches of Zinovieff, [Karl] Radek, Lenin and Trotsky (the theses have not yet reached us) is almost ready, and will appear about September 5, dated October. The purpose is to make the Communist Review the organ of the whole revolutionary movement in Latin America, expressing its development and needs, and also connect the Latin American movement with the United States. It is edited by a member of the Agency direct.

The following pamphlets have been issued or will be issued by the time you receive this report (issued in Spanish, of course):

1) The Communist Party, Zinovieff; 2) State and Revolution, Lenin; 3) Communist Program, Bukharin; 4) Theses Second Congress (these of Third Congress will be issued as soon as received); 5) Left Sickness, Lenin (of particular importance in Latin-America, because of sectarian Anarchist and Syndicalist prejudices); 6) Terrorism and Communism, by Trotsky. There has been practically no Socialist education here; the classic Socialist works were never published in Mexico; so that 7) will be The Communist Manifesto, by Marx and Engels (to include the Manifesto of the First and Third Congress of the Comintern. In addition, "The Proletarian Revolution," by Lenin and Trotsky (edited by

Fra[ina]) is to be translated and published in Spanish. The publication of literature will be increased as a definite organization of the party develops. (Also Manifesto to working class of North and South America, by E. C. of C. I., is issued in pamphlet form.) ⁽⁵⁾

We try at all points to bring Communist theory and practice home to the Mexican situation, to express Communism in terms of Mexican history, conditions and developments. Accordingly, we are trying to have produced a Mexican Communist literature. The following pamphlets are being prepared: 1) The Agrarian Problem in Mexico; 2) History of the Development of private property in Mexico; 3) From [Francisco I.] Madero to Carranza (discussing character and accomplishments of the recent revolutions); 4) The Labor Movement in Mexico (a history). Of these, 1, 2, and 4 are about ready. It is hard to find Mexican writers, and just as hard to make them work in accord with promises. In addition Com- Fra[ina] is writing a pamphlet, "The Mexican Revolution," discussing the conditions and problems in the light of our Communist theory and practice.

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We think you will agree with us that we should proceed slowly and carefully, not to make an immediate big splurge and lots of noise, but to lay a sound, permanent basis for the Mexican Communist Party. In this way, when delegates of the Mexican Communist Party come to the Fourth Congress they will actually represent a movement, and not simply themselves as individuals as was the case at the second congress.

A real, mass organized Communist Party in Mexico will have enormous and decisive influence on developing a movement in Cuba and Central America, and must also inevitably wield a large influence in South America, since Mexico is directly menaced by American Imperialism, and the revolutionary struggles of the Mexican masses will directly inspire the movement of the whole of the Americas.

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There are many disadvantageous factors that must be overcome in Mexico. We have spoken of the bad influence of the former "Communist parties" consisting of a handful of "leaders." These, however, should not be condemned too severely, since enthusiasm largely got the better of their judgment. The fact is that the Mexicans are very difficult to organize. There is not a single party in Mexico, bourgeois or Socialist, with a definite organization and membership (with the possible exception of the Socialist Party of Yucatan). The labor unions are also very loosely organized. The General Confederation of Workers (adhering to the Red Labor International) is dominated by the decentralization ideas of Syndicalism: the Executive has practically no powers, it receives no dues from the affiliated locals, with the result that it cannot publish a paper or carry on the work of organizing the unorganized workers. The Regional Confederation (Yellow) is in the same position, and also at this moment publishes no paper. It is only since the Revolution that Mexicans have the right to organize, and they are painfully learning. They have anarchistic traits, largely due to their former slavery and the absence of large industrial production.

The idea of a revolutionary political party is not popular. This is partly due to the Anarcho-Syndicalist influence, and partly due to the fact that political parties in Mexico are thoroughly corrupt, and exist only to be abused by the leaders, organized by them to satisfy their own personal ambitions. These features are pointed out to the workers and exploited profitably by the Anarcho-Syndicalists. But while the radical leaders are almost all Anarcho-Syndicalists, this is not exactly true of the masses: they fall under the Syndicalist influence largely because of their inexperience in organization and because of the anarcho-individualism produced by primitive industry. We are

carrying on a definite theoretical propaganda against Anarcho-Syndicalism, but not in a way to repel workers under their influence. The best answer is to develop a party of action. The Anarcho-Syndicalist leaders' influence is waning, since the problem now in Mexico is becoming one of organization and struggle; and the Mexican Anarcho-Syndicalists are woefully incapable of organization and struggle, being mostly big mouthed talkers and spinners of fine theory. The best of these leaders are gradually coming over to us.

There are exceptionally numerous military and political parasites in Mexico (it is said there are two thousand Generals alone: any man who can collect and arm two dozen starving peasants immediately becomes a general). A very small minority of the Mexican workers, and a still smaller minority of the peons, are able to read. This helps the political and military parasites, and makes Communist agitation difficult. We shall have to develop capable speakers and organizers out of the workers and peons as the best means of agitation.

The overwhelming majority of Mexican industries are owned by foreign capital, mostly American and British. The Mexican workers are mercilessly exploited by these foreigners. But what is particularly serious is that the skilled and better qualified Mexican workers, receiving slightly better wages, unite with the foreign capitalists to exploit the common unskilled workers. This feature is characteristic in a backward country being developed and exploited by foreign capital - as in India and Cuba. The more intelligent workers unite with the foreign oppressors and prove traitors to the Mexican working class.

But there is a more encouraging aspect. The Mexican workers and peons are revolutionary, in the sense that they do not shrink from fighting. This they have proved in the recent revolutions. But they lack consciousness and understanding of objectives, and so were abused by the "revolutionary" leaders, who deceived them with false promises and trampled them under foot when they secured power through the revolution. The recent revolution (largely peasant uprisings) has not produced a single leader who could be used for the Communist struggle. The great task, accordingly, is education and organization, developing the consciousness and understanding of the masses, creating a Communist Party to direct and organize them. The period of revolutions is over: this is the period of revolutionary organization as the preliminary to the Communist struggle and revolution.

In spite of the recent revolutions (agrarian in causes) the peasants are still terribly exploited by big landlords. There were confiscations of land, it is true, but these were overwhelmingly for the benefit of the generals and other military leaders (as in the case of Pancho Villa): the peons got practically nothing. The Mexican peasants are now beginning to realize their deception, and only recently in some parts of the country they have confiscated big landed properties and divided among themselves. A falling leaf foretells the coming of Autumn! It is encouraging that requests are coming from peasants in the vicinity of Mexico City for the organization of a peasants section of the Communist Party.

Another encouraging aspect is that the most dogmatic elements of the Anarcho-Syndicalists have organized a group called "Light and Life" in order to fight against proletarian dictatorship and the Communist Party. They are given much space in the bourgeois press. This, and our conferences with Anarcho-Syndicalists, show clearly that they are afraid, that they fear our coming success. The ideas of Communism are making steady if slow progress among the masses, and the Anarcho-Syndicalists are becoming frightened, in spite of the fact that we have not fought them as such and have tried to co-operate with them. One of these Anarcho-Syndicalists proposed to us in a conference that we should organize the Communist Party out of intellectuals and middle class elements, but leave the workers and the labor unions alone! Wonderful simplicity.

Socialism in Mexico is practically a new thing and Communism almost unknown. No Socialist or

Communist books were ever printed here prior to the publications issued by the Agency. These were accessible in editions imported from Spain, but sold at a price prohibitive to the workers. On the other hand, the literature of Anarcho-Syndicalism, the books of Kropotkin, Malatesta, Proudhon and Bakunin are accessible in cheap editions. The organization Committee for the Communist Party will issue small pamphlets and leaflets in simple popular language to distribute among the workers.

These are the conditions determining the work of organizing a Communist Party in Mexico.

Enclosed find also our report to the Council of the Labor International, and also the answers to the "Fragebogen."

Fraternaly yours,
[signed:] Kata-
[signed:] Fra-
American Agency, C.I.

Sept. 5, 1921 ⁽⁶⁾

a receipt stamp: No. 177
 15/X. 1921 г.
 СЕКРЕТАРИАТ
 Исполк. Коммунист. Интернац.

- (1) "From the Declaration of Principles adopted by the Congress of the Mexican Federation of Communist Youth, August, 1921," in: РГАСПИ, 495/108/10/19.
- (2) "To the Congress of the Mexican Federation of Communist Youth," dated July 18, 1921, in: РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/41-42; 495/18/66/401-402; 495/108/10/12-13.
- (3) "To the Workers and Peasants. Manifest Issued by the Organization Committee for the Communist Party of Mexico," in: РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/355-359.
- (4) "To Congress of Socialist Party of Southeast of Mexico," dated August 1, 1921, in: РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/57-58; 521/1/17/91-92.
- (5) In the blank space on the left side the following is handwritten:
"Just received Zinovieff's, Trotzky's and Radek's speeches in full. Issue will come out in pamphlets."
In the second text the addition is handwritten differently:
"Speeches at the 3 Congress of Zinovieff, Trotzky, Radek, just received, will be issued as pamphlets."
- (6) The date is handwritten in: РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/103.

1-11

24.09.1921 [Katayama] (Mexico, D.F.) to G. Zinoviev
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/122-124 (3×; typed duplicate)]

Mexico, D.F., Mexico, Sept. 24, 1921,

Comrade G. Zinoviev:
Dear Comrade;

Few weeks ago we sent you our first substantial reports on the works of the Agency. Through those reports you will find the difficulties and at the same time hopeness [*sic*] of our future in Mexico and Latin American countries in general. I shall not reiterate what we have said in those reports, but I like [to] review the whole situation of the American Agency since I have assumed the duty on January 8, 1921. Because I feel it my duty to let you know the real situation of the Agency at this time.

1) The first three months, namely Jan., Feb. and March were spent almost entirely for the Red Labor Union International and chiefly selecting the delegates and equipping them for their trip. Of course the Agency was not fully organized owing to absence of Comrade Thompson, who arrived in New York in the middle of February and soon left for Canada staying about 10 days in New York and then Thompson was obliged to sail for Berlin instead of his proceeding to Mexico as it was planned and agreed on. As to the work of the Red Labor Union International we have done fairly well under the circumstances as you know the Agency was placed then. I took just five weeks to get a semblance of the co-operation of the C.P. However, we could send the delegates from the U.S.A., Canada and Mexico, whom you have met in the Congress.

2) I left New York for Mexico on March 18, 1921, expecting to meet Comrade Thompson soon at Mexico City, it was figured at that time he will be at the said city in a month or five weeks. Comrade Scott has to stay a while to ship the delegates, who left the last on the end of March and he was to join us in Mexico soon.

At this point we had some difficulties in our entire work, especially it was the case concerning the finance of the Agency. You appropriated us fifteen thousands while the Red International also fifteen [thousands] which Comrade Scott brought with him. Now by the middled of March we have spent nearly fifteen [thousands] expecting to get the money that Comrade Thompson have had in Berlin; we made out our budget for the coming three or four months. This was the end of February and we found it out that we could not make connection with Berlin, consequently we could not get desired money. This was the very cause of Comrade Thompson's trip to Berlin instead of to Mexico.

With such a situation I left New York for Mexico with five thousand cash, the half of which was borrowed from the C.P. treasury. Under the circumstance Comrade Scott has to stay in New York until at least the financial entanglement be straightened.

3) Under the financial uncertainty I started the work in Mexico City in a very limited way organizing the Red Bureau provisionally and started a week with 10 week budged, expecting the arrival soon of Comrade Scott and Thompson. But Comrade Scott was detained in the States to look after the amalgamation of two Companies, for which your mandate came somewhere on the first part of May, I believe on May 5th. Thus I have to go on our work alone here while Comrade Scott have had a hard time there with the amalgamation work. I was unable to go back on account of difficulty of trip across the border.

4) By this time we heard from Comrade Thompson who sent some money to Com. Scott, the latter promised me to send me three thousand which I got to my hand on the 8th of June. But before I got the re-enforcement from Com. Scott we have had a misfortune with us here, as I reported on June 5th our workers were all arrested and deported from the country. I had to work under the very difficult situation with only few Mexican comrades and continued what I could manage under the circumstances.

5) In the beginning of July Comrade T. has arrived with twenty-seven teshatsa [тысяча= thousand]. At once we cabled to Scott to come right way and at the same time we started to work whatever we could under the situation. But we wanted Comrade S. should come and consult and work together with us. We have been trying to get Comrade Scott here but so far we have not succeeded. However, it is now clear that he must come here, and we think that he shall.

6) As you know that we sent Comrade Max Coh[e]n and his wife to Argentine. They sailed on March 21, 1921, from New York for the country. Owing to bad communication so far we do not hear much about the situation there except what we knew from the bourgeois papers. Comrade Alexandrovsky [М.А. Комин-Александровский] is in Argentine now we heard from him a couple times, he last wrote us that he wanted to come here. Owing to difficulty of getting visa he may not able to come soon. Thus as to the Latin America we have done practically nothing, although I wrote a letter addressing to socialist and communist parties or groups. We have very bad connections with South and Central Americas.

7) Now as to the immediate future we have made out our plans for Mexico. We have abolished the Mexican Red Labor Bureau at least for temporary, owing to some grave difficulties that arose in the Bureau on account of anarcho-syndicalist influences. We thought it advisable for the present to concentrate our effort to the organization of the Communist Party of Mexico. Without the C.P. of Mex. it is quite impossible to manage the Red Labor Bureau. This we have experienced in the brief past. However the work started by the Bureau, such as the weekly and the propaganda for the affiliation of labor unions to the Red International will be carried on by the organizing committee of the Communist Youth Federation of the C.P. The weekly will be issued twice monthly hereafter until the C.P. is organized duly.

8) The organizing work has been somewhat delayed on account of our literatures are not got out as we desired owing to difficulties of getting the printers for the work. It is necessary first of all that we should have substantial communist literatures printed in Spanish in order to make our communist propaganda effective among the workers and peasants. As soon as we get sufficient communist literatures got out we shall send the field organizers all over the country. In two months of our aggressive propaganda we shall be able to get the first Communist Congress well organized.

9) As to the strictly financial aspect of the Mexican Communist propaganda it is estimated to cost about nine thousand. This will include the entire expenses of propaganda work, printing a weekly, twice monthly paper and a monthly, with other necessary publications such as pamphlets leaflets and books. With this amount of money and work of three months we think that we shall be able to organize a very good C.P. of Mexico, judged from what we have done so far in the way of organizing the various communist nuclei.

10) Financially speaking there yet remains in our hands a little over ten thousand. This we want to spend for the strictly Latin American propaganda. The very first thing we want to do is to send three representatives to the Latin American countries in order to establish a permanent at least for the present, say, a half year. With these representatives we may be able to work for the South and North Americas

internationally. And we shall be able to organize the pan American Communist movement. To do this preliminary work we have to spend at least nine to twelve thousand, which means to put almost the all fund on this.

11) Now in order to start this, namely sending three organizers to South America, we want first ascertain as to our future policy whether we can pursue the ori[gi]nal plans or not. A reason why we hesitate the plan to be carried on is that I received a letter from a trusted comrade in New York in which the comrade said that "Story here is that your firm (The American Agency) will soon be liquidated and that the C.P. will act." Whether the story thus circulated among the comrades in American is true or not we should go on with our work right straight on as long as we have means and power to do so. But under such circumstances we have difficulties in getting right kind comrades to do the work. And then it seems a waste to start a work that involves much expenses, unless we know that it is carried out to the goal. We like to know it as soon as possible.

12) My fixed aim for the work of the Agency has been to work up a plan for a Pan American Communist Congress before the Fourth Congress so that we can bring to the 4th Congress our crystallized pan[-]American standpoint as well as material to work on in the 4th Congress. Of course as you see from the above how our work has been hampered owing to many unexpected circumstances.

The above statements are some of facts that I wish you to take into considerations when you are going to decide the future policy of the Pan American Communist movement and its propaganda in the near future. Whether you should change the policy in Pan America of the Communist propaganda or not we shall go on with the organizing work in Mexico of the C.P. as I have intimated to you above.

Mexico is, as I have been experiencing past six months, a very inconvenient place, especially looked from a practical standpoint, although Mexico is geographically and strategically a very important country when we consider the Communist propaganda work of South and Central Americas. This, of course must be overcome by our strenuous efforts and activities. As a matter of practical expediency it would be far better to work from somewhere in America (U.S.A.). Because the commercial relations between North and South Americas are well established, the New York as a centre.

But South American proletariat is not so willing to listen to the American talk, owing to a certain prejudice that exists to-day between two continents. And then American (USA) comrades are accustomed to look down on the Latin American workers. Personally I think that the choice of the seat of the Agency is wise one in the long run. Mexico is the very key to the Communist movement in Latin America and of course in Central America.

Finally I wish you to look into the matter at your earliest conveniences as to the future policy of the Agency. Of course when all the members of the Agency are assembled, which I am sure will soon, we shall ask you officially and definitely but meanwhile I wish you study our situation which we sent to you sometime ago and let us know as soon as you can.

I remain yours for the cause,

1-12

28.09.1921 Kata[yama]/Fra[ina] to the Small Bureau, Comintern
[ПГАСПН, 495/108/11/42-46 (5×; typed and signed); 495/18/66/327-331 (typed duplicate)]

To the Small Bureau, Comintern.

Dear Comrades:

Supplementing previous reports on Mexico, the following are the new developments, which have a most important bearing on the organization of a Communist Party in Mexico:

On September 4th-12th was held the first National Congress of the Confederacion General de Trabajadores (C.G.T.).

The C.G.T. was organized in February 1921, at a national Conference called by the Communist Federation of the Mexican Proletariat. This Federation consisted of a number of unions in Mexico City, and a number of Anarcho-Syndicalist groups; there was practically nothing Communist about it except the name. This Conference organized the C.G.T., having as its objects (1) the total emancipation of the Mexican Proletariat, and (2) the introduction of Rational education (modern schools) among the workers. While accepting Direct Action (in the sense of direct struggle with the employers, ignoring the state) the C.G.T. Declaration provides that "separate affiliated unions will be left in absolute liberty to choose the methods of struggle that best correspond to their individual needs." Further: "We accept as the fundamental principle the class struggle, recognizing that there is nothing in common between the working class and the exploiting class; we stand for Free Communism as the supreme aspiration and Direct Action as the method of struggle, rejecting all participation in politics, bourgeois or otherwise; and declaring for Rationalist Education." Autonomy or freedom for the affiliated groups or unions is emphasized again. The dominant sentiment was Anarcho-Syndicalist. Owing to the pressure of two or three Communist delegates the C.G.T. convention decided "to accept in principle affiliation with the Red Labor Union International, and to submit said approval of our constituents." After denouncing all political action and all political parties, bourgeois or proletarian, the convention decided "to recognize the Mexican Communist Party as a thoroughly revolutionary organization, with the same rights as the "cultural" groups," but this was meant apparently in a Pickwickian sense, for immediately after it was decided that "no member of this C.G.T. may belong to a political party, under pain of being declared a traitor to the Cause." What was meant by "Communist Party" was a propaganda group not participating in the political struggle.

At the time a membership of 60,000 was claimed. Up until September the C.G.T. participated in no strikes, two or three most important strikes finding the Executive Committee completely helpless, issuing revolutionary phrases and advice, but doing nothing in action. ...

The first convention in September represented not more than 20,000 workers, many unions having seceded from the C.G.T. because of the organization's inactivity. There were 73 delegates of whom 28 did not represent any labor union - 20 representing Anarcho-Syndicalist groups, and 8 Communist groups. There was present a solid Communist group of 25 delegates, of whom 18 were representatives of actual labor unions.

We sent to the C.G.T. Convention a letter in the name of the R.L.[U.] I. (Letter enclosed, Appendix 1 ⁽¹⁾). Moreover, we co-operated with the Communist delegates, and drew up for them seven resolutions, which they accepted and laid before the Congress Resolutions Committee (Enclosed, Appendix 2 ⁽²⁾). The Resolutions Committee refused to introduce these resolutions in the Congress, or have them discussed; and the Committee was sustained by the Anarcho-Syndicalist majority.

You will secure an adequate picture of the incapacity of the Congress from the following summary of its sessions, compiled by a Communist delegate:

Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, September 4-6: Opening of Congress, organization, election of Committees.

Wednesday: Correspondence - no importance. Proposed methods of procedure approved. ... [sic] Following resolution adopted: "That this Congress declares its solidarity with the activity of the West Virginia miners" in the United States. Also, greetings sent to R. Flores Magon, a Mexican revolutionist in prison in the U.S.A. ... Financial report: The C.G.T. Executive had received \$130.00 and spent \$118.50. ... Delivery of resolutions: Atlitxco delegation - 1) That a solidarity pact be made; 2) to organize Rationalist Schools; 3) the prohibition of work for children under twelve years of age; 4) move more quickly with building the organization. Tampico delegation: to strike out of the C.G.T. Declaration of principles all reference to Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Communist Party. Another resolution for Rationalist Schools. A peasants' resolution providing that only the peons (agricultural hired labor) should be organized and not the small peasants, or tenant farmers. The resolutions of the Communist group. ... Now appears a young lady in the Congress, accompanied by a Lieutenant of the Mexican army. She has been discharged from her employment in the National University, and wants the Congress to help her. This question is discussed for four hours; finally decided that the Commission will interview the rector in name of the C.G.T. local Federation in Mexico City.

Thursday: Congress has been waiting for three days for the C.G.T. Executive Committee to make a report; but the E.C. is still not ready. The session, which started at 9 o'clock, waits for the E.C. report. At 12 o'clock, [Rafael] Quintero appears to report for the E.C. His report is on three strikes: that of the railway men, that of the street car men in Mexico City, and that of the textile weavers in Atlitxco (during all three of which the C.G.T. revealed a complete impotence). Quintero keeps on speaking all during the session, up until 10 o'clock at night.

Friday: All day (12 hours) Quintero keep[s] on speaking, and introduces an attack on the Mexican Federation of Communist Youth. He informs that Ramirez had been sent as delegate to the First Congress of the R.L.I. One delegate wants to know if the C.G.T. is affiliated to the R.L.I., another says that The Worker (our labor paper) declares the C.G.T. is affiliated, and wants to know what right The Worker has to state so. Quintero dodges, and says it is none of the delegate's business what The Worker says. A Communist delegate points out that Quintero had signed a Manifesto, which appeared in No. 2 of The Worker, in which the C.G.T. Executive declares it is affiliated with the R.L.I. Quintero answers: "I do not remember very well, but it might be so." (This is actual fact that Quintero spoke continuously in the Congress for about 22 hours - and there was no action taken on his "report").

Saturday: Sessions opens early, but Resolutions Committee is not ready to report. Valades and Quintero ask for a private session to clear up the ideas of two delegates, who declared in the Congress that the Soviet Government had sent "millions of rubles" to Mexico, and who repeatedly declared there was a "Communist Tank" demoralizing the Mexican movement. Quintero declares "there are no millions of roubles." The information is accepted. Nothing more is done all day. At half-past seven in the evening, the Resolutions Committee reports. Not one of the Communist resolutions is brought in by the

Committee. Valades (Communist) points this out. Another delegate protests. Still another asks why his resolutions are not brought in. Another delegate says the Resolutions Committee has not worked honestly. [Jacinto] Huitron, replying for the Resolutions Committee, declares "the Communist tank (Russian money) is obstructing the work of the Congress." Two other Anarcho-Syndicalist delegates declare the same. The Resolutions Committee is sustained by the Anarcho-Syndicalist majority. ... The Resolutions Committee recommends the following substitution for the existing clause in the Declaration of Principles: "The C.G.T. accepts the class struggle, and Direct Action as the means to achieve Free Communism; but its aspiration is the absolute freedom of all means of life." The Communists attack this formulation, pointing out the omission of Soviet System and Proletarian Dictatorship; the Anarcho-Syndicalists defend the formulation. The Congress rejects the proposal of the Resolutions Committee. (The only Communist victory in the Congress.)

Sunday: The Resolutions Committee proposes the following as the first point in the C.G.T. constitution: "The Federal Council will be formed by delegates from the local Federations." Valades points out that at present there are only two Federations in the C.G.T. An Anarcho-Syndicalist declares that very soon there will be more than 15. The proposal is accepted.

Monday: By a trick the Anarcho-Syndicalists have called a special session - the majority of the Communists, unaware of this, are not present. The session decided: 1) To expel Valades from the C.G.T.; 2) to expel the Mexican Federation of Communist Youth from the C.G.T. The reason - Valades and the Youth Federation are working to organize a political Communist Party. The Third decision (no reason given) - members of the C.G.T. are prohibited from serving on the Mexican Bureau of the Red Labor International.

From this brief summary, it will be seen that the constructive work of the C.G.T. Congress was - Zero. In Fact, the Congress practically abolished the C.G.T. as a national organization by its action on the Executive Committee.

The original clause (quoted on page 1) concerning affiliation with the R.L.I. still remains in the C.G.T. Declaration of Principles. But this affiliation is largely only formal, and the dominant Anarcho-Syndicalist leaders are against affiliation.

That the Anarcho-Syndicalist leaders were not able to bring about dis-affiliation with the R.L.I. is very encouraging; even more encouraging was the presence of a pretty solid group of Communist delegates. (In accordance with our policy to broaden the base of the Organization Committee for a Mexican Communist Party, we invited the caucus of this Communist group to elect two representatives to the Organization Committee, which was done.)

There were many bitter attacks in the C.G.T. Congress upon the R.L.I., and upon Soviet Russia itself. One of the resolutions sabotaged by the Resolutions Committee concerned itself with having the Congress affirm its solidarity with Soviet Russia, and to assist the starving workers and peasants there.

But the aftermath of the Congress is very important and encouraging. The membership is dissatisfied with the fact that the Congress did absolutely nothing of a practical character, to build the C.G.T. on a stronger basis, to formulate practical plans in order to mobilize a struggle on the immediate workers' issues. In some places this dissatisfaction assumes the form of desire to withdraw from the C.G.T., and either remain independent or join the reactionary C.R.O.M. We have urged our Communists against withdrawal, and they are in agreement with us.

The situation is such in the C.G.T. - the Anarcho-Syndicalist leadership has shown its complete

impotence as concerns organization and action. This provides an excellent opportunity for the possibility of securing Communist leadership in the C.G.T., providing the Communists in this particular fight concentrate on the practical problems of labor union organization and action.

The first symptom of the dissatisfaction was over the expulsion of the Federation of Communist Youth. The Youth appealed against this expulsion to the Car-men's union of Mexico City. At the meeting of one section of this union (there is one union but two sections, one of the employees on the cars, the other employees in the car shops) the question of the Youth came up. The voting was exactly even for and against the Youth.

We have, however, advised the Youth not to press for re-admission, and have written them a letter (Appendix 3) to that effect and what in our opinion should be the strategy of the fight; and also submitted them a draft of a Manifesto (Appendix 4). They are in agreement with these.

oooOooo

The work of organizing the Communist Party is proceeding slowly, but on a definite basis.

As already stated, the Organization Committee has been strengthened by the inclusion of two representatives elected by the group of Communist delegates in the C.G.T. Congress.

The Organization Committee has been divided into two bureaus - one specializing on the labor union activity (and supervising the publication of The Worker, which now appears twice a month as an independent labor paper): the other bureau specializing on the political organization work. However, all decision are made by the complete Organization Committee. The labor bureau has definite instructions to proceed actively with work in the reactionary C.R.O.M., which until now has been largely neglected in favor of the C.G.T.

The Organization Committee also has instructions to start raising money to carry on the work, since they have a tendency to rely exclusively on our financial support.

Four new Communist groups have been organized in Yucatan, and a large one in Mexico City. One hundred thousand copies of the Manifesto for a party (copy sent you in our last report) have been printed and distributed throughout the Republic - 15,000 copies in large placard size for pasting on walls.

The greatest handicap is lack of experience of political party work, the lack of a previous Socialist training. Even our Communists have lingering Anarcho-Syndicalist prejudices; and it is quite likely that the Congress which organizes the Communist Party will declare against parliamentarism and participation in the elections. But while systematically trying to destroy these prejudices, we are not forcing the issue: we must first get a party.

We have enough funds to continue the work until the Party is organized (end of December). But the Party will need support after that. We do not need support after that. We do not believe in giving assistance in general, but only for specific purposes. The amount required (figuring eight months from January to August, will be \$11000.00, distributed as follows: for the Revista Comunista (monthly), \$200 a month for eight months, \$1600.00; for The Communist Worker, organ of the Party, \$600.00 a month for eight months, \$4800.00; for The Worker, twice a month labor union organ, \$300.00 a month for eight months, \$2400.00 - Total, \$8800.00. For issuing pamphlets and publications of the Comintern, \$2200.00. - Total, \$11,000.00.

Rumors have reached us from New York that the Comintern contemplates liquidating the American Agency. We do not know the source of these rumors, or how true they are. But if true, then we suggest that you send to Mexico a competent Communist comrade as your representative, to work here, with support; otherwise the whole movement will go to pieces.

Note: in the financial proposals for the Mexican C.P. we allow nothing for organization and general agitation expenses; that, in our opinion, must be financed by the party itself. If it cannot, then it is no party.

oooOooo

We send you copy of our report to the Executive of the R.L.I. We ask you to consider our suggestion for issuing the slogan for a Pan-American Federation of Labor, and for a Pan-American Conference in Moscow just before the Second Congress of the R.L.I. This, we feel, is of the utmost importance for the work in Latin-America.

[handwritten:] Sept 28

Fraternally yours,
[signed:] Kata[yama]
[signed:] Fra[ina]
American Agency

P.S. As we were about to send this report, some very interesting events have developed. The Executive Committee of the Communist Youth, after agreeing with our letter and proposed Manifesto (Appendix 3 and 4) decided to submit them for discussion and approval to the Youth in Mexico City. A general membership meeting was called, with 150 present. The suggestions in our letter and the Manifesto were unanimously and enthusiastically accepted. ... The Labor Union bureau of the Organization Committee is working out a practical program for action in the C.G.T., which will be adopted by and issued in name of a local labor union. ... The Youth organization in Puebla withdrew from the Federation recently, being against a Communist Party. The Anarchists and Syndicalists of the Puebla organization thereupon called a national congress of the Youth without informing the Executive Committee or the Mexico City organization. But the E.C. heard of it and went in a body to the Congress (in Orizaba) the Congress thereupon came to Mexico City, discussed the situation, and with the exception of the Puebla delegate unanimously accepted the idea of the Communist Party. The Anarcho-Syndicalists are losing strength; and are now using contemptible tactics: they have just issued a leaflet accusing the Communist leaders of receiving millions in gold, buying houses, automobiles, etc. ... At the meeting of the 150 Youth members, it was unanimous that each member should give one day a month working for the C.P.

a receipt stamp:

No. 389
17/11 1921 г.
СЕКРЕТАРИАТ
Исполк. Коммунист. Интернац.

- (1) "To the Congress of the C.G.T.," dated August 25, 1921, in: ПГАСПИ, 495/18/66/340-342.
- (2) "Communist Group Resolution in C.G.T. Congress," in: ПГАСПИ, 495/18/66/377-379.
- (3) "To the Executive Committee of the Youth Federation," in: ПГАСПИ, 495/108/10/20-21; 495/18/66/375-376.

1-13

10.10.1921 Kata[yama]/Fra[ina]/American Agency to the Small Bureau, Comintern
[ПГАСПН, 495/108/11/47-50 (4×; typed and signed); 495/18/66/156-159 (4×; typed draft dated 04.10.1921); 495/18/66/237-240 (typed; no date)]

To the Small Bureau,
Comintern.

Dear Comrades:

Your instructions concerning the immediate departure of one of the members of the Agency (you know who) are being carried out.

We have nothing definite from you concerning the status of the Agency, although a number of rumors have reached us. However, from what we know we conclude the following: The Agency is not yet politically liquidated, although it is financially, in the sense that no further financial support will be forthcoming. This means, of course, that the Agency must from now on proceed in such a manner as to get the largest results from funds on hand, that instead of expanding we must contract our work, with ultimate liquidation in view, this being determined by the exhaustion of our finances. We are, accordingly, planning our further work on this basis. (If you intend to continue the Agency, this decision will not be injurious, since the work can again immediately start on a larger scale.)

We have decided to dispose of the funds on hand in the following manner:

- 1) A very small part may be used for work in Canada.
- 2) The larger part will be used to continue the organization of a Mexican party (which will be completed in December), and to assist in placing the new party on its feet.
- 3) A smaller part will be used for certain limited work in South America, in accordance with possibilities and developments.

It is a small sum we have on hand, and by this division we can use it to the best possible advantage.

The following are the technical arrangements:

F. is to be Acting Chairman of the Agency; although that technically is nominal, in view of developments. But he is entrusted with the final responsibility in winding up the Agency affairs. He is, also, appointed Mexican representative, and authorized to carry out the South American work agreed upon.

oooOooo

We wrote you some time ago suggesting that the Executive of the R.L.I. issue a call for a Pan-American Federation of Labor, to consist of the rev. labor unions of North and South America, and

that the Executive issue the call for a Conference to organize such a Federation, to be held in Moscow six weeks or two months before the Second Congress of the R.L.I.

We wish to repeat and emphasize our suggestion, since we consider it vital to American developments.

Events are proving conclusively that such a Pan-American Federation of Labor will be organized, whether we want it or not. It is the only effective way of fighting against the completely reactionary Pan-American Federation of Gompers & Co. Moreover, the peculiar conditions of the American continents, with the domination of the Imperialism of the United States, make such a Federation indispensable.

The idea of organizing a rev. Pan-American Federation of Labor has been discussed for a number of years in the Americas. The proposal is being sponsored by the Anarcho-Syndicalists. It will be heartily welcomed in Latin-America, and may be supported also by the I.W.W. in the United States. If such a Pan-American Federation is organized independently of the R.L.I., it will probably be used against the R.L.I. as the basis for organizing a Syndicalist International.

There is at this moment a great deal of activity in Latin-America for such a Pan-American Federation. In October is scheduled a convention of the Gompers Pan-American Federation, and this will probably be the impulse for the Anarcho-Syndicalists definitely acting to organize their own Pan-American Federation.

Under these conditions it is necessary that the Executive of the R.L.I. issue a call immediately for the organization of a rev. Pan-American Federation of Labor, as a section of the R.L.I. The Conference itself should be two months before the Second Congress of the R.L.I. - but the call for the Conference should be issued immediately.

If the R.L.I. issues such a call, it will be easy to defeat the Anarcho-Syndicalists in their plans. If the R.L.I. does not act, the proposed rev. Pan-American Federation will be wholly Anarcho-Syndicalist; but if the R.L.I. issues such a call, non-Syndicalist but radical unions can also be gotten to affiliate.

In so far as the United States and Canada are concerned, the arrangements should be in the hands of the American party or the R.L.I. representative in the United States.

In so far as Latin-America is concerned (Cuba, Mexico, South America) the arrangements should be made through sending one or more representatives to Latin-America (unless it should be decided to authorize F. to carry on the arrangements). Approximately \$15,000 would be required to do this in Latin-America.

From our study of the situation, we feel convinced that the holding of such a Conference in Moscow to organize a Pan-American Federation of Labor will be of decisive importance for the immediate future of the R.L.I. in Latin-America (although perhaps not of such decisive importance for the United States and Canada).

oooOooo

Another suggestion which we think of real importance is the holding of a Pan-American Communist Conference in Moscow, six weeks or two months before the Fourth Congress. (The same delegates to the Conference would then participate in the Congress.)

Such a Pan-American Communist Conference, held in conjunction with the Executive, would discuss the peculiar problems of immediate tactics in the Americas - those problems not definitely covered by the general theses adopted at the Congress. The Conference would adopt definite theses on these problems, select a referat [report] to speak before the Fourth Congress and thus bring the whole American question and its peculiarities before the World Congress.

The movement in the Americas is so backward, has so many features different from the European movement, that it would be of the greatest value to hold such a Pan-American Communist Conference, and place the American question on the Agenda of the World Congress.

The party in Canada is weak and still sectarian. The American party (U.S.A.) is still split by factional disputes, continuation of the former factionalism, which is ruining the party. The Mexican party will be new and inexperienced; while the same is generally true of South America. A Pan-American Communist Conference in Moscow in conjunction with the Executive, would contribute enormously in giving a special directive to the parties in the Americas, liquidate the factionalism in the U.S. party, etc. The Americas constitute a world in themselves, differing materially from Europe; and a special directive would be of inestimable value.

If this suggestion is accepted, the call for such a Conference should be issued immediately, although to be held six weeks or two months before the Fourth Congress.

In so far as Canada and the United States are concerned, the arrangements should be placed in the hands of the American party.

In so far as Latin-America is concerned, a special representative should be sent out (unless, again, you wish to authorize F. to do the work). Approximately \$8,000 dollars would be required for delegates, etc.

oooOooo

There is no suggestion in the preceding proposal that the Pan-American Communist Conference should organize a Pan-American Communist Federation or a Pan-American centre. The Conference is important independent of any such purpose. But the Conference could decide with the Executive what are the best means of carrying on the International's work in the Americas, and particularly in Latin-America.

oooOooo

The Agency relations with the American party have been very unsatisfactory. Before the Unity, the Executive of the U.C.P.[A.] was very friendly to the Agency, while the C.P. Executive was not. The reason for that was the Agency attitude on Unity - which the U.C.P. interpreted as favoring them, while the C.P. interpreted it as against them.

Since the Unity the Executive of the American party has completely ignored us - and the majority on this Executive is composed of five former U.C.P. members and one former C.P.

We felt very keenly the necessity of keeping in touch with the American party in our work in Mexico and Latin-America, in order to bring the two movements together, in closer contact - contact which is important, but which does not exist. We accordingly wrote a letter to the American party

Executive suggesting co-operation (letter enclosed ⁽¹⁾). The American party Executive, in the haughtiest, most contemptuous manner, totally rejected co-operation (answer enclosed ⁽²⁾). The only notice this Executive takes of the Agency's existence is to ask us to lend them money!

The Executive of the American party sends us absolutely no information. The only paper we get is the illegal party central organ - they send us none of the legal papers, in spite of our requests. The American party is carrying on activity in the elections of New York City, but they have not sent us one word about this activity. There has been and still is a serious controversy and crisis in the party - but again we know nothing. Of course, we have no political authority over the American party and cannot compel them to send us information; but ordinary comradely courtesy should make them send information - particularly as that would be valuable to us in our work.

We say deliberately and in all seriousness, that the Executive of the American party has been and is sabotaging the Agency - and thereby injuring activity in Latin-America.

It is for the Small Bureau to ascertain the motives for this behavior on the part of the American party - a behavior of petty politicians which is also seriously injuring the American movement itself, which is now on the verge, apparently, of a split.

oooOooo

A part of the responsibility for the attitude of the American party is due to the other member of the Agency, Jansen (Scott), who has shown no understanding of the obligations and discipline of the Agency.

When all three members of the Agency were in New York (March [February]) it was decided that K should proceed at once to Mexico, F to Berlin in order to secure money, and Jansen was to remain in U.S. for a few weeks longer and then proceed at once to Mexico. But your mandate for unity compelled Jansen to remain longer.

When F joined K in Mexico, the Unity had been accomplished, and Jansen should have come to Mexico. He didn't. We sent him word to come. He paid no attention. We telegraphed - again no answer. Then we sent Jansen imperative instructions to come at once - and his answer was to completely ignore our instructions: his answer was: "will be in Mexico in a reasonable time - that's all." (Now he expresses a willingness to come, when it is too late, and when he has no more money in his possession.)

But that is not all. Jansen has been alone in the United States for 6 months, and during that time he has not rendered us a single financial report (has spent about 60% of our appropriation and made no report). He has, moreover, during these six months never sent us a real report of his activity - we know practically nothing of what he has been doing. We have asked him for literature, for a report on the situation in the American party, for a report on Canada, for a report on the American Labor Bureau - and he has not done any of these things. We feel, moreover, that Jansen has been using his authority as a member of the Agency to assist the former UCP in factional disputes in the united party. We do not know if Jansen has sent you any reports on his activities in the U.S. and Canada; but if he has, he has never sent us copies (except the first Canadian report).

oooOooo

The comrade who is coming to you will personally and at more length report on all these matters.
Fraternally yours,

[handwritten:] Oct 10

[signed:] Kata[yama]

[signed:] Fra[ina]

American Agency

a receipt stamp:

No. 388

17/11 1921 г.

СЕКРЕТАРИАТ

Исполк. Коммунист. Интернац.

(1) "To C.E.C. C.P.A.," dated 16 August 1921, in: РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/75-76.

(2) [CEC reply (signed by J. Carr, Exec. Secy.) forwarded by A. Bray on 8 September 1921]
РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/109-110.

1-14

08.12.1921 L.C. Fraina to the Small Bureau [of ECCI]
[ПГАСПН, 495/108/22/11~11a (2×; typed and signed)]

To the Small Bureau,

Dear Comrades:

Supplementing previous reports:

All preparations are about completed for the Congress to organize the C.P. on December 25. According to the Organizing Committee, there will be delegates from 25 groups representing approximately 1000 members present at the Congress.

The Congress, of course, will unanimously accept all the decisions of the Congresses of the Comintern. It is doubtful, however, whether parliamentarism and participation in the elections will be accepted. Anti-parliamentarism here has penetrated the best sections of the workers, because in few countries is political turpitude so terrible as here. If we force this issue, accordingly, we shall lose good workers which the party needs.

I have discussed this matter thoroughly with the Organizing Committee and with Comrade Ramirez. We have formulated this plan:

Not all the Communists here are anti-parliamentary. It is possible that the majority in the Congress will favor accepting parliamentarism, in which event we shall fight for that. If, however, the majority is anti-parliamentary, or forcing the parliamentary issue would bring a split, then this will be done: the introduction of a compromise resolution, accepting the parliamentary stand of the International "in principle," but declaring that for the time being and under the prevailing conditions the party will not participate in the elections.

That is not a very agreeable compromise, of course, but it is necessary here to move cautiously. Later, with more education and the pressure of the Executive Committee of the International, the compromise can be broken.

The anti-parliamentarism is not so strong as it was among the active comrades. For instance, Comrades Valades and Ramirez, formerly strongly anti-parliamentary, are now honestly in favor of the parliamentary attitude of the Comintern. One must move slowly, but the material is good.

Since our last report, the Mexican bourgeoisie has developed an offensive. The Government is moving steadily to the right, under the domination of American capital. The bourgeoisie is now attacking, and destroying, conquest after conquest of the Revolution. In the state of Puebla the Legislature and the Governor introduced some "radical" legislation, increasing direct taxes and introducing profit-sharing. The bourgeoisie immediately rose in revolt. In the city of Puebla, the bourgeoisie issued an ultimatum that, if the Governor promulgated the law, they would close down business, factories, stores, etc. The law was promulgated and the bourgeoisie "went on strike." All factories, food shops, drug stores, etc. were closed down. Nothing could be bought - the workers were

starving. The bourgeoisie won, with the support of the national government.

During this crisis the workers of Puebla did nothing. When I read of the situation, I asked what the Organizing Committee intended doing - that something should be done. I was informed that a representative had been sent to Puebla, who would act. But he nor any one else did anything. A splendid opportunity was missed for propaganda and action. I thereupon proposed a manifesto to the Organizing Committee, on the significance and lessons of the Puebla incident, which was adopted and issued (Appendix 1).

The greatest defect of the Mexican comrades I am in touch with is that they are not realists, they do not use every opportunity for action. Unemployment is now a big issue here, since about 40% of the Mexican workers are out of work. None of the labor unions are doing anything in this connection; while the unemployed themselves depend upon charity. The Organizing Committee did nothing to make an issue of unemployment, until I learned the facts, and insisted on action. Thereupon a Manifesto was issued calling for a national unemployed Conference, in which was proposed the following measures:

“1) Immediate and regular relief by the national Government for the unemployed, by means of money grants. 2) Work for the unemployed through Government sources, all work to be paid for at union rates. 3) No rent and free medical service. 4) A special Unemployment tax to raise money for the unemployed.” (See Appendix 2)

The party alone can not do much; but a campaign is being carried on to force the labor unions to take up action.

In connection with the unions, progress is being made in the C.R.O.M. the yellow union organization. By means of the unions in Orizaba which have affiliated with the Red International, a force is developing by means of which to conquer the C.R.O.M. As for the C.G.T. the leaders are still carrying on agitation against Communism and sabotaging the R.L.U.I. But these Anarcho-Syndicalists are fast losing their influence. Comrade Ramirez and I have worked out a Manifesto which is to be the rallying centre for a campaign to transform the C.G.T. (see Appendix 3 ⁽¹⁾). This manifesto will be adopted by the Carmen and Bakers unions of Mexico City (the largest in the C.G.T.) and will undoubtedly bring good results.

As the Gompers Pan-American Federation of Labor is to meet in January, a Manifesto has been issued by the Labor Union Bureau of the C.P. (appendix 4 ⁽²⁾). It has been sent to all American countries. We tried to work together on this issue with the comrades in the United States, but they boycott us completely. As an illustration, I have during the past five months sent six articles on Mexican and Latin-American developments to the C.E.C. of the American party, and not one has been published, although these same articles have been published in South America, Spain, Germany and England. It is impossible to build a good movement in Mexico unless it has close relations with the American party. I am informed by the acting editor of the American party organ that none of my articles (including three or four others on various subjects) will be published. You can draw your own conclusions from these facts.

Mexico has been pretty well covered by agitation and four organizers in preparation for the Organizing Congress. This preliminary but intensive work of agitation and organization will continue until December 20.

Enclosed find article on Central American movement ⁽³⁾.

[handwritten:] December 8/21

Fraternally yours,
[signed:] L.C. Fraina

a receipt stamp: No. 809
 20. 1. 1922 г.
 СЕКРЕТАРИАТ
 Исполк. Коммунист. Интернац.

- (1) "To the C.G.T. Unions. Declaration by the Mexican Federation of the Communist Youth," in: РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/347-349.
- (2) "Workers of the Americas, Unite! Manifesto to the Labor Unions of North and South America - Issued by the Executive Committee of the R. L. I.," in: РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/364-367.
- (3) It is probably the following article "for publication" by Fraina, "The Mexican Labor Movement," in: РГАСПИ, 495/108/12/37-40.

1-15

02.01.1922 Louis C. Fraina to the Small Bureau [of the ECCI]
[ПГАСПИИ, 495/108/22/1-4 (4×; typed and signed); 495/18/66/241-244 (typed draft)]

To the Small Bureau,

Comrades:

Supplementing previous reports, and as a final report on Mexico:

The Congress to organize the Mexican C.P. has been held - December 25-30. A full report of the Congress, with the theses, resolutions, etc., will be sent you by the Central Committee of the Party. I shall summarize here the most important points:

There were 21 delegates in the Congress, representing about 1000 members. The representation was fairly characteristic of the whole country, one delegate coming from Yucatan, which is almost isolated from the rest of Mexico. The peasants were well represented, and all the delegates (except one) were members of a labor union or a peasants' organization.

The most significant feature of the Congress was its sobriety and steadiness. Mexican congresses as a rule are flamboyant, hysterical, the sonorous phrase and the excited gesture being dominant. This was absent at the Congress. Instead, most of the time of the Congress was used in the work of the various commissions, where every phase of the Mexican problems were earnestly discussed and acted upon.

The theses and resolutions adopted are based upon and in full accord with the theses and decisions of the Comintern. I purposely took no part in the working out of the theses and resolutions, except in general discussions with three of the comrades who met with me regularly during the congress: feeling that the matter should arise and settle itself spontaneously.

It is not necessary to speak at length about the theses and resolutions, since they will shortly reach you. I shall merely briefly report on some of the special problems and the action thereon.

1) The theses on political action are not wholly satisfactory. While it accepts in principle the Comintern's position on parliamentarism and elections, it states that for the time being the party will not participate in the elections. This is obviously a compromise. But I believe that under the prevailing conditions it is a necessary compromise. The best comrades I was in contact with agreed to the compromise, and for me to have forced the issue would have had bad results. The best Mexican comrades, while accepting Communism, are still tinged Syndicalism conceptions of parliamentarism, and the radical masses more so. European politics and elections are ideal in comparison with the corrupt system which dominates in Mexico, and the "labor leaders" and "friends of the working class" who get into office are corrupt to the bone and marrow. The argument was that for the new party at once to participate in the elections would isolate it from the best sections of the working class, and there is truth in the argument. Let us first, it was said to me, build the party and get the workers confidence, and then we can go on to the program of participating in the elections. The argument, I am convinced, is honestly

made. However, I feel also that our comrades place too much emphasis on the importance of the syndicalist elements, are in some measure are afraid of them, and that participation in the elections is not so dangerous as they think. At the next international congress this question should be discussed by the Executive with the Mexican delegates and if you impose the condition of immediate participation, I am sure it will be accepted.

2) The party's attitude to a prospective new "revolution" was another very serious problem. In the past two or three months there has been talk and maneuvers of a new "revolution" - naturally rallying around some general. The Anarcho-Syndicalist elements are clamoring for arming the workers and participation in such a revolution. Valades, our organizer in the North, returned excited about the prospects of a new revolution and urged that the party should agitate for such a revolution. I emphatically opposed the proposal, and the matter was thoroughly discussed between Valades, Ramirez, Stirner [Edgar Woog] and myself. I pointed out that, while large sections of the workers and peasants were radically discontented, they were not united for action; that while certain sections of the workers were for armed struggle, the majority of the workers were against, and thus the workers were not in harmony; that if the new "revolution" was to be a workers and peasants affair, it was doomed to bloody disaster, which would break up what little organized movement already existed in Mexico; and that the situation was just as bad if not worse should the new "revolution" be an affair of the generals and the politicians. I insisted that the party should concentrate on peaceful constructive labor organization activity and propaganda, and offer the workers a program of immediate activity and measures on which they could be rallied. This standpoint I incorporated in a resolution, which after being revised was adopted by the Congress. This new "revolution" business is a real and serious danger, and if after getting the fuller report you could in some way issue a statement about it, it would be of great value.

3) Comrade Katayama and myself have all along been emphasizing the necessity of the party making it its chief business for the time being to agitate and organize for the unification of the labor unions in Mexico. As you will have seen from my report on the unions, there are not only two national labor federations, but very many independent unions. As it is now, the Mexican labor union movement is pitifully weak: but if unified they would have a respectable strength. At first some of the comrades opposed our standpoint, insisting that the party should concentrate on strengthening the (Syndicalist) C.G.T. But the workers themselves are forcing the issue, and the delegates to the Congress were unanimous in urging that the party should be for the unification of the labor unions in one national federation. This is, moreover, the most effective immediate way for the Communists to fight both the Syndicalists and the yellows, who each for their own reasons are opposed to unity. It was decided that the major activity of the party should concentrate itself upon the campaign for labor union unification, and I feel that this is perhaps the most fruitful decision of the Congress.

The Congress clearly recognized that the party has a dual task, that of constructive action and theoretical education. The fulfillment of this double task is not easy, since the Mexican workers are familiar neither with constructive action nor theoretical education. The congress itself acted upon this basis, and it studied very thoroughly all theoretical and practical problems. But the real difficulty is to do that in every day activity. It is a colossal problem for the new party, and it will only gradually accomplish the work. The Mexican workers have had very little labor union experience and virtually no Socialist education. This compels the new party to concern itself almost exclusively with the most elementary phases of our movement.

A word as to the character of the delegates and the new party.

With one exception, all the delegates were workers or peasants. The Mexican intellectuals are just like the Mexican bourgeoisie - without a radical or social consciousness, and it will be a long time

before the intellectuals are influenced by Communism. However, the school teachers are an exception, since they are miserably oppressed and should supply good material to our movement. Plans for intensive work among them have been in process of preparation.

It is interesting to note that two of the peasant delegates are mayors of two small villages, elected as independent revolutionary candidates by the peasants.

Although the party claims 1000 members, I should place the actual solid permanent membership at about 700. And of these only a small minority are really familiar with the theory and practice of Communism. Recognizing this, the party will place much emphasis on schools, that is, study classes.

The three best and most reliable comrades are Ramirez, Valades and Stirner (the latter was Mexican delegate to the Youth International Congress in 1921). Ramirez is the most solid; Valades is still young and excitable, but is learning fast, while Stirner has the best understanding of theory, but lacks qualities of leadership. Ramirez is the best qualified for leader, sober, and having the confidence of the workers, a good speaker and organizer. There is another comrade, Salvador Rodriguez, the secretary of one of the two national railway workers' organization (radical), but up until now, while a member of the party, it has been impossible to get Rodriguez to take an active part in our work. The prospects are that he now will, in view of the labor union unification campaign. Rodriguez would be of immeasurable value.

The party, accordingly, is weak in membership and leaders, has a tremendous task before it, and not too much should be expected from it at the start.

For Mexico is not on the verge of the social revolution - far from it. Mexico has secured a reputation for Bolshevism which it does not deserve. From a fundamental stand-point, Mexico may be said not even to possess a revolution mass movement, in spite of the ten years of revolution and counter-revolution. In fact, as already stated, Mexico is at the beginnings of primitive organization and education.

There is at the moment no social class in Mexico capable of wielding political power, not even the bourgeoisie, who rule because of the weakness of the other classes and through the power of foreign capital. Foreign capital, particularly American, rules the country - and this factor enormously complicates the struggle of the Mexican masses.

But aggressive mass struggles will shortly develop, so terrible are the conditions of work and life. What the results of these struggles will be, depends upon the progress of organization and education.

pppOppp

I suggest that you send a Russian comrade as your representative to Mexico, one capable of giving direction to the work and program of the party, since the party will need that. I do not know what is your present policy on finances, but if support is still to be given, I suggest that it be limited in the case of Mexico. Comrade Katayama and I somewhat misjudged the situation, imagining that the movement was larger or capable of being made larger than it is, and accordingly our plans were bigger than could be carried through, and expenses were according. You will note that in Nov and December I reduced expenses considerably in comparison with previous months. I did this largely under the conviction that we had been working and spending on too large a scale. I left \$1115.00 with the new party, to be spent solely on pamphlets and the weekly paper [cf. Doc. 10-6].

pppOppp

It is indispensable that the party in the United States should be in close and intimate contact with the Mexican party, giving the Mexican comrades moral encouragement and a certain amount of direction. The Mexican comrades themselves desire this.

But up until now, the American party has absolutely ignored our work in Mexico, both while Comrade Katayama was there and after he left. It is impossible to convey here an adequate picture of the American party's boycott and sabotage of our Mexican work, but three facts will convey an impression:

1) Of four articles on Mexico and one on Central America which I wrote and sent to the Central Committee of the American party for publication, not one has been published, and I am informed by a comrade in touch with the C.E.C. that the C.E.C. does not intend to publish them - simply because I wrote them. These same articles have been published in other countries, including Germany and England.

2) In spite of repeated requests from Comrade Katayama and myself for articles on American developments for publication in Mexico and South America, not one has been sent - refused.

3) I requested various communist parties to send greetings to the organizing congress of the Mexican party: answers were received from the French, German and Italian parties, but not from the American party, although I wrote twice and my letters I know were received.

It is necessary that the Executive inform the American party that they must establish intimate relations with the Mexican party.

pppPppp

Note: I must state that three articles on Mexican affairs sent to the "Voice of Labor" were all published: only the C.E.C. has refused to publish my articles. In fact the C.E.C. has not published one of the eight articles I sent them.

pppPppp

At the risk of appearing too personal, I must state one thing more: I learned that irresponsible comrades in the American party were circulating most vicious rumors about me: 1) that I had refused to come to Moscow from Berlin when you ordered me, 2) that I had squandered immense sums of money which you had entrusted to me, and 3) that you intended to re-open the Nuorteva spy charge against me. My friends considered these rumors important enough to demand an answer from me. I wrote a letter to the C.E.C. demanding action, but received no answer and no action as taken. I ask that you act in the matter.

In accordance with instructions left by Katayama I am proceeding to South America. I am first going to Argentina, to act with the party there in relation to the rest of South America.

[handwritten:] January 2, 1922

Fraternally yours,
[signed:] Louis C. Fraina

a receipt stamp: No. 974
 21ого Марта 1922 г.
 СЕКРЕТАРИАТ
 Исполк. Коммунист. Интернац.

On the top of the first leaf the following is handwritten by someone: “Aus den Teilen, die Gefragen betreffen, Auszüge für Gen. T[a letter illegible].”

2 Pan-American Agency in New York

- 2-1 01.03.1921** Meeting of Council
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/39 (1×; typed); 495/18/65/40 (typed)]
- 2-2 05.03.1921** Decisions of the Agency
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/41-44 (typed); 495/18/65/62-65 (4×; typed)]
- 2-3 09.03.1921** A Memorandum Prepared in Conjunction with Comrade Allen [Cohen]
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/57-58 (2×; typed); 495/18/65/54-56 (handwritten draft)]
- 2-4 04.04.1921** American Agency of the Communist International, by Charles E. Scott to the Communist Party and the United Communist Party
[*The Communist* (Official Organ of the United Communist Party), No. 16, April 1921; Reprinted from: Records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation [1908-1922], RG 65, Bureau Section Files No. 202600-1644-1, National Archives and Records Administration (Washington, D.C.)]

2-1

01.03.1921 Meeting of Council
[ПІАСІІІ, 495/18/65/39 (1×; typed); 495/18/65/40 (typed)]

MEETING OF COUNCIL March 1st

Present: Yavki, chairman; Scott; Harper [Dr. Julius Heiman (Hyman)], acting for Thompson.
Motion, that we inform Benjamin [M. Cohen] that one of the Council will appear at Bureau meeting tomorrow and present information. Carried
Motion, to reconsider original budget, due to state of finances. Carried.
Motion, that a new emergency budget be adopted. Carried.

The following budget was adopted:

BUDGET ON SIX WEEKS BASIS STARTING FROM MARCH 7th

6 on Bureau at 40.00 per week	\$1440.00
(Benjamin, Atwood [Caleb Harrison], Dawson, Phillips, Wanda, Harper and Scott)	
Yavki	1500.00
Allen	1500.00
Office	300.00
Six Delegates and salaries to wives	5000.00
Negro Bureau (no salaries) expense fund cut to	200.00
Salaries week of March 5th	480.00
Bills to be paid	600.00

Total budget about \$11,000.00

Balance left over in treasury about \$4500.00

Motion: that salaries temporarily shall be reduced to \$40.00 per week for the next six weeks. Carried.
Motion: That Scott appear before Bureau to notify them of change of plans.
Motion: That employees not on this budget be dismissed next Saturday
Motion: That Atwood be the representative to Canada and remain in Winnipeg until further notice.
Motion: To issue credentials to Atwood to take up work in Canada according to instructions. Carried.
Motion that the delegates shall be cut down to six. The following agreed upon: Bill, Dixon, [Robert B.] Russell, Buck, [Ella R.] Bloor and [Dennis E.] Batt. [George] Williams be sent if he wants to go.
Motion: That \$500.00 be turned over to U.C.P. to be applied for Defense. Carried.

05.03.1921 Decisions of the Agency

[ПГАСПШ, 495/18/65/41-44 (typed); 495/18/65/62-65 (4×; typed)]

Decisions of the Agency:

1. That the Bureau shall immediately start publication of the labor paper agreed upon.

Note: It is sheer nonsense to so arrange the budget as to cut out the paper. Better to cut down the salaried persons from 6 to 3. At this stage paper is a most important thing.

2. That the C. E. C. of the U. C. P. be called upon immediately to refund the \$500 advanced to it for "defense."

Note: It is outrageous to have advanced the U. C. P. money. What becomes of our impartiality? It is beyond the imagination of Scott and Harper to realize the use the C. P. will make of this advance when the news leaks out-- as it will leak out? Limit our work but finance the U. C. P.-- that is no policy for the Agency.

3. That Yavki be immediately given \$3500 for his trip

Note: It is outrageous to offer Yavki \$1500. He will for labor union business alone require \$1500, to be used in 2 or three weeks (delegates, etc.) We cannot spend everything on U.S.A.

4. That Allen be advanced \$1500 for his trip, and start at once.

Note: The Proposal of Scott and Harper that Yavki and Allen not start on their trip shows a complete misunderstanding of the work of the Agency. Our work is Pan-American and only incidentally U.S.A. Argentine should have been taken care of immediately upon Scott's arrival-- it was a serious mistake to delay. Argentine is the pivot of our whole work in South America.

5. That the original decision should be concerning the Negro Bureau-- \$35.00 a week salary and \$500 for expenses.

Note: Here again Scott and Harper show no real understanding of the Agency business. The main office considers all the Negro affairs as fundamental. It was another serious mistake not to have started this work ten months ago. Time is precious. It is a big job-- and on what principle do you decide to pay salaries to some and not to others?

6. It is understood that, while drawing our salary, Wanda works for us and not for the U. C. P.

7. Scott and Harper are instructed to hold a conference with Thompson not later than Wednesday.

8. That the phrase, "Harper, acting for Thompson" be exchanged from the minutes of March 1.

Note: Harper has not authority to represent Thompson on the Agency-- that ceased upon Thompson's arrival. Harper, at the moment is treasurer of the Bureau, and representative of it of the Agency. The only representative of Thompson at the March 1 meeting was Allen, on the business concerning the Amalgamation report.

9. That the original matter concerning Borrodine [Михаил М. Бородин; Michael Borodin] be reinserted in the Amalgamation report: If this is too late, Thompson is instructed to write the Main office as a supplementary report.

Note: It should be realized that the larger measure of success of our Amalgamation proposals depends upon the [sic] of the Main office representative. We must impress the Main Office that we want Borrodine not on general principle, but because he has certain particular qualifications for this particular job. Another Bernstein would be disastrous. We must impress the Main office sharply, as they have important work for Borrodine. If Scott has any objections to Borrodine, let him propose some one else.

Supplementary:

Scott must bring with him all Amalgamation documents and Dixon's report. Also financial

statement, detailed.

A new budget must be made. Thompson can give the Agency \$2500 in a week.

A plan for work after the convention in May should be submitted to Main Office by us. Has a draft been prepared?

March 5 [1921]

These 4 sheets seem to be sent together and the following address was written on the back of the last sheet (л. 44 об.):

Nathan Mendelsohn
1729 Park Ave[nue]
Montreal
Canada

Inside envelop addressed
Josef Skala [L.C. Fraina]
Immediate delivery please

Judging from their contents, the first half (Decisions of the Agency) and the latter half (incomplete accounts, n.d., unsigned) need to be divided, so in printing the latter the editor starts a new page.

Expenditures since last Feb. 28th.

Scott's wages.....	45.00
Atwood-trip to Canada.....	500.00
Yavki-- Mexico.....	1500.00
Allen-- Argentine	1500.00
[Thomas J.] Mooney Defense.....	200.00
[Harry M.] Winitzky	500.00
Paid Saturday.....	490.00
In Advance for office.....	200.00
A. L. Crawford.....	20.50
Big B[ill]. [Haywood]	150.00
Ella R. Bl[oor].	100.00
Crozby for halls.....	5.55
Cable to Berlin.....	6.81
Telegram to Boston.....	.41
	<u>5219.17</u>

Books for 3rd	<u>400.00</u>
March total expenditures	5619.17
January and February	<u>13525.94</u>

	19145.11
	<u>30000.00</u>
Cash on hand	10854.89

Transmit to Mexico	500.00
Yavki	2000.00
Delegation	5000.00
Salaries Negro	385.00
Extra exp. Negro	500.00
Scott's Wages	
" 5 weeks	200.00
" Extra exp.	50.00
" Forwarded to go home	500.00
This week wages, Benj.[.] McGee, Dix and Phil	<u>160.00</u>
	9295.00

Harper's exp. about	<u>100.00</u>
	9395.00
	<u>10854.89</u>
	1459.89

2-3

09.03.1921 A Memorandum Prepared in Conjunction with Comrade Allen
[ПГАСИИ, 495/18/65/57-58 (2×; typed); 495/18/65/54-56 (handwritten draft)]

N.Y. 1921, March 9th.

A Memorandum Prepared in Conjunction with Comrade Allen.

Meeting was opened with Yavki, Scott and Harper. Allen was present taking minutes.

Harper stated that he was acting for Thompson and it was so written into the minutes.

Harper then announced that something had happened which necessitated a change in plans. He seemed nervous and excited, and spoke rather disconnectedly and mysteriously. He said that the treasury was depleted mentioning various sums from 12 to thirteen or fourteen thousand dollars being left. He said that the Bureau would have to be cut down, that Yavki and Allen could not leave for their mission and that the Negro Bureau would have to be abolished, and remarked that Jeanette [Jeannette D. Pearl] and Sascha [Rose P. Stokes] were unfit for this work.

Then Scott began to figure how the change could be effected, and finally announced that only six members be employed by the agency as follows: Scott, Dawson, Benjamin, Atwood, Wanda[,] Haynes and Allen on Negro Bureau in place of two already appointed; and that salaries would be cut down to 40 per week.

Discussion began and Yavki objected to stopping Argentine trip, and Allen declined to be a member of Negro Bureau. Then Harper wanted to abolish Negro Bureau altogether. But Allen stated that this would be wrong and suggested that in his opinion, the Negro work should be continued by cutting out Sascha's salaries (which he did not think she wanted) and by asking Jeanette to continue her work with the understanding that she would be reimbursed when money comes.

The Agency decided to do away with the salaries for Sascha and Jeanette and to cut down contingency fund from 500 to 200.

Then Allen was asked by Harper how much he wanted for trip-- if one thousand dollars would do. Allen stated that he would take whatever was appropriated in view of the money stringency.

Then Yavki was asked by Scott or Harper whether 1,500 would be enough for his trip, and 1,500 was then put down on the budget for Yavki's trip and 1,000 for Allen's.

Scott then began to figure up the actual figures of treasury and it was found that there was about 16,000 left in treasury.

Then Scott and Harper figured that by cutting out the paper and reducing the personnel and closing the office etc., there would be 5,000 left over in the treasury at the exn [exp.] of six weeks.

Then Harper began to speak about a telephone message from C. E.'s lawyer that morning-- the lawyer wanted money; the parties were neglecting the prisoners; the Agency should take up the matter and devote some money for the case. Scott then asked if 500 would be all right and Harper said that much more was needed but that 500 would be enough for a start. Harper then dictated the motion as it appears in the minutes. That left 4,500 in treasury according to the new plans.

Motions were then dictated by Harper as they appear in the minutes.

Mrs. Scott then interrupted to ask if Yavki took 1,500 to Mexico and Allen 1,000 to Argentine, it was an injustice. And then they increased Allen's to 1,500.

04.04.1921 American Agency of the Communist International, by Charles E. Scott to the Communist Party and the United Communist Party
[*The Communist* (Official Organ of the United Communist Party), No. 16, April 1921;
Reprinted from: FBI, RG 65, BS202600-1644-1, NARA]

April 4, 1921.

To the Communist Party and the
United Communist Party.

Comrades:

On March 28th we received notice that the Third Congress of the Communist International would be held on June 1st at Moscow and the Congress of the Red Trade Unions was postponed until July 1st. We immediately notified the Central Executive Committee of each party, in order that they might make preparations for representation.

On April 2nd we received a second message from the Executive Committee of the Communist International stating that the American Agency of the Communist International has full power to unite the two Communist Parties, that this unity must be achieved by June 1st, otherwise the whole movement will be reorganized without regard to the existing parties. The Executive Committee of the Communist International has made no special conditions as to the method of bringing about the unification of the parties. The decision is final and the Executive Committee of the Communist International will not recognize representatives from America unless they come from the united party (Communist Party and United Communist Party united).

The American Agency has unanimously agreed upon the following conditions for the unification of the two Communist Parties:

1. A Unity convention shall be held within six weeks after the receipt of this statement, to be composed of thirty delegates from each party, on the basis of new elections. A committee of Three--one from each party and one from the American Agency of the Communist International--shall call and organize the convention. The chairman of the convention will be designated by and will represent the Executive Committee of the Communist International.

2. The Convention shall elect eight members of the Central Executive Committee of the United Party, four from each delegation; but the voting on members shall be by full convention and not be each delegation separately; the ninth member (who shall also be chairman of the Central Executive Committee) will be designated by the Executive Committee of the Communist International and will directly represent the Executive Committee of the Communist International on the Central Executive Committee of the Party.

3. The Manifesto and Program of the United Party, of course, to be in full accord with all the Theses of the Second Congress and the decisions of the Executive Committee.

4. Concerning certain controversial problems of tactics, the American Agency of the Communist International declares:

a) The use of force in the Proletarian Revolution is not merely defensive, but it is equally an offensive tactic of the revolutionary workers. The Party must systematically familiarize the masses with the role of armed insurrection, making this a feature of the Party agitation in general. But this does not mean that during an ordinary strike force must be propagated, or to inject the problem of armed insurrection into the immediate problem of the unemployed, etc. Such direct agitation for armed insurrection depends upon certain historic conditions and revolutionary maturity which must be adequately appreciated.

b) Neither shop Committees nor Communist factory nuclei are the basis of the Soviets, since Soviets develop their actual basis during the revolutionary struggle itself. Communist factory nuclei must be systematically organized; but equally necessary are Shop Committees embracing non-Communist workers united on problems of the immediate economic struggle, in which the Communist factory nuclei constitute a Party caucus, and driving force. (The American comrades, in their work for Shop Committees, should remember that sinister industrial interests also advocate Shop Committees as a means of crushing unionism--this makes necessary flexibility and discretion.)

c) The Party must be thoroughly centralized on the basis of the lowest unit electing the next highest, up to the Convention and the Central Executive Committee. Full power and confidence must be vested in the Central Executive Committee, but the Central Executive Committee shall appoint only district organizers and not the local officials.

5. The united Party must participate in the coming mayoralty and congressional elections, perhaps nominating reliable and well-known Communists as independent candidates. Participation in the elections must remain not simply a platonic aspiration in the Party program.

6. The Language Federations have played a role of the utmost importance in the history and development of the American Left Wing and Communist movements. But the form of Federation organization in the Communist party is not permissible, since these are practically autonomous, while the Central Executive Committee constitutes in reality simply an expression of federated Federations and not the supreme Executive of a centralized Party. On the other hand, the policy of the United Communist Party of now completely abolishing federations is premature. On this problem, the American Agency of the Communist International declares:

a) The united Party must permit the existence of language federations for the purpose of carrying on the Party agitation in their language, subject to the control of the Party Central Executive Committee, and of publishing organs owned and controlled by the Central Executive Committee of the Party.

b) Shortly after the Party convention, the Federations may hold their conventions with the approval of the Central Executive Committee of the Party, at which a Bureau of three members of each particular federation shall be elected, as well as editors of the language organs. The Bureaus and editors shall be subject to the approval and full control of the Central Executive Committee of the Party; and all decisions of the language federation convention and Bureaus shall be subject to the approval of the Party Central Executive Committee.

4[sic]) Federation branches shall purchase due stamps in the manner prescribed for all Party branches, i.e., from the local district or sub-district organization, and not from their Bureaus. The Bureau shall have no power to expel any member of the Federation; nor shall it have the power to expel Federation branches; it may, however, recommend the expulsion of branches to the Central Executive Committee of the Party.

7. The American Agency has full power to carry out these instructions. It will break any deadlock that

might occur at the convention and will decide any disputes on the Central Executive Committee of the united Party.

8. The provisions in clause 7 and in clause 2 continue until the regular Party convention.

9. The Party or section of the party which rejects these instructions shall be automatically expelled from the Communist International and its members called upon to unite with the party which accepts.

Comrades of the American Communist movement!

Upon you depends a mighty historic task--the completion of the World Revolution, the assurance of the International Soviet Republic. UNITE! On with the struggle against Capitalism and Imperialism.

The Central Executive Committee of each party is called upon to elect its representative to the committee of three which is to call and organize the convention in accordance with clause 1, also to take the necessary steps at once to arrange for the new elections for convention delegates. Each Central Executive Committee is urged to act promptly in order that the period of six weeks allowed for complete unification may be shortened if possible.

Yours for Communist Unity,
American Agency of the
Communist International,
by Charles E. Scott.

P.S. Comrades Fraina and Yavki, the other two members of the American Agency are temporarily absent, but I am hastening to transmit to you the decisions made by the agency in regard to unity on March 5th and signed by all three members of the Agency, together with the message just received from the Communist International giving full power to the American Agency, in order that unity may be achieved and representation secured for the completely united Party at the Third Congress of the Communist International.

The former part of the report which reprinted this text is as follows:

“Report Made at: Chicago, Ill.

Date When Made: Apr. 20, 1921

Period for Which Made: Apr. 19, 1921

Report Made by: JACOB SPOLANSKY

Title and Character of Case: COMMUNICATION FROM THE AMERICAN AGENCY OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL signed by CHARLES SCOTT to the Communist Party of America and the UNITED COMMUNIST PARTY

Facts Developed:

AT CHICAGO:

Incorporated in this report is a communication which appeared in the “Communist,” official organ of the United Communist Party, No. 16, which is considered of great interest to this Department in view of the fact that certain instructions emanating from the Executive Committee of the Third International in regard to future policies to be pursued by local communist organizations is outlined.

Attention is also called to the fact that the Red Trade Union Congress has been postponed until July 1st, and that the Third Congress of the Third International is scheduled to be held on June 1st in Moscow.

The communication reads as follows:”

3 Pan-American Agency in Mexico City

3-1 01.04.-12.04.1921 Minutes of Conversations between Yavki and Tanner [Charles F. Phillips]
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/108-109 (2×; typed)]

3-2 [14.05.1921] Six Weeks' Work of the Provisional Mexican Bureau of the Red Labor Union
International
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/337-338 (2×; typed)]

3-3 19.09.1921 [Katayama] to the Organization Committee of the Mexican Communist Party
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/119-120 (2×; typed)]

01.04.-12.04.1921 Minutes of Conversations between Yavki and Tanner [Charles F. Phillips]
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/108-109 (2×; typed)]

MINUTES OF CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN YAVKI AND TANNER.

April 1st: talked over the general situation in Mexico, the labor movement in general, the organization of the "Confederacion General de Trabajadores" (General Confederation of Workers) which was accomplished in February, 1921, at a convention called by the "Federacion Comunista" of Mexico City. Y[avki] asked who would be the best man to send to the May 1st Congress of the Red Labor International. T[anner] suggested Manuel D. Ramirez, secretary of the "Federacion Comunista" and member of the "Partido Comunista Mexicano" (Mexican Communist Party). In the evening Y met Ramirez and had a long talk with him.

It was finally decided to send Ramirez, on the understanding that he would be able to get the proper credentials from the Executive Committee of the C.G.T.

April 2d: Decided to print Spanish edition of J.T. Murphy's "Two Months Activity of the International Council of Trade and Industrial Unions," which had already been translated by T. Decided also on the necessity of forming a Provisional Mexican Bureau of the Red Labor Union International. T suggested Jose Rubio (of the E.C. of the C.G.T. and member of the Mexican Communist Party), M. Paley (editor of "El Obrero Industrial," organ of the Mexican Administration of the I.W.W.) and one man from the Left Wing of the conservative "Confederacion Regional Obrera Mexicana."

Y met Paley in the afternoon. Paley was asked to become member of the bureau. Paley suggested Leija Paz as the C.R.O.M. member of the bureau, T concurring.

April 3d: Y said he needed a discreet comrade to act as sort of secretary, to assist in translation work, etc. T suggested young tailor, a member of the Federation of Communist Youths (affiliated to the Mexican Communist Party). --T informed that the E.C. of the C.G.T. had agreed to send Ramirez and to give him the proper credentials, as well as a letter of adhesion to the Red Labor Union International.

In the afternoon Y met Rubio, who was asked to become a member of the Mexican Bureau of the Red Labor Union International. T informed that Paley had also accepted and had announced his willingness to put his paper at the disposition of the Bureau.

April 4th: T suggested that the Bureau should consist of four instead of three men, so as to place two Communists on it. Y accepted. T suggested Jose Valades (member of the Communist Party) as the fourth man.

It was decided that, in addition to the Murphy pamphlet and such other pamphlets as might be printed later, the Bureau should publish a weekly paper.

April 5th: At Y's suggestion it was decided that the paper of the Bureau should be called "El Trabajador" (The Worker). T suggested Valades as editor. --T informed that the E.C. of the C.G.T. had already made out the credential for Ramirez.

April 6th: Y talked with Rodriguez (of the Federation of Young Communists) and engaged him for the day after tomorrow at a salary of \$150 (Mex) a month. It was later decided that R's salary should be raised to \$200 after the first week. T presented estimates from several printers on a 5,000 copy weekly

edition of "El Trabajador" and it was decided to accept a bid of \$111 (Mex). The Murphy pamphlet is to cost \$310 for 10,000 copies. Decided to give the copy to the printer this afternoon.

April 7th: Decided that Rubio is to work half a day on the paper, temporarily, at a salary of \$150 (Mex) a month.

Ramirez all ready in the evening for his departure-- with credentials, letter of adhesion, passport, etc. He is to go tomorrow morning.

April 8th: Ramirez left on the 7:00 o'clock train this morning. --Rodriguez began work for us to-day, beginning on the translation of Lozovsky's "The International Council of Trade and Industrial Unions."

T reported conversation that he and Paley had had in the afternoon with Leija Paz (of the C.R.O.M.). Both T and Paley feel that Leija Paz is not energetic and is not a man to inspire confidence, but inasmuch as he professes his complete agreement with us and inasmuch as he received 13 out of 27 votes cast in the last elections for General Secretary of the Mexico City local federation of the C.R.O.M. both agree that he can be very useful as a member of the Mexican Provisional Bureau. It was decided to accept him as a member of the Bureau, without for the present taking him into complete confidence.

April 9th: Y took up the importance of unifying the scant forces in the "Communist Party of Mexico" and the "Mexican Communist Party." T said that Gale had been the only obstacle to unity and that since his expulsion from the country a United Communist Party was a certainty. T said he was going to meeting of C.P. of M. tonight to sound out the proposition.

April 10th: T reported C.P. of Mexico as ready to united but added that very little could be hoped from a simple unity between the M.C.P. and the C.P. of Mexico, both of which are woefully weak, the C.P. of Mexico being little more than a name. T believed what was needed was a general move for enlistment of new forces, for attracting new blood into the Communist Movement.

April 11th: Y agreed with T that manifesto to all Communists (inside and outside of both Com Parties) should be issued, calling them to a convention for the reorganization of the Communist Party. Y insisted, however, that this manifesto should be issued conjointly by both Communist parties. This was decided. T drew up an outline for the manifesto. --Y directed a letter to the members of the M.C.P. and the C.P. of M., instructing them to unite in the publication of a manifesto to all the workers, inviting Communists to take part in a convention for the reorganization of the Communist Party, all persons accepting the principles and decisions of the Third International and conforming in their activity to those principles and decisions to be eligible for membership in the new party. The work of preparation for the organizing convention and the general activities of the Provisional C.E.C. of the new Party are to be carried out in conjunction with the Mexican representative of the Pan-American Agency. Y suggested and it was finally decided that the provisional C.E.C. be named as follows: one member from each of the now existing Communist parties and three additional members at the organizing convention.

April 12th: T (Frank Seaman) was appointed by Y Mexican representative of the Agency and given credentials. T translated Y's letter to both parties and will take charge of its delivery.

Y met Valades, editor of "El Trabajador" and one of the four men chosen for Mexican Bureau of Red Labor Union International.

--It was decided that the paper shall make its first appearance on Saturday, April 23d.

3-2

[14.05.1921] Six Weeks' Work of the Provisional Mexican Bureau of the Red Labor Union International
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/337-338 (2×; typed)]

Six Weeks' Work of the Provisional Mexican Bureau of the Red Labor Union International

On the 31st of March I arrived in Mexico City. The first week of April was mostly occupied with selecting a delegate to the Red Labor Union International. Fortunately there was the General Workers' Confederation, which is a federation of labor unions, organized in the middle of February, 1921. It now includes all important unions, with exception of the electric workers' union, in Mexico City. Besides, lately two states' Federation of Unions and Railway Union are affiliated with the Confederation. By my suggestion the Central Executive Committee chose Comrade Ramirez as duly accredited delegate to the Red Labor Congress. Comrade Ramirez left the City on the morning of April 8th for the States with credentials from the General Workers Confederation. He sailed from New York on the 21st of the same month for Europe.

Meanwhile we talked on organizing provisionally the Mexican Bureau of the Red Labor Union International, as our secretary's report shows, we have duly organized the Provisional Mexican Bureau of the Red Labor Union International on the 6th of April with four members; one from I.W.W., one from the left wing of the Mexican Federation of Labor and two from Communist Party.

The first work we have done was the preparation and publication in Spanish of the Murphy Pamphlet; The Two Month[s] Activity of the Red Labor Union International. We have printed 10,000 copies. It came out on the 14th of April, and distributed free to the workers through the labor unions.

Next we planned weekly publication. The first number of the said weekly; "El Trabajadores" (The Workers) came out on April 22. Since then every Saturday, with exception of May First, the weekly is coming out regularly. So the fourth number came out today (May 14). We issued the Manifesto of the Mexican Bureau of the R.L.U.I. in the second issue of the weekly and also printed in a leaflet form for free distribution.

We are translating Lozovsky Pamphlet into Spanish, and expecting to publish soon the State and Revolution by Lenin in Spanish. There is published already in Spanish, but it costs 3.00 pesos (\$1.50) a copy, so it is impossible for a worker to get it. We can get it out above three thousand copies at 45 cents (22.5 cents in American currency). The Party has a little printing shop, we are planning to enlarge it so that we could print our publications, if we get little more money.

So far our work has been done by voluntary help mostly. Our Bureau members do not draw salary except one, who edits paper, do general managing work of the Bureau. We engaged a young man as typist but not able to do the kind of work we want, so until two days ago with help of comrade Mrs. Tanner we have managed the work. The acting editor gets only \$75.00 a month as his half salary. However, as our work somewhat progressed we have obliged to get a typist, who will do the office work, correspondence and mailing. There was a very good comrade for this kind work, so we just engaged her with a salary of 100.00 dollars per month and as a natural consequence we rented an office at \$25.00 (Mexican) per month. It will costs us some 20 or 40 dollars to fix it with furniture and etc.

Thirdly we sent two comrades as propagandist and organizer for the Red Labor Union International for two weeks, visiting four important industrial centers of the country. This is the first attempt to do anything for the movement outside the City of Mexico. In the Mexico City, we sold May First number of El Trabajadores some thousand copies at 5 cent a copy. With the exception of first number of weekly we do not give any copy, which is not custom, because all the labor papers in Mexico are subsidized by either government or some politician, so the worker never expect to pay for it and the publishers (Labor organizations) are too glad to give away. But ours is different we must show that it is not a sort of bribe met out by capitalist class. It is really a labor paper must be supported by the workers themselves.

Fourthly, as to the finance, first two weeks we spent \$1,265.75 it includes expenses for the delegate and some debts contracted by the comrade Tanner and cost for two type machines. Next two weeks cost us \$545.43. We paid some \$81.31 for cables. The expenses for first two weeks in May show at \$541.35. It includes the sending two comrades to the country for two weeks propaganda, and some expenses for May Day advertisement. In six weeks we spent \$2,352.53 all together including defraying debts amounting \$240.00 and expenses for the delegate some \$400.00, that's, \$640.00. So really the current expenses amount to \$1,712.53, or \$285.82 per week.

Fifthly, the above is a brief account and work of the Mexican Bureau of the R.L.U.I. for the first six weeks. Now as to the immediate future, our budget if as follows;

1) Salaries-----	\$150.00	per week
2) Office rent-----	12.50	per month
3) Weekly-----	\$55.00	" week
4) <u>Mailing and other office expenses</u>	<u>25.00</u>	" "
Total	\$242.50	

The above budget is of course only for the bear necessary expenses to carry on the work we have begun so far. It does not include any expenses for organizers expenses or extra publication.

On April 23, 1921 I submitted to the M.O. [Main Office] a budget for the Provisional Mexican Bureau of the R.L.U.I. as follows;

Monthly Salaries and Expenses,		
1) Editor	per month	\$150.00
2) Assistant	" "	125.00
3) Two Organizers	per month	250.00
4) The Secret.-Treas.	" "	150.00
5) Travelling Expenses for Organizers	per month	200.00
6) Office Rent	" "	59.00
7) Ditto Expenses	" "	50.00
8) Weekly (4 issues)		400.00
9) Ditto Mailing expenses	" "	40.00
10) Two Leaflets and One Pamphlet	" "	100.00
11) Emergency expenses	" "	25.00

Total		\$1540.00

What I have done and what I put done here are all provisional in nature, until other members of the P.A.A. will come.

I might say here that I have not made any estimate on the work of the Agency proper because I want [to] wait for the other members come and co-operate in the matter.

3-3

19.09.1921 [Katayama] to the Organization Committee of the Mexican Communist Party
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/119-120 (2×; typed)]

To the Organization Committee of
the Mexican Communist Party.

Dear Comrades:

For the past six months, up until now, the Communist work has been agitational only. It is now necessary that agitation be combined with definite organization activity.

We want to make clear to the Organization Committee its functions. While the Agency has general direction of the work of organizing a Mexican Communist Party, in accordance with the Mandate of the Executive of the Communist International, this direction is general and advisory - the Agency is here simply to help the Mexican comrades. The actual work of organizing a Communist Party must be carried out by the Mexican comrades, by the Organization Committee.

It is necessary that the Organization Committee realize its responsibility and power. You are not to consider yourselves as children taking orders from the Agency - the Agency will soon go, but you will remain, and you will have to carry on the work of the Mexican Communist Party.

Up until now the Organization Committee has done practically nothing. It is necessary that it energetically and consciously take up the work of organizing for the Congress in December to organize the Communist Party.

It is you who must make the plans, etc. and carry on the work. We make the following suggestions:

Out of the members of the Organization Committee should be formed two Bureaus - a Labor Union Bureau and a Political Bureau.

The Labor Unions Bureau should 1) specialize on the propaganda for the Red Labor Union International; 2) organize Communist groups in the Labor unions (no labor union as such can be affiliated with the party or send delegates to the Congress); [3)] supervise the publication of the labor Union organ, El Trabajador; 4) specialize in general on Communist activity in the labor unions, both in the C.G.T. and the C.R.O.M.

The Political Bureau should specialize 1) on activity in the various Socialist parties, to organize Left Wings and Communist groups therein, get members there to join the Communist Party; 2) work among the peasants, organizing Communist groups and directing the propaganda among them; 3) organization of non-labor union Communist groups; 4) supervise the publication of El Obrero Comunista.

This does not mean that each Bureau is independent: they report to the full Organization Committee, which also can make decisions either political or labor union. The Bureau may meet

frequently during the week; the full Organization Committee should meet once a week.

Among the things that it is necessary for the Organization Committee to do are the following:

1) Organize Communist groups in the C.G.T. and the C.R.O.M. The CROM must not be neglected, since it has a large membership of industrial workers. Speakers might be sent to the union meetings in Mexico City, etc. Definite organization is necessary.

2) A number of answers have been received to the Manifest in Mexico City. These persons should be definitely organized, and given definite work to do. It is necessary that the Organization Committee work out Regulations and By-Laws for these groups, and also the amount of initiation fees and monthly dues to be paid. It might be a good idea to call a meeting of these comrades for discussion and organization purposes.

3) The same definite organization work should be done all over Mexico, forming groups in an organized fashion, regulations, dues, etc., and giving them definite work to do. A definite part of the dues must go to the Organization Committee, as representing the national organization.

4) Public meetings should be held in Mexico City, and wherever possible to discuss Communism and secure members.

5) There are two or three Socialist parties which have an actual membership. Active work must be carried on among these members, exposing their parties and leaders, and convincing them to join the Communist Party. This is very important, and should be done not simply by article and manifestoes but by practical work in those parties.

6) The Organization Committee must carry on its work on the basis of the actual Mexican class struggle, and not simply from abstract theory. It must, of course, emphasize education in Communist theory, but always bring it home to the Mexican struggle and Mexican conditions.

7) It is indispensable that the Committee in its work develop an actual organization, and not simply loose groups. A definite organization is necessary, with regulations, obligations, responsibility. The various groups should hold regular business meetings, once every week or two weeks.

8) This work of organization must not be postponed until after the Congress, but precede the Congress.

9) The Organization Committee must act as if it were the Executive of a party already in existence, and have definite discipline and control over its own members, and all who carry on its work - editors, organizers, etc.

10) The plan to send out 4 organizers to various parts of Mexico is good. But this cannot be done yet, because we have not a single Communist pamphlet yet printed. Unless the future members of the party understand Communism, it will break up; and this can come only from study of Communist pamphlets. Unfortunately, in spite of trying for three months we have not succeeded in printing a single pamphlet, and in spite of Jose's activity. This is really terrible. We ask the Committee to consider this and find out what the matter is, how we can get pamphlets printed.

11) The Organization Committee should immediately proceed to raise money for its work - by appeals in the Obrero, at meetings, and in all ways possible. The financial support from Moscow will

not continue forever. The Mexican Communist Party, when organized, must be able to finance itself. Financial help from Moscow will probably be continued, but only if the Mexican Communist Party is largely financing itself independently. This is important.

These are merely a few suggestions - you will develop other plans. Put enthusiasm in the work. Organize definitely and aggressively.

September 19

Fraternally yours,

4 S. Katayama in Mexico City to S.J. Rutgers

- 4-1 12.04.(-10.05.)1921** [Katayama] (Mexico City) to [S.J.] R[utgers]. [in care of Bartha Rutgers]
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/5-10 (6×; typed duplicate); 495/18/65/100-105 (typed)]
- 4-2 28.04.1921** Sen Katayama (Yavki) (Mexico City) to R[utgers].
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/22-23 (2×; typed and signed)]]
- 4-3 05.07.1921** S[en]. K[atayama]. (Yavki) (Mexico, D.F.) to R[utgers].
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/26-28 (3×; typed and signed)]

12.04.(10.05.)1921 [Katayama] (Mexico City) to [S.J.] R[utgers]. [in care of Bartha Rutgers]
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/5-10 (6×; typed duplicate); 495/18/65/100-105 (typed)]

Mexico City, April 12, 1921,

Dear Comrade R[utgers].

At last I am here safe! I left New York on the 18th of March, coming to New Orleans on the 20th I took a Steamer Gonzaba, on the 23d, and arrived at Vera Cruz on 30th, from there I took a day train to Mexico City next morning arriving in the Capital 10 p.m. on the same day. We met in the Mexican Gulf big storm delaying two or three days, so it took me unusually a long time to come here. Here I feel much free politically, being unknown to any outsiders. So far I met only a half dozen comrades, who are all trustworthy in every way. However, Comrades here tell me that daily papers wrote and interviewed me and fully describing my personal appearance and even my own political social and economic opinions. In reality there was some one here who assumed my person, so the comrades said to me. A funniest thing of all is that this was happened a month ago. So you see every one expecting to see me among the comrades, but I thought it wise not to appear before the public. I am now under an assumed name, --H. Kiyoda.--.

Before I tell you the Mexican situation, I like tell you now more or less fully my life experiences, which I could not do so in the States, on account of censor. I shall write you cursory in the chronological way, so something already I wrote you.

It was in March 1919. A detective came to Mrs. Hess's wanted me come the justice at the old Post Office Building. I went with the detective there. I waited some time in one of rooms. Waiting about an hour I was conducted the room where an officer, who was to investigate me was sitting. He called a stenographer to take my words down. He asked my past. I told him as much as I thought it necessary. He tried to intimidate or threaten me by some official tricks, but I knew myself better, so I was not caught by the tricks. He first showed me my letters written to Mrs. [Mary E.] Marcy and to you altogether three or four. All in copy, of course, as the investigation progressed I found that they were trying to connect me with you as a German spy. Concerning you, of course, they asserted that you were a big German spy, a quite notorious, recently slipped out of the States. This made me feel somewhat easy, because they were incriminate me on false charges.

Now as to the letters I explained away pretty well. Then he produced the Heimin, I believe they were two copies. An article particularly questioned was some something about war, criticizing the U.S. government, as well as the Allies. He told me that the Heimin was published with German money. But the article in question was the exact translation from an article printed in the Taiyo (The Sun) the monthly published in Tokyo. And circulated in the U.S. with the second class mail privilege, so I told the officer that the U.S. government permit the monthly circulation within the territory, the translation of one of articles ought not to be against the laws of the U.S. I made this argument to him. The investigation lasted about two hours. The officer seemed not much interested in the matter, he said that he will call me again, and dismissed me on that day.

A few weeks later another detective came after me at Mrs. Hess's. This time a young man of quite intelligent looking. He came from front door, so Mrs. Hess met and spoke of me quite favorably as a most reliable man, and with this good introduction the detective met me and questioned me holding the stenographic report of what I said previously to them the young detective was quite interested in my past as I was educated in American colleges, such as Grinnell and Yale as well as at Andover, so he left me with full satisfaction of being my reliability and a good cook. Since then detective never bothered

me until the beginning of the year 1920 when the great raid was occurred.

On the 3rd of January I went to Newark to see Mr. [Keikichi] Ishimoto off for Norway. There were already Miss [Agnes] Smedley, the secretary of the Indian revolutionary organization, Comrades [Kamekichi] Takahasi, editor of the Oriental Economist and [Unzo] Taguchi. When we came back to the city, we thought it best to celebrate the new year spending together that day. Well we went to the show and stopped at the Japanese restaurant. We talked the great raid just began, as if it were some other persons affairs, but at the same time we should be prepared to meet emergency ourselves too.

When I come back to my home in the evening, my daughter was anxiously waiting me and told me that that whole morning many telephone calls came, and some of them inquired about my being arrested or not. She was quite scared of the situation we were in. She told me that I should do something to avoid a possible danger. Any way I left that night my room and went to Mr. [Michio] Itow's and stayed at his. I might say here I was fortunate myself, because my niece was staying with my daughter, so I could leave my daughter with her. Next day I spent at the Japanese Association reading the Japanese newspapers. In the evening I went to one Japanese restaurants to attend a farewell meeting of a friend. The place was only seven blocks from my home.

The farewell meeting was over 11 p.m. I left alone the Japanese restaurant and walked to the Columbus Circle. There I lingered a moment or two, thinking whether I should return my home or go to Mr. Itow's, not knowing thing that was happening at my room. To return my home seemed reasonable, because it was a matter of few blocks' walk, while if I go to Itow's I have to ring the door bell and wake up the people of the house. Then I took out my watch and saw it was not too late to go to Itow's. I went to Itow's apartment, which was in Madison Avenue few blocks below the Grand Central. When I went into his studio, Itow was not there, but he left a note, which said in substance as follows; "Early in the evening Miss Yasu telephoned and told him that late in that afternoon three soldiers and three detectives came to my room inquiring after me, they questioned my daughter about me as to where I was then and when I was to return [and] so on. They were still before my room door and also at the elevator, so should not go out at all." Adding that he, Itow, shall advice me that I should keep quiet in the room.

Then, only then I knew clearly I was watched by the American Government. And I have to look after myself. Mr. Itow came back past midnight. We talked together for sometime as to what was the best for me to do. Of course, Itow sympathized with my present situation, because I have to look after my daughter, although she was at that time with my niece. My mind was occupied with Yasu's affairs more than my own. Mr. Itow promised to look after Yasu, then studying dance with Mr. Itow, beside with Mr. Albertierie.

Next morning we thought it better not stay any longer at Itow's, because his being studio there will naturally come and go many people. I have decided to go to a friend's at College Point, Long Island. I left Itows early in the morning of 5th of January. The friend at the "College Point" welcomed me sympathizing at my difficult circumstances. His wife and their children, two daughters and two sons, made me perfectly at home. All this while I was in a close touch with Comrade Taguchi, who looked after my own and Yasu's affairs during my hiding that followed several months.

At College Point I thought I could stay safely for the while. But few days later, Yasu through Mr. Itow sent words in effect that the Japanese government was also trying to deport me. Who informed this news to Yasu, I shall not say here on account of Yasu's or rather my niece's friendship. But this fact caused me to stay away from the place where the Japanese were frequenting. Comrade T. advised me to go to his friend's at one of fashionable summer resorts, which abound near New York. He kindly arranged everything for me with his friend, so that I went to the place from Penn[sylvania]. Station on the 8th. Comrade T. got me ticket, so I went to the train without any trouble. It took me to get there some 4 hours. It was cold but clear and fine day for winter in this part of the country.

When I arrived the place I took a taxi to his store, little after 5 p.m. I met comrade T.'s friend for the first time. He is a simple and earnest business man, without least pretension or assuming air, but kind and sympathetic toward his fellow men. He took me to his residence after closing the store. In his

house there a young man employed in the store by him. The young man was ill in bed for past few days. He was up the bed within a few days.

We three men lived all to ourselves. Mostly the friend cooked his own way, we just eat. But the rest of us cooked our breakfast, because the friend never woke up earlier than 9.

After the breakfast the young man goes first to the store, and friend too. I was left alone in the house, so studied and wrote some; particularly, revising and mostly rewriting my old book-My Socialism- written in 1901 and published in the same year.

For nearly two months I was with the friend, occasionally we went to the show in the evening, but mostly I stayed myself alone in the house. Just before dinner hour the friend usually came back and prepared our mail, although I tried to do the task myself, the friend liked to do his own way. The friend goes to the store as soon as he gets his dinner through. Then young man comes back to eat his dinner and goes to the store. They stay in the store until dark. After the supper we all read newspapers or book. Each goes to bed whenever he likes without any ceremony.

That winter was severest one in many years. New York had deep snow of thirty years record. All the traffic was stopped on account of snow N.Y. spent over ten million dollars to get rid of snow, which took many weeks. Our place had snow too, but not so deep as N.Y. Anyway I had a very safe and comfortable place of restraint under the friend's hospitality.

During those two months I was at ease physically, I did not to do any physical work, but mentally I was not at ease by any means. I have to watch myself whenever I go out I have to look around whether I might be watched or not. Looking back those days from now it may seem very foolish to be so careful and so over cautious. Yet it was my duty to be on my guard not be caught by my enemy.

My daily work was simple. When two others went out to attend the store, I was all alone in the house. Generally I sat in the little kitchen which was in the back part of the house and it was faced south-east. Sun shined all the morning. I had only coal the kitchen stove once in a while. Furnace was taken care of by the young man, so I needn't bother with it at all, except its fire went out, I had to build fire in order to keep the house warm. Every day I read the New York Times and A Japanese paper (Daily) published at San Francisco also a weekly published in N.Y. The rest of my time was spent in reading some books or writing.

At twilight I generally took a long walk along the Boardwalk. I choose specially this particular hour for my outside exercise, I felt safe then, no one will distinguish my identity. I enjoyed this very much. It is one of the best things at Atlantic that the city has. I mean the Boardwalk. The Boardwalk is the word signifies a walk built along the entire beaches with board for walk. It is a wide walk of about 50 or 60 feet, the middle part is for the push cars, while two sides are supposed for the pedestrians. The entire Boardwalk is for the pleasure walkers. No automobile or any other wagon is allowed to drive on the Boardwalk. And this B'dwalk is always cleared of snow, so you can walk as soon as snow falling stops.

Atlantic is the most bourgeois city in the United States, clean and elegant. But I felt it the most proletarian and enjoyed as such very much in the construction of this Boardwalk. It can be utilized by all equally. Then on the sea sides of the Boardwalk along the beautiful beaches there stand only three piers that serve for the common amusement resorts. The entire beaches are all free to all comers, rich and poor equally. This feature pleased me very much, because what we want is beaches, and this place opens them for all.

Evenings were spent together in the little sitting room. We often entered at discussion on some current topics. The friend is, however, a simple self made business man, and a man of limited education, so I avoided the discussion on the subject of socialism or communism. But he often opened the discussions on the subject himself. I found out that ha was too interested in those subjects and understood in a certain extent. This is because of his past career. He was a poor boy served as an apprentice in a trading house, was fully exploited by the house for seven long years. Then he run away to America to get his own independence. Thus he could understand things great deal by his own

personal experiences.

The young man came from a fishery village on the Japan Sea. At one time his family was rich and respectable in the village but his father lost property so he was to support the family by working as a fisherman from the time while he was quite young, so he too knew some things of hardship of life as a worker. He has a very little education in the school but educated himself by his own effort, so understand things pretty well. Within few weeks he became very much interested in communism and Bolshevik movements. He read my Mss. and then copied all I wrote for his own benefit. When I left the place he was a very good comrade, who promised to consecrate himself to the cause. And I am glad to say that he kept his promise right along and to-day he is one of the most promising young comrades among my own countrymen on that part of country.

At the end of February Comrade T. wrote me in the effect that the city became now quiet and there seems no serious danger for me if I came back. So I have decided to come to the old town. However, I did not come to my old nest, for it was still dangerous to be there. Because often there comes a man who inquires of me, and asked at one time my picture.

With Comrade T's effort I was allowed to become one of boarders in a Japanese hotel, where only sailors and runaway Japs stay. It is considered as one of worst places in the city, but the proprietor of the hotel is old sailor came to the city some thirty or forty years ago, so he is considered to be a pretty good man and a good term with all the people about him. Thus my comrade T. thought it specially safe. Well I stayed here about two weeks. The boarders were all good fellows. They gamble all day and night, at times fight each other after quarrelling over dimes and dollars. But they all were good to me. After two weeks I got a job as a cook in a family near the city.

It was a family pretty good and easy to work for. No complaint or any trouble at all. My duty was to cook only, so I had plenty time to read or write. Every week I got a day off. Generally I went to the City and met comrade T. to get some news about the movement and also about my daughter, who was then connected with Murry Anderson's "what's in a name." All the leaders of both parties were yet in hidings. I was often cautioned by comrades not visit any comrade, and I too should be very careful about myself. However, I visited often comrade Nick. H. then staying with comrade family up town. I got most of the Party news from him, as I got new issues of The Communist. Comrade N. was soon to hide himself again, being followed by the some of gentlemen. I worked in the same family up till the first part of June. The lady of the house was going to some summer resort. I came back to the old place this time and stayed there more or less until the middle of January this year. I spent a couple months at Rockaway Beaches with a friend of mine and sold "pop corn."

Now summer is over, I expected to get a job in a family again. But this year there were not many new jobs, on account of general depression. I however got one. After a trial of two days was dismissed as too old. Since then I could not get any. However, as Christmas season approached I sold some of the Japanese Art Prints, which I had from Comrade [Eizo] Kondo, who went back to Japan. I lived with a young man, who was with me during the last summer at the Rockaway. Then my daughter was staying with my niece, who was singing for the San Carlo Opera Company.

As to this young man until he came to my home he never heard of socialism or communism. He too was a sea man, he was a sailor cook. Left his home at 17, ever since he was working in one or other ship. He has had quite wide and really surprisingly varied experiences in the sea. He is a quiet and industrious youth of exceptional energy and patience.

Naturally my place soon became a headquarter for the Japanese comrades. And this young roomer of mine became the most enthusiastic student of communism and faithful worker. He is now one of young leaders among the Japanese comrades. Last autumn he got through the Automobile training school and since he is working in a grocery store as a driver. He by both work and his actual propaganda support the movement among the Japanese.

At the end of December 1920 I got a commission to work on the collecting some material for the P.A.C. It came in a form of a letter signed by S[cott]. and F[raina]. at M[oscow]. Owing to the splits of parties and party hatred and antagonisms. The letter was not notified me until after three weeks the

arrival of it, so when I got the copy of it was almost end of Dec. We started to work at once, but again on account of the party squabbles one party boycotted us entirely, so that we can not officially constitute the committee. Thus the matter was drugged till Jan. 8, 1921. On that date Comrade Scott arrived with my credentials so we started to organize and work on the business assigned to us.

We have had some troubles from the very beginning. When we appointed a member to the A.B. He was happened to be a man who favored Unity, so he was expelled from the party thus crippled our work from getting co-operation of one party. It took me five weeks to get the matter straightened out so that we could get a semblance of co-operation.

However, we organized the A.B. sent out organizers and picked up delegates 8 in number. All went to their destination without hindrance. We published two pamphlets several leaflets and manifestoes.

On the 15th of February 1921, Comrade F. came back and we somewhat reorganized the work already began [begun]. But unfortunately Comrade F. has to go away sooner than we expected, in fact he went away after staying little over a week to Canada, from there it was arranged long before this that he was to come to Mexico. Then it was soon realized the fact that the goods left at the place from whence he recently came, stacked there, he thought it was necessary for him to go there himself, although Comrade S. and I were against his trip, he went there, and he sent some goods, as to his future movement I do not know at this date (May 10, 1921) ⁽¹⁾. Thus our work so far went wrong one after another, and worst of all is I do not know as to our future course at all.

Then there were some very complicated questions about the unity business in the States. A mandate to the P.A.A. came in the first part of April, which said "A full power is given to the P.A.A. to unite two parties' fore June First." I was then away here. Comrade S. was in the States, naturally he took the charge of the matter. We made a grave mistake at first step, which delayed the matter for more than three weeks, which caused the M. [to] send second mandate in which reversed the first and took away the controlling power over the Convention for the unity, thus the matter drugged so long and it is now in the hand of Comrade S. I don't know what will be the outcome. Comrade S. don't inform me hardly anything of the progress. I left on the 18, March and I did not get any letter until 19th of April, although he asked me necessary instructions or credentials by cables. I did not understand the real situation of the matter. Of course we are all somewhat in secret or underground work, so we can not report things as it were in open. Still it is rather unusual not to get a letter during one full month since we parted! Although I asked by letters and cables to make his report on various matters. He wrote since three or four letters but never answered some of important questions I put to him and it is his official duty to answer me. Thus things stand now. The communications and I dare say relations between the States and Mexico are in the most incomplete and this makes me still more uncertain as to the immediate future. I at least do not know about Comrade F.'s future movement. He controls certain amount of goods, and then I do not know what will be the future work of ours.

Then there were raids again in the States, which made all the leaders went [go] to hiding places respectively. Thus we are in the most gloomy situation. Looked at international standpoint. I hope however, things will come out alright in end [*sic*] near future.

Since I assumed on this important duty I met many unpleasant and very hard experiences first with the C. Company, and next with Comrade Julius Heiman, who tried to bulldog me, failing in that he hold up the funds belonged to the cause. Then with the unity business and Scott. The last is not over yet. As I am placed being the chairman of the institution, I feel great responsibility of the whole matter, but thus I am kept in the dark and then my colleagues disregard or ignore me, almost left me uninformed of the things present as well as to the things future.

Those are, however, concerned with the other parts of the world, really I can not possibly direct or control the things myself. So I must satisfy with things as they come to me. Now I have my direct responsibility here in this country. These, I would like very much to tell you here.

Since I arrived in this city it is now just about six weeks. There were two comrades, husband and his wife, husband went to Russia with Roy, an Indian revolutionist came back with his Russian young

wife, the husband was supposed to have been employed by Comrade F., so he has been in touch with one of two parties. Thus I had a path already paved by a comrade, who knew something about the nature of our work. And at the same time I have responsibility of supporting two comrades. I had to pay some debts of the said comrade. Still he speaks fairly good Spanish and write it too. This was a great help to me.

First thing I did here was to pick a good comrade to go the Red Congress, because there was already a pretty strong Federation of Unions affiliated to the Red L.U.I. through the credentials from that organization the comrade I selected could get into the Congress. He left here on the 8th of April, sailed from N.Y. on the 21, so he will be in M. by this time.

Next I organized, with the aid of Comrade Tanner, the Provisional Mexican Bureau of the Red Labor Union International. Bureau membership consists four; one from I.W.W., one from the Mexican Federation of Labor (A left Wing man in the reactionary Federation that affiliated with the Sam Gompers' Federation) and two from the Communist Party. Comrade Tanner serves as the Chairman of the Bureau.

Third, we published the Two Months Activity of the Red Labor, by Murphy Pamphlet 10,000 copies in Spanish and distributed almost all now.

Fourth, we started a four pages weekly "El Trabajadores." Already we issued three nos., printing each 5,000 copies. We sold 1,000 copies on May First in the City of Mexico. Here all the labor papers and labor publications are subsidized by the politicians or by the government, so no worker expect to pay for such paper. But I am starting a new move. I shall not give any paper to the worker at all. At least we made a good beginning on the First of May.

Fifth, I wrote a letter to two C.P.s asking them for the unity. I met several times with representatives of the both parties and they finally agreed to unite. Thus the unity of two parties in Mexico is already an accomplished fact. We expect to issue an organ of the C.P. unified soon.

The Red Labor U.I. has been becoming quite popular in Mexico. We are getting some new unions affiliated to the Red Labor. One thing we have advantage over the States is that Communist movement is yet open and legally conducted. We got the second class mail privilege for the Weekly.

Six, we are sending two comrades to Tampico and other places as the first propaganda trip. Each will cost about \$75.00 in American gold. So they will travel two weeks holding meetings at four important industrial centers.

The above are the brief outlines of our work here already done or fairly well started past six weeks.

Now I must close this with my hearty greetings to you all!

Yours for the cause,

P.S. Mrs. B. [sic] Bartha [Rutgers-Mees]! Please send this to Comrade R. wherever he may.

(1) This letter was being written on May 10, 1921.

28.04.1921 Sen Katayama (Yavki) (Mexico City) to R[utgers].
[ПГАСПИ, 495/108/11/22-23 (2×; typed and signed)]

Mexico City, April 28, 1921,

Comrade R[utgers].

Few days ago I received yours of April first, I heard your two letters came to Atlantic [City], but some way or other I don't get them. I am very glad to know that you are well and you will be soon at M[oscow]. According to yours, you are going to leave Berlin tomorrow, so I shall mail this to you via Reval and to Mrs. R. at Amersfoort.

In Berlin you must have met Fraina, so I presume that you have heard all about my troubles at New York, and moreover you must know that who is the most trusted friend from Comrade F. Even at the eve of my departure the trusted friend, his being treasurer to the American Bureau and happened that he kept our money he hold that up and claimed that he has had right to hold up our entire funds asserting that I am unfit to the position and incapable of doing business. To which Scott did not make any objection, although he afterward admitted to me that the trusted friend was wrong. Although I did not took such an outrageous claim gen[er]ously, and yet it would be possible that he might hold the fund up simply to make me submit to his dictate, so I went to Cec [CEC] of C.P. just asked for some fund, and they readily advanced me enough to carry on necessary work for the time being. It shows the character of the trusted friend! It was the very same friend, who advised the minority to carry the entire treasury fund away, and not give a cent to the majority party. The trusted friend calls proudly, "It is a Bolshevik way." T.F. tried the same method on us. By this time even Scott realized the wrong attitude of the T.F., so we took by some skilful way almost all the money in his hand. But you see how I have suffered on account of this former friend! This last rather tragic episode happened after Comrade F. left for Germany, so I just tell you that we must be very careful in trusting others.

We have had again very trying experiences, which fortunately just solved almost by cable from M. I mean the unity affairs. This too you may heard from Comrade F. So I need not go into any details. Perhaps you know the draft with five conditions, that we proposed or suggested to M. Now some where beginning of April the mandate from M. came to us, in a cable; - "Agency has full power amalgamation two companies. Amalgamation must be completed June first otherwise new company will be formed disregarding old ones. No special form amalgamation decided by home office. Decision final. Representative to home office only acceptable amalgamated corporation."

When this cable came I was here in Mexico City, so without consulting me Scott presented the said draft to two parties and compelled them to accept as final. Scott asked me my authority to support and give him all the power necessary to carry out, to which I had to comply. Of course C.P. did not accept the draft but appealed to home office and got answer satisfactory to cp. Now to get out of the present difficulty either Scott or F. asked home office approval on draft, which entirely unnecessary in the phase of the mandate. The fact that ucp [UCP] accepted the draft as final and cp. didn't create an impasse, especially ucp attacked the Agency as indecisive and lingering, threatening us to appeal to the home office. It troubled Scott very much and asked me what to do.

Now although under the circumstances I supported Scott and complied with everything he asked for. Yet again and again I warned him to go carefully aiming always at the goal for which we are working. Scott never sent any letter since I came here but always only cables, although I asked fuller report on matter by his letter. But none he wrote. Even until this day. I rather felt uncertain of the things but have to answer his cables only judging from his cables. Even then I told to be very careful in such words as follows; I wish you reconsider the calling over heads if possible for the sake of speedy

amalgamation. After all draft is our own we may change, what we want is amalgamation within the specified time. Since Agency has full power. Avoid unnecessary antagonism that might delay amalgamation. Call to act over the head is gravest and most dangerous that might delay aim rather than hasten. Consider Agency is acting with greatest responsibility." Again "My last cable not retraction of your authority merely recommended reconsideration before action, as hasty steps may prejudice unity instead of helping particularly if main office hasn't sent draft approval. Perhaps harmful to excommunicate whole C.P. Officialdom."

As with my appointing Scott as the solely authorized representative of the Agency I also appointed Miss Jenny Dean [Jeannette D. Pearl] as my personal representative in advisory capacity only. It was cabled to Scott saying in the cable that "full instructions and explanations on the appointment by letter." In spite of my appointment gave a good effect on C. Company, and without waiting to see my letter as I notified in the cable Scott flatly refused to recognize her as such, which of course gave Scott an attitude of undenying [undeniable] partisanship, which naturally angered the cp. Thus you see by the lack of tact and consideration overpowered probably by partisan feeling on part of the chief actor the matter dragged unnecessarily long and got an attack from his own party.

At this very stage second Mandate came from M.O., which apparently upset the first. It runs as follows; "Authorized by board of directors to state Agency has no authority to press five conditions (put forth in draft — by the present writer). Equal basis and chairman joint stock meeting with voice but no vote enough and all is necessary. Other conditions are not pertaining to preliminary arrangements and are subject to the decision of joint stock meeting. Joseph Andrews and Marshall Co."

Thus you see again Agency dominated by somewhat partisan attitude was fortunately defeated by the second mandate, although it too shows a trace of partisan attitude bias in the hand of Andrews! Yet I am glad that this will shift entirely the responsibility of the coming convention on the shoulders of both parties, while the Agency's responsibility is greatly lightened, being taken away the chairman's casting or controlling power.

No doubt this time they shall unite. If not within the specified time, namely, before June first they unite, then by the very aim and purpose of the Agency, which it was created by the 3rd International the Agency shall step in and conduct the work of "New Company will be formed disregarding old ones." This is my interpretation of two apparently contradictory mandates.

Now with the second mandatory cable two parties have signed the call, so Scott cabled me no longer my presence required. I am sure this time they shall unite.

Now what I wrote so far all things past, but they will show you under what condition am I working. But above all things just now interest me the most will no doubt interest you too. That I shall write you in the following lines;

I believe that I wrote you few lines from New Orleans just before I sailed from that port. I arrived this city on the last day of March. So you see I have been now just four weeks. In those 4 weeks I have with a help of one comrade organized the Mexican Bureau of the Red Labor Union International, selected a good comrade [and] sent to the RLUI congress as the duly authorized representative from the General Federation of Workers of Mexico, which affiliated to the RLUI.

Under the M.B. [Mexican Bureau] of RLUI we published Murphy's Pamphlet (10,000 copies) and distributed them almost all. We issued the first number of the organ of the M.B. entitled; "El Trabajadores." [sic] both in Spanish language. We printed 5,000 of No. 1. The next issue will come out on Saturday next as the May number.

Since I came here, namely on the 1 of April membership of the Communist Youth that were 40, and last evening meeting showed 150 due paid members. C.Y. publishes its own weekly and there are quite many active members who will help the work of the M.B.

In Mexico there were two opposing parties, which was one my duties placed by Comrade Kobezky last year, to investigate. Since I came here I approached with a unity proposal with a written communication. I met representatives of two parties several times. And it was decided last evening

meeting that both agreed on every point contained in my letter addressed them and now practically the unity of two parties is accomplished fact in Mexico. Of course two parties are very small in membership but the unity will give facility and vigor for the C.P. and its movement in future. We are going [to] publish a Communist organ at least once a month.

At the present time we have a very little fund to do any effective propaganda work, although every prospect seems bright and hopeful from my short experiences.

Comrade F. promised to be here by the end of the present month-April-. He controls certain amount of materials, if he comes we will be able to continue this most hopeful work in this and other Latin Countries. I wish you look after the matter. Comrade Scott has some that might be sent here. But as I wrote above I don't hear much about the condition of his field, since I left on 18th of March last, so I am very much worrying about our immediate future. I am responsible for the work, and above all to the welfare of a comrade and his Russian wife, whom Comrade F. engaged at Moscow and he sent here. Such being the case I urgently ask you to look after the matter. This anxiety of mine, however, will be taken away, if comrade F. is coming as he promised. Under the present status I shall be able to continue our work about two months.

I close this with my hearty greetings to you and to our Comrades!

I remain yours for the cause, [signed:] Sen Katayama
(Yavki)

4-3

05.07.1921 S[en]. K[atayama]. (Yavki) (Mexico, D.F.) to R[utgers].
[ПГАСПИ, 495/108/11/26-28 (3×; typed and signed)]

Mexico, D.F., Mexico, July 5, 1921,

Comrade R.;

Dear Comrade;

It is now over three months since I came this place. Time flies very fast. I have had so many things and, I dare say, so many troubles to get through in order to make progress. Until the middle of June from the wholesale arrests of foreigners in our movement on April 16, I was living in one house or some other just temporary in constant trouble that cropped up one after another. Moreover, I had to look after myself in order to avoid eyes of enemy as it was rumored that every foreigner connected with the Red labor movement is to be deported, at once by the order of the chief executive without trial or anything, so that I have to guard myself from the possible arrest. There is one Japanese spy employed by the Mexican Government, which fact made me still more difficult for me, because there are in the city 150 to 200 Japanese, so that it would be a easy matter for Mr. Jap. Spy to sort out me, if I go out in the streets.

Since June 16th I moved a little more secluded quarter with independent entrance and located in a country town about 45 minute ride from the Capital. So I am having little easier life than before. I do not go out to the streets, except I had to see some important comrade at certain trusted comrade's.

Before a young comrade with his Russian wife were working for me, who lived here some years and manage[d] Spanish, I hardly did any work with Mexicans directly, always through the young comrade, consequently I knew very little of Mexican comrades and their mental attitude, I might say, or national characteristics. But since his arrest on April 16th and his wife's voluntary surrender to the authority and joining in him, I was thrown into among the Mexicans, who mostly can not speak English, I have had or still having rather a difficult life but unbounded kindness and protection of the Mexican comrades I managed to recognize the necessity of organizing the work with them wholly and I am glad to say that I have in a greater measure succeeded: everything seems alright, although I had to adjust thing to avoid the possible trouble that arose on account of the careless talk of the young man with certain comrades before his arrest, but fortunately I got the trouble through without much inconveniences. Now I find myself much more in closer touch with Mexican comrades than before and they are very patient and diligent people, ever ready to work without complaint or unnecessary argument and above all they are not after pay or money.

Our work here somewhat crippled on account of the said arrest and incurred some unnecessary expenses but things now are in a pretty good shape as you will see my financial reports for the months of April, May and June. The month of June seems too much expended, but it is owing to the budget for the future of the Mexican Bureau of the R.L.I., so on the whole our work here, as far as Mexico only concerned will be carried out quite economically.

Now as to the future I only say that I must consult with other member just arrived from Europe, although I do not yet met him owing to the disordered connections, but I shall meet him sooner or later.

I shall tell you briefly about situation in Latin America. In Mexico communist propaganda has been never systematically done. The labor movement is tinged with syndicalism and anarchism. Consequently the Communist Party work has been entirely ignored. However, workers are generally more class conscious and revolutionary than the workers of the U.S.A. At the present time here we have far more freedom of speech and assembly than it is the case with the U.S.A. So prospectus of our movement is bright here.

Few days ago I got a letter from Guatemala where three of our deported comrades landed. One of them wrote in the effect that there is labor movement and socialist movement with a pretty good ground for our propaganda, and he says it is possible that the Central American communist movement may be brought into a good shape. Workers of Guatemala are looking toward Mexico for moral influence and support.

Peru, Chile, Argentine and Uruguay have [*sic*] starting pretty good movement, which I am sure you will posted already. Thus little aggressive efforts on our part we may soon able to organize the Pan American Communist movement. My hope is that we should do the work very diligently and carefully so that we may able to hold a Pan'Merican Congress next year before the 4th Congress shall be held, so that we may able to bring our forces to the 4th Congress. I wish you tell our friends there in the effect that we can pursue our work with vigor and aggressiveness. I need not tell you as to the work in States. It is reported to me that since the unity was accomplished things going very smoothly and getting in workable conditions.

Just I got the first two days' reports of the S.P. convention held at Detroit. They give very dark picture. Sickly [Morris] Hillquit has been taking cold water as Japanese proverb says. He is dominating the entire convention. And the most miserable attitude the convention took so far is about the Third International, the whole convention joked at the Third International and voted that the S.P. will not keep in touch with any international but keep the work entirely at home!

Saddest of all is the report of the C.E.C. it shows that S.P. lost 10,000 members last year and 4,000 this year, making the present membership at 17,000. But what kind members are they? Here is a financial report, I shall give a portion of it;

Membership dues during past five months-

	Membership	Paid in dues
Jewish	922	\$77.10
Italian	993	98.26
Bohemian	868	67.78
German	624	59.58
Jugo-Slav	601	54.64
Lithuanian	174	17.40

The above shows how the members are dwindling away. No wonder that the S.P. voted not to send delegates to Soviet Russia, the report says that financial condition was such the party could not finance the delegates. Now the Party is sustaining a monthly deficit of \$688.00!

With above financial condition socialist party of America will soon wether away even the heroic struggle of old man Hillquit. His effort was and is and will be far poorer than that of Demosthenes, the latter defended nationalism of Greeks but mighty Alexander dominated the entire country of Hellenic League. Hillquit published a pamphlet. It is apologetic through and through defending the petty bourgeois standpoint of his socialist party. Your friends will review the pamphlet in due time, but I am going to write a review in few days. I am sure it will follow the foot steps of the S.L.P. [Socialist Labor Party] and we need not bother much with the S.P. any more after the conduct of the convention as it had acted.

Now I must close this hasty report to you but I shall do my best next time.

I remain yours for the cause, please give my best regard to all especially Bukharin [Alexandra] Kollontay and Mrs. Loudin. To Mrs. Loudin I send my deepest sympathy!

[signed:] S.K.

No doubt you have met Unzo Taguchi and helped him in his duty. I think of him great deal. He is the most energetic able and strong comrade. Hope you will kindly aid him as much as you can. The

Jap. Government again started the most barbarous persecution of Communists. Two best leaders are arrested and put into the dark cell we can not find about them since. They shall do the worse yet so we must rebound our propaganda and crush the imperialist Japan we will do it surely!

5 S. Katayama in Mexico City to/from Ch.E. Scott (K. Jansons) in New York

- 5-1 19.04.1921** Charlie [Charles E. Scott] to Chairman of the American Agency of the CI
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/126-128 (3×; typed and signed)]
- 5-2 22.07.1921** A. Bray [Scott] (New-York) to Kelley [Katayama]
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/49-51 (3×; typed and signed)]
- 5-3 21.08.1921** A. Bray to Y[avki] & Co[mpany]
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/87 (1×; typed and signed)]
- 5-4 16.09.1921** [Katayama] to Bray
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/116 (1×; typed duplicate)]
- 5-4a 16.09.1921** A. Bray to Y[avki] & Co[mpany]
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/121 (1×; typed and signed)]
- 5-5 28.09.1921** Y.C. [Yavki & Carter]— A.A. to Bray
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/130 (1×; typed duplicate)]
- 5-6 08.10.1921** [Yavki] to A. Bray
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/165-167 (3×; typed duplicate)]

5-1

19.04.1921 Charlie [Charles E. Scott] to Chairman of the American Agency of the CI
[ПГАСИИ, 495/18/65/126-128 (3×; typed and signed)]

April 19th, 1921.

To the Chairman of American Agency,
of the Communist International.

Dear Comrade:

I am so extremely busy these days that I consider it nearly impossible to sit down and write you a letter to let you know how things are progressing on this side of the line, and for that reason you will have to excuse me for not being explicit enough in some instances of what follows, but hope that you will be able to form an idea of what is being done by the telegrams I have sent to you. In fact, I would have sent you most of the information before was it not for me expecting you to arrive any day, impression of which I got from one of your communications.

8 delegates to the first Congress of the Red Labor Union have departed, and from the information on hand it is clear, that they have reached their destination.

A delegate from Mexico is here at this time, and I am tending to the necessary details to enable him to leave on Thursday April 21st.

The work of the T.U. Bureau is confined to weekly meetings of the members, and thus tending to little details as they come up. No one is on the payroll of the Bureau, outside of the comrade who is in charge of the office of the so called American Trade Union Publishing Company, and he is tending to all kinds of work, in connection with the work of the Bureau and the publishing, as well as distributing the pamphlets issued. A copy of his report to the Bureau is herewith enclosed. It contains also the information about the number of leaflets printed and distributed, so will omit it here.

Another leaflet is being drafted by Bob. M. [Robert Minor] and action may be taken to have it published in the near future. It deals with Gompers and his attacks upon the Soviet Government and the accusation that the latter is attempting to split the American Unions. It will be headed: "Don't strangle the Labor Unions."

We are getting all possible data for the publication of a paper together, and shall go ahead with it as soon as the situation will permit. Presently, the controversies between the two communist parties and that regarding the unity as per our instructions, has created certain difficulties that makes the publication of a paper practically impossible. On the whole of it, I do not think that much effective work can be done, until the parties are united and thus do away the duplication of so much work and wasting of so much energy and money. To all this, honest comrades say amen. The whole Bureau is about the same opinion.

Still receiving indorsements from local unions in response to the "Appeal to the American workers." Many have written for information as to aims, personnel of officers and affiliations of the Bureau. All this has been taken care of.

One more delegate, W.F. Dunn, representing the A.F. of L. organizations from Butte, Montana, may go to Moscow. Expect him here any day.

The Butte, Montana, Daily Bulletin has approached me for financial assistance, but I am not to take any action, in any way, shape or manner, until I see the above mentioned Dunn, to hear more details of what they want. Then, I shall not act independently, but refer, whatever decision I shall come to, for your approval and action.

The question of unity of the com. parties is the most discouraging affair that I can report on. You must have some definite idea from the many telegrams received from me, as to the general policy and what I have been and am up against now. I shall not depart from anything what we have agreed to (by the Agency) and shall not attempt to induce either of the party committees to this or that of this question. I am enclosing herewith copies of official documents which will enable you to exactly know where they stand. BUT ONE THING SEEMS CERTAIN TO ME THAT IF THE AMERICAN AGENCY IS GOING TO PURSUE A WAVERING POLICY THAT SUCH POLICY WILL BRING NO OTHER RESULTS THAN THE ABOLITION OF THE AGENCY ITSELF, BY THOSE WHO CREATED IT, BECAUSE OUR FAILURE TO BRING UNITY ABOUT, WILL MORE THAN WARRANT SUCH ACTION. IT IS MY FIRM CONVICTION THAT CERTAIN FORCES ARE WORKING OVERTIME TO DISCREDIT THE AMERICAN AGENCY. It seems certain, the both C. E. Committees are fighting the American Agency and are out to prove that we have no stand and no action and will prove to the C. I. that instead of clearing up matters and bring unity about, we are doing the opposite. That we have to look our [out] for.

My stand is clear to you. I feel, that if we have sent anything to the C. I. for approval, and upon receiving their sanction, we should not exhibit a weakness to carry it to a logical conclusion, otherwise, what is the use?

It took the U.C.P. one day to decide the question, agreeing to all the conditions as laid down by the agency. Just the opposite from the CP. Would like to call your attention to the inference that one gets from this: "We have received the communication of April 4, written in your name by one of your members Charles E. Scott." It is plain that my honesty is questioned and whether I am not using the Agency to cover. Nevertheless, I paid very little attention to that. First, as you understand my authority was questioned: Secondly, insisting upon the agency having a formal meeting, and thirdly, not having the authority to receive decisions etc.

It took them three days before these decisions were handed to me in writing, but without the signatures of any of the officers of the Committee. When I produced your approval of my actions, in submitting our agreed plan of action, I finally was given the decisions in writing, properly signed, copies of which are herewith enclosed. It took 13 days to bring this about. I am ashamed of the manner in which this important matter of international significance was handled by them.

[I] Met with Duffy [Alfred Wagenknecht], representing the UCP and Baldwin [Oscar Tyverovsky] representing the CP. It look as we are to agree upon a plan for a unity convention, but Baldwin refused to sign the call for the convention, on the grounds that call contains the conditions of unity and convention as laid down by the American Agency. I maintained that the plan of the agency was obligatory to both parties, and that if any changes are to be made, it will have to come from the C. I. It was only after this fray [afraid] that I got their decisions in writing, and that is as far as we got. Everything is up in the air again.

Going through all that, I could not help but come to the conclusion that as far as the Executive Committee of the CP is concerned, they do not want fraternal unity, and are doing doing [*sic*] everything possible to prevent its achievement.

Reports coming from Canada are very encouraging, in fact they could be classes as good. Comrade Atwood, who is in New York at this time, brought the good news here. According to him, the

attitude of the Canadian comrades of both parties is not of such antagonism, as here in the States, and comrade Atwood thinks that a united party is just as much as accomplished. He is preparing a report while here. Atwood is to remain in Canada until final unity is brought about. Conferences of both party representatives were presided over by comrade Atwood.

No. 1 of the Canadian Communist is out, and is edited by the Canadian Party's provisional committee. The cost is \$110.00 per issue. The next issue will have to be covered from here, but it is thought, that the third issue will be taken care of by themselves.

Atwood's report [Doc. 7-4] is being prepared and upon completion will be forwarded to you.

The same is true of the report on the Negro problem. It is being prepared and shall be forwarded upon completion at the end of the week.

Fraternaly yours,

[signed:] Charles E. Scott.

[handwritten:] P.S. I have stated into my telegrams more than once "come here at once." Why don't you inform about it? Please let me know.

Charlie.

5-2

22.07.1921 A. Bray [Scott] (New-York) to Kelley [Katayama]
[ПГАСПН, 495/18/66/49-51 (3×; typed and signed)]

New-York, July 22.

Dear Kelley:-

1) Your letter, report & story-dealing with the Far East Company I have received and forwarded to Main Office. Therefore I can't return to you.

l e y

2) Have met Com. Pa 10/5 3/1 3/5 - your former coworker - some time ago and he has informed me fairly good about all your work, conditions etc. with the exception of the amalgamation proceedings.

g h a r d y

3) I have had long conference with 5/5. 1/2 5/1 4/5 12/4 3/5, who is now also member of the Pan-American Council of the 4/5 3/1 2/7 - 10/5 5/1 6/1 8/1 4/5 - 8/2 3/2 2/1 8/1 5/2 - 2/1 2/2 2/3 4/3 r n a t i o n a l

4/5 3/2 5/1 5/3 5/4 7/2 5/2 5/1 10/5 - appointed by the Main Office. Besides him the Main Office a r g e n t i n a

appointed as fifth member certain man from 5/1 4/5 5/5 3/1 3/2 4/1 5/4 3/2 5/1, whose name I do not know yet.

g h d o l l a r s

5/5. 1/2. have got five thousand 12/4 8/1 10/5 10/5 5/1 6/2 7/3 from Main Office for to create and to develop our business point of view within 2/1. 13/8. 13/8.

v o i c e o f l a b o [r]

He is in full accord with our 1/8 8/1 2/1 1/5 3/1 - 7/2 7/1 - 10/5 5/1 6/1 8/1 and all other work done by us. But he is not able to admit that his Compan. 6/7 8/2 6/1 10/5 5/4 9/4 5/1 5/3 5/4 7/2 5/2 7/3 are

s a n a

not OK yet. There has been some improvements but there is still plenty of camouflaged 7/3 5/1 5/2 11/4 g r e n i s m

7/9 6/2 6/3 5/2 2/1 7/3 3/4. Also he is not willing to recognize the necessity of close contact and i[=c?] n[=i]

leadership of the 1/7. 2/1.

m p r a v e y d i[=e] b i

4) I had also conference with 3/4. 6/7 4/5 5/1 4/8 3/1 3/5 in regard to 2/7 3/1 6/1 2/1. I were told that he is drifting to our favor and is ready to quit the old company. Arrangements are being made that as soon as he will be out of his present place and will occupy his own office in home town - I will meet

d e b i
him at once and will try to convince 2/7 3/1 6/1 2/1 to visit our comp.[.] Main Office and to issue press statement that he disconnected himself from former company etc.

r
5) Very recently arrived here an agent with following credentials: "This is to certify that Com-4/5
a d e c r t h u r h t a l y
1/4 2/7 1/3 - 1/5 4/5 1/1 1/2 8/2 4/5 2/6 1/1 5/1 10/5 3/5 is duly sent by the E.C. of the C.I. to American
p a r t y m k o b e k y
Agency of C.I. for 6/7 5/1 4/5 2/3 3/5 work.- Sec'y E.C. of C.I. 3/4. 6/5 8/1 6/1 3/1 Z 6/5 3/5."

I took up this matter with the Board of Directors here and the Board Direct. decided to appoint him as editor in chief of Jewish paper and other publications. He has the ability.

l e g a l
He made the following report to and also to the Board of Directors "10/5 3/1 4/6 5/1 10/5 Daily
"must be started at once and somewhat mild expression - something like the Daily Herald in England.
l e g a l l e n i n
"10/5 3/1 4/6 5/1 10/5 activity must be started immediately. He stated that 10/5 3/1 2/2 2/1 3/2 is in
l e g a l p a r t y
"favor even to start 10/5 3/1 4/6 5/1 10/5 6/7 5/1 4/5 2/3 3/5 which of course must be controlled by our
"already existing comp.

d i c t a t o r
"The 2/7 2/1 1/5 1/1 5/1 4/1 8/1 6/2 ship must not be made an issue but just to dealt with as theoretical
"problem etc.

n[=i] i[=n] s u r [r] e c t i o n
"The 2/2 2/1 2/6 8/2 6/2 6/3 9/4 4/1 2/1 8/1 3/2 must not be mentioned at all."

The Board of Directors are ready to start the Daily but can't at once because they have no finances even to maintain the central office help.

The second instruction created new alignment within the Board of Directors. Field ⁽¹⁾ is in agreement with former United Co[m]p. side and I am informed that one more is sliding over and on the opposition
t o b i e m o o r e a s h k e n u i [e]
remains just three namely: 10/1 8/1 6/1 2/1 3/1, 3/4 7/2 7/2 6/2 3/1, 5/1 7/3 4/2 6/5 3/1 5/2 8/2 z 2/1.

- At the present time they all in favor of the plan which I submitted to the Canadian Stockholders Meeting.

c o u r i e r
6) I am informed that 1/5 7/2 8/2 6/2 2/1 3/1 4/5 on his way with all decisions and instructions on all matters. Therefore I can't meet Joseph [Charles Dirba] & comp. immediately. Furthermore the Canadian Comp. is not in very good shape yet. I was there for three weeks and set up perfect machinery

but improvements must be made and especially extension. The latter will be realized as soon as assistance will be received from Main Office. Meanwhile I am assisting them with one thousand per month. Complete report will be mailed to you soon.

7) The telegram sent by Joseph I have received also your letter addressed to Chicago.

8) Please address all communications to:

m o n e s s
Mr. J. 3/4 8/1 5/2 3/1 7/3 7/3
b r o o m
426 - 6/1 6/2 8/1 8/1 3/4 Street, New-York City.

9) I have mentioned in previous letters that I was in such a fix that I were compelled to destroy mine March financial statement. Please send me copy immediately to above mentioned address.

10) Do you receiving [sic] all kind of stuff from Main Office? If not let me know.

11) About Allen Comp. I know that much that she were in London, and Mr. Allen is still in South. Enclosed find his letter. That all I have received so far. From Mrs. Allen I have not received a single line yet.

Fraternally yours

[signed:] A Bray.

On the left side of the top the following is handwritten by Bray: "Page 9 (nine)"

In the above column of each numerical cipher deciphered letters are handwritten.

(1) On the blank space close by "Field" the following is handwritten: "Wrangel Morris."

5-3

21.08.1921 A. Bray to Y[avki] & Co[mpany]
[ПГАСИИ, 495/18/66/87 (1×; typed and signed)]

New-York, August 21.- '21.

Dear Y&CO:

g r o e r

Our Trade Representative Cos 5/5 6/2 7/2 5/8 5/9 is back from Main Office and reported the following:
r e d u n i o n i n t e r n

1) That on the Executive of the 4/5 3/1 2/7 Trade 6/6 5/2 2/1 5/6 3/2 - 2/1 2/2 2/3 3/1 4/5 3/2
c h i n e o n u n
Andret 1/5 2/4 2/5 3/2 3/3 [G. Andreychine] and Dix 5/6 2/2 are elected as the American Trade 6/6 5/2
i o n o [n] h e r e
2/1 5/6 3/2 representatives. Dix 5/6 is on his way 2/4 3/1 4/5 4/3 and will land next week.

p a n a m e r i c a n r e d u n i

2) That the 6/7 5/1 5/2 - 5/1 3/4 3/3 4/5 2/1 1/5 5/1 5/2 Council of the 4/5 3/1 2/7 - T.- 6/6 5/2 2/1
o n i n t e r n d i s b a n d e d
5/6 3/2 - 2/1 2/2 2/3 3/1 4/5 3/2.- have been 2/7 2/1 2/6 6/1 6/4 3/2 2/7 3/1 2/7 by the newly elected
u n i o n e n g l a n d d i s b
Executive. Also the Trade 6/6 5/2 2/1 5/6 3/2 Bureau in 3/1 3/2 5/5 10/5 5/1 5/2 2/7 is 2/7 2/1 2/6 6/1
a n d e d c o m m u n p a r
6/4 3/2 2/7 3/1 2/7. The whole work will be in full charge of the 3/6 3/7 3/4 3/4 6/6 5/2.--6/7 6/4 6/2
t i e s c r e d e n t i a l s
5/3 5/4 4/3 7/3.- This very decision indicates that our 1/5 4/5 4/3 11/5 4/3 5/2 5/3 5/4 6/4 10/5 7/3 are
r e v o k e d
6/2 6/3 5/7 5/6 6/5 4/3 11/5. Therefore all your suggestions on Manifesto etc. will be referred to the

a r

proper authorities. However I will not take any action whatever until Dix[on].- and others will 5/1 4/5
r i v e h e r e
4/5 2/1 5/7 5/8. I expect them 4/2 4/3 4/5 4/4 within 10 days.

m a r s h a l l p

3) 3/4 5/1 6/2 7/3 4/2 5/1 10/5 10/6 reported the following instructions as imperative: That the 6/7
a r t y l e g a l m a s s p a r t
5/1 4/5 5/3 3/5 here must prepare and launch a 10/5 6/3 5/5 5/1 10/6 - 3/4 5/1 7/3 7/3 - 6/7 5/1 4/5 5/3
y p r o g r a m
3/5 immediately. That the 6/7 4/5 7/2 5/5 4/5 5/1 3/4 shall be as strong as possible but in full accord
p a r t y
with the existing law. This 6/7 5/1 4/5 5/3 3/5 shall consist not only of affiliated organizations
d u e s p a y i n g
(federated body) but also of 2/7 8/2 6/3 7/3 - 6/7 5/1 3/5 2/1 2/2 4/6 membership and it must be fully
u n d e r g r o u n d p a r t y
controled by the 8/2 5/2 2/7 3/1 4/5 4/6 4/5 4/7 6/6 5/2 2/7 - 6/7 5/1 4/5 5/3 3/5. Second that the
p a p e r
Company here must [s]tart daily 6/7 5/1 6/7 4/3 6/2 at once.

Fraternally yours

[signed:] A Bray

In the above column of each numerical cipher deciphered letters are handwritten.

16.09.1921 [Katayama] to Bray
[ПГАСИИ, 495/18/66/116 (1×; typed duplicate)]

September 16

Dear Bray:

Your latest letter makes it quite clear that you recognize neither the authority of the Agency over you, nor its functions.

General authority is vested collectively in the Agency, and more in myself as its chairman. You are completely ignoring this authority.

Moreover, you seem to imagine that the Agency (and particularly yourself) is accredited to the U.S.A. Even if this were so, you would still be in duty bound to obey instructions; but it is not so, since the Agency work is now confined to Latin-America (Canada also partly). This work suffers because of your repudiation of Agency authority and instructions. It is an impossible situation.

You have given no reasons whatever why you should remain in the U.S.A. And there is no reason from the Agency standpoint (whatever peculiar reason there may be in your own mind). Your last letter to me may be summed up in this way: "I've decided to stay in the U.S.A.; I will stay; you and the Agency be damned."

Your answer to my letter is no answer at all - it is a complete evasion and full of a "you-be-damned" spirit. You are not being sidetracked - on the contrary, it is you who are sidetracking yourself from the work of the Agency. We know absolutely nothing of what you are doing, nor for what you are spending money - except that you are spending money in U.S.A. which was intended for Latin-America. You are, in fact, sabotaging the Agency. There is nothing to keep you in U.S.A., except, plans of your own of which we know nothing. You have nothing to do (nor has Agency) with instructions from Main Office to American Company, over organizing an L.P. [Labor Party] - that is the job of the Am Company. And even if there are instructions for U.S.A. which Agency must carry these are to be carried out by full Agency and not on your own irresponsible initiative.

It was originally agreed six months ago that you would immediately come here. Then came the amalgamation, which I recognize had to keep you; but after that you should have come here, particularly after instructions were sent you to that effect. But you have been ignoring these instructions, sending evasive replies, sabotaging Agency work. This is impossible. It cannot continue. Accordingly, as chairman of the Agency (and in agreement with Lilbit) -

1) I temporarily withdraw your mandate as a member of Agency, depriving you of all authority as representative as long as you remain in U.S.A. When you visit Agency, your authority will be restored.

2) I prohibit you from spending any of the money which may remain in your possession, except for your expenses in carrying out instructions.

3) I am writing to Directors American Co. informing them of this action, and asking them to have no relations with you.

4) Unless I receive from you a telegram accepting these instructions, I shall write Main Office about your astonishing, unbelievable behavior and lack of discipline.

Faternally yours,

On the back side the following is handwritten: "These two proposal by Carter [Fraina] but not approved."

5-4a

16.09.1921 A. Bray to Y[avki] & Co[mpany]
[ПГАСПШ, 495/18/66/121 (1×; typed and signed)]

New-York, Sept. 16. - 21.

Dear Y & Co:

All "overseas" are here and we are holding Conferences.-

In view of the fact, that the Main Office did not granted any assistance for the time being, - the Comp.-here [CPA unified in May of UCPA and CPA], the Com.-North [CPC] and I, we are all broke. I am broke because I have loaned to the Comp.-here 2000.00 long ago. Besides that, the Comp.-here through me have made loan from Messrs. Mendel- & Bross.[sic.] 6000.00. Furthermore, the Comp.-[here] have made several loans from Various concerns in total 25000.00. All I got back so far is 500.00. The balance - 1500,00 the Comp.-[here] is not in position to reply at the present moment. Therefore please send me 1000.00 (one thousand Dollars) immediately.-

I am in receipt of Cable from B.B.CO. [B.B. Company=Main Office] that Mr. Yav-- shall visit Main Office at once. I suppose that Mr. Yav-- will go via here and therefore neither I or Mr. Allen, who arrived yesterday, will start for South, unless you will instruct us. I am informed by the returning men, that in the Main Office sentiment prevails, that the Agency also will be abolished. And therefore is very likely that the order, that Mr. Yav-- shall go at once, indicates that there will be no more such institution. I am sure that Yav-- will not return here any more, because most important job is waiting for him over there.-

Please send money to the following address: Mr. H. Hamburger, 86 John St. New-York City.

Fraternally yours

[signed:] A Bray

28.09.1921 Y.C. [Yavki & Carter]— A.A. to Bray
[ПГАСПН, 495/18/66/130 (1×; typed duplicate)]

Dear Bray:

Your letter received. The personal instructions concerning Y will be carried out immediately.

In re your request for money: We are not clear upon this matter, since you do not state for what purposes it is needed - simply make the request. From the Canadian telegram, it would appear you want it for work in Canada. You have in six months disposed of about forty-two thousand without making a single report - except for the March report you have so much spoken about but which we never received, and for the statement in your last letter that you loaned American company two thousand, and that you have been giving Canadian company one thousand. And on top of this you ask for more. Business is not done that way. We ask you -

- 1) Specifically what you want the thousand for.
- 2) To render us a complete financial report.
- 3) To state in detail what the Canadian work is in connection with the whole situation, and an estimated budget.
- 4) To make a complete report, one from which we can understand the situation, concerning your activities with the American Co., the L[abor]. bureau; also Canadian activities.
- 5) You have never answered our request to know whether you made a report to Main Office on American amalgamation. If not, why not? If yes, why was copy never sent to us? Moreover, we want to know what reports you have been making to Main Office concerning American and Canadian matters, and why these, if you made them, were not submitted to us. If such reports have been made, send us copies now.
- 6) Have you seen Mendels ⁽¹⁾, and what has he reported on his financial mission? Carter loaned him one thousand in May, he was to repay you. Has he? (Incidentally, you wrote Y that Carter had sent you fifteen barrels, but Carter sent you twenty. Straighten this out.)
- 7) We asked you some time ago to send us copies all decisions both foreign stockholders' meetings. Nothing but one or two received. Send all.
- 8) What about Allen? He wants money, but no report received.
- 9) We get none of the legal papers American company, absolutely nothing from Canada. Also nothing on L party activity in New York at present. Please do something on this at once.

We write this letter because after all there should be some system in our work - although it may now be too late. But we have tried hard enough to get you to understand need of system and discipline.

Let us hear from you quickly so we can act. There is no longer any necessity of you or Allen coming here.

Frate yrs, Y.C. - A.A.

[handwritten:] Sept. 28

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- (1) According to Fraina's testimony in his later years, "Mendels must have been, it wasn't Yavki, some courier, some person who was used for sending messages or money"; "For the reason that I would not have given the money to anybody else but Scott and I recall clearly that Mendels was working with Scott. Outside of expenses for any actual activities there, any other money would have gone to Scott, that was what the money was for," in: Report of the Federal Bureau Investigation's of Lewis Corey, 1949-1950, Lewis Corey Papers, Box 2, #5, typed pp. 82, 85, Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Columbia University, New York.

08.10.1921 [Yavki] to A. Bray
[ПГАСПН, 495/18/66/165-167 (3×; typed duplicate)]

Mex., D.F., Mex., Oct. 8, 1921.

Comrade A. Bray:

Dear Comrade;

On Sept. 28 we answered your letter and cable from Canada [Doc. 5-5]. And after that I got your long letter mailed separately of the last one and I read it [with] greatest interest and profit ⁽¹⁾. I thank you for many valuable informations and suggestions to me. The letter of yours in question was written on back of a certain instructions given to a certain person, so you now remember what letter of yours I am talking.

We thank you for some of those papers you mentioned in the letter reached us and now are in the hand of translator for publication. As to the mandates Dix[on]. has brought back. I am glad that the M.O. made wise rulings for American movement. You have enough material and force to manage your own affairs without their help. In the past the American comrades have had shown very bad accountings especially of those old U.C.P. Exec. Waiting for their promise fulfilled by them is alright but capitalizing or even materializing that promise beforehand was the greatest mistake on your American party. It is by any means no safe and above all sound policy at all. I am sure their present experiences will do them good and taught them a better lesson!

You are quite enthusiastic about the majority pushing of the legal work in spite of minority oppositions. There you are again making a grave mistake, if I may be permitted to say on the matter frankly, because the legal activities are really auxiliary and supplement to the underground party and the party work. It is a grave mistake to undertake the leg. activities without a strong party behind them. Still more worse to push them neglecting the party unification and sound harmony which is needed for any strong and aggressive work. To respect and obey the M.O. mandate is right and necessary but its aim should be the successful carrying it out, otherwise your obeying to the mandate is worse than not obeying at all. It would be far better to wait and prepare yourself so that you could carry out the mandate when you are ready and take it up. Doesn't the mandate say that the legal work must be completely controlled by the underground party? Why my dear Comrade, without the party being on the sound and strong standing financially and spiritually it would be an utter impossibility. You are misapplying the very mandate you so much put on value and respect yes, you misunderstood or misinterpreted the spirit and content of the mandate. Your first duty is to build up a strong and UNIFIED party first of all. And then only then you can take up successfully the legal work.

The work is not really a majority or a minority squabble and wrangling. You made a great mistake in creating such divisions-majority and minority in the Exec. You ought remember the fact that before the Unity Convention there were two opposing and fighting parties. The present Exec. should respect the history and should have worked accordingly. A harmony in the Exec. means a harmony of the Unity in the United C.P. but you forget the greatest historical fact and created a split by making two uneven parties artificially. Now you are suffering the result of party inactivity and chaos. The United Party Exec. should have had a great tact and statesmanship in carrying out the new policy, at least until the Party be well unified and became compact party. But you all acted like a school boy, worse than a petty politician. By your majority pushing and crushing policy you are destroying the spirit and strength

of the movement in America. Yes you ignored the rank and file of the old party members by placing too much and undue weight on the present Exec. itself. On an ordinary time the party Exec. may acted like your present Exec. But you forget utterly the prime fact that you are, I mean the present Exec., the first Exec. of the United Party, whose duty is to complete and to carry out the work of the Unity which was begun at the Unity Convention.

From what I got informations about your party affairs the majority is acting very rushingly and even foolishly without respecting the first unity Exec. responsibility to the Unity itself and to the both party members in general. You seem to ridicule the armed insurrection 100% com. members and their upholders but your majority has been acting itself armed insurrectionist manner lately, if the reports I got be correct and true. No, my dear comrade a majority tyranny will never succeed in the end. You must guide the party sound and same path. The Exec. majority does not mean by any means that the rank and file are with the majority. As you say that party is in bankrupt condition means that the present Exec. has not representing the will and wishes of the rank and file at all. Indeed the present Exec. neglected the very rank and file desires and wishes and it had too much faith on the B.B. mandate and blinded by the mandate forgetting every other important party affairs and not only that the present Exec. depended too blindly and too much on the B.B. and Co. utterly neglecting the party work on its hands. This charge you have confessed me in your letter saying that "On these promises the party loaned money etc. etc.," has it not too much and too blindly depended on the B.B. and Co. But I am glad that Exec. found it out that they were mistaken on building a big and strong party movement and legal activities on mere promises! I hope it will realize once for all that they should depend first of all on the rank and file members and respect them more than anybody else.

Quit the petty politician policy and pursue the statesman like broad minded and same policy that represents the desires and wishes of the majority of members. Your letter shows that the present Exec. is not representing the party majority but the Exec. itself only as you wrote that "as the matter of the fact that quite a great number of these 10,000 are the ones." As this great number should be crushed or ignored but be educated and led to the right path. They are after all the very backbone of the true underground party.

As to the request of ours to get the real conditions of the party we thought it necessary to know the existing factions which are continuations of the old parties. You know as well as we do that there are such factions in the party to-day. To ignore the truth that exist is a act of cowardice. We must face actual fact and truth and deal with them as we could with our best knowledge and talent. Moreover we have no political authority over the American Party. What we asked you to do was to get true condition on things in the U.S.A. Our instruction was not to split the party over which we have neither influence nor authority simply to know the truth of the matter.

As to the instruction "Come here at once." It meant exactly the words signify. You should have come at once if you recognized the authority of the Agency. As I stated in my letter to you dated Sept. 15, under the heading 5) that your duty toward Agency required you to come here at once: the majority of the Agency decided that you should come here at once and so wrote and cabled. It was the strictest order and mandate from the majority of the members of the Agency of the C.I. You should have readily obeyed it by all means and should have come here. Your answer to our mandate was "Will be in Mexico in a reasonable time - That is all." Simply you evaded our definite and strict instruction. And you complained that we did not send the letter to the Exec. of the Cpa. [CPA] through. I for myself thought that you might be on the way any time we of course considered that you should obey the instruction that we sent. So it is natural we should send the letter directly. But it hurt your pride and feeling so I apologized you at the time. But now you say that your reason not obey our Agency mandate is that you were instructed from B.B. Comp. (M.O.) to stay here and wait etc." You did not tell us such

important instruction from the B.B. Comp. at all until the letter you sent after your answer "I will be in Mexico in a reasonable time - that is all." If you told us when you got the instruction in question we might have not spent much time and money to ask you to come here! It was utter neglect on the part of yours. Not to let us know as to the instruction from the B.B. Comp. Your coming here has been decided long time ago when we three were in New York in March [February].

As to your advice on the work here of the Agency in relation to our funds, I thank you for your thoughtfulness and kindness. But as you saw my financial report and other reports I sent to the M.O. that I never undertook work of any kind without due consideration and deliberation especially as regard to the financial matter. Since I came here on April 1 last I have been working continuously however my plan was limited and necessarily in a small scale owing to the absence of you and the other member but I never attempted to do a work without due deliberation and calculation beforehand. This was the very reason we called you here in order [to] deliberate and decide on the financial and other general work of the Agency, but you did not seriously consider the matter as any important at all. However, I thank you for your advice as to the work of the Agency in relation to the funds in general. Especially I am very grateful to you for your report on the Party condition in America. It really and greatly helped me in shaping the immediate policy of the Agency. I am sending you a letter written to Comrade Thompson after I have read your long letter of which I have been here discussing at length. You shall find yourself by reading the said letter. The letter of yours came just in time so that I could not miscalculated the matter of important as to the immediate future of the Agency and my own future course. For this I appreciate your time[ly] letter.

It was [a] pity that in deciding so important a matter of the Agency you were not with us. We have been deliberating on the policy of the Agency these two or three weeks and now [are] almost ready for the future work of the Agency. Here is the gist of the decisions that are reported to the Small Bureau with some other technical matters [Doc. 1-13].

"We have nothing definite from you concerning the status of the Agency, although a number of rumors have reached us. However, from what we know we conclude the following: The Agency is not yet politically liquidated, although it is financially, in the sense that no further financial support will forthcoming. This means, of course, that Agency must from now on proceed in such a manner as to get the largest results from funds on hand, that instead of expanding we must contract our work, with ultimate liquidation in view, this being determined by the exhaustion of our finances. We are accordingly, planning our further work on this basis. (If you intend to continue the Agency, this decision will not be injurious, since the work can be again immediately start on at a larger scale.)

"We have decided to dispose of the funds on hand in the following manner:

- 1) A small part may be used for work in Canada.
- 2) The larger part will be used to continue the organization of a Mexican Party (which will be completed in December), and to assist in placing the new party on its feet.
- 3) A smaller part will be used for certain limited work in South America, in accordance with possibilities and developments.

The following are the technical arrangements:

F. is to be Acting Chairman of the Agency; although that technically is nominal, in view of the developments. But he is entrusted with the final responsibility in winding up the Agency affairs. He is, also, appointed Mexican representative, and authorized to carry out the South American work agreed upon."

As to Mrs. Allen you sent me a letter from Com. Allen dated May 31, 1921, in which Com. Allen said "She will bring home a complete report with her." Therefore I have been expecting her bring

the said report. That is the chief reason for her presence here. And moreover we thought we could use her very profitably here at that time, which no longer exist. We like to get the report very much and also a proper connection with that country, about which I wrote you many times previously. Comrade Allen cabled he will write letter to us several weeks ago but so far we do not hear from him. You wrote you and Com. A. will wait Y's arrival to you. Unfortunately Y. is not be able to proceed on the way you expect so he should have written the letter he cabled. You must know what he has brought with him as his wife did not bring with her as Allen wrote on May 31.

Now I close this with best wishes to you. I expect to get your answer at Mecca.

Yours for the cause,

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- (1) In "Communications between Comrade Scott and Yavki for July, August and September, 1921," in: РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/136-144, that long letter is retyped as follows:

"I received a long and important letter from Scott undated and mailed in three pieces the last one I got on the 28 of September. The letter is as follows:

Dear Com: - In accordance with the mandate of the R.L.U.I. I am turning over to Jim all the trade union connections, materials, etc. to him. - The Voice of L[abor]. is also turned over to the "Board of Directors" and up to last Saturday, Sept. 10, all the bills are paid and every thing delivered to them in good shape. It is also delivered to them three pamphlets (2 Losovsky's and 1 Murphy) which we published but [a] few thousands of which were not disposed of yet i.e. left over. Of course orders are coming in and all the numbers printed will be sold within 2 or 3 months. We decided to send Jim to the miners' Convention, beside Jim there will be about 16 our point view delegates. We are preparing half a dozen resolutions for to be presented at that convention. Dennis B[att]. is 100 % ours and we are sure, that he will work in full harmony with our forces here and very likely that he will join the Party. He made a splendid speeches at the R.I. of L.U. Convention in replying to 99 % Big Bill, being still the same old or rather unchangeable I.W.W. mind. --The I.W.W. representative [George] Williams was nothing more or nothing less than 100 % Syndicalist. I will send you documents, speeches, English and probably Spanish translations of all decisions, resolutions and statutes. The whole stuff I just received in Russian. Dixon has one English copy, but too darn poor translation. So then, we agreed that Dr. Jacob H[eiman]. will translate from Russian, the copy I received. Now then, you can be sure that I will forward, and I always did it up to the present, at least, I am the only one who is getting stuffs, my connections are functioning regularly. But the party here and in Canada did not create proper machinery in that respect yet. Therefore I am compelled to supply them both and also Hardy. ---According to Dixon's statement, there will be no subsidy from M.O. All expenses must be met by the local organizations and funds used here. Therefore I will advise you to consider seriously that is very possible that Agency (will not get anything) also. Please don't start anything on large scale until you are sure that you will get more subsidy, but the only assurance in which I believed is: I must have in hands the stuff and not before. I have hell of good experience in that respect. And I will report to you soon about the financial catastrophe here. Almost whole party work is paralyzed and crushed here, because M.O. constantly promised and on these promises the party loaned money from our friends up North (Carter's

and mine friends) from me and many others. And after so (many promises) very from M.O. and after a long wait, - finally word is brought here by Dixon, - "Not a cent," because they, M.O. are in very very critical position and situation. And so the Party stranded financially. I would not be so bad, if the f.r.d.f. would not be full swing. There is impossible to ----that. Therefore the Board of Directors decided that members must give one day's wages for the party. But will take a month, before there will be the first receipt. And after all, this assessment will just cover the loans about 25,000.00 in total. Beside there is, about 45 % unemployed of our ranks, whom [who] surely can not respond with one day wages. Up in Canada that much better, that [than?] this they did not loan money, but they too are very short on account of unemployment and practically they were compelled to start from point of nothing. I assisted them up to September, but I can't any more. I will send you a complete report although I hate like hell, because I constantly feel that this is very poor address for such documents to be sent to. The party here is making the same complaint. The Federation "Block" control fight is diminishing at the present. The majority (7 out of 10) is going ahead in compliance with the instructions and decisions of the C.I. and Marshall is visiting all the districts and Federation conferences. I have made arrangements that two dates will be in Canada too. Marshall has improved greatly, his scope is widened and his stand is firm; no vacillation and hesitation. The old man[,] Len- [Lenin] told him, to take strong stand against "Leftists" in America. They (M.O.) are of the opinion, that the party is approaching S.L.P. danger, namely, is becoming a Sectionalists. --And I can inform you that the party is not growing, that there are not more than 10,000 members. Yes 10,000 last year (estimate I told to M.O. last year) and 10,000 this year----. But H. Dob and John'y B. do not lean anything, but just taking about armed insurrection, 100 % pure com. membership. But the matter of the fact is that quite a great number of these 10,000 are the ones, which Len[in]. in the Theses on legal activity describes as members "Who -----America yet." In your last letter, you requested me, that I shall o[b]tain STATEMENTS of the two groups. I have considered that would be a senseless step, because that would mean official recognition of two separately existing groups and really would be a splitting wedge, that the Agency is trying to split the party. I think that you both must think over and over again before you giving instructions to me or anybody else. For instance, you are cabling and writing time and again: "Come here at once." But my dear comrades, I can't leave everything here in chaos and unfurnished stage, concerning trade union work here and in Canada and Canadian party by the way. Furthermore I was instructed from B.B. Comp. (M.O.) to stay here and wait for Dix. and Nathan M[endelsohn]. who will bring all and everything concerning our "business." Now they are both, and almost every one, except William Z.F[oster]., here and are holding conference, discussing problems (your suggestions including). -Secondly, the article on Red Int. of Labor Union by Carter and the "Pamphlet" are both too "rush job." The latter one too much of "Chap [Chop] Suey." We know that Carter is much better writer and HE CAN do it and therefore he must produce the goods according to his ability; otherwise the party will not print. I suppose you noticed that the Central Organ is much better that [than?] it used to be since long, long time ago, namely "Revolut[ionary]. Age." (The editor in charge is the same with whom I have had the "Fight." We are both O.K. now.) Mrs. Al[en]. is here about 4 days ago, she can't, I would say, she is not able to report anything about the movement at all. I don't believe that she too must go to your office. Therefore I advised her, to stay here and wait till Male [Mr. Allen] arrives. The latter of course have to go to your office immediately and I will follow. --Dix. reports, that Jack Murphy, quite often mingling with the Syndicalists and that Tom Mann was much more supporter of our position and that Ballasts [Ballister] (Bob M-- [Minor]) and An--ne saved the situation i.e. that the syndicalists did not balted [halt?] the Convention, because they both impressed very strongly the French and Spanish Syndicalists with their speeches and tactful conduct.

Fraternally yours,

A. Bray.

From the contents the above must have been written the letter of his dated September 16 [РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/142 (retyped)] as I copies previous to the above."

6 The Pan-American Agency in South America

- 6-1 12/15.10.1921** The Situation in South-America. Report of HENRY ALLEN, South-American Representative of the Pan-Americ. Agency of Comintern
[РГАСПИ, 495/79/2/5-11 (7×; typed and signed); 495/18/66/324-326 (typed differently); *Коминтерн и Латинская Америка. Сборник документов* (Москва, 1998), 31-35 (Russian translation)]

6-1

12/15.10.1921 The Situation in South-America. Report of HENRY ALLEN, South-American Representative of the Pan-Americ. Agency of Comintern
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THE SITUATION in SOUTH-AMERICA.

Report of HENRY ALLEN,
South-American Representative of the Pan-Americ. Agency of Comintern.

[handwritten by Scott:] New York, Oct. 15-'21.

P.S. Прошу обратить внимание на рекомендации.

СКОТТ

REPORT OF HENRY ALLEN. [handwritten by Scott:] (South-American Representative of the
Pan-American Agency on Comintern)

Arrived in Buenos Aires on May 1st, 1921 after much trouble and delay. Got in touch with Masevich[Майор С. Машевич]'s organization but found that he had gone back to Russia a few days after he arrived. Found out through Secretary of union that a Communist Party existed and within a few days got in touch with its headquarters and got an interview with the Central Executive Committee. Presented my credentials after a thorough grilling I was notified that I would receive an answer in about a week.

The C.E.C. seemed to be suspicious about me and my credential which bore names totally unfamiliar to them. Furthermore, Masevich had told them nothing about the Pan-American Bureau and its mandate from the Provisional Council of the Red Trade Union International. Moreover, Masevich had brought no money with him, as I had been led to expect, to carry on work for the R.T.U.I. propaganda. Masevich himself did not seem to be well thought of by the Argentine Party because of his activities in Argentina and the lies he had told in Moscow. The foregoing reasons, plus a fear that I might interfere with their party work (this attitude was not expressed, but I felt it anyhow), made the C.E.C. very wary.

Finally after a week or more of waiting, I was notified that I would be recognized. Immediately the question arose as to what I intended to do. My credentials gave me a certain amount of latitude based on the assumption that no Communist Party existed - as seemed to be the impression of the Pan-American Bureau - but only Communist groups, which still needed welding into a Communist Party. I was also empowered to organize a R.T.U.I. Bureau on the industrial field. But instead of Communist Groups I found a real functioning Party in existence. The Left Wing of the S.P. had long ago been absorbed, without any of the internecine strife which had attended the organizing of the Communist movement in the United States.

The C.P. of Argentina seemed to be a Party which had steered clear of the sectarian and "Leftist" fallacies to which most new parties are prone to; it had no anti-parliamentarian bias on the one hand and had steered clear of syndicalist fallacies on the other hand. It had a membership of close to five thousand members, had strong contact with the trade union organizations and the masses, and though it was not yet a mass-party, it certainly tends in that direction. Its Communist nuclei in the trade unions though in a minority were gaining influence and prestige with the workers, as I will later describe. In

addition, the C.P. of Argentine was carrying on its activities not only in Argentine but in many countries of South America. It was responsible for the organization of a Communist Party in Uruguay, the building of a revolutionary Communist movement in Chili, and its agents were working in Brazil, Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru, etc.

In addition to the C.P., a strong Communist League of Youth, with a membership of two thousand, was carrying on splendid work among the youth.

A plant for a daily paper was already set up and the daily was to be launched within a couple of weeks, which, unfortunately, had to be postponed on account of Government raids during the general strike.

This was the situation I found on the political field. Under these circumstances I had nothing to do but to gather information. I may mention incidentally, that a delegate had already been sent off to Moscow for the forthcoming Congress. On the industrial field I found the following situation:

Most of the organized workers of Argentine were affiliated with two federations: one, the Federacion Obrera Regional Argentina[-]Comunista (anarchist) and the other, the Federacion Obrera Regional Argentina (reformista-sindicalista); the former had a membership of between forty and fifty thousand and the latter had a membership of close to one hundred thousand members. Outside of these two federations there existed some independent unions with a membership of about forty thousand workers, chief among which was the Chauffeurs Union with fifteen thousand. The two federations had attempted to unite at a Congress last year, but the anarchist federation had withdrawn. Since then the C.P. had set itself to bring about unity on the industrial field and had successfully carried on an agitation which had resulted, at the last Congress of the reform-syndicalist federation in the passing of a resolution introduced by the Communists in calling of a Unification Congress for the near future, and the election of a Unification Committee to lay the plans for the Unification Congress within the next three or four months. The Communists, though in a minority at the Congress succeeded not only in passing this resolution but also succeeded in electing a majority of Communists on the Unification Committee. The Secretary of the Unification Committee is a well-known and trusted union leader and a member of the C.E.C. of the Communist Party.

Under these circumstances the C.E.C. of the C.P. deemed it inadvisable to appoint a R.T.U.I. Bureau at the present time until the Unification Congress had been held and the question of unity had been solved one way or the other. Besides, the Party had no money - every cent that could be spared was being amassed for the launching of the daily - and I had none. Such a Bureau, even if appointed could only have been still-born and brought confusion into the struggle for unity, which they considered of the utmost importance. I agreed with them.

Realizing all this, I felt that my trip, if conducive to any good whatever, could not be in interfering in work which I was not fitted for and handicapped by a lack of the language, customs, psychology, etc., but by getting information and laying connections between the North and South American movements.

This, in brief, is the situation which I discovered in Argentine. Now as to the C.P. of Argentine. The Party came into existence right after the formation of the Third International and the following year absorbed the Left Wing of the S.P. It has about twenty branches in the city of Buenos Aires itself, and branches in all the industrial centers and cities of Argentine as well. The party is strongly centralized and well-disciplined. It is a legal party despite the periodical raids of the authorities, due to a combination of peculiar political circumstances. The Party takes full advantage of this condition and participates in the parliamentary campaigns at every opportunity. It has elected two Councilmen in the City of Buenos Aires, one of whom was removed by the Party for not using his position vigorously enough. The remaining Councilman, Comrade [José F.] Penelon, is a member of the C.E.C. and an able self-sacrificing comrade who knows and utilizes to full the possibilities of his position. The coming elections will find the C.P. stronger than ever, with a daily paper in the field and they expect to be even more successful.

From the very beginning the Party had a strong foothold in the trade unions and by a well-defined

policy succeeded in strengthening themselves and winning favor in the eyes of the workers. I believe the very fact that there was a strong anarchist and syndicalist movement in Argentina served to keep the Communist Party from making the usual mistakes of young parties.

As I already have mentioned, the C.P. of Argentina assumes the leadership in South America and it is looked up to everywhere. They were instrumental in organizing the C.P. of Uruguay. The C.P. of Uruguay has a daily paper "Justicia," and a Communist Senator in their ranks. This comrade was a Socialist Senator who went over to the Communist Party. An Argentine organizer is now a member of the Chilean Chamber of Deputies. He is a Communist and carries on splendid illegal and legal propaganda. I cannot understand the Chilean movement, not having been there, but I was told that the revolutionary movement there follows the line of the Labor Party of Great Britain, that is, all the workers' political parties are affiliated with the trade unions. There is I believe no separate Communist Party as yet. In Brazil, the Argentine comrades have sent agents to organize the trade unions and build up a Communist Party. Likewise in the other South American countries. Only a lack of funds prevents them from prosecuting this work more energetically.

During my stay in Buenos Aires I witnessed an industrial struggle which culminated in a general strike which failed very quickly. A series of provocative incidents generated by the "Liga Patriótica" (the Facisti of Argentine) led the anarchist leaders into calling strike after strike which finally culminated in a general strike. The Communists advised the general strike, as at that time the economic and political conditions and the industrial crisis and unemployment were such as were bound to make it fail. Besides, there was too much decentralization and lack of discipline. But once called the C.P. stuck faithfully to the workers and emerged with much prestige gained in the eyes of the workers, while the anarchist and syndicalist leaders lost a good deal of theirs.

In addition to this report I am enclosing a copy of a report of the organization and growth of the Party prepared by the Secretary, as well as the names and addresses of all labor and revolutionary publications in Argentina, Uruguay and Chili. Also three secret addresses and the legal addresses of the Communist Party. Also the greetings sent to the C.P. of North America when I informed them that unity had been achieved ⁽¹⁾. The original of the last three copies are in the hands of Comrade Scott, to whom I turned them over. In addition I am also sending a copy of itemized expenses during my trip ⁽²⁾.

I now present the following recommendations as a result of my observations, which I hope will be acted upon favorably.

1. Recommend that the C.E.C. of the C.P. of Argentina be entrusted, that is given a mandate, to carry on the work of propaganda and agitation in all South America, and that funds be supplied for this purpose. This committee, appointed from or by the C.E.C., under the supervision of the Comintern, should have the power of establishing agencies in all large cities and industrial centers of South America.

2. Recommend that a grant of five thousand dollars, at least, be made to the C.E.C. of the C.P. for their own domestic work. Their daily will be a heavy drain upon them and the workers earn very little. If not helped their daily may have to be discontinued. When it is considered that we in the United States are still so far from owing a daily, with all the natural advantages which we possess, the Argentine comrades must be given high credit for accomplishing this task without any outside help. This should be done immediately.

3. A similar grant to the C.P. of Uruguay.

4. As for the R.T.U.I. Bureau[,] would suggest leaving that to the Argentine comrades with power of appointing Bureau as soon as the Unification Congress has been called. Funds should be supplied for this Bureau as well.

5. Recommend that a comrade, preferably from Argentina, be empowered to make a complete industrial and political survey of all South America. If you agree plans can be discussed later. This is important. This work can probably be done in connection with the R.T.U.I. Bureau.

6. If there is any idea of calling a Pan-American Congress in the near future, would recommend that it be dropped for the present. Not until several years of intensive agitation and propaganda in all of South America, and the establishment of a number of Communist Parties there can such an idea be realized

with some measure of success.

Yours for the Proletarian Revolution,
[signed:] Henry Allen

[handwritten by Scott:] New-York Oct. 12th-'21.

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- (1) None of these mentioned copies and others are kept together in the same file.
 - (2) “Financial Statement of Henry Allin [*sic*],” in: РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/322.

7 The Pan-American Agency in Canada

- 7-1 19.02.1921** Thompson[/]Scott to the C.E.C. of the C.P. and U.C.P.
[FBI, RG 65, BS202600-1775-291, NARA (1×; typed duplicate)]
- 7-2 04.04.1921** Minutes of Meeting of the Provisional Executive, held in Toronto
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/89 (1×; typed and a postscript handwritten)]
- 7-3 18.04.1921** Minutes of meeting held by comrades Scott, Atwood and Marks
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/117-118 (2×; typed and signed); 495/98/1/1-2 (typed duplicate)]
- 7-4 18.04.1921** Report of Organizer Atwood
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/119-124 (6×; typed); 495/98/1/4-9 (typed)]
- 7-4a 13.07.1921** Minutes of meeting July 13, 1921
[РГАСПИ, 495/98/4/19 (1×; typed)]
- 7-5 15.07.1921** The Application of the Communist Party of Canada for Affiliation with the Communist International
[РГАСПИ, 495/98/4/59-62 (4×; typed, signed and a postscript handwritten); 495/18/66/231-233 & 495/18/66/36 (typed and signed)]
- 7-6 26.09.1921** To the Executive Committee of the Communist International
[РГАСПИ, 495/98/4/70-77 (8×; typed and signed)]

7-1

19.02.1921 Thompson[/]Scott to the C.E.C. of the C.P. and U.C.P.
[FBI, RG 65, BS202600-1775-291, NARA (1×; typed duplicate)]

[F]eb. 19, 1921.

(CEC)

To the C.E.C. of the C.P. and U.C.P.

Dear Comrades:

The American Council of the Communist International is now proceeding to the definite organization of the American Bureau of the International Council of Trade and Industrial Unions, which is to carry on the work of the Red Labor International in the United States.

The Bureau itself will consist of three members, appointed by us, which will have full charge of the work subject to our control.

In order to establish contact cooperation with the Communist parties the C.E.C.s of the two parties are each to have a representative on the Bureau, with a voice but no vote. You are therefore asked to submit to us the names of the members of your C.E.C. from which we can select one to serve on the Bureau.

Quick action is necessary, since the most important preliminary work must be done within six weeks. The Bureau will shortly publish its own official organ; but we ask you all the same to carry on an agitational and educational campaign in your party organs on the purposes and organization of the Red Labor Union International.

ooooOoooo

Among out instructions is one concerning the development of a Communist Party in Canada. Our plan is two-fold.

1) To get a Left Wing movement started in the two old Socialist parties in Canada, which shall publish a legal paper twice a month.

2) To extend and consolidate the illegal Communist groups now in Canada, which shall publish a theoretical paper, illegal, once a month.

You have groups in Canada, and we ask you to give us all information concerning them, addresses, etc., and that you instruct them to work with our Canadian representative.

Do this at once, please, as quick action is necessary.

Fraternally yours.

Thompson[/]Scott.

American Council of the C.I.

This is one of the documents (ca. 1,000 items) which were confiscated under the command of the Bureau of Investigation on April 29, 1921. In a blank space below to the left the following is stamped:

Copies of Letters &-
Documents Found
AT 170 BLEEKER ST.
4/29/21

04.04.1921 Minutes of Meeting of the Provisional Executive, held in Toronto
[ПІАЦПІІ, 495/18/65/89 (1×; typed and a postscript handwritten)]

MINUTES of MEETING of PROVISIONAL EXECUTIVE,
held in Toronto on Monday April 4th, 1921.

Meeting opened at 8 P.M.

Present: 3 delegates CP of A. Canadian section

2 " UCP " " " "

3 " from Ukrainian Federation and

1 " (English) from Winnipeg.

Comrade Atwood, representative of the Pan American Bureau, presided.

Comrade Atwood, at opening of meeting explained why the 3 delegates from Ukrainian Federation and the English delegate were present, and reported about instruction he had received from headquarters.

Moved and seconded, that items contained in report be taken up seriatim. Carried.

Much discussion took place on question of group admittance to Provisional Executive. Finally the following motion was made, seconded and carried: "That this committee goes on record as being opposed to inviting any group which is not as yet affiliated with existing communist Group organizations to the Provisional Executive.["] 3 for 2 against.

It was moved and seconded that "we immediately request the Pan American Bureau to send a full report regarding Finnish situation and request their opinion concerning the same." Carried.

Moved and seconded that "We choose a man to organize Left Wing in S.P. of C. [Socialsit Party of Canada] with following instructions:

1) To build groups of communists which may be represented at convention.

2) To instruct communist groups to remain within S.P. of C. until instructed to split by the C.E.C. of C.P. of C.

3) To organize the general Left Wing of C.P. of C. by connecting each local Left Wing." Carried.

Moved and seconded, "That comrades from Winnipeg on return select a trustworthy comrade for the organization work outlined in previous motion and submit same to joint E.C. for approval.["] Carried.

It was moved and seconded "That letter be sent to secretary for joint Council." Carried.

It was moved and seconded "That the comrades of Left Wing of the S.P. of C. be instructed not to press referendum for affiliation with Third International until the C.P. of C. is formed." Carried.

Moved and seconded "that since a special (meeting) session of Provisional Executive will be called in the near future that the matter of a Canadian representative to the 3rd International be left until then.["] Carried.

Respectfully submitted,

F. Hillier, Rec. Sec'y.

[handwritten:] Dear Yavki! Am sending you this for information
Scott

7-3

18.04.1921 Minutes of meeting held by comrades Scott, Atwood and Marks
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/117-118 (2×; typed and signed); 495/98/1/1-2 (typed duplicate)]

Minutes of meeting held by comrades Scott, Atwood and Marks
on April 18th, 1921.

[handwritten:] ← CP organizer

Order of business:

- 1) The question of a Canadian Bureau of the I.C. of T. & I.U.
- 2) Report of Atwood.
- 3) Canadian Convention Call.

I.

A) Gray, member of Printer Union of A.F. of L.

Rugoff, member of Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union, A.F. of L. and Brennan, Secretary of Office Employees Union A.F. of L. being asked to serve as members of the Canadian Bureau, I.C. of T. & I. Unions, to which same have agreed. Action approved and nominations concurred in.

B) Rugoff to act as secretary and organizer, for the time being, receiving regular weekly compensation. Gray and Brennan to be members of Bureau without pay.

C) The issuance of a four page leaflet, an appeal to the Canadian Workers - approved, with the understanding that it should include also a blank resolution for indorsements.

D) Not to start a Labor Union paper in Canada at present, but to have the matter postponed indefinitely.

E) The Bureau to act or function as a semi legal or illegal organization, adopted to the prevailing political situation in Canada.

F) To work out a set of by-laws or a constitution, best fitted to the situation and conditions in Canada and submit same for approval.

G) To instruct the newly constituted Canadian Bureau, to prepare a report covering the different aspects of the Canadian Labor Movement, for submission to the first congress of the International Council of Trade and Industrial Unions and that this report is to be ready not later than the middle of June, 1921.

II.

Comrade Atwood's report received. (copy attached [Doc. 7-4]) Summary:

A) Satisfactory progress made to have the Canadian communists united. Provisional Executive Committee, composed of 2 members of the UCP and 3 members of the CP and one member, fraternal, representing the Finnish Socialist Federation, organized, and presided over by comrade Atwood,

constituting a committee of seven members.

Agreed: that Finnish delegate can be made a full pledged representative of the Finnish organizations, provided sections or parts of the organization, have formed so called underground groups and thus complying with rules of the communist organizations. Atwood given full power to act on whatever the situation may call for, and make changes.

B) The proposed Unity Convention is to take place in the middle of May, and a delegation of 30 is expected, representing approximately 700 members, 450 of the CP, 150 of UCP, and 100 others.

C) Estimate of convention expenses being \$3000.00, of which \$2000.00 will have to be covered by the American Agency. The balance may be raised by the Canadian comrades themselves.

D) The first issue of the Canadian Communist is out at the cost of \$110.00.
The next issue will cost \$150.00.

E) Authorize the Canadian Bureau to issue a May Day leaflets, about 40,000 copies, and allow \$100.00 to cover expenses.

III.

A) If at the time of the Unity convention in Canada, the communist parties of U.S. have not united, that both party's executive committees may send a fraternal delegate to the convention.

B) Comrade Atwood is to preside over the convention.

C) Draft for convention call approved.

[signed:] Charles E. Scott
Sec'y of American Agency
of Comintern.

18.04.1921 Report of Organizer Atwood
[ПГАСИИ, 495/18/65/119-124 (6×; typed); 495/98/1/4-9 (typed)]

REPORT OF ORGANIZER ATWOOD

April 18th, 1921.

TO THE AMERICAN AGENCY, OF THE C.I.

Arrived in Winnipeg on Sunday March 6th, 1921, where I met comrade [Ella R.] Bloor who had been there for some time to get the O.B.U. [One Big Union] to agree to send a delegate to the R.L.U.I. Congress in Moscow. My first duty was to see that the O.B.U. would not fail to choose a delegate. I learned at once through Comrade Bloor and later when I met some of the committee that the delegate was already chosen in the person of Joseph Knight of Toronto. Having nothing further to do in this direction I decided to spend some time studying the general situation as it affects the labor movement in Winnipeg.

Since this city was the scene of the great general strike in 1919 which led to the imprisonment of several of its leaders, naturally the feeling is still strong for the "cause of labor." The general strike was in the control of leaders who brought about the O.B.U., spilt [split] the A.F. of L. unions in Western Canada in their convention some time previous to the strike. The strike strengthened the power of the O.B.U. and increased the prestige of its leaders. According to what I could learn the leaders of the O.B.U. with the exception of Russell and [Richard J.] Johns, had no large influence over the rank and file in the trade unions. All, with the exception of the two above mentioned, were leaders in the doctrinaire S.P. of C. Another, Rev[erend]. [William] Ivens, is a one time christian minister. Russell and Johns who were men of practical value, in the trade unions contributed much to give the O.B.U. an actual following before the strike. The strike itself made the organization a factor to be considered in Winnipeg and other cities in the West. In that region, notably Winnipeg, the A.F. of L. unions have diminished to mere paper organizations. The further one moves from Winnipeg however, it will be noticed that the influence of the O.B.U. diminishes rapidly. In the Eastern cities of Ontario and Quebec the O.B.U. is found only in the form of propaganda societies out to organize the workers into the perfect union. A good account of the OBU will be found in the first number of the Communist, issued in behalf of the Communist International for Canada ⁽¹⁾.

Besides being the stronghold of the OBU, Winnipeg is also the stronghold of the S.P. of C. although they have a membership in the local there of 50 members only. But because men like [William A.] Pritchard and Russell are also members of the S.P. and, I believe most of the S.P. membership also belong to the OBU, naturally the S.P. absorbs some of the glory of the OBU activity.

Just at the time of my arrival there Pritchard, OBU and SP; Johns, OBU; Ivens, Labor Church, were released from prison; mass meeting were held, some by the labor church, which attracted large crowds; the minds of whom the S.P. and OBU were closely linked.

The opinions expressed by speakers at these meetings were all of pacifist, right wing character.

Desiring to learn whether there was any left wing tendencies with sympathies for the Third International, I went probing around amongst the membership of both organizations. In doing this I learned that a member of the S.P., [Fred W.] Kaplan by name, was very much interested in the Third

International. I also learned that an underground paper called the Communist Bulletin, which is designated as the official organ of the UCP of Canada, was distributed secretly a week before my coming ⁽²⁾. When I saw Kaplan and showed credentials I disclosed the fact that the CP of A. had some connections in Winnipeg, since he had stamps of that party. He would not go very far with me, however, until he brought another person, Popenitch [Matthew Popowich; Mathew Popovich], a leader in the Ukrainian Labor Temple before me. I spent some time with them outlining the nature of my work, of which they signified approval but they were sceptical of assisting me. They held that they knew nothing about the signatures on my credentials; and also, that they should have received advance information about my coming. At another session I had with them, they told me that they could not deal with me.

When I left New York my instructions, given verbally, said that I would have a months time to do the work in Canada. A week had gone by in Winnipeg without much being accomplished. It was impossible to get from headquarters by mail within another week sufficient assurances to overcome doubts and establish contact with the communist elements I knew existed in Winnipeg. Besides that, and because of the peculiar turn affairs had generally taken since the big strike, I came to the conclusion that most of my work would be in the Eastern Provinces of Ontario and Quebec. I decided to get to the East as quickly as possible but before doing so I met the representatives of the two Lettish Locals of the SP of C. (Winnipeg and Lac Du Bonet) and learned that they are solidly for joining the Third International.

I left Winnipeg on Tuesday Mar. 15 for Montreal where I had the name of a CP member for connection. Also met here Markus [Marks], a member of the C.E.C. of America. Markus and Rogoff [Rugoff] gave me their assistance in viewing the general situation in Montreal. Did not learn of any connection with the U.S. parties except the groups of the CP. Here the OBU is not a factor as a mass movement; being merely a propaganda society for their conception of a correct union. The organized workers are in the A.F. of L. and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America. The Communist[s] have been responsible for the formation of a Council of Action; a committee formed of representatives of various trade union bodies for the purpose of arranging mass meetings and demonstrations, principally on the unemployed question and arrests growing out of such actions.

There is a strong sentiment amongst the French workers for the Third International but competent leadership in that element is lacking. French literature on communism comes from France in abundance, nevertheless and is circulated openly by the French Workers. When reliable leadership is found there is every prospect of a strong French movement in the future Communist Party of Canada. While the prospects looked good for the location in Montreal of the headquarters of the Party and the Canadian Bureau of the Red Labor Union International, yet there seemed to be lacking sufficient good material among the English speaking members of the CP (at present there are not many such) also they doubted they could get an illegal publication out in that city. I therefore decide to wait until I visited Toronto before making a decision.

I arrived in Montreal on March 17th and left on Sunday March 20, arriving in Toronto on Monday March 21st. Markus put me into touch with Grey [Gray], district organizer of the UCP. Rogoff, CP of Montreal, was already in Toronto having reached there earlier on business for the CP. After seeing Grey I learned that he could have the D.C. [District Committee] of the UCP before me on the following evening, Tues. Mar. 22. I then asked Markus if he could do the same with the D.C. of the CP. After I informed him that I had come to the conclusion, that, from many standpoints I considered Toronto the most suitable place for the headquarters of the Provisional Executive Committee to form the Canadian Party as well as the Canadian Bureau of the International Council of Trade and Industrial Unions. I was anxious to see if we had good material here to go ahead with work. Markus agreed and on that Tuesday night I met with a joint committee of five from the UCP and four from CP District Executives. Up until this time I had only the general outline of my duties which I received when I left New York but no instructions as to particulars how the work should be carried out.

After outlining these instructions, both agreed to co-operate in carrying them out, and then it

came to the question of forming the committee. It was decided, I agreeing, that only the groups belonging to the U.S. parties should have representation on the Provisional Executive. Then came the question of the basis of representation. I held, that in view of the fact that the question in the U.S. which prevented unity there should have no place in the Canadian movement and therefore the representation should be equal. The UCP delegates held the same view. To this Markus of the CP who announced that he was expected to stay in Canada, until the Canadian Party is formed, strongly objected and insisted that the CP, because of its larger membership was entitled to majority representation. He argued that it is not only their right to have majority representation, but, because of certain differences (Not in principle he admitted but in manner of stating those principles) it was their communist duty to demand their rights. He then went into a brief examination of the program of the CP and UCP, criticizing the latter, and stated that for this reason they would not yield an inch of their rights. The other of the CP delegation stood by Markus and showed that they would refuse to enter the committee upon any other terms. At this juncture I was asked whether my instructions permitted me to make a ruling on the question, to which I replied, instructions so far did not cover the point. Lacking instructions, I said, it appeared to me as if the matter was left to my judgement; and that my judgement was to be used to get results according to the actual conditions as I found them. If neither side could come to some agreement that I would have to await further instructions following my next report; but, I believed better results would follow if equal representation would be agreed upon. I did not consider that the arguments of Markus had any bearing upon the situation; because I believed that in writing their program the Canadian CP did not need to follow the actual footsteps of either party in the U.S.; and I had confidence in the ability of the Canadian comrades to write their own program to conform with the Theses and Statutes of the Third International and suitable for Canadian conditions. The CP would not yield the point; the UCP delegates held a caucus, then announced that considering the necessity of acting promptly, agreed to proportional representation. On motion a committee of five was formed 3 from CP and 2 from UCP.

Then the discussion arose over the time necessary to arrange for convention. This discussion was general as it was understood that no definite date could be set just then. The CP considered two months activity is necessary to prepare; the UCP argued to one month time. The matter was left open.

All this time I was looking over all the comrades whom I met in order to find likely material for the Canadian Bureau of the R.L.U.I. The first good prospect I met was Rogoff, of the C.P. from Montreal. As he was in Toronto and attended the joint conference as delegate I asked him to stay over until I looked about for two other members for the Bureau. I did not want him to get away until I knew what the prospects were in Toronto. He has excellent qualifications for the position of organizer. He is young, energetic, good appearance, positive personality; and an excellent working knowledge of Communist theory. Besides that he is very popular in the Trade Unions in Montreal; a prominent member of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers; also a good knowledge of the labor movement in Canada. He is a Jew, born in England; decidedly English in manner and speech; and can be taken for an Englishman by appearance. I asked Markus to bring before me any of other CP comrades who he thought could fill positions on the Bureau. He presented one man Denton. When I learned that Grey had some experience at editing a paper, is a good writer, and thorough in his communism, I decided I need look no further for an editor of the paper.

Grey also presented a comrade from the UCP for the position of Secretary. The choice lay then between Brennen [Brennan] of the UCP and Denton of the CP. Brennen is the most suitable man, for besides having excellent qualifications as a communist, he is also at present in charge of office work, earning his living. Considering it very fortunate that competent men could be found who reside in Toronto, or in the case of Rogoff, who can stay there, I decided there was no reason to delay forming the Red Labor Bureau. Subsequently on Thursday Mar. 24 I called the three together, Grey, editor, Brennan, Secretary; and Rogoff[,] organizer - outlined the nature of the work, took up the draft of the Rules of the American Bureau, went into details on the formation and function of a Bureau for Canada. In the discussion I could easily see that all three comrades had given serious study to the [A.]

Losovsky's pamphlet, as well as all the other literature bearing upon the subject of Communist attitude towards trade unions. I could definitely say then that all three had a better knowledge of the Trade Union situation in Canada than any other three comrades that I could find in Canada. We then took up the Rules of the American Bureau seriatim. After certain changes were made to meet the conditions- (changes that meant mostly the cutting down the number of workers needed) we finally drafted rules for Canada.

On Saturday Mar. 26th I received a letter from Comrade Scott in which I learned that communications were sent to me to Montreal to N.M., a connection, I did not have up until this time. I immediately wrote for letters and received them on Tuesday March 29th. Most important of the communications was a copy of detailed instructions most of which had already been carried out; also a bank check for \$300.00 Canadian Currency. On this same day I received word from members of the Executive Committee of the Ukrainian Federation of the CP that they desired to see me relative to the formation of the Canadian Party. When I met them that evening I learned that they did not know of the plans of the Pan American Council which I was carrying out, which they wished to carry out by taking advantage of a convention which their legal organization was about to hold on Friday April 1st in Toronto. What they wanted to know was this: Whether it would not be a good thing to take advantage of the convention and get the UCP to elect delegates; and with their delegates who are members of the CP, together with other delegates from the CP, to meet in another and illegal convention, right after the Ukrainian legal convention, and there form the CP of Canada. In the discussion with them they represented that their members in Winnipeg were enthusiastic for the plan and were standing ready to send two delegates to Toronto if it could be carried out. I asked them why they conceived such a plan, and was informed that they were so anxious for unity with the UCP because in Canada, so far as they could observe (the committees observations were limited to Toronto and Vicinity; with some information about Winnipeg) the UCP is more active than the CP. I got into contact with them through comrade Grey of the UCP, because they approached him first with their plan. It was by this means they first learned of my presence. They wanted to learn from comrade Grey whether their plan would be acceptable to the UCP and on this they wanted information that might so that they could send a telegram to Winnipeg advising their delegates whether to come or not. If the plan could not be carried out then the delegates would not come because of the great expenses to no purpose. I learned that the two delegates were the aforementioned Popovitch and an Englishman named Waters (Empi and Downly). Downly I sized up as good material when I saw him in Winnipeg but who remained tight when I spoke to him. I decided at once that it would be advisable to have the delegates come to Toronto where I could meet them, for two reasons: first, because I could learn now, when these two comrades accepted me, what I failed to learn while in Winnipeg; second, it was necessary to get the Winnipeg Comrades acquainted with the plans of the Council and informed how to carry them out in their territory. When I was told by the Toronto Ukrainians that it would cost only \$150.00 to get the two delegates to Toronto and back I instructed them to wire for them to come and the council would pay the expense. They arrived on Thursday March 31st.

In the meantime, as I mentioned before I received instructions on March 29th, the second paragraph of which reads: "Meantime, direct efforts to get a provisional Executive of all groups recognizing the Third International. All such groups co-operating in preparation for CP convention must immediately cease all organic connections with parties outside of Canada, in U.S." On March 30 I was brought into contact with the Executive Committee of the Finnish Socialist Federation of Canada. This committee are all Communists, connected with the UCP groups in Toronto. They had prepared to organize more groups for the UCP out of their legal membership of 2000 persons. When I asked them what the attitude of the most of their membership is toward the Third Int., they [were] unanimous in declaring that all favored the Third; that their paper was thoroughly communist as regards news and editorial policy. They said that if we would want them the whole membership would organize

underground. I explained then that according to the instructions quoted above it was not necessary for them to proceed organizing into UCP but that I considered their organization important enough to have a representative on the Provisional Executive and since the UCP and the CP groups would be disconnected, all groups would then be in the same position. This was satisfactory to them. The next day, Thursday Mar. 31 I received a visit from Flynn [Edward I. Lindgren] of the UCP who informed me that the C.E.C. of that party was somewhat concerned and apprehensive about the formation of an Executive with unequal representation. When I explained to him all that is outlined above, and outlined the plans to increase the Ex. Com. with a Finnish Delegate, he was satisfied and considered that his C.E.C. would be also.

When this question of my interpretation was brought before the Provisional Executive on Monday April 4th, there was much discussion over the question of disconnecting the groups from the U.S. Parties, and the inclusion of a delegate from the Finns into the committee. The CP delegates opposed both propositions. They agreed that if disconnection would be enforced then the activity now conducted by both parties would cease and nothing would be gained. Heavy emphasis was laid on the possibility of being unable to get literature which is necessary to keep up the work until the Convention. Markus said that the groups could not afford to allow any other group not now connected with the C.I. to participate in the activities of the provisional executive. He contended, (The other CP delegates support) that at no time in any country when a convention is to be called did they permit of an executive committee to handle the matter which is made up of representatives of any organizations except those that are affiliated with the C.I., when such organizations existed at the time of the formation of the committee. Only when affiliated organizations did not exist did they permit or accept the assistance of non affiliated bodies. I contended that in England for instance the C.I. called upon bodies outside of the two communist groups, such as the S.L.P. [Socialist Labour Party] and the left wing of I.L.P. [Independent Labour Party] to elect each a representative to form a provisional executive to call a unity convention. However a motion was passed, 3 CP in favor and 2 UCP against, which declared against the committee's approval of admitting a Finnish delegate to the Provisional executive, until there was a final decision from the Pan American Council. Other action of that meeting is found in the minutes. An Editorial Committee was formed to have matters prepared for the first member of the paper The Communist which is to appear simultaneously in all parts of Canada of April 27th.

At a later meeting of the committee Markus of CP was absent to the U.S.A. Gerkoff of CP took his place.

At this meeting the UCP delegate reported that their D.C. had decided that the instructions pertaining to equal representation on the Provisional Executive should be carried out to the letter; and that they were not keen for the inclusion of a Finnish representative at this time. The CP delegates said that they stood for proportional representation as before, but that they would not resist any final orders from the Council.

I decided to have the matter settled by taking a trip to N.Y., after learning that the Pan American representative could not come to Toronto. I left for N.Y. April the 15th when the whole situation was taken up decisions found in minutes of conference between Scott, Atwood and Markus of C.P.

[typed:] Henry Atwood.

Canadian Representative.

The two delegates from Winnipeg, Empi & Downly insisted that their expenses were considerable more than \$200.00 actually, counting time lost \$300.00. I gave them \$200.00 which is \$50.00 more than I expected to give as receipt will show.

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- (1) *The Communist*. Official Organ of the Communist Party of Canada (Section of the Communist International), Vol. 1, No. 1, n.p., VI.1921.
- (2) *The Communist Bulletin*. Published by Canadian Section of the United Communist Party of America, Vol. 1, No. 1, n.p., n.d.

7-4a

13.07.1921 Minutes of meeting July 13, 1921
[ПГАСИИ, 495/98/4/19 (1×; typed)]

MINUTES OF MEETING JULY 13, 1921.

All members present, with Com. Scott in attendance.

Com. Baker in the chair.

Minutes of the meetings of July 8 and 12 read and accepted.

The Secretary's report was accepted.

After some discussion, it was decided to leave the matter of D. in Hamilton to the judgement of D.O. [District Organizer]

The following letters were read and dealt with,-

Patrick, July 4, discussed; a motion was carried on the suggestion of Com. Scott, that a man be sent to Vancouver, in co-operation with the American Agency to force the development of the illegal movement in the far west, and the disruption of the S.P. of C. It was also decided to leave the matter of choosing a man for this trip until Com. Scott has returned to N.Y. and reported regarding the prospects of getting a good man there for the purpose.

A letter and report of July 7, from Com. Morris, to be filed.

A report from the Ontario D.O. of July 8, to be filed.

The financial report to date was received as read.

The Technician's report was received.

The Editor reported that the next issue of the party organ would be out on the 23rd. July. His report was received.

The Editor reported progress in the preparation of leaflets for agitational purposes, etc. Report accepted.

The Director of Industrial Activity reported progress. Accepted.

On the suggestion of Com. Scott, it was decided to elect Committees of Industrial Activity and Legal Activity and an Editorial Board. For the Committee of Industrial Activity and Organization Work were Chosen Com. Lawrence and Pugatcheff, with the Secretary also included. For the Editorial Board, Com. Marat was chosen to serve with the Editor. For the Committee of Legal Activity were chosen Com. [A.] Kent and Baker. These two were to recommend three other party members from outside the C.E.C. to complete this committee, which would act as the executive committee of the Legal Organization, when it was formed.

It was decided that the date of first issue of the Legal weekly paper should be August 15, and the Editor agreed to bring in a suggestion for the name of the paper at the next meeting.

The Committee for preparing a report for the C.I. read their report which was accepted, with certain suggested changes. The Committee was authorized to sign the report when revised, and hand three copies to Com. Scott. It was agreed, on the suggestion of Com. Scott, that the Editor and Secretary should prepare a report for Moscow every three months, in addition to reporting immediately anything very special.

A motion was carried that the Editor should take the responsibility for the Secretary's work during his absence for a month, getting such assistance as he finds necessary from the other members of the C.E.C. It was agreed that Com. Marat should take the place of the Secretary on the Committee of Industrial Activity during his absence.

The Secretary was authorized to immediately procure a mimeograph.

The next meeting was set for July 22, Friday.

- 15.07.1921** The Application of the Communist Party of Canada for Affiliation with the Communist International
 [РГАСПИ, 495/98/4/59-62 (4×; typed, signed and a postscript handwritten); 495/18/66/231-233 & 495/18/66/36 (typed and signed)]

THE APPLICATION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CANADA FOR AFFILIATION WITH THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL.

The Communist Party of Canada, as already explained, was organized out of all existing Communist groups in Canada, in accordance with the mandate of the Pan-American Agency of the Communist International. The Constituent Convention was composed of 22 delegates representing a membership of six hundred and fifty. The program adopted was, with certain eliminations of specifically American matter, and certain additions applicable to the Canadian situation, that of the C.P. of A. before the Unity Convention. The sources of this document, are largely Engels, Marx, and Comrades Lenin, Zinoviev, Bucharin and Radek. It is a digest of the Theses of the Second Congress and the Manifesto of the First. The Communist Party of Canada accordingly believes this program to accord with the demands of the 21 Conditions for admission into the Communist International. The following excerpts, however, will define the attitude of the Party on all essential points precisely.

(a) On Proletarian Dictatorship and Soviet Power.

The necessary condition for a social revolution is the dictatorship of the proletariat, which means that the proletariat must seize political power to enable it to crush the resistance of the capitalists.

The proletarian dictatorship, in the form of the Soviet Government, thus realizes true proletarian democracy, the democracy for and of the working class and against the bourgeoisie.

(b) On Political Action.

Every class struggle is a political struggle. The object of the struggle, which inevitably develops into civil war, is the conquest of political power. However, this power cannot be acquired, organized and directed, otherwise than by means of a political party. Only when the workers have as their leader an organized and experienced political party, with strictly defined objects, and a practically drawn up program of immediate action, both in domestic and foreign policy- only then will the acquisition of political power cease to be a casual episode, but will serve as a starting point for the gradual realization of the Communist Society.

(c) On Mass Activity.

The Communist Party of Canada will systematically and persistently propagate to the working class the idea of the inevitability of and necessity for a violent revolution, and will prepare the working class for armed insurrection as the only means for the destruction of the bourgeois state and the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship based upon Soviet power.

(d) On Parliamentary Action.

While the Communist Party of Canada makes its major campaigns and activities among the working class in their mass-struggles outside of the parliaments, it will participate in elections and election campaigns for revolutionary propaganda and agitation only.

(e) On the Trade Unionism and Factory Committees.

The Communist Party of Canada in its attitude toward the Trade and Industrial Union movement, rejects the tactics of both the reformists, opportunist socialists, and the pseudo-revolutionary syndicalists, and affirms its position as set forth in the Theses and decisions of the

Second World propaganda and agitation only.

(e [f]) On Trade Unionism and Factory Committees.

The Communist Party of Canada in its attitude toward the Trade and Industrial Union movement, rejects the tactics of both the reformists, opportunist socialists, and the pseudo[-] revolutionary syndicalists, and affirms its position as set forth in the Theses and decisions of the Second World Congress of the Communist International, viz: of participation within the Trade Unions in their every day struggles, maintaining contact at all times with the organized working masses, while incessantly, systematically and mercilessly criticizing and exposing the social and patriotic and reactionary leaders destroying the official trade union bureaucracy, and carrying on a continual propaganda to win the trade unions over to the side of the proletarian revolution, and developing the leadership of the trade and industrial unions by the Communist Party of Canada.

The factory committees should not be formed exclusively of working men who already understand and are fighting for the proletarian dictatorship. The Communist Party will organize all workers on the basis of the economic crisis, and lead them toward the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat by developing the concrete struggle for workers control of industry, which they all understand.

(f [g]) On Agrarian Problem.

- (1) Active championship of the agricultural proletariat and the poor tenant farmer.
- (2) Neutralized of the hostility of the middle class farmer.
- (3) Relentless warfare against the capitalist farmers and landlords, in the name of the proletarian revolution.

(g [h]) On Imperialism and Colonies.

The Communist Party of Canada will relentlessly unmask the real character of British Imperialism and militarism and the part played by the Canadian Bourgeoisie in the maintenance of the Empire. The Communist Party of Canada will carry on a steadfast agitation against any contribution to the support of the Empire imposed on the Canadian working class whether by the British or Canadian bourgeoisie and declares its solidarity with and support by all means at its disposal of the colonial movement of liberation from the British Imperial yoke.

(h [i]) On Communist Nuclei.

The Communist Party of Canada will organize its Communist nuclei in every mass organization of the working class, in the trade unions, shop and factory committees, welfare associations, etc. It will also endeavour to form nuclei in the naval and military forces of the State.

The Constitution of the Communist Party of Canada, it believes also conforms to the conditions of the International, since it provides for an underground, illegal, group form of organization, highly centralized, with the Convention as its supreme body, and the Central Executive Committee of seven as such between conventions. The country is divided into four districts, with one more in contemplation, each with a District Executive Committee, elected from the groups up, and linked with the C.E.C. through the appointed District Organizers. The Districts are further sub divided into sub districts, each with its sub district committee, and the sub districts composed of locals and directly connected branches or groups. The foreign language comrades are organized into language sections directed by elected section bureaux if a given language embraces 200 or more, and appointed by the C.E.C. if under the 200 mark, if deemed advisable. The language sections are an integral part of the machinery of the party, and the language bureaux are under the absolute control of the C.E.C.

DECISION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.

Necessarily the Executive has been taken up in this initial period with the technique of illegal party organization, making appointments, dividing the work etc. Its political activity has, consequently,

up to the present, been mainly programmatic. But an illegal organ has been issued. A legal organ is due to appear August 15 ⁽¹⁾. A series of agitation party leaflets, addressed to the unemployed has been prepared and No. 1 is on the press. Another series of a more general political educational character, relevant to the coming general is in preparation. Posters and placards of an agitational character, addressed to the masses, and a number of pamphlets and brochures are also planned to deal with the relation of Communism to Trade Unionism and the Farmers etc.

The work of the Central Executive Committee is apportioned among the following departments,

- (a) Industrial Activity and Organizational Work.
- (b) Editorial.
- (c) Legal Activity.
- (d) Secretarial.
- (e) Technical.

PROBLEM AND PROSPECTS.

The Communist Party of Canada at present composed of 650 members has a potential field estimated at about 3000. But the field of agitation and influence among the masses is of course immeasurably greater. The organizer and unorganized Canadian proletariat alone runs to well over 700,000.

The chief contemporary political task to the Party is to stimulate and direct the masses of the unemployed in the severe crisis now approaching. The degree of its influential participation in the general election also close at hand will naturally depend on the Party[']s strength and resources.

Meanwhile the C.E.C. has a number of problems to deal with,=

- (a) The consolidation of the existing party groups, the perfection of the technique of the illegal organization.
- (b) The ab[s]orption into the party ranks of the workers of revolutionary sentiment hitherto unapproached, to make communists out of the vaguely syndicalist workers in the O.B.U. and the socialist workers still attracted by the S.P. of C.
- (c) The radicalization of the workers who have advanced as far as the I.L.P. stage.
- (d) The stimulation of the class consciousness among the masses hitherto unaffected by political activity.

For these various tasks the C.E.C. will choose the appropriate method for each situation and given element. As far as possible the C.E.C. will coordinate legal with illegal activity, legal with illegal agitation.

Accordingly the Communist Party of Canada, conscious that its structure and its aims coincide with the demands for affiliation, asks for admission as a disciplined party unit of the Communist International ⁽²⁾.

Countersigned

[signed:] G. Roderick

Chairman

Charles Edward Scott

R. Duncan

Executive Secretary

Pan American Agency

[handwritten:] Canada, July 15th 21.

P.S. I am preparing draft for Legal Mass Party.
This Legal Party will be launched within a month
and of course, fully controlled by the
underground Party.

Fraternally yours

Scott

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- (1) The first issue, entitled *The Workers' World*, appeared in Toronto on August 17, 1921. The weekly paper subsequently became *The Workers' Guard*, then *The Worker*.
- (2) The ECCI at its session of December 18, 1921, after hearing comrade Carr's report (cf. Doc. 7-6), unanimously approved the application of the CPC for affiliation with the Comintern. Letter of Jules Humbert-Droz, Secretariat of the Executive, Moscow, Dec. 28, 1921 to the Communist Party of Canada, in: РГАСПИ, 495/98/2/1-2; Communist Party of Canada fonds, MG28, IV4, Vol. 8, File 15 (H-1581), Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa.

26.09.1921 To the Executive Committee of the Communist International
[ПГАСИИ, 495/98/4/70-77 (8×; typed and signed)]

TO THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL.

Report of the Communist Party of Canada for September 26th, 1921.

The Political Situation.

At the present moment political attention in Canada is centered on the impending general election. Feeling the ground slipping from under its feet the Meighen Government decided to face the worst rather than to linger out its legal term of existence, to reorganize its forces while it still has forces. This Meighen Government is in direct descent from the Conservative Borden Government which threw Canada into the arena of the Imperialist war, to bolster up the British Empire. It is in direct descent from the Borden Government which, drawing in a wing of the Liberal Party, was able, by its most unscrupulous terrorism of public opinion (bribery of the press, a Franchise Act disfranchising thousands of citizens of so[-]called enemy alien origin, etc.) to carry a general election to force military conscription on the country. After governing the country by naked order-in-council, the Unionist Government, as it came to be known, achieved continental notoriety by breaking the Winnipeg strike, arresting and imprisoning the strike leaders, and by the unprecedented speed with which it forced legislation through Parliament for the deportation of agitators of non-Canadian origin, and a Sedition Law making the interpretation of sedition as wide as any arbitrary official of the judiciary would desire.

It now goes to the polls under the garb of the National Liberal and Conservative Party. Judging by the name the Government openly avows the solidarity of Conservatism and Liberalism in face of popular unrest. For a while the Meighen Party hoped to range all bourgeois and petit bourgeois support solidly behind it, by conjuring up artificially the bogey of Bolshevism, which was alleged to exist in a fancied Farmer-One Big Union alliance. The coupling of these latter forces was in itself ridiculous. The Farmers movement is not even remotely Bolshevik in character, and this Governmental imputation was therefore quickly and universally laughed down.

The ostensible issue of the coming election, with the elimination of the Bolshevik bogey, became the tariff. The Meighen Government professes to be maintaining the so[-]called national policy of protection against the Free Trade conspiracy of the Section of the Liberal Party which had remained outside the Unionist Coalition Government, and which is now led by Mackenzie King, a former employee of the Rockefeller Standard Oil Interests. These Liberals, however, deny the accusation of entertaining a free-trade policy and claim to be working only for a more moderate tariff. Absurd as it may appear, it is nevertheless indicative of the backwardness of certain elements of the Canadian labor parties that sections of these parties are found complaining of the advanced tariff and free trade views of other sections, and generally consider the tariff to be the vital issue before the Canadian workers.

The Farmers Sun shows that there is a tendency even among the farmers which is much more conscious of real issues than the above-mentioned labor party elements. Editorially in its issues of August 27th, 1921, the "Sun" writes:- "The core of the Canadian political problem is not the question of a Customs tariff but the rule of a class. Since 1878 the life and growth of the Dominion have been

dominated by a small group of men. These are manufacturers. They have elected every government and revised every law." The Farmers have won brilliant successes as an avowed Farmers Party, having become the government party in both Alberta and Ontario. They are contesting the Dominion elections, however, under the vague name of the National Progressive Party, the leader of which is a former member of the Unionist Government Cabinet, one Crerar. The latter denies any class objectives in the Farmers movement and altogether behaves like the orthodox Liberal-Conservative politician. The Farmers, the bulk of whom in Canada belong to the middle stratum, are a democratic element in political life, of the type more prevalent even in Europe in the pre-monopolist stage of capitalism. So far as economic policy is concerned, they want to lower the tariff and control the prices of their products, at least, to take that control out of the hands of the urban capitalists. They want sufficient governmental control to give them good co-operative facilities for the marketing of their products. They have formed well-organized and extensive co-operative societies of their own. They do not of course contemplate enlisting against the capitalist in his exploitation of the urban proletarian masses, whom they promise relief only when the above-mentioned objectives of the Farmers movement are obtained. In political theory the farmers are parliamentary democrats.

The Labor Parties are here and there running candidates, with a view to entering into or continuing an alliance with the farmers in the parliamentary arena. The Canadian Trades and Labor Congress, the executive organ of the Canadian Section of the American Federation of Labor, met in Winnipeg, where the delegates were wined and dined by the Winnipeg business men. None but representatives of the capitalist press were permitted to attend. A whole series of recommendations of a platonic character were made public which will leave but little impress, like the whole congress in general on actual events. The Executive in its report mentioned warningly the "the disrupting influence of radicals who were boring from within" the Labor Movement to affiliate the Canadian Trades Unions to the Red Trade Union International. Unfortunately, this "warning" was due to the reverberation of European events rather than to the actual facts of the Canadian situation. The radicals in the unions are, as yet, a scattered force both as to numbers and influence. There was even less open radical representation at this congress than at previous congresses. But one decision of the Congress may become significant in time. An organization committee for the formation of a Canadian Labor Party was appointed whose task is to federate the existing autonomous provincial labor parties, the trades unions, and workers societies. In view of the short time left for organization it is unlikely that this party will be a real factor in the present general election, but undoubtedly the labor candidates elected by the various local labor parties will constitute the nucleus of a labor parliamentary fraction.

The Communist Party is preparing to launch a legal mass party, under the control of the underground party, but this legal party will not be in a position to put up candidates in the coming Federal elections. Our participation will be confined to distributing leaflets, editorials in our legal paper, and speaking from the Farmer-Labor platform where possible. The revolutionary elements in the country are more poorly organized to draw all the possible advantages out of the current situation, which is dominated by the facts of the continental-wide economic crisis, than others.

The Third Annual Convention of the One Big Union will open in Winnipeg on September 26th. Judging by the implied admissions of the Winnipeg "One Big Union Bulletin" the convention will be attended by fewer delegates than on previous occasions. The Bulletin explains this as due to unemployment of members and the consequent decision of the local units to utilize available funds for purposes of local organizational work, which the bulletin professes is more important and vital than "fifty conventions." The O. B. U. has usually a tendency to avoid that expression of a definite policy which can only come from a convention. The revolutionary elements in Canada are as yet so few that all must be propelled toward a united effort. The O. B. U. does not make progress by avoiding the decision as to affiliation with the Red Trade Union for instance. There have been internal dissensions and secessions. And there is much apathy prevalent in local units. Much depends, to repeat, on whether it

will face or sidetrack the question of international affiliations. If it goes with Moscow, then the way will be open for a solution of the problem of how the Communist Party will co-operate with the O. B. U. and how the O. B. U. will face the necessity for avoiding petty splits within the A. F. of L. Trades Unions as they exist now.

The Socialist Party of Canada continues its interminable discussion in the columns of its paper[,], the "Western Clarion" on the pros and cons of affiliation with the Third International. Reports have come to us from members of our party working within the S. P. of C. that the executive of that party refuse to call a convention to decide this question, as the columns of the "Clarion" are a sufficient medium for expressions of opinion. The S. P. of C., with its abstractions and pseudo-professorial propaganda is a deadening influence in the West. The C. E. C. is circularizing all its branches appealing for a convention and in case that is refused openly, for the local branches to secede.

The economic situation continues much the same as at the time of our first report. There are fluctuations in the employment curve, due to seasonal work, but when once the winter sets in earnestly, when the harvesters return to the cities, the curve of unemployment will steadily rise. The Trade Unions report 170,000 out of work, but the total figures are probably well over 200,000. The Communist Party has formed unemployment Associations in the large cities of Eastern Canada. The Associations are composed of delegates from various workers organizations including the Trade Unions. It is planned to make these Associations the rallying centre for a mass unemployed movement. There have been as yet few indications of spontaneous self-activity of the unemployed masses. The situation is, for instance, very much different than in England where the unemployed are becoming very insistent and aggressive in their expressions of discontent and in their demands for relief.

SECRETARY'S REPORT

Since our last report we have continued to receive financial help from the Pan-American Bureau. This has averaged \$1000 a month for June, July and August, besides the expenses of the Convention. In the latter part of August, we received word that all such help was being cut off. The C. E. C. at once adopted the policy of making the Party self-supporting. This is a very difficult problem and requires the most careful consideration of every activity in order to decide where expenses can be reduced with the least injury to the Party, and where the revenues can be increased to the utmost. As an immediate step the wages of all Party officials were cut off, and the C. E. C. is working out a permanent policy of reducing to the lowest minimum the number of paid officials, and dividing up the rest of the work among a sufficient number of unpaid officials, to enable it to be done in their spare time. The desire of the C. E. C. is to devote as much as possible of the Party revenues to actual propaganda work and for this reason they are planning to continue to give financial help to the legal paper, at the same time making every effort to have it self-supporting as soon as possible ⁽¹⁾.

Since the Convention 67 new members have been reported through the sale of initiation stamps.

The following important decisions were made by the C. E. C., in consultation with Comrade Scott of the P. A. B., and after hearing the report of Comrade Marshall who was a delegate to the Third Congress- of the C. I.:-

1) To increase the C. E. C. from 7 to 9 members, and to re-organize the work of the C. E. C., by forming 2 sub-committees, Political and Organizational, in accordance with the thesis on Organization of Communist Parties.

2) To launch a legal mass workers party, parallel with and under the control of the underground Party. Further details on this matter will be found in the report on Legal Activity.

3) To prepare and issue the following pamphlets through the legal organizations,- "The Labor & Socialist Movement in Canada": "The O. B. U., its Origin, Development and Collapse": "The Agrarian Question in Canada": "Class Struggles in Canada, from Colonial Times to the Present": "Canada and British Imperialism."

4) To give credentials to Comrade Carr [Ludwig E. Katterfeld], delegate from the C. P. of A., to the C. I., in order that he may represent us in Moscow until we are able to send our own delegates.

5) To request permission for Comrade Scott of the P. A. B., to spend three or four months in Western Canada, in order to force a split in the Socialist Party of Canada, and build up a strong organization of the C. P. of C. in that territory.

Copies of Financial Reports and Party Bulletins for June, July and August, are attached to this report ⁽²⁾.

REPORT OF EDITOR

The Editorial Department has published two issues of an illegal paper, the suspension of which became inevitable owing to shortage of funds and the urgent necessity of a paper of wider and legal character for mass appeal. The policy of the illegal paper, which came out while the Third Congress was sitting, was to orientate the comrades on the questions facing the Internationale as a whole, but owing to the misunderstanding of this purpose on the part of some of the comrades, there was some criticism of its contents which were judged to be too theoretical. The legal paper which took its place, W. G. [*The Workers' Guard*], has had the policy of attending to issues of the Canadian Labor movement, in general, reprinting articles of such a nature as would keep the comrades informed of the direction of the Comintern, and thirdly, to feature Soviet Relief. There has been criticism of this paper too on the score that it did not contain sufficient Canadian news. This latter was correct criticism, but can be remedied only by the organization of systematic press service in the different centers of Canada. We realize that the paper is not as good as it should be, but we are taking steps to improve it, and expect to make steady progress in that direction.

REPORT OF INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY & ORGANIZATION.

Since this committee was formed in July, its chief activities have been,

- 1) Formation of plans for organizing nuclei in the Trade Unions,
- 2) Making arrangements for the Ukrainian conference which was held in Winnipeg in August,
- 3) Arranging a method of keeping the expenses of District and Sub-district Executive Committee meetings within the present financial means of the Party, by only holding meetings on the recommendation of the District Organizer, approved by the C. E. C.

Nuclei: This work has been started, but will be greatly speeded up by the help of a questionnaire which is being issued to all members, and which will furnish exact information as to the Party membership in each local union. The general plan is to have the Local Executive Committees organize the nuclei work in their respective cities, electing sub-committees to look after this activity, and later adding to these sub-committees elected representatives from the nuclei, in order to form active committees in touch with all the Trade Unions, in each city.

Ukrainian Conference: This conference was held in place of a Section Convention, for financial reasons. The Conference elected a Bureau to look after the propaganda work among the Ukrainians. This Bureau is located in Toronto, where it can be in touch with the C. E. C. The conference also decided to issue an illegal monthly organ in their own language, to be printed in Winnipeg where they have already a well-established legal paper. The Ukrainian Section is the only language division of the Party strong enough to form a section, and it comprises about half of the Party membership.

District & Sub-district Executive Committees: Organization work has met with the most meagre results in districts 1 and 2 which comprise the whole of Western Canada from the Great Lakes to the Pacific Ocean.

The Party machinery in District 3 is now completely organized. This district includes about half the total membership.

The work in district 4 is progressing satisfactorily and the Party machinery is nearly complete ⁽³⁾.

REPORT ON LEGAL ACTIVITY

Instructions from the C. I. transmitted through the Pan American Bureau resulted in the legal aspect of our work being taken up more vigorously than at the time of the formation of the Party.

Plans for a legal Party apparatus, which was to promote a Communist mass movement, acting as an auxiliary of and parallel with the illegal party, were in process of preparation.

The launching of such a project was deferred until after the decisions of the Third Congress of the Comintern and the arrival of a delegate who would present definite instructions as to, a) the form, and b) the tactics of such a legal Party apparatus.

Comrade Marshall recently delivered these instructions. Plans in conformity with these instructions will be prepared by both the Political and Organizational Committees of the C. E. C. The launching of the legal party will be speeded up.

Practical Work or Actual Activity:

(a) Unemployment: The seriousness of the unemployment situation compelled party members to act in view of the fact that everywhere local Trade & Labor Councils were hesitating to take action.

This hesitancy being due, apparently, to the fact that it would bring the unemployed, that is, the rank and file, into direct contact with the bureaucracy of the labor movement, and at a moment when the labor bureaucrats least want their policies weakened for the coming election. They want to speak to the workers only from the election platform. The Party members have set in motion the unorganized expression of discontent by organizing unemployed associations and councils. The slogan adopted by these bodies is "Work or Compensation with Union Rate of Wages." In the East of Canada this activity has borne some fruit already inasmuch as it has compelled the hesitants in the Trade & Labor Councils to move on behalf of the unemployed.

(b) Defense.

Considerable interest has been kept alive in this branch of the work. Three comrades were arrested in Toronto for distributing May Day leaflets. The charge against them is seditious libel. The cases come before the jury in October.

(c) Education.

Before the formation of the C. P. of C. two workers colleges had been founded. These are under the direct control of Party members. The curricula of the colleges for the coming winter session, contain courses in Economics, Political and Social History, History of Working Class movements, and provide for the training of speakers and propagandists. The future career of these colleges remains to be seen, but it is anticipated that with support from the Trade Union movement they may become Communist

training centers on a large scale.

(d) The Relief campaign on behalf of Soviet Russia:

The Relief Campaign is the most important activity at the present time. All energies are being thrown into this work.

The organization, Canadian Friends of Soviet Russia, established through Party members and directly controlled by the Executive Committee of the Party, is making every effort to gather support from every section of the workers; the farmers also, are being approached. The response from the city workers so far, is very favorable. The support of the Trades and Labor Councils is being sought, and is assured in some cities.

It is hoped that the terrible calamity facing our comrades in Russia will be the means by which international working class solidarity and support can be measured, to the end that not only material assistance (food, clothing, medicines etc.) will be supplied our comrades, but also that actual support of their noble achievement, the Proletarian Revolution, will be given.

Leaflets

A leaflet dealing with "Unemployment" has been issued, of which a copy is attached to this report.

A leaflet dealing with the coming Federal elections is being prepared. This will give an explanation concerning political conditions in Canada, an exposure of the policies of the parties aspiring for power, and conclude by showing our stand toward parliamentarism.

[signed:] R. Duncan [stamp]
Executive Secretary

[handwritten:] Canada
Sept 26, 1921

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- (1) According to the Financial Report attached to "Report of Central Executive Committee of the C.P. of C. for 9 months from May 25th, 1921 to Feb. 20th, 1922" (reprinted in: G.S. Kealey, "The RCMP, the Special Branch, and the Early Days of the Communist Party of Canada: A Documentary Article," *Labour/ Le Travail*, Vol. 30, Fall 1992, 186-187), the CPC's revenue during the period was as follows:

Receipts from Party sources	\$2344.97
Receipts <u>from P.A.A.</u>	<u>3168.</u>
Total receipts	5512.97

- (2) "Copies of Financial Reports" are not kept together in this file.
"Party Bulletins for June, July and August," that is, "C.P. of C. Monthly Bulletin. June 30, 1921," "Bulletin 2. Official Report. June 30 to July 31. C.E.C. of C.P. of C.," and "C.P. of C. Bulletin 3. August 31, 1921" are kept at the beginning of this file. ПГАСПН, 495/98/4/1, 2-4, 5; reprinted in: Kealey, "The RCMP, the Special Branch, and the Early Days of the Communist Party of Canada," 172-177.
- (3) On June 3, 1921 the CEC of the CPC decided to form four districts, with headquarters at Vancouver, Winnipeg, Toronto and Montreal. On July 3 boundaries of Districts were set as follows: Dist. 1: Maritime provinces, Quebec, Ontario up to Ottawa; Dist. 2: Ontario, west of Ottawa, up to Fort William; Dist. 3: Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Ontario west of Fort Wm.; British Columbia and Alberta. "Excerpts. C.E.C. Minutes. C.P.C. from May 25 to July 12, 1921," in: ПГАСПН, 495/98/4/16-18a.

8 Ch.E. Scott (K. Jansons) to G.E. Zinoviev

8-1 15.10.1921 Scott (New York) to Com. Zinoviev, President of the Comintern
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/171-181 (11×; typed duplicate); 495/18/66/307-311 (typed draft); 495/18/66/245-246 (typed draft)]

8-1

15.10.1921 Scott (New York) to Com. Zinoviev, President of the Comintern
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/171-181 (11×; typed duplicate) ; 495/18/66/307-311 (typed draft);
495/18/66/245-246 (typed draft)]

TO COM. ZINOVEIV [*sic*], PRESIDENT OF THE COMINTERN.

Report on the situation in the United States; the work of the Pan-American agency among the trade-unions of the U.S.; the situation in Canada, the Pan-American agency and Scott's proposition.

New York, October 15, 1921.

THE SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES.

The merging of the American Communist Parties was delayed because the majority of the Pan-American agency, , and especially did not take a definite and sustained stand in carrying out their decisions as well as in making use of your mandate.

The unity congress lasted two weeks. Unfortunately, practically all that time was wasted in deadlocks over various questions on the agenda, on constitutional interpretation, election of committees and the Central Committee, and whether the united party is in America or in the United States. On the other hand, such problems as purging the party of sectionalism, and giving it the character of a mass organization, the question of the use of legal possibilities, of creating a legal organization, of co-ordinating its work with that of the illegal organization, of using the unemployment situation, how to carry on the work in the unions and get closer to the masses, — about these questions there was a discussion, but no debates, and no decisions were made.

Immediately after the unity congress the C.C. of the Communist Party occupied itself with purely technical questions, such as that of uniting the groups of the former two Communist Parties and the election of officials. But this work proceeded slowly, for the two factions refused to make concessions, and Gurevich's followers attempted to get their men placed into every position regardless of whether they were capable of filling them efficiently or not.

Then arose the question of participating in municipal elections and of organizing a legal party. These questions about a new regrouping not only among the members of the party, but also in the Central Committee, two members of the former Communist Party joined 5 members of the former United Communist Party resulting in a group of 7 opposed by the 3 remaining members.

The Central Committee decided to start upon the organization of legal committees and their co-ordination into one general national organization — the American Labour Alliance. This organization has no individual dues-paying members; it is conglomeration of various labour organizations. The minority of the Central Committee opposed the formation of such an organization on the ground that it may develop into a political party. Dow, secretary of the Central Committee stayed with the minority resigned his post on this reason after trying his best in general to disrupt the party.

The delegate Marshall has just returned from Moscow with a report of the conference between the American delegation and Lenin during which the latter advised the delegation to form not only a legal organization, but to organize a legal political party along with the illegal party, so that the latter may

control and lead the former. On the strength of this report the Central Committee issued a call through its illegal organization (American Labour Alliance) for a congress to be held soon for the purpose of organizing a legal political party. The minority of the Central Committee has advanced far enough in its views to recognize the expediency of the existence of the American Labour Alliance, but it is still opposing with all means at its disposal the organization of a legal political party.

The majority of the Central Committee has strong support among the English-speaking members, and therefore, decided to carry its idea into effect, for the disrupting minority consisting of foreigners is not sufficiently interested in and do not understand how to transform a lifeless underground organization into a genuine mass party. Now for the first time a purely American element is heading the party and framing its policies.

It is very desirable that you express your authoritative opinion on this question. The minority then would abandon its demoralizing activity and give up the hope of re-establishing control over the party by the foreigner's "Federation Block." It is of particular importance that you give your opinion because the delegate Stephan Hanson who has just returned claims that Lenin gave no instructions to the American Delegation about organizing a legal party, but merely to carry on with them a "friendly conversation" on general topics, and did not emphasize the necessity of carrying on legal work, etc. It seems absolutely clear to us that Stephan came here for the purpose of political intrigues for a certain faction.

After the organization of a legal party the question of merging the illegal party with the legal one, i.e., the question of the liquidation of the illegal party will inevitable arise. I am against the liquidation of the illegal party; at least we must see first how the legal party will be able to develop and work.

No doubt, the question of our attitude to the Farmer-Labour Party will also come up. The latter is becoming a strong factor in local policies. The more radical unions of the American Federation of Labour are beginning to turn towards it. The recent United Miners' convention where there were 20 Communist delegates and 57 sympathizers, decided to support the Farmer-Labour Party. The same convention decided to delegate to the International Congress of Miners the radical Howat, and to contribute one day's wages to relieve the starving in Russia. You will have to express your opinion on the relations with the Farmer-Labour Party also. I shall send you literature and data on both the Farmer-Labour Party and the Non-partisan League. The general political attitude of the U.S. towards Soviet Russia is shaping to the latter's favour. The tone of all the chief conservative papers is becoming more polite and lenient towards Soviet Russia; they express the thought that the Washington Conference on "disarmament" will compel the U.S. to pay more attention to Soviet Russia.

The number of unemployed has reached 6,000,000, but there is no reason to expect any serious movement or disturbances. The composition of the unemployed continually changes, many of the unemployed workers finding work while others are thrown out of employment; besides, it must be remembered that American workmen generally know 2 or 3 trades, thus finding work in some other line after a period of unemployment. It must also be remembered that many workingmen, especially metal workers, have considerable savings from the war period. In addition a number of unemployed find work through the municipal registration bureaus, and for that purpose many cities are opening repair shops and organizing public work. And finally, it may be expected that the large cities will soon open soup kitchens and barracks for a night's shelter to the unemployed.

Nevertheless, it is possible that in some places demonstrations of unemployed accompanied by street fighting will take place, but those will be isolated affairs. The American workingmen lack a militant spirit, and their mood is very low. The local Communist Party does not know how and is unable to make use of the unemployment situation, it cannot co-ordinate the isolated flare-ups of the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat. The Communist Party has a very weak influence in the trade-unions, and without such influence it will not get the support of the unions. And not until it attains to this influence will you hear any good news from the United states.

THE WORK OF THE PAN-AMERICAN AGENCY

among the Trade-Unions of the United States.

The work in the trade-unions given by Com. [Mikhail] Tomskey was too much for the agency, for this field is terribly complicated and conflicting. Besides, the agency itself was very little acquainted with the conditions of this work. It is also necessary to add the fact, that according to instructions the agency could not work openly, which made us carry on all relations through members of the Communist Party in the unions. Due to the fact that at the time there were still two hostile Communist Parties, one of which (the Gurevich Party) was forbidden to work or confer with the members of the United Communist Party, it frequently happened that Communists spoke against each other at union meetings. In addition, the old Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party opposed any attempts at carrying on agitation among the unions undertaken by me and the agitational centre. It was only a considerable time after the 2nd Congress of the Comintern that the local radicals understood and agreed to the necessity of working among the trade-unions in general, and in the A.F.L. in particular.

Early in spring Com. K left for Mexico, and I remained alone.

Despite all these unfavourable conditions I succeeded in carrying out the following work of organization. I established relations and had conferences with many of the radical labour leaders, and through them came in contact with many trade-unions. I succeeded in organizing an agitational centre among the trade-unions showing out our views. I published three of Lozovsky's pamphlets in 100,000 copies, and about a million copies of our appeal on the attitude towards the trade-unions; organized the publication of a trade-union weekly (The Voice of Labour); sent a union delegation to Moscow to the Red Labour Union Congress. This delegation would in its composition and representative character have had more weight had com. Tomskey informed me that the Congress had been postponed until July. Recently we had several conferences with the delegates of the R.L.U.I. (Profintern) who returned from Moscow, and I turned over all connections with the local trade-unions as well as the direction of the work of the R.L.U.I. to com. the Profintern representative. W.Z. Foster returned from Moscow fully sympathetic to the new order.

In the sphere of politics I succeeded first in uniting the two C.P-s of America; second, in taking the initiative and effecting a split in the Socialist Party of Hillquit; third, in organizing an illegal C.P. in Canada; fourth, in starting the publication of a legal weekly paper in Canada; fifth, in preparing the ground for the legal release of five imprisoned communists in the U.S., which, however, was held up due to the fact that you had not replied to any of my three telegrams about the 25,000 dollars promised by you.

CANADA.

The entire work in Canada rested on my shoulders. Recently I succeeded in forming an illegal Communist Party. Probably you will want to know why an underground and not a legal Party has been formed in Canada. The thing is that the C.P. of U.S.A. had organized severely underground branches in Canada. These branches, which belonged to the two warring Parties, were unified by the Canadian Congress which decided that the C.P. must be organized on the basis on the full programme including the demands re-armed rising, application of force etc. in order, by these means, to concentrate and develop from the beginning the guiding and controlling nucleus of a fully crystallized communist movement. Now, that this nucleus has already been organized, the Central Committee of this small underground C.P. had prepared and will shortly issue an invitation to organizational Congress of a legal Party in Canada, which will be held under the auspices and control of the illegal Party. The illegal Party has a membership of about 1,000 members, but 3 to 4,000 organized workers at the very least will be represented at the Congress of the legal Party.

Among the Canadian comrades there is no opposition to the formation of a legal Party. On the

contrary there is in the Western territories a strong feeling against an illegal Party; for the Westerners have more political freedom than the workers in the Eastern States. Therefore it is only natural that the former should lay stress on the necessity for legal, and the latter for underground activities, both of them however recognize the necessity for a legal Party organization. The only moot point is — should the illegal Party dissolve at the 1st Congress of the legal Party, or should it continue its activities as a parallel organization for the guidance and control of the legal work. I am of the opinion that one need not be in a hurry over the liquidation of the illegal Party.

The Canadian Socialist Party is still continuing to work as an integral organization, because it had not as yet made an official pronouncement on the 21 points, and has therefore had no split in its ranks. Its leading organ is against the acceptance of the 21 points, but some of its members are favourably inclined towards them. As soon as I shall get the means, I shall go to Vancouver in the West and will insist on the Socialist Party making a clear statement on these points. In other words, I shall bring about a split, in order to unite its revolutionary sections to the future revolutionary C.P. of Canada. I also think that it is imperative for me to stay in Canada for the next four months in the capacity of chief organizer attached to the illegal organization, and for the convening of the Congress of the legal Party. The guidance of the Canadian Communist movement is in the hands of Anglo-Saxon workers, and not in those of the foreign element. The members of the Central Committee are comrades whose words carry weight with the local trade-unions. There are communist factions in a considerable number of unions whose work is attended with considerable success. The Conference of the unemployed is also under the indirect guidance of party members (for a more detailed account I refer you to the enclosed report, of the Canadian C.P.).

MEXICO.

Com Katayama has been working in Mexico for over six months. About a month ago arrived there. Up to the present nothing positive has been done. After several months of “unification” work, it became apparent that there was no justification for such work, as no C.P-s were in existence. After the arrest of a dozen people nothing was left of the Party which was represented in Moscow by com.

After the arrest of Lynn Gale his party also ceased to exist. I have proofs that Lynn Gale addressed a letter to Gompers, in which he begged the latter to get him out of goal, in return for which L. Gale promised to betray all the communists, and to show up the “stupidity of communist teaching, etc.

Com. Katayama and Fraina have issued a call for the formation of a new C.P., the details of which are contained in the enclosed report on Mexico. It seems to me that this report is putting too rosy a complexion on things. There is much talk but nothing will come of it in the end.

Com. Fraina demands that I should leave everything in Canada and at once proceed to Mexico. I have refused to do so, because my presence in Canada is absolutely necessary. Moreover, my three times repeated request for means for my trip to Vancouver for organizational purposes has met with no response from him.

A PAN-AMERICAN AGENCY.

The hopes in connection with the Pan-American agency have not been realized. It is not in the agency itself that we must look for the reasons of the failure. The agency could not have fulfilled the tasks with which it had been entrusted even if one of its members had not spent all his time knocking about Germany.

It has proved quite impossible and would have been premature to do any preliminary work for the convening of a Pan-American Conference of the C.P-s. The Pan-American C.P-s, including the U.S.A. are as yet in their initial organizational phase, and their time is therefore taken up with internal friction

and disputes. They have hardly paid any attention to the big problem of the class struggle in their countries. The Pan-American problems are for them still a book with seven seals. The C.P-s and the Communist movement in South America are still much more akin to the C.P-s and Communist movements in Spain and Italy than to those in U.S.A. On the other hand the C.P-s of U.S.A. are simply a sorry parody of the R.C.P. and are unable to take any interest in the Southern countries, nor to pay enough attention to them.

It would be desirable to carry on the preparatory work for the Pan-American Conference direct from Moscow, somewhat in the following fashion:

All the American C.P-s should be circularized and asked to discuss and prepare their reports on the American problems, at least a month before the 4th Congress of the Comintern, in order that the delegates could be in good time in Moscow provided with full powers to participate in a preliminary Pan-American Conference. This preliminary Conference would serve as the corner stone in the work for the unification of the American C.P-s, the co-ordination of their work and the organization of their centre. The same kind of work should be carried out by the Red L.U.I. with regard to the Pan-American trade-unions.

MY PROPOSALS

(I) The immediate dissolution of the Pan-American agency.

(a) All the funds (about 20,000 dollars) which are in the keeping of _____ must be allocated in the following way: 10,000 dollars to the Argentine C.P. for South America (see report and proposals of comrade Allan); 5,000 dollars for Mexico, and 5,000 dollars for the Red L.U.I. for work among the trade-unions in U.S.A. (b) Comrade _____ should be sent out to you. He will be very useful in Eastern affairs, while these are very little use here. (c) In my capacity of ordinary organizer I should be allowed to stay here until I have succeeded (1) in splitting the Canadian Socialist Party, (2) in organizing a legal party in Canada, (3) in preparing everything for the departure of old Debs for Moscow immediately on his release from jail. I am closely connected with his intimate friends, and they are assuring me that old Debs has gone over to Moscow.

(2) It is imperative for the trade-unions (not the Red L.U.I.) to immediately approach the American and Canadian trade unions with the request to allot one days earnings for the benefit of the famine stricken districts of Russia. You should also send here a Delegation of the Red Cross, consisting of pure Slaves, for instance of the trade-unionist Tziporovitch, professor Bekhterov, Reformatsky, Pavlov, or some such savants of world wide renown. Such a delegation would be able to collect here up to 15 million dollars, and could prepare the ground for [Leonid] Krassin[Krasin]'s visit. The present representative of the Red Cross in America has not any influence either in the trade-unions or at Washington.

(3) 5,000 dollars should be put immediately at the disposal of the Canadian Communist Party. This party is collecting most energetically for the Russian famine relief, their collections reaching the figure of 50,000 dollars, which monies it cannot borrow for its expenses.

(4) I beg of you to give due consideration to comrade Allan's recommendations.

With Fraternal Greetings,

Yours,

[typed:] Scott.

New York, October 15th, 1921.

Names in underlined parts, inserted into a few blank spaces, are supplemented by the draft, in: ПГАСПН, 495/18/66/245-246.

9 S. Katayama in Moscow to Small Bureau of the ECCI

9-1 10.01.1922 Sen Katayama (Moscow) to the Members of Small Bureau [of the ECCI]
[РГАСПИ, 5/3/145/2-5 (4×; typed and signed); 495/18/66/211-214 (typed duplicate)]

9-1

10.01.1922 Sen Katayama (Moscow) to the Members of Small Bureau [of the ECCI]
[ПГАСПН, 5/3/145/2-5 (4×; typed and signed); 495/18/66/211-214 (typed duplicate)]

Moscow, January 10, 1922,

The Member of Small Bureau:
Dear Comrades;

While I was in America and in Mexico I sent you my reports as much as I could do so through the mail. Something that I wanted to report to you but I could not do it by the letter. Now I am here and I feel my duty to tell you something that may interest you to know what I have had experiences in connection with the American Agency.

You buried the American Agency which as I reported to you in [on] Oct. 4 last I have expected that you will. In fact the Agency acted as if it were abolished as to the matter of finance, but not politically yet. Now I shall not count the age of the buried child. What here I write to you will be some interest to you in your pursuing the policy of the Comintern toward the United States of America, Mexico and South America.

The American Agency was organized in the first part of January 1921 when the two Communist Parties were fighting each other on the question of unity. Either Party at first did not welcome the Agency but looked at it with suspicious eyes as an intruder on the Communist movement of America. But one of the Agency members, Comrade Scott being the expressed U.C.P. member was a means to get understanding of the said party. It took five weeks to get co-operation of the C.P. This was necessary for the Agency to get advertisement of the Red Labor Union International and select delegates to the first Congress of the Red International. In this work the Agency succeeded fairly well in the selection of the delegates, and sending Comrades Foster and Haywood. Choosing those delegates were largely the work of Comrade Scott with aids of the U.C.P. Executives: this naturally caused the more U.C.P. element was represented in the delegates.

Comrade Fraina arrived to attend the C.P. Congress and give his final approval to the selection of our delegates to the Red International Congress and the full members of the Agency made out the plans and budget for the American Agency while submitting a proposal for the unity of the two Communist Parties to the Comintern we have decided that the Agency should start at once the organizing work of the Communist Party in Canada. In this two American Communist Parties acquiesced to surrender their branch to the Agency.

The very first great difficulty encountered by the Agency was a realization of a situation that the Agency could not get the money left in Berlin. We sent several cables in vain. The Agency spent already over fifteen thousand out of thirty appropriated for the Red International and Communist International works. Over five or six thousand needed for sending the delegates to Moscow. To clear up this difficulty Comrade Fraina has to leave for Berlin, which he did, arriving first part of April 1921. Comrade Fraina as his financial statements show stayed in Berlin from April 1 - June 5, 1921, he sent 20,000 dollars to Comrade Scott in two sets and brought with him to Mexico 27,200 in cash. Comrade Fraina did not "Loafing all the time in Germany," as Comrade Scott wrote you. He is not a business man; other comrades are not. To handle that amount money took him a considerable time and he wrote

some articles to the Comintern and made a proposal to the Agency on the establishment of a daily paper, printing house, books and pamphlets. The proposal the Agency voted to start but Comrade Scott did not carry them out.

American Comrades especially old U.C.P. leaders, including Comrade Scott can not grasp the situation of the Communist movement in a broader outlines from the international standpoint. They can not see the Communist movement beyond their national borders. Even within the country they pay a little or no attention to the foreigners, who by the way constitute the vast majority of the American proletariat. So-called English speaking Americans include the pure Americans of the New England stocks, who constitute majority of the present American petty bourgeoisie, clerks, country shopkeepers, middle class farmers and high skilled workmen. The Englishmen in America are bigger politicians while Irishmen are petty politicians, who control the primary politics and slavishly serve the Wall Street magnates at the time of a general election. Germans in America before the war were a power as beer and whisky votes while Jews control the American finance, the present directing power of the American imperialism. If I do not mistaken nearly 90% of large cities like New York, Philadelphia and even Boston are made up with the foreign or American born foreigners, they constitute the city proletarians controlling in some cases big industry like the clothing by Jews in New York. But so-called English speaking labor and socialist and even Communist leaders are mostly Americanized foreigners as the present C.E.C. of the C.P.A. They minimize the power and influence of the foreigners in the socialist and Communist movement, although the latter have been and are bones and sinews of the movements. This hating and despising the foreigners including the Jews, Negroes, and Asiatics are the very characteristics of American, the "Dog in meager spirit."

The chairman of the American Agency met with this American prejudice once. An Agency held with Scott, Harper (Julius Heiman, who was appointed by the Agency to be a treasury of the American Labor Bureau of Red International) and myself present. Allen (Max. Cohen) acted as secretary. Harper dictated the secretary "Harper acting for Thompson (Fraina)." The meeting thus opened. Harper proposed to abolish the Negro Bureau; to stop sending Allen to Argentine and give up my going to Mexico. Scott made no objections to the proposals. They tried to bulldog me but I objected and agreed after some discussions to send Allen with \$1,000 and Yavki (Katayama) with \$2,000 and retain the Negro Bureau without salary to Rose Stokes and Jenny Dean (both old C.P. members) and carried to advance 400 to U.C.P. to be used for the Comrades prisoners.

I was not satisfied with the results of the meeting I at once get in touch with Fraina and found it out that he never gave Harper any right or power to act for him. With Fraina's written denial to Harper's claim "acting for Fraina" proved to be utter falsehood. Harper acted an impostor in this case. At subsequent meeting he acted against me with all sorts of insults and threats and he said I am unfit for the position if he told you you shall dismiss me in five minutes then he told us, Scott and me that he will hold up the funds (he kept almost all the funds in his hands) and shall not surrender a penny without signing a receipt by three members-Scott, Fraina and Yavki (myself). It is outrageous claim for him, but he did not give out money any way, I had to barrow money from C.P. to get along with the situation. I did so remembering that it was the same -Harper- who advised Luthenburg [Ruthenberg] and Furgeson [Ferguson] to carry away the entire treasury \$8,000 or more from the C.P. and used all for his minority Party U.C.P. To Harper's claim and action Scott acquiesced.

Now Comrades, perhaps I told you too much but the above are some of my most unpleasant experiences in America with trusted comrades. With Fraina's written proposals and my approval I persuaded Scott to see as we two thought right and after some difficulties we got hold of the funds held by Harper.

On March 18 I left New York for Mexico arriving in Mexico City March 31. I took 5,000

leaving with Scott over ten thousand; later Scott got \$5,000 note brought by Fraina cashed, and Fraina sent Scott \$20,000 in two sums. Thus the Agency spent somewhere about \$45,000 for America and Canada, together with expenses for Allen.

I started the work in Mexico \$4,771 and spent in three months, April, May and June, \$4,735. I got \$3,000 from Scott in first part of June. I sent you my financial reports three times as far as concerned with Mexico but Scott did not send any after I left New York in March 1921. He promised many a time to do so but did not. Last I heard is that he sent his financial reports to you and me which I do not get it yet.

I understand that Comrade Scott made a report in the effect that "Comrades S. Katayama and Fraina called for a new party. There is a Mexican report on it - written in rosy colors - It says lots but in fact there is nothing to it." And Comrade Scott says, writing in middle of Oct. "About a month ago Fraina arrived there (Mexico). Up till now almost nothing has been done there." I shall not comment on what Comrade Scott says to you. The Agency made its reports from time to time from Mexico, which I brought copies, expect to present at the first chance to you and you can judge them yourselves. However, I should say this much that Comrade Fraina arrived in Mexico City 1 or 2 of July 1921 not middle of September. We never made a call for a Communist Party of Mexico. It was planned, when Fraina arrived in July to work for the C.P. of Mex. with a purpose of holding a Communists Congress in December, not a Communist Party Congress, at Orizaba. When I left Mexico on Oct. 28 there were already 17 Communist nuclei with varying members. Our aim was to get as many as Communist nuclei before we issue a call for the Communists Congress in which they the representatives of Communist nuclei should come together and from duly the C.P. of Mexico.

When we met together for the first time in New York in Feb. 1921 we all agreed that all three, Scott, Fraina and myself should proceed to Mexico. Scott as soon as he ships all the delegates for Moscow and I should leave at once and Fraina by way of Canada. But as I said above Fraina went to Germany and Scott delayed till May. Then we received to act for the unity of two parties which took Scott till beginning of June. After that as before I wrote many a time asking Scott to come to Mexico. When Comrade Fraina arrived we cabled Scott on July 6 and wrote a letter, but he did not come. It was only he wrote his reason for not coming to Mexico. In a letter of Scott reached me Sept. 28 gives his reason saying "I was instructed from B.B. Comp. (Main Office) to stay here and wait for Dix. and Nathan M." If we knew such an important instruction from you we should not asked him to come to Mexico so many a time!

Our work in Mexico has been very slow owing to various circumstances. First three months I was alone with limited fund to do much aggressive work. However [I] organized the Red Labor Bureau and let the C.G.T. send a delegate to the First Congress of Red International and started a weekly Worker and published Murphy pamphlet and started actual propaganda among the industrial centers with two field organizers. But as I reported to you all the foreigners who were connected with the radical movement were arrested and deported from the country four of our workers were thus deported in the middle of May.

Since the middle of May I was in hiding and worked with Mexican Comrades to build up the foundation of the Communist movement get in touch with the youth Communists trained them for the communist movement and when Fraina came we could start actual work of forming Communist nuclei and push our work under the Organizing Committee of the Communist Party of Mexico.

I think that the Communist movement of two Americas should be aimed at the first overthrow of American imperialism and its capitalism of America. Without a *[sic]* strong Communist Parties in

Mexico and South American countries the American Communist movement even led by the powerful Communist Party of America will not be able to strike hard blow at the American capitalism because its capitalism and imperialism have been laying their foundation widely along those countries. Mexico is the key to Central and South America and she is the connecting link of two Americas. The Communist International needs a strong Communist Party of Mexico and make it the connecting link of American Communist International with which united front will strike at the American capitalist imperialism a death blow.

To do this important work the Old Agency proposed to hold the American Communist and Red Labor Conference a month before the next III and Red International Congresses here in Moscow, which we made written proposals and draft of manifestos.

Finally I add one or two things. One is rumors of abolition of the American Agency. I want say this matter as a matter of Communist discipline, for I have had considerable difficulties in carrying out my duties. In September a trusted Comrade wrote me from New York thus "A story here is that the Agency will be soon abolished." Then Comrade Scott wrote on September 16 "I am informed by the returning men, that in the Main Office sentiment prevails, that the Agency will be abolished." These rumors reflected in the attitude of the American Communist Party Executives, who treated the Agency with the most insulting tone. To the earnest and sincere requests sent by the Agency to the C.E.C. of C.P.A., were dealt with by them coldest and utterly uncomradely manner. You shall see it by reading our requests to them and their answer to the Agency.

The Communist movement in America and among foreigners in Mexico. We must rely entirely on the personal integrity and mutual trust. But in the Communist Party of America various rumors are got up to cripple the Communist movement. To give another example:

Fraina writes dated November 16, 1921.

"There is one and new interesting development, of which J[eanette]. and Allen have written me. In the American Party they are circulating the following rumors about me:

1) That I am discredited in M[oscow]., because I run away from Berlin after the E.C. had ordered me to come to M.

2) That I have squandered immense sum of money.

3) That old spy case is going to be reopened in M. against me.

4) That the American Agency was interfering in the fight in the party over the legal party idea; and that in particular, J. and others had invited me to come to the U.S. (and I have accepted) in order to co-operate with the opposition in fighting the C.E.C. and the legal party.

Again dated November 22, 1921: Fraina writes;

"I asked C.E.C. of C.P.A. to express an opinion as to our proposed Pan American Com. Congress, but no answer. I have twice written to Comen[,] representative of the R.L.U.I. in U.S. about the proposed Pan American Labor Congress in M., but no answer. None of my articles (8 articles, four of which deal with Mexico and one with Central America,) have been printed. Indeed, Allen, who is working in the central organ, has written me:

"I knew that none of your articles will be printed."

and he adds: "As far as I can gather none of your pleas for co-operation and work will be heeded. You have been relegated to 'oblivion' and they intend to keep you there. In the present C.E.C. you are bucking a stone wall."

"The public rumor melts even metal," says a Chinese proverb. A creator of rumors and their carriers are cowards who can not speak the truth to the responsible persons.

It is grave matter of discipline in the Communist Party that it should stop the circulating rumors by investigation and proper communication with the responsible authorities.

There is one more thing ask you to look the matter up. It concerns money matter of the Agency. Comrade Scott cabled me on April 18, 1921:

“Received fifteen barrels of magnesium from Lillebit (Fraina) company. How much you require.”

To the above I answered:

“Ship me five barrels through company so and so. (April 18, 1921)

Scott sent me a cable on May 6, 1921:

“Hamburger sent three barrels acknowledge receipt.”

The financial statement of Fraina submitted to me reads:

To Hamburger (Scott)	\$10,000.00
To Mendels "	\$10,000.00
For cabling M. (Bank cheque)	245.00
" " H. " "	205.00

Comrade F. wrote in July last but till I left Mexico he did not receive answer from Comrade Scott.

It is a matter of discipline and order for the Communist movement that we should make clear as possible so that there shall be no room for rumor.

I remain yours for the cause,

[signed:] Sen Katayama.

After Katayama arrived at Moscow probably on 11 December 1921 at midnight, he drew up this lengthy report at free moments during his hasty preparation for calling the Congress of the Peoples of the Far East. It was also sent to Lenin with a brief letter dated 12 January 1922, requesting a run-through of it. РГАСПИ, 5/3/145/1; cf. “Деятели Коминтерна — В.И. Ленину,” *Известия ЦК КПСС*, 1989, No. 5, 211.

10 Financial Accounts of the Pan-American Agency

- 10-1 n.d. [before 05.08.1921]** My Personal Accounts for Jan., Feb. and March, 1921
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/12 (1×; typed and signed); 495/18/65/81 (typed draft); 495/18/65/80 (typed draft); 495/18/65/79 (typed draft)]
- 10-2 n.d. [after the end of 06.1921]** Financial Accounts, April, May and June, 1921
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/30-32 (3×; typed)]
- 10-3 n.d. [after the end of 09.1921]** Financial Statements for July, August and September, 1921
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/134-135 (2×; typed and signed)]
- 10-4 07.10.1921** General Financial Statements. From April 1 to September 30, 1921
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/160 (1×; typed and signed)]
- 10-5 n.d. [after the end of 12.1921]** Pan-Amerikanishes Buro 1921 [Abrechnungen]
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/52 (1×; typed)]
- 10-6 n.d. [after 07.03.1922]** Abrechnung über die seitens des Pan-Amerikanischen Buros an die K.P. Mexico gegebenen Summen
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/22/15 (1×; typed)]
- 10-7 n.d. [after 11.08.1921]** Accounts by T[hompson]
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/71-73 (3×; typed and signed)]
- 10-8 n.d. [after 15.09.1921]** Financial Statement of Henry Allen
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/322 (1×; typed)]
- 10-9 n.d. [after 26.04.1921]** Report of Receipts and Expenses by Henry Atwood, Canadian Representative
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/323 (1×; typed duplicate)]

10-1

n.d. [before 05.08.1921] My Personal Accounts for Jan., Feb. and March, 1921
 [ПГАСПИ, 495/108/11/12 (1×; typed and signed); 495/18/65/81 (slightly different version); 495/18/65/80 (ditto); 495/18/65/79 (ditto)]

MY PERSONAL ACCOUNTS for JAN.[,] FEB. and MARCH, 1921,

January,

Received	\$500.00
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Expended	\$
Room rent	30.00
Typewrite[r] (Underwood)	45.00
Typist wages	90.00
Stationeries	4.29
Passport vises [visés]	12.50
As wages	200.00
[Total]	381.79

February,

Received	\$500.00
Carried over from Jan.	118.21
Total	618.21

Expended	
Room rent	30.00
Typist wages	120.00
As wages	200.00
Total	350.00

March,

Carried over from Feb.	268.21
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Expended	
Typist wages	30.00
Stationery and stamps	4.27
First two week wages	85.00

" 17th Received	\$5,000.00
-----------------	------------

Expenses coming to Mexico	
Remitting money	20.00
Railway fare fr. N.Y. to N.O.	70.00
Vaccination and vise at N.O.	5.00
Tax for sailing permit	16.00
Ticket fr. New Orleans to V.C.	78.80
" " Vera Cruz to Mexico City	10.00
Corona Machine [Typewriter]	50.00

Received in three months
 \$6,000.00

Travelling expenses	48.00	Expended in three months
Two weeks wages	80.00	\$1,228.94 [1,228.86]
Total	496.27 ⁽¹⁾ [497.07]	

Balance at hand	4,771.93 [4,771.14]
-----------------	---------------------

[signed:] Sen Katayama

At the end (in: ПГАСПИ, 495/18/65/81) the following is handwritten by Katayama:
 “Sent to Scott on August 5, 1921.”

In a blank space below the last line (in: ПГАСПИ, 495/18/65/80) the following is typed:
 “Please note I [Katayama] had in my hand \$268.21 left from what I received, namely \$1,000.00 during prevention two month[s], Jan. and Feb., So I had at the beginning of March the above amount.
 To Comrade A. Bray.”

(1) This is a miscalculation, which is corrected by the editor in square brackets.

10-2

n.d. [after the end of 06.1921] Financial Accounts, April, May and June, 1921
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/30-32 (3×; typed)]

Financial Accounts, April, May and June, 1921.

April

Balance from March	\$4,771.00
--------------------	------------

Expended

Printing	\$	
Murphy pamphlet	130.00	
Weekly (2 issues)	123.00	\$
		253.00
Office expenses		
Typewriters; Hammond	54.50	
Oliver	62.50	
Furniture	35.00	
		152.00
Meeting	6.40	
Advertisement for May 1	32.50	
Mailing weekly and pamphlets	9.00	
Sundries (Stationery, exchange etc.)	35.00	
		82.90
Cables		113.08
Wages		
Comrade Tanner (his debt)	240.00	
	205.00	
(advanced as rm. rent)	10.00	
		455.00
Comrade Paley	10.00	
Comrade Rubio	65.00	
Comrade Rodrigez [Pablo Rodríguez]	40.00	
Comrade Yavki (5 weeks)	225.00	
Comrade Ramirez (travelling expense)	415.00	
		[755.00]

Total	\$1,810.98
-------	------------

Balance at hand	\$2,960.02
-----------------	------------

* * * * *

May

Balance from April	\$2,960.02
--------------------	------------

Expended

Printing	\$		
Weekly (4 issues)	200.00		
		200.00	
Cables		18.10	
M.B. Office rent with deposit		25.00	
Wages			
Comrade Tanner (2 weeks)	110.00		
Comrade Mrs. Tanner (given on 17th)	100.00		
Comrade Rodrigez	20.00		
Comrade Stella, acting secretary to M.B.	90.00		
Comrade Yavki	180.00		
Comrades Rubio and Paley (2 week propaganda trip)	155.00		
Comrade Tanner's rent arrears (To release contract)	60.00		
		[715.00]	
Sundries			
Ink and envelopes	1.85		
Stamps	3.30		
May 1's expenses	6.20		
Furniture, M.B. Office	25.00		
Stationery	18.35		
M.B. Office expenses paid to V.[Valadés]	4.90	\$	
		59.60	
		<u>\$1,017.70</u>	
Total		\$1,942.70	[1,942.32]
	* * * * *		

June			
Balance from May,		\$1,942.70	[1,942.32]
Received [from Scott. cf. Doc. 10-4]		<u>\$3,000.00</u>	
Total		\$4,942.70	[4,942.32]

Expended			
Printing	\$		
Weekly (4 issues)	106.50		
Travelling expenses Comrade V.	40.00		
Wages			
Comrade Stella (paid to Com. V.)	75.50		
Comrade Yavki	180.00		
Comrade Y's secretary and office	50.00		
Comrades Rubio (expelled)	75.00		
Comrade Mrs. F.	40.00		
		567.00	
Printing apparatus	200.00		
Furniture and furnishing house	120.00		
		320.00	
Paid to Communist Youths with printing apparatus		250.00	
* Paid to the Prov'l [Provisional] Mex. Bureau to execute its budgets by Com. V.		500.00	
Paid for ty[p]es to be sent to Orizaba		50.00	
Sundries			

Stamps	5.00	
Advanced to Com. V. as office expenses	52.50	
Newspaper and \$10. for endorsing check	12.00	
Sent to Comrade Tanner, Guatemala	150.00	
Ditto. Expense	10.00	
	<u>229.50</u>	
Total		\$1,942.70 [1,916.50]
Balance at hand		\$3,036.20 [3,025.82]

* The budget is attached to this report.

The Budget for Mexican Bureau		
Paper for The Worker (4 months)		\$170.00
Salaries and expenses " "		250.00
Stationery " "		30.00
The rent for the private office (M.B.) " "		<u>50.00</u>
		\$500.00

There are some miscalculations, which are corrected by the editor in square brackets.

10-3

n.d. [after the end of 09.1921] Financial Statements for July, August and September, 1921
[ПГАСПН, 495/18/66/134-135 (2×; typed and signed)]

Financial Statements for July, August and September, 1921.

July

Balance from June		\$3,036.20
Expended		
Advanced to Mexican Red Labor Bureau	200.00	
Printing: [Lenin] State and Revolution	120.00	
Bukharin A.B.C.	300.00	
Biblioteca Internacional: Office rent	20.00	
Furniture	25.00	
Typewriter	40.00	
Office expenses	10.00	
Letterheads	10.00	105.00
Salaries: [José] Rocha [Charles F. Phillips]	112.50	
Josefina	45.00	
Yavki (5 weeks)	225.00	382.50
Furniture (Y's office)		50.00
Stamps		5.00
Mexican Post		5.00
Automobile and sundries		30.00
Total		\$1,197.50
Balance		\$1,838.70
	* * * * *	

August

Balance from July		\$1,838.70
Received from Thompson (August 11)		\$4,200.00
(" 16)		" 255.00
(" 20)		" 255.00
(" 30)		" 255.00
Total		\$6,803.70
Expended		
Mexican Red Labor Bureau	396.50	
To Celis, representative to Yucatan S.P. Congress	250.00	
To Bertha [Mrs. Inomata], expenses from N.Y. to Mex. City	130.00	
Printing Shop improvement	73.50	
Obrero Comunista	140.00	
Biblioteca Internacional expenses	25.00	
Salaries: Tanner	115.00	
Rocha	150.00	
Josefina	60.00	
Bertha	25.00	

	Yavki	180.00	530.00	
	Taxis		32.00	
	Cable		6.55	
Total				\$1,583.55
Balance				\$5,220.15
	* * * * *			
September				
Balance from August				\$5,220.15
Received from Thompson (Sept. 10)				" 252.50
(" 19)				" 252.50
(" 28)				" 252.50
Total at hand				" 5,977.65
Expended				
Mexican Red Labor Bureau		435.00		
Organizing Committee of the Mex. C.P.		178.00		
Printing: Obrero Com.		140.00		
Bukharin A.B.C.		200.00		
Pamphlets		240.00		
Salaries: Tanner (50.00 advanced)	220.00			
Rocha (50.00 advanced)	195.00			
Josefina	60.00			
Bertha	100.00			
Translator	100.00			
Celis at Yucatan	50.00			
Yavki	180.00	905.00		
Bakers' Union for propaganda purpose		100.00		
Typewriter		150.00		
Books on China and Japan		20.00		
Moving (Y's)		25.00		
P. Port fix.		40.00		
Sundries-sending money 15.00 carbon paper stamps etc.		22.60		
Taxis		8.55		
Total				"2,464.15
Balance				"3,513.50
	* * * * *			
As separate account				
Received from Thompson (Sept. 28)				\$1,000.00
Balance from regular account				"3,513.50
Total				"4,513.50
Expended				
Advanced to four Japanese comrades going to the Far East P[ropaganda]. Bureau				"1,000.00
Balance at hand on September 30, 1921.				"3,513.50
	* * * * *			
	[signed:] Yavki			
	[signed:] Thompson			

Several additional dotted lines are made in the table of accounts by the editor.

10-4

07.10.1921 General Financial Statements. From April 1 to September 30, 1921.
[ПГАСИИ, 495/18/66/160 (1×; typed and signed)]

Mexico, D.F., Mex., Oct. 7, 1921.

General Financial Statements. From April 1 to September 30, 1921.

Total Funds Received for the Agency,		\$34,993.50
Of this: Yavki brought (April 1)	4,771.00	
Received fr. Scott (Jun. 8)	3,000.00	
Thompson brought (Jul. 8)	27,200.00	
Exchange gains	22.50	
 Total Funds Expended or Advanced,		\$12,190.40
Of this: April,	1,811.00	
May,	1,017.70	
June,	1,916.50	
July,	1,648.50	[including 451.00 (cf. Doc. 10-5)]
August,	1,842.30	[" 258.75 (")]
September,	2,954.40	[" 490.25 (")]
Advanced to four Coms. to the Far East P. Bureau	1,000.00	
Balance at Hand on Oct. 1, 1921,		\$22,803.10

The detailed financial accounts are attached to this by Yavki and Thompson. In the detailed statements Yavki made an error in carrying forward from June to July. It should be \$3,025.80 instead of \$3,036.20 [cf. Doc. 10-2]. And in the Thompson's statements the amount transferred to Yavki omitted the Exchange gain \$22.50.

[handwritten:] Yavki takes with him	3,000.00
Balance at Comrade Thompson's hand	\$19,803.10
Above correct	[signed:] Thompson
Aug. 30.	

This "General Financial Statements," "Accounts by T." [Doc. 10-7] , "Financial Statements for July, August and September, 1921" [Doc. 10-3], etc. were found in a courier's possessions en route from Latvia to Soviet Russia and confiscated by an agent of the Commissioner of the United States, Riga about June or July 1922. They were enclosed in an envelope addressed to "Comrade G. Zinoviev, Comintern, Moscow." Cf. Correspondence of the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff, 1917-1941, RG 165, 10058-O-99-7, NARA. Immediately they were summarized [with some mistakes] by the staff(s) of the Commissioner, sent to the Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., and then filed in: *ibid.*, 10058-O-99 and 10058-24.

10-5

n.d. [after the end of 12.1921] Pan-Amerikanisches Buro 1921 [Abrechnungen]
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/52 (1×; typed)]

Pan-Amerikanisches Buro

1921

Laut den Abrechnungen die sich in meinem Besitze befanden ergibt sich folgendes:

Fraina erhielt von Borodin und Thomas [Jakob Reich]	Doll.	60 000.-
Davon uebergab er an Scott	"	26 000.-

Es bleibt ein Saldo bei Fraina von	"	34 000.-

Am 5 Juni 1921 verliess Fraina Berlin
und kam am 8 Juli nach Mexico City.

In Mexico uebergab er an das Pan-Buro	Doll.	27 200.-

1) Es fehlt die Abrechnung ueber den Saldo von	"	6 800.-

Saldo am 8 Juli 1921	Doll.	27 200.-

Ausgaben:

Juli 8 - 30	An Katayama	Dol.	4200.-	
	Allgemeines	"	451.00	" 4 651.-
Aug. 1 - 30	An Katayama	"	750.00	
	Allgemeines		258.75	" 1 008.75
Sept. 1 - 30	An Katayama	"	750.00	
	An Fern Ost		1000.00	
	Allgemeines		490.25	" 2 240.00
			-----	-----
Ausgaben vom 8. Juli bis 30. Sept.				7 900.00

Am 1. Oktober bleibt nach Frainas Rechnung ein Saldo von	Doll.	19 300.00

Vom 1. Oktober bis 24. Dez. wurde ausgegeben

An Pan-Buro	Dol.	6659.00	
" K.P. Mexico	"	1115.00	" 7 774.00

Ende Dezember bleibt bei Fraina ein Saldo von			" 11 526.00

2) Es fehlt nun die Abrechnung ueber diesen Saldo d.h. ueber Doll. 11 526.-

10-6

n.d. [after 07.03.1922] Abrechnung über die seitens des Pan-Amerikanischen Buros an die K.P. Mexico gegebenen Summen
[РГАСПИ, 495/108/22/15 (1×; typed)]

Abrechnung ueber die seitens des Pan-Amerikanishen
Buros an die K.P. Mexico gegebenen Summen.

Von 12. Oktober 1921 bis 24 Dez. 1921 und
" 25. Dezemb. 1921 " 7 Maerz 1922.

Anfang Oktober 1921 kam Gen. Stirner vom III. Kongress nach Mexico zurueck. Nach seiner Ankunft wurde ihm von den Gen. Katayama und Fraina die Gelduebermittlung an die K.P.M. uebertragen.

Vom 12 - 31 Okt. 21	erhielt die K.P.M. fuer Sekretariat	Mex. \$ 802.00
" 1 - 30 Nov. 21	" " " " "	" \$ 871.25
" 1 - 31 Dez. 21	" " " " "	" \$ 755.00

"	12 Okt. bis 31 Dez. 21 fuer Sekretariatsauslagen	Mex.	\$2428.25
"	12 " " 31 " 21 " Zeitungen	"	\$ 885.00
"	12 " " 31 " 21 " Broschueren	"	\$1100.00

Total der Summen vom 12 Okt. bis 31 Dez. an K.P. Mex.	4413.25
---	---------

"	"	"	in amerikanischen Dollaren	2206.63
---	---	---	----------------------------	---------

[illegible]

Am 22. Dezember 1921, vor der Abreise des Gen. Fraina, uebergab derselbe an Gen. Stirner die Summe von Amerik. \$ 1115.00 (mex. \$ 2230.00) zu folgender Verwendung: Dollar 440 fuer die Fertigstellung der in Druck gegebenen Broschueren und Doll. 675.00 fuer 8 Nummer des Zentralorgans der K.P.

Vom 25 Dez. 21 bis 7 Maerz 1922 fuer Zeitungen Zentr[a]l.	Mex.	\$ 794.50
" " " " " " " " Flugblaetter	"	\$ 71.05
" " " " " " " " Delegationen	"	\$ 261.00
" " " " " " " " Sekretariat	"	\$ 249.85

Total der Ausgaben vom 25 Dez. bis 7 Maerz	Mex. \$2255.90
--	----------------

In amerikanischen Dollar	1127.95
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Von P.A. Büro erhalten	1115.00
------------------------	---------

Mehrausgaben	12.95
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[illegible]

10-7

n.d. [After 11.08.1921] Accounts by T[hompson].
[ПГАСПН, 495/18/66/71-73 (3×; typed and signed)]

ACCOUNTS by T[hompson].

Received from E[xecutive].C[ommittee]. Moscow (October, 1920)				\$2,000.00					
"	Barrodin [Borodin]	Pound 600 &		3,000.00		also a draft \$5,000.00			
"	James [Jacob Reich] (Berlin, April 1921)			50,000.00					
Total		600 pounds & \$60,000.00							
Expended:									
Oct. 15, 1920 to Jan. 18	Living Exp.		Travelling		Political		Miscellaneous		
	Pound	Dollar	Pound	Dollar	Pound	Dollar	Pound	Dollar	
Moscow to Berlin			5.00						
Loans repaid "	15.00								
Typewriter									15.00
Visas (Mexico, Italian and Austrian)			7.00	100.00					
Berlin-Vienna Trip, Abandoned (ill)			6.00						
Hamburg-Stett[in].				20.00					
To Scott					220.00	250.00			
To Ramirez						360.00			
Passport and visas			60.00	150.00					
Illness	12.00								
Liter[ature]. to Mex.						200.00			
For Scott passport					25.00				
Cable									3.00
Film from E.M. ⁽¹⁾									100.00
Ship-Canada			69.00						
Berlin-Translations									80.00
To Frankfort				10.00					
In Berlin 90 days	125.00								
In London 4 "	10.00								
Books-Magazines									60.00
Berlin-England			6.00						
Telegram									3.00
To Liverpool			5.00						
In " 2 days	5.00								
Baggage			2.00						
Incidentals	7.00								
On ship to Canada		10.00							
Salary 13 weeks									585.00
Totals	174.00	10.00	160.00	280.00	245.00	810.00	21.00		825.00
Feb. 5 to Apr. 1, '21									
St. John-Montreal				15.75					
Meals		5.00							

Baggage		3.00		
Montreal Hotel Feb. 6-9	70.00			
Telephones to N.Y.				24.50
Books			20.00	
Meals @\$4 a day	40.00			
Film Business				50.00
Business cards				6.00
To N.Y. Feb. 10-24				
All exp. paid to Scott		214.57		
Taxi N.Y.	6.43			
Cynthea 1st Trip		28.00		
" 2d Trip		25.00		
Montreal, Feb. 25-Mar. 14; hotel	119.00			
Meals	68.00			
Phones to N.Y.				24.75
Cables to Berlin (James, re money)				26.00
To Ottawa		18.50		
" St. John		15.75		
" " Meals	5.00			
Ship to England		225.00		
On ship	10.00			
Radio to Mendels				5.75
Cable to Scott				8.50
Telegram-Berlin				15.00
Liverpool-London		15.00		
London 6 days: hotel	30.00			
" Meals	20.00			
German visa (b---e)				100.00
To Koln fare		25.00		
" " sleeper		5.00		
" " meals	5.00			
To Berlin: fare		8.00		
" " meal	2.00			
T. Hotschl.-Koln-Berlin, return		10.00		
Baggage		5.00		
Salary 9 weeks				405.00
Totals	380.43	613.57	20.00	665.50
April 1-July 9,				
Cables to N.Y.				275.00
" " Canada				45.00
To Frankfort 3 times		25.00		
Hamburg 1 "		8.00		
Translations			70.00	
Books-Magazines				30.00
To Hamburger (Scott)			10,000.00	
" Mendels "			10,000.00	
For cabling M. (Bank charges)			245.00	
" " H. " "			205.00	
Changing bills-small to large (10,000 [a word illegible] [A.] Stoklitzky)			125.00	

For cabling M. Frau Sch. (services)						12.00		
Changing \$20,000 small to large						90.00		
Bad bills fr. J.								40.00
Visa Canada				60.00				
" Mexico				11.00				
" French				30.00				
" Belgium				3.00				
" Germanausreise				60.00				
Subscriptions (all Papers)								30.00
Books for Mex.								50.00
Berlin-Paris: Fare				40.00				
" " Meals		8.00						
" " Koln hotel		2.00						
Berlin fr. Apr. 1-Jun. 5		237.50						
T. Hotschl, Ber.-Koln				10.00				
" " (illegal exp.)								50.00
E. Morena (debt)								90.00
Paris hotel 2 days		10.00						
" Meals		8.00						
To Bougune				10.00				
In " Hotel		8.00						
" " Gov[t]. tax				11.50				
To Mex. fare (Ship, one person)				430.00				
" " on ship				20.00				
Veracruz fr. ship				9.00				
" Hotel		3.50						
" Meals		3.00						
To Mex. City fare				10.00				
" " " Meals		3.00						
Telegram-Mendels								13.00
Opening Bk. Ac't [Account] (5000 @1% - cash to draft)								50.00
Baggage				5.00				
Incidentals								20.00
Salary to July 9								765.00

Totals	pound	\$	pound	\$	pound	\$	pound	\$
Oct. 15-Jan. 28 [<i>sic</i>]	174.00	10.00	160.00	280.00	245.00	810.00	21.00	825.00
Feb. 5-Apr. 1		380.43		613.57		20.00		665.50
Apr. 1-July 9		278.00		742.50		20,747.00		1,458.00

147.00[174.00] \$668.43 160.00 \$1,636.07 245.00 \$21,577.00 21.00 \$2,948.50

	Expended		Received	
Totals	Pound	\$	\$	
	174.00	668.43	60,000.00	
	160.00	1,636.07	30.00	from Murphy (Typewriter sold)
	245.00	21,577.00	60,030.00	total received
	<u>21.00</u>	<u>2,948.50</u>		
	600.00	26,830.00		

To draft Scott (March)	5,000.00		
To Mendels at Berlin for Scott	1,000.00	32,830.00	total expended
Total expended	600.00	32,830.00	27,200.00 balance at hand

August 11, 1921,

To Yavki \$4,200.00

[signed:] Thompson

(1) From Germany Thompson (Fraina) traveled to Canada in the guise of a motion-picture representative. To make his role more convincing, he actually bought one German film, *The Arabian Nights*. Report of the FBI's Interrogation of Lewis Corey, typed p. 81; cf. Th. Draper, *The Roots of American Communism* (New York), 1957, 294.

10-8

n.d. [after 15.09.1921] Financial Statement of Henry Allen
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/322 (1×; typed)]

FINANCIAL STATEMENT OF HENRY ALLIN [ALLEN]

Preliminary Expenses: prior to sailing	
March 1st- Coat, shoes, underclothes, collars etc.	- 100.00
" 2 - Tax on 1st passport and pictures	- 15.00
" 3 - salary	- 45.00
" 10 - 2nd passport and expenses	- 304.00
" 18 - salary	- 40.00
" 19 - salary	- 40.00
" 20 - steamer trunk	- 34.00
" 20 - grip	- 11.00
" 19-21 - trips to Springfield and Boston and return to N.Y.	- 99.00
" 22-23 - Hotel in N.Y., taxi to pier, express port fees, consul fees	- 62.00
" 23 - To Montevideo, 2nd class, 2 tickets	
laundry, tips, change of stateroom	- 550.00
April 10 to 30 - Hotel and expenses	- 300.00
May 1 - fare to B[uenos].A[ires]., consul fees, etc.	- 90.00
" 1-7 - Hotel and expenses	- 90.00
" 7-14 - Hotel "	- 50.00
" 14-21 - " "	- 60.00
" 21-28 - " "	- 60.00
May 28- June 4 - " "	- 60.00
June 4 - winter suit	- 30.00
" 4-11 - hotel and expenses	- 60.00
" 15 - New passport for Mrs. A[llen]., pictures[,], consul fees	- 24.00
" 11-18 - hotel and expenses	- 60.00
" 18-25 - hotel and expenses	- 60.00
" 25 - consul fees, pictures for A.	- 13.00
" 25- July 2 - hotel and expenses	- 60.00
Cables to N.Y. for months of May and June	- 16.00
July 2-8 - to Rio de Janeiro	- 125.00
" 8-16 - hotel expenses	- 70.00
" 16-22 - to Pernambuco	- 78.00
" 22 - Cables to N.Y. and Para	- 8.00
" 22-29 - hotel and expenses (waiting for funds)	- 60.00
29- August 4 - hotel and expenses	- 45.00
August 4-11 - " "	- 45.00
" 11-15 - return to Rio (could get no boat to New Orleans	
in Pernambuco so had to return to Rio)	- 78.00
" 15-24 - hotel and expenses	- 60.00
Allen's trip to New Orleans and expenses	- 325.00
2 cables for funds to N.Y.	- 10.00

September 12-13 - hotel and expenses in New Orleans		
cables to N.Y.	-	18.00
" 13-15 - rail to New York	-	80.00
August 24- September 8 - Mrs. Allen to N.Y.	-	140.00
(steerage passage and other expenses)		
September 8-15 - tickets to Montreal (bought at Ellis Island, telegrams		
and cost of cabling money to New Orleans)	-	20.00
" 8-15 - cables to Yavki in Mexico	-	13.00
" 8 - trunk to home, tip to Ellis Island officia[l]	-	15.00
		<hr/>
	Total	\$3,434.00 [3,523.00?]
Received from P.A. Bureau	-	2,800.00
		<hr/>

In a blank space on the right side the following is handwritten:
 "Balance due (money borrowed on promise to return immediately) 634.00"

n.d. [after 26.04.1921] Report of Receipts and Expenses by Henry Atwood, Canadian Representative
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/323 (1×; typed duplicate)]

4

March 3rd, 1921	\$530.00
March 29, "	300.00
Aprrril 1, "	<u>500.00</u>
Total	\$1330.00

EXPENDITURES:

- 160 -

Per diem expenses from Feb. 26th to Apr. 26, 49 days	<u>147.00</u>
Total expenditures from beginning of work to Apr. 23, 1921	\$1169.77
Cash balance on hand on April 26th, 1921	<u>160.23</u>
Grand total	\$1330.00

Budget, for Canadian work from April 23rd to June 1st, 1921.

Organizer Rogoff, 5 weeks wages @35.00	175.00
" " per diem expenses	18.00
Editors Grey[,] wages for 5 weeks @35.00	175.00
" " estimated per diem expenses	<u>14.00</u>
H. Atwood, Canadian Repr.[,] wages for 5 weeks @40.00	200.00
" " " " estimated per diem expenses	56.00
For May Day leaflet	100.00
For second edition of [The] Communist	150.00
For convention expenses	2000.00
Total	<u>\$2888.00</u>

In a blank space on the left side the following is handwritten: “(copy)”

Part 2

Supplementary Research Results

The Early Comintern in Amsterdam, New York and Mexico City

Akito YAMANOUCHI

Introduction

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 - a) Counterarguments to the Decision on Dissolution
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 - 6) Results of the Agency’s Activities?
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7 Some Problems with Funds for Activities of the Pan-American Agency

- 1) Total Sum of Recipient Subsidies and Its Distributions**
- 2) Expenditures of Funds for Activities in Canada**
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- 5) Expenditures of Funds for Activities in the USA**

List of Documents on the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the Comintern

Bibliography

Introduction

After the collapse of the communist regimes in Russia and Eastern Europe, most of the historical documents of the Comintern (1919-1943) were publicly released. As a result, new and comprehensive studies on the Comintern have been commenced on a global scale and, as a first step, documents concerning relations between the Comintern and the communist party in each country have been compiled, edited and published. In the case of Japan, a collection of historical documents entitled *VKP(b), the Comintern and Japan* was published in 2001, but this collection consists of one volume and that is only available in Russian. In addition, historical documents concerning the early Comintern remain largely uncompiled ⁽¹⁾.

My second book, *The Early Comintern and Japanese Socialists Residing Abroad: A Transnational Network* (in Japanese) has been published in Kyoto, 2009. Its study seeks to understand the early Japanese communist movement in an international context, to be exact, in the context of “the international history of socialism” (G. Haupt’s term) ⁽²⁾. This research, through the use of documents collected independently in Russia, the USA, and Western nations, aims to elucidate how the newly established Comintern tried to make contact with Japanese socialists by establishing a transnational network through two routes: “a western route” (Amsterdam — New York — Mexico City) and “an eastern route” (Siberia — Shanghai) beginning from Moscow. This book details the movements by the “western route” in the first half and those by the “eastern route” in the latter half, each of which is focused, in order, on the top and the rank-and-file of the movements. This research seeks to provide a full understanding of the organizational structure leading from Comintern headquarters in Moscow to lower branches, with a special emphasis on the important role played by Japanese socialists residing abroad and, in particular, Sen Katayama’s leadership (cf. “A transnational network” at the next page).


The “western route” was opened up by taking advantage of a comradely relationship between Katayama and Sebald J. Rutgers at the end of 1916 (Louis C. Fraina was added to it soon). The Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the Comintern was in existence in Amsterdam during the period from November 1919 till May 1920 on the one hand. Rutgers was given full authority to its activities by the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI), and worked its secretary. At that time he established contact with Katayama in the USA and Shozo Sugiyama in Yokohama. On the other hand, the Pan-American Agency of the Comintern was organized in New York in the first half of January 1921 and Katayama was appointed as its chairman. Katayama arrived at Mexico City on 31 March 1921 and started its activities (Fraina joined again with Katayama at the beginning of July). While Katayama kept contact with the members of the Japanese Socialist Group remaining in New York, he was also carrying out the preparation of other members for

(1) *ВКП(б), Коминтерн и Япония. 1917-1941 гг.* (Москва, 2001). In 2014 the Japanese version was selectively translated, independently enlarged and published by T. Tomita and H. Wada (*Documents. The Comintern and the Japanese Communist Party* [Tokyo, 2014]). Nevertheless, the conditions which are short of early Comintern documents are not improved.


(2) Cf. G. Haupt, “Histoire de l’Internationale socialiste ou Histoire internationale du Socialisme? Sur quelques controverses à propos de problèmes de recherche et de méthode,” *Le Mouvement social*, No. 41, X.-XII.1962, 13-34.

A Transnational Network

【A Western Route】



【An Eastern Route】



Note 1) The image of “a transnational network” is given for convenience’ sake by a variety of organizations.
 2) The organizations in round brackets are supposed to have been no more than a plan or hardly practicable.

going to Japan or Russia ⁽³⁾. Finally, at the end of October 1921 Katayama himself left for Russia for a new mission, that is, the preparation for calling the Congress of the Peoples of the Far East, in the very midst of the secret plan of the ECCI to dissolve the Pan-American Agency.

It was through its two Foreign Bureaus, that is, the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau and the Pan-American Agency, that the early Comintern made the initial contact through the “western route” with the Japanese socialists.

This Part 2 is research results on the two Foreign Bureaus which were deeply concerned with the “western route.” Its attention is focused more on the matters concerned with the elucidation of problems and the evaluation of activities than on the detailed explanation of facts.

(3) Among them Taro Yoshihara and Unzo Taguchi were to leave for Russia, where they were to take an active part on the “eastern route,” and Eizo Kondo and others were to go home.

1 Planning and Establishing the Foreign Bureaus of the Comintern

In the early autumn of 1919 the chairman of the ECCI, G.E. Zinoviev, drew up a plan. In accordance with his plan, the Foreign Bureaus of the West were established as the initial base from which the newly founded Comintern would attempt to coordinate and achieve the so-called "World Revolution." The Bureaus were expected to function as a means to come into contact with the external world under difficult circumstances of the military interventions inside, and the absence of the Communist Parties outside, Soviet Russia. The following is extracts from the German translation by A. Kan of the plan which was written down in the undated draft ⁽¹⁾.

I. Zur Entwicklung der kommunistischen Bewegung in Westeuropa und Amerika und besonders zwecks der Koordinierung der praktischen Arbeit verschiedener nationaler Komparteien beschloß das EKKI folgende Büros im Westen zu schaffen: In Stockholm/ In Berlin (Westeuropäisches Sekretariat)/ In Holland - für Holland, England, Amerika, Australien und andere außereuropäische Länder,/ In Wien/ In Sofia

II. Die ausländischen Büros sind Hilfsorgane des EKKI und erfüllen eine Vermittlerrolle in den Beziehungen zwischen den einzelnen Parteien und des EKKI.

III. Den ausländischen Büros des EKKI werden folgende Aufgaben auferlegt:

[1] Mitwirken an der organisatorischen, propagandistischen, speziell literarischen und gegenseitig informierenden Arbeit der entsprechenden Parteien, [2] Beseitigung der Meinungsverschiedenheiten und Konflikte zwischen den verschiedenen Strömungen innerhalb einzelner KP,/ [4] Vereinbarung einzelner Aktionen des Klassenkampfes, Vorbereitung und Organisierung des gemeinsamen Auftretens des Proletariats der verschiedenen Länder, zu diesen Zwecken Einberufung besonderer Beratungen und Konferenzen von Vertretern der entsprechenden KP - gemäß der Übereinkünfte mit den ZK der Parteien dieser Länder.// [6] Aufbewahrung und Verteilung der Geldmittel.// [8]

IV. Im weiteren wird das EKKI den kommunistischen Organisationen verschiedener Länder materielle Hilfe lediglich durch seine ausländischen Büros leisten. Für diesen Zweck wird bei jedem Büro ein besonderer Fonds gebildet. Ausgehend davon, daß KP sämtlicher Länder das Ziel verfolgen müssen, materielle Unterstützung von außen her zu entbehren, läßt das EKKI seine Vertreter - die ausländischen Büros - am Anfang für folgende Bedürfnisse Geldhilfe erweisen:

[1] Für die Herausgabe der kommunistischen Literatur; [2] für die Subventionierung illegaler Parteizeitungen, Zeitschriften und Broschüren; [3] für die Gründung von neuen legalen Organen, insoweit ihre Notwendigkeit vom entsprechenden ausländischen Büro anerkannt wird; [6]

Die ausländischen Büros des EKKI sind verpflichtet, eine möglichst enge gegenseitige Verbindung untereinander und mit dem EKKI zu unterhalten, regelmäßig, mindestens

(1) ПГАСПИ, 495/18/33/20-21; German translation in: A. Kan, "Die Skandinavische Kommission der Komintern 1919-1921," *JahrBuch für Forschungen zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung*, 2004, H. 3, 68-69.

einmal im Monat, ausführliche Rechenschaft über ihre Wirksamkeit und Vorträge samt allen Materialien bezüglich der Entwicklung der Arbeiterbewegung und der kommunistischen Arbeit in verschiedenen Ländern an das EKKI zu senden.

The plan of the Foreign Bureaus was elaborated exhaustively in that draft. To take an example of the issue of financial support from the outside (the ECCI) which has been debated intensively and almost negatively in a lot of historical studies up to the present, the plan had a convincing argument as follows: “the CP of all countries must pursue the aim of doing without the material support [i.e., funds] from the outside.” The Bureaus, however, did not work as initially planned, and suffered some changes due to both internal and external causes. Although the plan called for, for example, the following: “The Foreign Bureaus of the ECCI are engaged in maintaining a connection as closely and mutually as possible with *each other* and with the ECCI” (my *italics*), the “connection as closely and mutually as possible with *each other*” was broken in most cases due to not only external hindrance, but also the arbitrary manipulation of the ECCI. To begin with, the tasks assigned by the ECCI at the establishment of each Bureau were not understood each other. In addition, the unfair discrimination was developed among the Foreign Bureaus according to the strength of the ECCI’s backing up and its change. I have surveyed in *The Early Comintern and Japanese Socialists Residing Abroad* how the Foreign Bureaus were established with the approval of the Bureau conference of the ECCI on and after 14 April 1919, discussed those problems, and argued that the Bureaus were planned primarily to tackle the preparations for the “World Revolution.” Here I make a short mention of each Foreign Bureau chronologically.

(1) The Bureau of Hungary: decision on founding on 14 April 1919 — the Soviet Republic itself collapsed on 1 August 1919.

(2) The Bureau of Bavaria: decision on founding on 14 April 1919; the founding unconfirmed — the Soviet Republic itself collapsed on 3 May 1919.

(3) The Bureau of Kiev (the Southern Department): decision on founding on 14 April 1919 — decision on reorganizing on 21 January 1920 — decision on dissolving on 11 August 1920.

(4) The Scandinavian Bureau (Commission): prehistory; decision on founding on 14 April 1919 — decision on dissolving on 8 August 1920; but continued by limited powers until August 1921.

(5) The Vienna Bureau (the Southeastern Bureau): decision on founding in March 1919 — founding in January 1920 — decision on dissolving on 8 March 1922.

(6) The West-European Secretariat (WES): decision on founding on 8 September 1919 — decision on dissolving on 8 August 1920, but continuance approved for the time being — disorganized in 1925.

(7) The Balkan Bureau: prehistory; decision on founding on 2 February 1920 — continued as the Balkan Communist Federation.

(8) The Dutch Branch (the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau): decision on founding on 8 September 1919 — the first meeting on 22 November 1919 in Amsterdam — decision on diminishing powers on 2 February 1920 — decision on dissolving on 25 April 1920.

2 The Transformation and the Dissolution of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau

In this chapter some important documents concerning the history of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau from its establishment to its dissolution are introduced and its transformation on the way is made clear. And in Chapter 3 some important problems (excluding financial problems which are treated in Chapter 4) with the activities of the Sub-Bureau are tackled straight and its activities are aimed at evaluating properly.

The Sub-Bureau was, to be blunt, burdened with impractical expectations. Plenary powers were given to the Sub-Bureau at the outset by the following decision on the third agenda item ("On the organization of the Section of the ECCI in Holland and the directions to it") of the Small Bureau conference of the ECCI on 28 September 1919⁽¹⁾:

1) To organize the Dutch Section out of comrades Rutgers, [Henriette] Roland Holst, [Antonie] Pannekoek, [Herman] Gorter, [David J.] Wijnkoop and [Willem van] Ravesteijn. The reward for them is determined at the Dutch Branch's discretion. For comrades Gorter and Pannekoek, moreover, a specified sum is allocated with a special fund./ 2)

3) To commission the Section to call a conference of the Communist International as soon as possible, in January 1920, and, for that, to have preliminary relations with the Section of the ECCI in Stockholm./ 4)/ 5)

6) To commission [the Section] to establish connections with all the countries.

7) To empower the Section in Holland in exceptional cases, without giving time, to come out independently by the name of the Third International.

8) To empower comrade Rutgers to be a plenipotentiary representative of the ECCI at the conference of the Communist International in case for the ECCI an opportunity does not arise to dispatch there its own representative./ 9)

Thus all the Dutch members were nominated directly by the ECCI, which was quite different from the nomination of members to other Foreign Bureaus. Especially, expectations for Gorter and Pannekoek were extravagant and optimistic. Furthermore, the "calling of a conference of the Communist International" was commissioned and, as is clearly shown in Clauses 6, 7 and 8, the plenipotentiary power empowered by the ECCI was predominant.

The Comintern switched policies abruptly to the "right" at the Bureau conferences of the ECCI on 30 January and 1 February 1920 where intense discussions followed the report from Karl Radek who had been just released from the German Government and returned home⁽²⁾. Then Sub-Bureau's powers were weakened one-sidedly by the following decision on the second agenda item ("On the organization of the foreign Bureaus of the ECCI. Heard letters of comrades Rutgers and [A.E.] Abramovich and a report of comrade Radek") of the ECCI conference on 2 February 1920: "3) The Dutch Bureau must serve Holland, England and America. To oblige the Holland Bureau to detach from its own staffs two or three members, who must devote themselves

(1) РГАСПИ, 495/1/1/78-79 (A-Doc. 1-1-1 in Part 1 of *Documents on the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the Comintern*).

(2) РГАСПИ, 495/1/6/17, 19.

exclusively to the work of the ECCI”⁽³⁾

On 25 April 1920 the conference of the ECCI decided the dissolution of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau ⁽⁴⁾. On the same day a certified copy of the decision was sent by the ECCI to Stockholm. On 12 May it reached Fritz [Ström] of the Scandinavian Bureau, who sent it to T[rotter=Rutgers] on the same day. At last it reached the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau on 15 May ⁽⁵⁾:

Das Holländische Bureau hat in einer Anzahl wichtiger Fragen eine Stellung eingenommen (Gewerkschaftsfrage, Parlamentarismus), die gegen die Stellung der Exekutive der 3-ten Komm. Intern. ausläuft. Das Holländische Bureau hat die Exekutive von seiner entgegengesetzten Stellung nicht in Kenntnis gesetzt, bevor es die Intern. Konferenz in Amsterdam einberief. Auf Grund dessen erklärt die Exekutive das Mandat des Holländischen Bureaus als erloschen und zieht dieses Mandat zurück.

Die Exekutive beauftragt ihrem engeren Bureau einen ausführlichen Brief darüber den Holländischen Genossen zu senden. Die Funktionen des Holländischen Bureaus werden dem West-Europäischen Sekretariat übertragen. Das Skandinavische Bureau in Stockholm wird beauftragt den Rechenschaftsbericht und den Rest des Geldes, wie auch der Wertsachen in Empfang zu nehmen.

Für die Exekutive der Komm. Int. Sekretär

K. Radek

Petrograd 25 / 4-20.

Although it was three weeks since Radek had sent it, the decision reached the Sub-Bureau by radiotelegraph (Radio-Rosta) a little earlier on 4 May ⁽⁶⁾. At once the Sub-Bureau began arguing against the ECCI's decision (To be continued in the next chapter).

(3) РГАСПИ, 495/1/6/21.

(4) РГАСПИ, 495/1/6/66 (A-Doc. 1-1-5).

(5) РГАСПИ, 497/1/9/2; 581/1/95/18 (A-Doc. 1-4-3). When the decision was printed in *The Communist International*, the last sentence on the transfer of control was deleted because of a confidential matter. *Коммунистический Интернационал (КИ)* (Петроград), No. 10, 1920, 1659-1660.

(6) РГАСПИ, 497/1/9/1.

3 The Points at Issue of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau

1) Problems on Parliamentarism and Trade Unions

a) Switching Policies and Deciding Dissolution by the ECCI

On 25 April 1920 the conference of the ECCI decided the dissolution of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau, mainly because the Sub-Bureau took a position against that of the ECCI in a number of important questions (Trade Union issue, Parliamentarism). The Sub-Bureau argued firmly against the reasons furnished by the ECCI. I examine here which argument is appropriate.

The Founding Congress of the Comintern in March 1919 was rejective against participation in Parliament (Parliamentarism). In "Parliamentarism and the struggle for Soviets (ECCI's circular)" which was issued by the president, Zinoviev, of the ECCI on 1 September 1919, Parliamentarism was only conditionally recognized on the presupposition that the Soviet power was originally incompatible with Parliament⁽¹⁾.

As mentioned above, at the Bureau conferences of the ECCI on 30 January and 1 February 1920 the ECCI switched policies abruptly to the "right," that is, receded the line inclining to the "radical left" and was to open up the way for forming a united front of workers after a year. Consequently the Comintern adopted the tactics rather to form a majority of the left in the existing trade union than to establish a new trade union of the left.

As mentioned below, the Trade Union issue was not taken in the platform of the Founding Congress of the Comintern (to be exact, the International Communist Conference yet) because of the difficulty of drawing together various opinions. Making allowance for the reasons, the issue would belong to the case that the ECCI ought not to have directed the policy one-sidedly, before holding the following Congress of the Comintern, fully discussing the issue, and passing something like a resolution.

b) The Consistency in Policies of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau

The provisional executive of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau made preparations for a full discussion on both problems at the international conference on 3-8 February 1920 (hereafter cited as the "Conference of the 3d International"). "Theses on Trade = Unionism" and "Comment on the Theses concerning Trade = Unions," which had been drafted by Pannekoek and published in No. 1 of *Bulletin of the Provisional Bureau in Amsterdam of the Communist International* just before the opening of the Conference, were proposed and defeated at the Conference. Next, an amendment by Fraina was proposed and adopted.

The following sentence of the "Comment" would have been regarded as too passive by Fraina and John T. Murphy who was leading the Shop Stewards movement: "..... when considerable masses of workers have already turned their back on the old unions new organizations must be built up, in new forms" In the amendment the new industrial unionism was advanced more concretely and more positively. But its 15 (last) clause went ahead rashly and said: "After the

(1) "Парламентаризм и борьба за Советы (Циркулярное письмо И.К. Коммун. Интернационала)," *КИ*, No. 5, IX.1919, 703-708; cf. РГАСПИ, 495/1/1/48.

conquest of political power, industrial unionism comes actually to function in the economic reconstruction of society on a Communist basis;"⁽²⁾

Although "Theses" drafted by Pannekoek were substantially modified by Fraina's amendment, we should keep a firm grasp here on the following sentence in the "Comment": "According to the degree of maturity of the revolution, and to the conditions obtaining in various countries these forms will differ, and the decisions on this point, will, of course, have to be left to the workers of these countries."

In the same way, "Theses concerning Parliamentarism" and "Comment on the Theses concerning Parliamentarism" were drafted and published in No. 1 of *Bulletin of the Provisional Bureau in Amsterdam*. The opening sentence of the latter said: "The attitude adopted by the Communists towards Parliament and its utilization by the proletariat has been set forth at length in a circular emanating from the Secretariat of the Third International, dated September 1st [1919] and signed by Zinovieff"⁽³⁾. In the 5 (last) clause of the former the following was also declared: "As in various countries, this process of social revolution does not develop at the same instant, at the same rate and under the same conditions, the decision as to whether, when, and in what way parliamentarism is to be made use of in the class-struggle, must be left to the working class of every single country." At the end of "Comment" the following similar to "Theses on Trade = Unionism" was repeated: "An international Congress can only lay down general principles for the tactics of the class war. The application to the special conditions of any single country must be left to the Communists of that country."

Respecting the workers of the countries concerned for their independence and self-reliance which was also clearly stated in both "Comments" was the consistent policy of the Sub-Bureau⁽⁴⁾.

When a notification of the ECCI's decision (on 25 April) on dissolving the Sub-Bureau reached the Sub-Bureau by radiotelegraph on 4 May 1920, that was a complete surprise to the Sub-Bureau which had clearly defined its position on Parliamentarism and the Trade Union issue. On 10 May the Sub-Bureau under the joint signature of Roland Holst, Rutgers and Wijnkoop issued a declaration (Erklärung) against the decision⁽⁵⁾. Following the letter of G.L. Trotter [Rutgers] to Winter [J. Berzin] dated 12 May⁽⁶⁾, Trotter refuted concretely the decision in his letter dated 14 May addressed directly to the ECCI as follows⁽⁷⁾:

1) "In der Frage des Parlamentarismus haben wir uns ganz gestellt auf dem Boden des Rundschreibens wie es bei meiner Abreise vorlag. Dass wir keineswegs gegen die Teilnahme an parlamentarische Tätigkeit sind, geht schon hervor aus dem Umstande, dass zwei der Mitglieder die von Ihnen in dem Amsterd. Bureau angewiesen sind, selber in Holländischen Parlament sitzen —/ Es wurde aber immer in Moskau anerkannt, dass es Situationen geben

(2) *Bulletin of the Provisional Bureau in Amsterdam of the Communist International* (Amsterdam), No. 1, II.1920, 3-4.

(3) *Bulletin of the Provisional Bureau in Amsterdam*, No. 1, 3-4.

(4) According to the report of Fraina to the Communist Party of America (CPA), that agenda item (Parliamentarism) could not be discussed because the Conference was broken up by the police. L.C. Fraina, "The International Communist Conference," *The Communist. Official Organ of the Communist Party of America* (Chicago), Vol. 2, No. 4, 25.IV.1920, 7-8.

(5) РГАСПИ, 581/1/95/22-24; 497/1/9/7-9 (A-Doc. 1-4-2).

(6) РГАСПИ, 581/1/95/15-17; 497/2/8/8-10 (A-Doc. 1-2-3).

(7) РГАСПИ, 495/172/60/21-23; 497/1/9/10-12; 581/1/95/26-28 (A-Doc. 1-4-4); cf. G. Voerman, *De meridiaan van Moskou. De CPN en de Communistische Internationale, 1919-1930* (Amsterdam/Antwerpen, 2001), 91, 500.

kann, die eine Beteiligung am Parlament unratsam machen und weiter, dass Verschiedenheit der Meinung in dieser Angelegenheit nicht ein Hindernis zu Zugehörigkeit der dritten Intern. bilden sollte. Damit ist unsre Haltung durchwegs in Uebereinstimmung. Es scheint, dass man jetzt in Moskau der Beteiligungen an den Wahlen einen grösseren Wert beilegt, da man eine Ablehnung in „flagrante“ Widerstreit zu den proletarischen Interessen, und als „leere Phrase“ andeutet, ohne jede weitere Ausnahme./ Das bedeutet jedenfalls eine Aenderung im Standpunkt des Exekutivkomitees, die uns niemals zur Kenntnis gebracht wurde und die ohne weitere Begründung nur noch grössere Verwirrung bringen kann.”

2) “Ein zweiter Punkt bildet die Gewerkschaften./ Wir haben uns niemals dagegen erklärt, dass man unter Umständen in den Gewerkschaften den Kampf von innen ausführt. Nur ist es eine lebendige Tatsache, dass neben den alten Gewerkschaften auch neuere revolutionäre ökonomische Organisationen sich bilden und es war doch gewiss immer die Ansicht auch in Moskau, die revolutionären Gewerkschaften nach Kräften zu unterstützen — Haben nicht gerade unsre russischen Gewerkschaftsfreunde die revolutionären Gewerkschaften der Welt, die sich zur 3-ten Intern.-bekennen zu einem Kongress aufgerufen! Wo reaktionäre und revolutionäre Gewerkschaften nebeneinander bestehen, wird man doch wohl die letztere bevorzugen dürfen? Aber auch wo diese noch nicht bestehen, kann es doch gewiss eine Situation geben, die zur Schaffung solcher Organismen günstig ist.”

To that question Rutgers might have inclined to say “Yes” indeed. But he would have thought that the response “must be left to the working class of every single country.”

Here I would like to examine the Trade Union issue supplementarily from the side of the Comintern’s move to founding an International Labor Union. At the Founding Congress of the Comintern that issue was taken up only by Boris Reinstein on the agenda item 3 (Platform) as follows: “The other idea that in my view is not correctly presented is the role of the economic organizations, the trade union movement.” “The Gomperses and Hendersons are already hard at work founding a Yellow international union movement whose task will be to function as an international lightning rod. We must work against them” ⁽⁸⁾. After all, that issue was not incorporated in the Platform ⁽⁹⁾.

One of the drafters, Max Albert (Hugo Eberlein) told frankly in concluding remarks of the agenda: “I now come to a very important question that the platform does not deal with, that of the trade union movement. We spent a lot of time on this question. We interviewed delegates from each country about their trade union movement, and concluded that since the proletariat’s situation in each country is completely different, it is impossible at this time to include in the platform an international position on this question” ⁽¹⁰⁾.

It was urgently necessity to enact the platform, so it would not have time to spare for going deeply into that separate issue. In addition, there were few delegates who were versed in the issue. Originally, there was a low level of interest in the labor movement among Bolshevik leaders

(8) W. Hedeler / A. Vatlin (Hg.), *Die Weltpartei aus Moskau. Der Gründungskongress der Kommunistischen Internationale 1919. Protokoll und neue Dokumente* (Berlin, 2008), 129-130; J. Riddell (ed.), *Founding the Communist International. Proceedings and Documents of the First Congress, March 1919* (New York, 1987), 140-141.

(9) The following remark of Leonie Kascher (Communist Group of Switzerland) was not taken up even for discussion: “It seems strange that these workers’ councils, which are forming everywhere, are not mentioned in the platform.” Hedeler / Vatlin, 131; Riddell, *Founding the Communist International*, 142.

(10) Hedeler / Vatlin, 133; Riddell, *Founding the Communist International*, 144.

including V.I. Lenin, for they concentrated their energy on the Soviet movement and inclined to pay little attention to traditional mass organizations of the working class like trade unions. Nevertheless, as the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU; Amsterdam International) was restored at the Congress held first after the World War in July-August 1919, the Comintern was obliged to aim at founding a Red Labor Union International in rivalry with the IFTU⁽¹¹⁾.

At the Bureau conference of the ECCI on 27 September 1919 (which Rutgers attended at) the resolution of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party on summoning an International Congress of Trade Unions was reported by Zinoviev and the resolution for summoning "an International Congress of Trades Unions on behalf of the Third International" was adopted⁽¹²⁾. At the following Bureau conference on 28 September a detailed and concrete resolution "on the organization of the Branch of the ECCI in Holland and directions to it" was carried. The resolution included "to entrust the Branch with summoning, as far as possible, in January 1920 a conference of the Comintern," on the agenda item of which "the formation of a professional International" was expressly placed⁽¹³⁾. It would mean that at the start the ECCI expected that conference [which was to be held in February] in order to look for a clue to that formation.

At the Second Congress of the Comintern in July-August 1920 the International Council of Trades and Industrial Unions was provisionally organized. The Congress, however, adopted "Theses on the Trade Union Movement, Factory Committees, and the Communist International" without overcoming the differences of opinion as to the Trade Union issue. Among others, the deep-rootedness of differences was evident in the following remark of Zinoviev: "[Jack] Tanner [Shop Stewards leader] believes it is a contradiction to say we must remain in the unions at the national level, while internationally we want a separate body. We want to remain in the unions nationally in order to bring people over to our side. Rather than abandon the unions to the Amsterdam International, we want to unite them and place them under the leadership of the Communist International. We want to win the unions in every way possible, at the national level if necessary"⁽¹⁴⁾. Zinoviev did not dare to grapple squarely with that problem which was difficult to practice.

That "contradiction" was taken up in the memoir of Alfred Rosmer, who was to take an active role in founding the Profintern after a year, as follows: "La tactique défendue énergiquement par Lénine contre les «gauches» dans la *Maladie infantile* [cf. the next paragraph] et approuvée par la majorité du [2^{ème}] congrès pouvait paraître contradictoire; on demandait aux communistes, aux ouvriers révolutionnaires, de rester dans les syndicats réformistes, et, d'autre part, on s'acheminait ouvertement vers une Internationale syndicale rouge. Les leaders réformistes de la Fédération syndicale internationale d'Amsterdam ne manquaient pas de le dire ni même de la crier, et avec eux la presse bourgeoise; nous étions dénoncés comme des scissionnistes"⁽¹⁵⁾. Rosmer continued writing thus: "Mais la contradiction n'était qu'apparente; les scissionnistes n'étaient pas de notre côté ainsi" But it would be undeniable that the very dual policy of the Comintern introduced

(11) Cf. A. Resis, "Comintern Policy toward the World Trade-Union Movement: The First Year," J.S. Curtis (ed.), *Essays in Russian and Soviet History. In Honor of Geroid Tanquary Robinson* (New York, 1963), 238-240.

(12) ПГАСИИ, 495/1/1/77.

(13) ПГАСИИ, 495/1/1/78-79 (**A-Doc. 1-1-1**).

(14) *Der zweite Kongreß der Kommunistischen Internationale. Protokoll der Verhandlungen vom 19. Juli in Petrograd und vom 23. Juli bis 7. August 1920 in Moskau* (Hamburg, 1921), 638-639, cf. 508; J. Riddell (ed.), *Workers of the World and Oppressed Peoples, Unite! Proceedings and Documents of the Second Congress, 1920*, Vol. 2 (New York et al., 1991), 936-937, cf. 789.

(15) A. Rosmer, *Moscou sous Lénine*, Tome 1 (Paris, 1970), 134-135.

confusion (e.g., on how to square the policy with the rising radical trade unions) into its own camp and gave momentum for the leaders of “reformist trade unions” to exclude “revolutionary workers” who were trying to form communist cells within reformist unions.

c) A Counterargument to “*Left-Wing*” Communism — an *Infantile Disorder*

In the minutes of the Bureau conferences of the ECCI at the beginning of 1920 where the ECCI decided to switch the policies, the details were not recorded. The Comintern’s positions on the issues concerned after the sudden turnabout are defined in “*Left-Wing*” Communism — an *Infantile Disorder* in which Lenin harshly criticized the “leftism.” I examine the book and try to make a counterargument over it.

In its seventh chapter (Should we participate in bourgeois parliaments?) Lenin said as follows: “Parliamentarianism is of course “political obsolete” to the Communists in Germany; but — and that is the whole point — we must *not* regard what is obsolete *to us* as something obsolete *to a class, to the masses*. Here again we find that the “Lefts” do not know how to reason, do not know to act as the party of a *class*, as the party of the *masses*”⁽¹⁶⁾.

In the “ECCI’s circular” of September 1919 five necessary conditions were attached to the utilization of Parliament which was originally incompatible with Soviets. But Lenin did not come out with the participation in Parliament by checking it against those conditions, but by adopting utterly different criteria for it which were too ill-defined, that is, “something obsolete *to a class, to the masses*” [in contradistinction to “what is obsolete *to us*”]. He said that in the spring of 1920 Parliament system did not yet come to “something obsolete *to a class, to the masses*.” If so, neither in March 1919 (when the Founding Congress of the Comintern was rejective against that participation) nor in September 1919 (when the “ECCI’s circular” was still cautious about that participation) that system would naturally come to something obsolete *to a class, to the masses*.” In that case, why the participation in Parliament had been come out with in March or September 1919 earlier than the spring of 1920? Lenin passed the question by in silence in the book, still more the reason of the sudden turnabout at the beginning of 1920. To begin with, it is unreasonable to regard the tactical policy as a principle. There is no sense generalizing (or compelling) the tactical policy, which is required to change in the wake of changes in situations, as a principle. Because, whenever the tactical policy changes, one principle after another could be generalized (or compelled). The ECCI and Lenin should not have regarded the issues concerned as matters of principle which were so fundamental and divisive that they could not but split with the Left Communists, but as matters of tactics.

In order to appeal for the participation in Parliament Lenin took two examples of Karl Liebknecht and Zeth Höglund in the book. Indeed, those examples had already be taken in the “ECCI’s circular,” but the reasons why those examples were taken were different each other. That is, the reason for the latter is “the usefulness of utilizing Parliament” but that for the former is altered into “the ability to *forge* a communist group in the worst of parliaments.” Lenin altered the reason on the assumption that “a *revolutionary mass* party” (my *italics*) was “rapidly growing.” Was there really such a *revolutionary mass* party in those days? As for that party, Lenin probably kept the USPD in mind. Indeed the USPD was “massive,” but it would be too tactical to call it “revolutionary.” His explaining the reason why Parliamentarism has to be adopted positively in the very spring of 1920 would not be persuasive.

Just as the Sub-Bureau argued that “the decisions on this point, will, of course, have to be left

(16) V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31 (Moscow, 1966), 58.

to the workers of these countries,” so this Trade Union issue would not have been such a case that Lenin regarded the tactical policy on one side as a principle and did not take the least notice of the tactical policy on the other side. After all, the strong action taken by Lenin and other Bolsheviks raised the above-mentioned problem with the dual policy. History reveals that the dual policy of the Comintern resulted in a failure. Therefore, it is highly questionable that Lenin and others disregarded the tactical policy on the other side, that is, that of the Left Communists.

2) Counterarguments to the Decision on Dissolution and the Internal Split

At the beginning of May 1920 the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau received the ECCI's decision on dissolving the Sub-Bureau and immediately began arguing back the decision. In this paragraph I make clear how the Sub-Bureau argued back and examine its internal split and the sudden “conversion” of Rutgers just after the dissolution.

a) Counterarguments to the Decision on Dissolution

On 10 May 1920 the Sub-Bureau under the joint signature of Roland Holst, Rutgers and Wijnkoop issued a declaration (Erklärung) against the decision⁽¹⁷⁾. In it the Sub-Bureau focused its criticism of the WES (Westeuropäisches Sekretariat) as follows: “Indessen ist in West Europa der Unwillen gegen das W.E.S. schnell gewachsen und haben sich die Verbindungen von unsrem Bureau mit den verschiedenen Parteien und Gruppen ausgedehnt.” “Wir erachten es aber bedauerlich dass man in Moskau nach einseitigen Mitteilungen sich dazu entschliesst das W.E.S. eine offizielle Sanktion zu geben.” In his letter to Winter dated 12 May 1920 Trotter also concentrated upon criticism of the WES as follows⁽¹⁸⁾: “Erstens hat sich das Berliner W.E.S. nach unsrer Meinung immer mehr als Hemmnis für die Einheit und Aktionsfähigkeit in West-Europa erwiesen

Furthermore, Trotter refuted concretely the decision in the above-mentioned letter to the ECCI (A-Doc. 1-4-4). The points of the counterargument are four, out of which the first and the second have been cited in Paragraph 1-b, so the third and the fourth are cited here:

3) “Was die Einheit der Parteien und Gruppen in den verschiedenen Ländern anbetrifft, so scheint uns jetzt, dass Moskau überall eine straffe Zentralisation und Disziplin durchführen will. Bis jetzt war das nicht die Ansicht, da man alle mögliche linksstehende Gruppe immer aufgefordert hat auf verschiedenen Wege nach Moskau zu kommen. Man hat die Syndikalist, Sozial-Anarchisten etc. immer aufgefordert, Wir haben gemeint die linken Gruppen nicht unnötig abstossen zu müssen, dagegen dem immer wankelmütigen Zentrum gegenüber der revolutionären Tat als das entscheidende entgegenführen zu müssen.”

4) “Zuletzt oder besser als erste und wichtigste Aufgabe, haben wir uns über das Verhalten West-Europas zu Russland ausgesprochen und zu Taten aufgefordert. Dabei stellten wir uns auf den Standpunkt, dass nur eine Erhebung in West-Europa, oder wenigstens nur revolutionäre Aktionen im Stande sein können die Russischen Revolution zu Hilfe zu kommen. Wir haben von Anfang bestritten, dass ein wirklicher Frieden von den Kapitalisten mit Soviet-Russland möglich sei, ohne einen starken Druck von den Arbeitern in West-Europa.”

(17) РГАСПИ, 581/1/95/22-24; 497/1/9/7-9 (A-Doc. 1-4-2).

(18) РГАСПИ, 581/1/95/15-17; 497/2/8/8-10 (A-Doc. 1-2-3).

When the Sub-Bureau received the ECCI's decision, the Sub-Bureau was about to tackle two international tasks: One is to make a preparation for an international conference about May jointly with the WES. It aimed to resolve the strife between the Sub-Bureau and the WES, which had been caused by the resolutions adopted at the "Conference of the 3d International" in February 1920, and to hold "another international communist Conference" "within three months" "which it is hoped will possess the necessary authority to institute a more definitive international Bureau." Indeed there were some conflicts between them over Parliamentarism, the division of their roles as Foreign Bureaus, etc., but the WES did not yet act in concert with the ECCI's harsh criticism of the Sub-Bureau⁽¹⁹⁾.

The other is to take part in the Scandinavian Bureau's undertaking for an international conference. It aimed to found "an international Bureau" "representing the revolutionary Labor-Unions" by taking advantage of the opportunity of the scheduled Congress of the Norwegian [Labor] Party on 23-24 May 1920 and, furthermore, to "organize an international congress of labor-unions most likely at the end of June in Kristiania"⁽²⁰⁾.

In the midst of such Sub-Bureau's tacklings the ECCI's decision was notified abruptly and one-sidedly.

b) The Internal Split and Rutgers' "Conversion"

In an article printed in *De Tribune* on 16-17 August 1920 v. R. [van Ravesteyn] took up an article of K. Horner [Pannekoek] as "a misleading article" and criticized it on the strength of Lenin's "*Left-Wing*" *Communism — an Infantile Disorder*⁽²¹⁾. As v. R.'s attack led to the Sub-Bureau's members, Pannekoek and Herman Gorter, at once Rutgers sent his counterargument to the editor, Jan C. Ceton and its copy to van Ravesteyn, respectively⁽²²⁾. It was printed in a readers' column of *De Tribune* on 26 August. Rutgers pointed out some mistakes of fact in v. R.'s article as follows:

1) It is incorrect that v. R. would have refused to cooperate with Pannekoek. On the contrary, it is not objectionable that v. R. refused exclusively to cooperate with Gorter on grounds of Gorter's personal action in party affairs.

2) It is incorrect that the Sub-Bureau would not have functioned and v. R. did not participate in its activities.

3) It is incorrect that Pannekoek and Gorter participated in the Conference without any right of representation. On the contrary, they were nominated by the ECCI as members of the Sub-Bureau which was to arrange the Conference. V. R. himself attended it one day. There was a consensus of opinion among members (Roland Holst, Wijnkoop and Rutgers) of the new Sub-Bureau approved by the Conference and no criticism of it in the Dutch communist press.

4) It is incorrect to evoke an impression as if Horner were placed on the same level with Heinrich Laufenberg. It is well known that Horner has always fought against "National

(19) *Bulletin of the Sub-Bureau in Amsterdam of the Communist International* (Amsterdam), No. 2, III.1920, 1-3; **A-Doc. 3-1-3, 1-3-4**; *Bericht über den 3. Parteitag der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands (Spartakusbund) am 25. und 26. Februar 1920* (Berlin, n.d.), 69-84; cf. **A-Doc. 1-3-2, 1-3-3**.

(20) **A-Doc. 3-1-4**, cf. **1-4-1**; [Fredrik Ström] an Trotter, 6.IV.1920, ПГАСП, 581/1/95/10-11; 497/2/5/19, 20, 21. This undertaking was to be abandoned due to the early notification of convening the Second Congress of the Comintern on 15 July 1920.

(21) v. R., "Een misleidend artikel (I/II)," *De Tribune*, Jrg. 13, No. 267-268, 16-17.VIII.1920, elk 1.

(22) Archief W. van Ravesteyn, Map 17, IISG; *De Tribune*, Jrg. 13, No. 276, 26.VIII.1920, 4; cf. ПГАСП, 495/172/6/15.

Bolshevism” of Laufenberg [and Fritz Wolffheim].

The editor’s postscript was added as follows: At the contributor’s request we printed this short article immediately. But we never meddle in the matter itself only in a miscellaneous column of minor importance⁽²³⁾. It was underlined in it that the ECCI in Moscow decided in advance the organization of the Sub-Bureau (especially the appointment of six members) and the Dutch Communist Party itself did not take part in it.

Indeed, the problem with the appointment of members had overshadowed discussions among six members since the first meeting of the Sub-Bureau in Amsterdam on 22 November 1919 and intensified the strife between Gorter and van Ravesteyn / Wijnkoop. But the Sub-Bureau of six members did start as a technical bureau and continued to the opening of the “Conference of the 3d International”⁽²⁴⁾. At the “Conference” on 8 February 1920 Wijnkoop suggested the new executive of the Sub-Bureau to be formed by Rutgers and Roland Holst, together with a delegate of the Dutch Communist Party. It was agreed and soon the last was filled up by Wijnkoop⁽²⁵⁾. Furthermore, Wijnkoop did sign with Roland Holst and Rutgers the above-mentioned “Erklärung” on 10 May 1920. It turns out that the editor’s postscript made desperate efforts to leave no trace behind of the Party’s participation in the Sub-Bureau.

It is well known that the desperate efforts bore fruit in part. That is, Wijnkoop’s letter to Lenin dated 30 June 1920 was printed at the end of appendix of the translation of Lenin’s “*Left-Wing*” *Communism – an Infantile Disorder*, saying that only “some members of the Communist Party of Holland” who “took little or not point in the Party’s current activities” participated in the Sub-Bureau⁽²⁶⁾. And Lenin’s foreword, where he had corrected the words concerned in the text on the basis of Wijnkoop’s letter, was attached to it. It should be paid attention to, however, that Lenin seems to have not considered the internal strife within the Dutch Party as a vital matter to himself, because during the discussion on “Conditions for admission” at the Second Congress of the Comintern Lenin said as follows: “In every speech he delivers, Comrade Wijnkoop reveals that he shares almost all the errors of Comrade Pannekoek. Wijnkoop has started that he does not share Pannekoek’s views, but his speech prove the reverse”⁽²⁷⁾. As a matter of fact, Wijnkoop said as follows: 1) The ECCI should not negotiate with leaders of parliamentary parties [like the USPD] but “speak directly to the masses.” 2) [The delegates of the KAPD broke off preliminary negotiations with the ECCI and left just before the opening of the Congress.] “By concentrating all criticism on the USPD, on a reformist party, we failed to listen to the KAPD’s criticism of the German Communist Party, which, though not friendly, is useful”⁽²⁸⁾. To be sure, Lenin’s grasp was scarcely off point.

The origin of an affair is that Wijnkoop who arrived in Moscow on 19 June 1920 in order to attend the Second Congress of the Comintern began consulting with Lenin, Karl Radek and others on that day. Wijnkoop kept insisting that from the start there had been the internal strife of

(23) Although Ceton did not answer Rutgers’ criticism point by point, on 24 August Ceton sent a reply as follows: Although you [Rutgers] write “the greatest nonsense” relentlessly, I will never embarrass you and print your article in the newspaper tomorrow. Your contribution is so “in contradiction to all experiences in our party” that it will be of no avail to refute it. ПГАСПИ, 495/172/6/16.

(24) ПГАСПИ, 497/1/10/8a, 9-11, 17-20; cf. Trotter to Winter, 9.III.1920, ПГАСПИ, 497/2/8/1-7; 581/1/95/33-39.

(25) *Bulletin of the Sub-Bureau in Amsterdam*, No. 2, 8.

(26) Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, 65.

(27) *Der zweite Kongreß*, 351; Riddell, *Workers of the World*, Vol. 1, 486; cf. B. Lazitch/M.M. Drachkovitch, *Lenin and the Comintern*, Vol. 1 (Stanford, 1972), 254.

(28) *Der zweite Kongreß*, 298-303; Riddell, *Workers of the World*, Vol. 1, 432-437.

opinion among six Dutch members of the Sub-Bureau and the ECCI which had been ignorant of it appointed them one-sidedly and forced Dutch communists to accept the “strange combination”⁽²⁹⁾.

It is said that Rutgers had stayed in foreign countries since January 1911 and just after coming home he perceived that he had been little informed on the internal party strife in the SDP/CP⁽³⁰⁾. But revelations about the strife surfaced fairly in *De Tribune* and *De Nieuwe Tijd*. Rutgers rather kept up correspondence with comrades of both groups and tried to advocate the thought and political stance of the Dutch Left in one body in the USA and Soviet Russia, without turning his attention to the rift within the Party. Such Rutgers’ intermediary role was highly characteristic at the period of the Sub-Bureau.

Rather than an emphasis on the strife, why only Dutch comrades were appointed directly by the ECCI as members for one of Foreign Bureaus should be questioned. They were treated well as follows: “The reward for them is determined at the Dutch Branch’s discretion. For comrades Gorter and Pannekoek, moreover, a specified sum is allocated with a special fund”⁽³¹⁾. It is hardly possible that Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders were ignorant of the internal strife within Dutch Party, because they had witnessed indirectly an internal strife over their participation in the Zimmerwald movement⁽³²⁾. Furthermore, in Gorter’s letter to Lenin dated 22 September 1918 Lenin could know anew the following strife: The SDP had done well in general during the War, but only its diplomatic policy — pro-Entente and anti-German — had been too bad. “[A]ls sie [Wijnkoop und van Ravesteijn] sich freuten über Kerensky’s und Brussiloff’s Offensive [gegen Deutschland] Jetzt aber, da sie immer die Entente noch nicht bekämpfen, sondern über sie schweigen, habe ich [Gorter] einen scharfen Kampf gegen sie angefangen”⁽³³⁾. Although Lenin was informed of the strife, he did not pay attention to it, but still kept backing Gorter and Pannekoek up and expecting the cooperation between the two groups till the decision on dissolving the Sub-Bureau.

The following instances were in the background of Lenin’s backing them up: Pannekoek revived anti-statism which Marx and Engels had advocated, next Bukharin developed it into a theory of the imperialistic State, and finally Lenin turned his attention to its importance and wrote *State and Revolution* by way of the so-called “April theses.” It followed that Gorter translated *State and Revolution* into Dutch in Autumn 1918, which was published at the beginning of 1919⁽³⁴⁾.

One more problem is the so-called “conversion” of Rutgers: he suddenly published an article in which he showed some sympathy for the ECCI’s decision on dissolving the Sub-Bureau. G. Voerman have taken up the matter: “Of all people, it was Rutgers himself, the initiator of the Amsterdam Bureau, who was the first to buckle under in the face of this intervention from

(29) Cf. Wp. [Wijnkoop], “Een onderhoud met Radek,” *De Tribune*, Jrg. 13, No. 300, 23.IX.1920, 1.

(30) H. de Liagre Böhl, *Herman Gorter. Zijn politieke activiteiten van 1909 tot 1920 in de opkomende kommunistische beweging in Nederland* (Nijmegen, 1973), 227; Voerman, *De meridiaan*, 79.

(31) РГАСПИ, 495/1/1/78-79 (A-Doc.1-1-1).

(32) Cf. H. Roland Holst, “Der Kampf um Zimmerwald in Holland,” *Vorbote. Internationale Marxistische Rundschau* (Bern), No. 1, I.1916, 64-68; D.J. Wijnkoop, “De geest van Zimmerwald,” *De Nieuwe Tijd*, Jrg. 21, No. 2, II.1916, 54-62; H. Roland Holst, “De eenheid in zicht,” *De Internationale* (Amsterdam), Jrg. 1, No.12, IV.1916, 260-265.

(33) G. Stuiveling, “Gorters brieven aan Lenin,” id., *Willens en Wetens. Twaalf Essays* (Amsterdam, 1967), 133.

(34) “Из материалов Института Маркса-Энгельса-Ленина,” *Большевик* (Москва), 1932, No. 22, 87; Stuiveling, 137-138; de Liagre Böhl, 221.

Moscow. After the Bureau was closed, Rutgers continued to strongly oppose the Comintern's tendency towards centralization. »Eine einheitliche, straff disziplinierte internationale Organisation herbeizuführen ist heute noch unmöglich«, he informed the ECCI [in "Erklärung"]. Once Lenin condemned leftist communist views, Rutgers adopted the new line without protest. He was suddenly praising the benefits of »strict discipline« and »as great as possible a subjection of national organs to international leadership from Moscow«⁽³⁵⁾.

At the beginning of that article⁽³⁶⁾ Rutgers gained a new understanding of the conditions that the Comintern had swiftly developed during the Founding Congress till the Second Congress. Based on that understanding, he did write that "a mighty counterrevolutionary power can be overcome only by the well organized, centralized and disciplined proletariat."

But it does not seem to me that Rutgers gave his full consent to Lenin's criticism of the leftism. The fact is that Rutgers set the following conditions in accepting "centralization and strict discipline in all functions and in the international struggle": "so great possible freedom of criticism and control from the bottom up" is an absolutely indispensable supplement to it. Indeed, there would have been no possibility of Lenin's accepting the conditions, but could it be distinguished from the complete "conversion" that Rutgers set such conditions? After Rutgers came back in Moscow in May 1921 through his recuperation in Italy in the winter of 1920-21, he was to become an originator and prompter of the project for the Autonomous Industrial Colony Kuzbas. At that time his "leftist" stance was maintained in a sense⁽³⁷⁾.

As is noticeable in his articles, "Uit Sowjet-Rusland" and "De Intellectueelen en de Russische Revolutie"⁽³⁸⁾, his high appraisal and expectation (including alarm occasionally) for the national construction of Soviet Russia after the October Revolution would be added to his above-mentioned new understanding. Rutgers possessed the "two-sidedness," that is, a socialist and civil engineer⁽³⁹⁾. It is supposed that the latter side also operated on his "conversion." During his stay in the USA Rutgers worked as a director and chief engineer for the Netherlands East Indies and expended a part of his funds upon the socialist movement. There were practical and utilitarian sides to his character, which were to lead him to be one of the founders of the AIC Kuzbas and then its manager. They would be the factors which contributed to his survival in the era of the Stalinism. He did not possess only the side of "dying a martyr to his cause."

Rutgers who had published that article split with Pannekoek, Gorter and Roland-Holst concerning the dissolution problem. The latter of three sent again the following undated statement (handwritten by Gorter) to the ECCI after the Second Congress of the Comintern: "Die Unterzeichneten, die Marxistischen Mitglieder des ehemaligen von der dritten Internationale ernannten Amsterdamer Büro's, protestieren hiermit gegen die Taktik, die vom 2^{en} Kongresse der dritten Internationale in den Fragen der Gewerkschaften und des Parlamentarismus angenommen wurde." And they rejected every responsibility for the tactics which would bring disaster in

(35) G. Voerman, "Proletarian Competition. The Amsterdam Bureau and its German Counterpart, 1919-1920," *Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung* 2007 (Berlin, 2007), 217-218; Voerman, *De meridiaan*, 95, 501.

(36) S.J. Rutgers, "Het Congres te Moskou," *De Nieuwe Tijd*, Jrg. 25, No. 18, 15.IX.1920, 577-582.

(37) Cf. Second Kuzbas Paper-Prepared by S.J. Rutgers with the collaboration of H.S. Calver and Ludwig A.C. Martens, Moscow, June 1921, ПГАСПИ, 5/3/246/8-18; 515/1/4306/58-62.

(38) S.J. Rutgers, "Uit Sowjet-Rusland. 25 September 1918 — 15 October 1919," *De Tribune* (Amsterdam), Jrg. 13, No. 75, 30.XII.1919, 2 ~ No. 93, 21.I.1920, 2; id., "De Intellectueelen en de Russische Revolutie," *De Nieuwe Tijd*, Jrg. 26, No. 5, 1.III.1921, 129-140; No. 7/8, 5.IV.1921, 196-212 [originally written in April 1920].

(39) Cf. G.C. Trinchter Rutgers/K. Trinchter, *Rutgers. Zijn leven en streven in Holland, Indonesië, Amerika en Rusland* (Moskou, 1974), 42; Г. Тринчер/К. Тринчер, *Рутгерс* (Москва, 1967), 44.

admitting many unrevolutionary elements⁽⁴⁰⁾.

3) The Potential of Wide-ranging Activities

The Amsterdam Sub-Bureau could establish its contact and correspondence with countries and regions on the largest possible scale among the Foreign Bureaus. The very scope of contact and correspondence was the chief advantage of the Sub-Bureau. To the best of my knowledge, the countries with which the Sub-Bureau had contact and correspondence are listed below: (1) Soviet Russia, (2) Germany, (3) Sweden, (4) Norway, (5) Denmark, (6) Finland, (7) Great Britain, (8) USA, (9) Japan, (10) Mexico, (11) Spain, (12) France, (13) Belgium, (14) Luxemburg, (15) the Netherlands, (16) Switzerland, (17) Austria, (18) Italy, (19) South Africa, (20) Australia, (21) Poland (through Austria), (22) Slovakia, (23) Bulgaria, (24) Dutch Indies⁽⁴¹⁾.

Compared with the Sub-Bureau, that scope in case of the Scandinavian Bureau was more limited. According to a letter of its president, Ström, to M.M. Litvinov, as of February 1920 Ström made connections with the following countries: (1) Germany, (2) the Netherlands, (3) Great Britain, (4) Belgium, (5) France, (6) Switzerland, (7) Austria, (8) Italy, (9) USA, (10) Canada, (11) Mexico [including Indian refugees], (12) Finland, (13) Estonia⁽⁴²⁾.

As for the WES, according to Lazitch / Drachkovitch, “[Jacob] Reich had the mission covering the largest geographical area and longest span of time”⁽⁴³⁾. According to the decision on the agenda item 2 (“On organizing Foreign Bureaus of the ECCI”) of the Bureau conference on 2 February 1920, “The West-European Secretariat in Berlin must take charge of Germany, France, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy and Poland”⁽⁴⁴⁾. But the scope of its activities was supposed to be chiefly limited to the Central Europe, though I cannot affirm it because the Comintern Archive scarcely holds letters and others concerned with the WES. Moreover, both the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau and the Scandinavian Bureau often complained in their letters that they had no communication from the WES (cf. Paragraph 4).

The Sub-Bureau also issued extensively the leaflets in English, German, French and Dutch during the period from January to May 1920, most of which were written in the style of the Communication (Mitteilung) of the Sub-Bureau. I could check 55 items, 37 of which I have reprinted in Part 1-3 of the present work. They can be broadly classified into three groups: 1) the Sub-Bureau’s appeals to the general or several countries; 2) a report on the Communist Young International; 3) reports on each of eight countries, that is, to use the above-mentioned numbers, (1), (2), (6), (7) (including Ireland), (8), (11), (13) and (16).

The Sub-Bureau also exchanged letters far away with Johannesburg, South Africa. William H. Andrews, Secretary Organizer of the International Socialist League (South Africa), wrote in a letter to Rutgers on 29 June 1920 that in spite of the ECCI’s denial to the Sub-Bureau, “we shall be glad to keep in touch with you and receive any information you may be able to give us from time to time”⁽⁴⁵⁾. This is enough to give us at least some idea of the important role which the

(40) ПГАСП, 495/172/61/17 (A-Doc. 1-4-5).

(41) In the following lists the letters and the material from/to the Sub-Bureau are classified into 13 countries and regions. “Liste von Materialien von Hutgers [sic],” ПГАСП, 497/2/8/13-18.

(42) A. Kan, “Der bolschewistische ‘Revolutionsexport’ im Jahre 1920 und die schwedischen Linksozialisten,” *Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung* 1994 (Berlin, 1993), 98.

(43) Lazitch/Drachkovitch, 149.

(44) ПГАСП, 495/1/6/21 (A-Doc. 1-1-4).

(45) ПГАСП, 497/2/2/214.

Sub-Bureau fulfilled as communications media. On Rutgers' advice the League came to send the Second Congress of the Comintern its application for entry into the Comintern by telegram⁽⁴⁶⁾.

According to Rutgers' handwritten memorandum for the advance of proceedings of the first meeting in Amsterdam on 22 November 1919, the Sub-Bureau aimed to throw its energy into collecting the foreign press, which was to be finally held in the International Historical Archive (mentioned below), and to assign its members for the task arranging and analyzing, by regional groups, information derived from the foreign press as follows: (1) Germany, Austria (and Border States), the Balkans and Switzerland: Gorter and Pannekoek; (2) France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Russia and Scandinavian States: Roland Holst; (3) British Empire with India, Dutch Indies, USA, Japan and the Far East: Rutgers and Asser Baars⁽⁴⁷⁾.

On 1 January 1920 the Sub-Bureau established the International Historical Archive at Willem L. Brusse's home in Rotterdam. He called out for comrades' sending their organs, pamphlets, documents, etc. from abroad⁽⁴⁸⁾. The Japanese Socialist Group in America led by Katayama also sent their printed matters to Brusse's address (Bergsingel 172a)⁽⁴⁹⁾.

Thus the Sub-Bureau had the potential of activities for taking deeper in the worldwide socialist/communist movement in its own way. But that was stifled too early in the process of Bolshevisation (cf. Paragraph 7).

By the way, Rutgers and Katayama had built up quite a comradeship since December 1916. By Rutgers (the Netherlands)—Katayama (USA, later Mexico) route, the Sub-Bureau could establish contact with the Japanese Socialists in the USA, next in Japan. In addition to that, the newly established Comintern could have initial relations with Japanese socialists by establishing a transnational network through two routes: "a western route" (Amsterdam — New York — Mexico City) and "an eastern route" (Siberia — Shanghai) beginning from Moscow (cf. Introduction).

4) An Issue on Transferring Sub-Bureau's Powers to the WES

The ECCI ordered the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau to transfer its powers to the WES in Berlin, but the capability of the WES was highly questionable. As mentioned above, Rutgers criticized the WES in the letter of Trotter to Winter dated 12 May 1920 (**A-Doc. 1-2-3**). I quote one more from it: "..... Dann bleibt vorläufig nur die Möglichkeit einer Zentralleitung in Moskau und Ausbildung der Verbindungen mit Moskau. Wäre es möglich in Berlin ein Organ zu schaffen, das wirklich eine Internationale Zusammensetzung hat, so könnten wir das selbstverständlich anerkennen; wir erachten die Möglichkeit dazu aber gering und fürchten, dass die Vorgeschichte der W.E.S. die Chancen vorläufig verdorben hat."

The ECCI's order was ignored by the Scandinavian Bureau, which declared as follows: "Mit dem holländischen Büro haben wir gute Verbindungen gehabt"⁽⁵⁰⁾. In his letter dated 9 May 1920 to T[rotter], Fritz [Ström] also criticized unfavorably the ECCI's preferential treatment to the WES: "Unsre Erfahrungen über die Tätigkeit des W.E.S. ist leider nicht gut. Wir bedauern dass die Exekutive einen solchen Schritt genommen hat, glauben aber dass alles noch gut geordnet

(46) *Der zweite Kongreß*, 102; Riddell, *Workers of the World and Oppressed Peoples*, Vol. 1, 236.

(47) ПГАСПН, 497/1/10/12-13a.

(48) ПГАСПН, 497/1/2/12; cf. *Bulletin of the Provisional Bureau in Amsterdam*, No. 1, 1.

(49) Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 4. 3. 2. 1-1 (14), Tokyo [in Japanese].

(50) Kan, "Die Skandinavische Kommission," 62.

wird”⁽⁵¹⁾. Almost at the same time, Ström sent the similar letter to the WES with the aid of Willi Münzenberg, secretary of the Communist Youth International in Berlin: “wir haben von J[ames]. seit Januar kein Wort gehört und auch keine Post bekommen [sic] auch von Holland sagt man uns, dass sie keine Antwort aus Berlin bekommen [sic] wenn Berlin nicht unsere guten Verbindungen mit Russland und anderen Ländern benutzen will, so können wir nur dieses beklagen [sic]”⁽⁵²⁾

Compared with the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau, a weak point of the WES was pointed out in the following comment of M.M. Borodin. After his attending the “Conference of the 3d International,” Borodin moved to Berlin, where he held talks with the members of the KPD, the WES and others for a month from 3 March. On all such occasions he wrote the records down in his “Diary” and sent them to the Sub-Bureau⁽⁵³⁾. In a report probably delivered to Comintern headquarters he wrote from his experience there as follows: “The Secretariat consists of one person — James [Reich]. Others only take part in meetings of the Secretariat, but almost no one carries out practical works. The Secretariat, in James’ opinion (and I fully agree with this), is in need of an ideological leaders, a person with an international reputation”⁽⁵⁴⁾.

5) Problems with “Leftism”

At the beginning of 1920 when the possibility of the revolution remained in Central and Western Europe, the ECCI and Lenin abruptly chose to break away from the “leftism” and came to criticize the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau, while lumping it and the groups of the “leftism” together. Taking a few examples, I will argue back against the criticism.

As for the Trade Union issue, I have already described how the proposal of “Theses on Trade = Unionism” by the Sub-Bureau was defeated and an amendment by Fraina was adopted. The ECCI considered that the Sub-Bureau, whose “Conference of 3d International” had adopted the latter, was accelerating a trend toward the “leftism” and criticized it. It may be undeniable that the Sub-Bureau was responsible for part of the result as a host organization. But speaking of Left Communists and Left Radicals, they have different varieties of ideas and doings. The members of the Sub-Bureau, such as Pannekoek and Rutgers, could be sharply distinguished from the groups which were extremely radicalizing, such as Fraina and Murphy in those days.

Moreover, what was important for Sub-Bureau is, as mentioned above, its policy that the vital problems, such as Parliamentarism and Trade Union issue, must be resolved by the working class itself of every single country (As for the theory of the so-called “Revolutionsexport,” I will deal with it in the next Paragraph 6).

Indeed, it is undeniable that the “leftism” in Left Communists and Left Radicals had a tendency that was apt on occasion to carry the movement too radically and roughly forward, that is, a tendency of slapdash radicalization and further split. But the following interpretation of H.M. Bock should be taken into consideration: “Während die aus der radikalen Weltkriegs-Linken entstandene und die Gründungsphase der KPD prägende linkskommunistische Opposition 1919/1920 *noch in gewissem Umfang lernfähig war*, setzte mit der von fortgesetzten Spaltungen begleiteten sektiererischen Entwicklung der KAPD seit 1921 eine dogmatische Erstarrung ihrer

(51) РГАСПИ, 581/1/95/14; 497/2/5/18.

(52) РГАСПИ, 499/1/5/28a.

(53) “Diary from March 3rd, 1920,” “Interview with Paul L[evi]. — April 1,” etc., РГАСПИ, 497/2/7/1-92.

(54) [Бородин-Грузенберг,] “Западный Европейский Секретариат” (n.d.), РГАСПИ, 499/1/3/93-96.

organisationspolitischen und taktischen Grundsätze ein”⁽⁵⁵⁾. It is an important problem that they who “had still the learning ability to a certain extent” were broken one-sidedly from the Comintern through the spring of 1920 into summer of 1921.

Lazitch / Drachkovitch argued: “In most of the countries of Central and Western Europe the same leftist ideas surfaced almost simultaneously around the start of 1920”; “In the first half of 1920 left-wing Communism seemed, if not stronger, at least noisier than the Communism of strict Leninist obedience”⁽⁵⁶⁾. Although that interpretation is opposite that of my inclination to evaluate the “left-wing Communism,” it raises a significant question: Why were the left wing forces on the rise and crossing national borders around the start of 1920 [or earlier]? The following is my attempt to resolve this question with the help of A. Agosti’s views.

The forces that founded the international communist movement immediately after the October Revolution accented the focus on the international nature of the revolutionary process. It is this original international dimension that guarantees the homogeneity, the consistency of the product of this history of the communist movement. This essentially international vision of the revolutionary process had two roots, of originally equal importance. On the one hand, there was the analysis of imperialism, which despite important differences was common to the entire radical left of the Second International. In opposition to the internationalization of capitalism, the working class was also required to be internationalized beyond nation states which had been obstacles for the socialization process of the productive capacity — proletarian internationalism. On the other, the Bolsheviks — and all the currents within the Comintern — shared the conviction that the Russian revolution was a prologue to a European social revolution and that its only guarantee of safety lay in receiving help from the victorious revolutionary proletariat in some, at least, of the biggest Western capitalist countries⁽⁵⁷⁾.

Based on these two roots, as I have already examined in my articles in 1989⁽⁵⁸⁾ and 2005⁽⁵⁹⁾, “Internationalized Bolshevism” (L.D. Trotsky’s term)⁽⁶⁰⁾ was formed on the Western European and American scale among the anti-war socialist left wings. The concentrated and interrelated series of events on Russia’s western borders at the end of 1918 and the beginning of 1919, on the eve of the founding of the Comintern, should be treated as “an integral whole” (J.D. White’s term)⁽⁶¹⁾. And the very idea of the “World Revolution” underlies the integral whole. It is no mere

(55) “Bericht über den Gründungs-Parteitag der Kommunistischen Arbeiter-Partei Deutschlands am 4. und 5. April 1920 in Berlin,” Eingeleitet und kommentiert von H.M. Bock, *Jahrbuch Arbeiterbewegung*, Bd. 5 (Frankfurt am Main, 1977), 199 (my *italics*).

(56) Lazitch/Drachkovitch, 253, 256.

(57) A. Agosti, “The Concept of World Revolution and the ‘World Party for the Revolution’ (1919-1943),” *The International Newsletter of Historical Studies on Comintern, Communism and Stalinism*, No. 9-13, 1997/98, 73-75.

(58) A. Yamanouchi, “‘Internationalized Bolshevism’: The Bolsheviks and the International, 1914-1917,” *Acta Slavica Iaponica. A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies* (Sapporo), Vol. 7, III.1989, 17-32; cf. id., *S.J. Rutgers and a Case Study of the International History of Socialism: Association with Sen Katayama, the Bolsheviks and the American Left Wing* (Kyoto, 1996), 117-133 [in Japanese].

(59) A. Yamanouchi, “The Latvian Soviet Power and the ‘World Revolution’ from the Autumn of 1918 through the Spring of 1919: S.J. Rutgers and the International (One of the Second Series),” *The Shien or the Journal of History*, No. 142, III.2005, 122 [in Japanese].

(60) *Ленинский сборник*, Т. 4 (Москва/Ленинград, 1925), 303.

(61) J.D. White, “National Communism and World Revolution: The Political Consequences of German Military Withdrawal from the Baltic Area in 1918-19,” *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 8, 1994, 1367-1368.

coincidence that the radical left thought and movement was developed in the West by using the Hungarian and Bavarian Revolutions as a further springboard on the one hand, and that Soviet Russia was unable to render active help to the left due to the circumstances surrounding Civil War and the Intervention on the other, just after the founding of the Comintern.

This radical thought and movement, however, was in part premised on wishful thinking, carried along as part of the larger anti-imperialistic war and anti-capitalist sentiment of the time. As Agosti has pointed out, the conviction there frequently induced the communist movement to confuse its desire with reality, overestimating the maturity of the potential revolution in the West, while underestimating both the solidity of the bourgeois regimes and the specificity of the workers' traditions in Europe and in America. As the developments subsequent to [the latter half of 1920 and] 1921 gave support to an increasingly unconditional confidence concerning the first Socialist State's capability of independent survival, the voluntaristic element which had given life to the conception that the revolutionary process was necessarily an international one gradually faded. The Foreign Bureaus examined in this paper were, needless to say, active in the era of a still-unshaken conviction of the international dimension of the revolutionary process, that is, the "World Revolution"⁽⁶²⁾.

6) Theory of the "Revolutionsexport"

During the discussion on another agenda item ("Acting against intervention in Soviet-Russia") of the "Conference of 3d International," Murphy read the resolution prepared by the Committee appointed the previous day [5 February] and Fraina moved two minor addition and one added clause. Only Fraina's added clause was withdrawn. In the latter part of the clause the theory of the so-called "Revolutionsexport" was advocated as follows: "This war will cease the moment the imperialist governments accept peace on the terms repeatedly made public by S.R. Should however the imperialist's opposition compel S.R. to transform her defensive war into a military offensive either in the East or in the West, then this becomes a phase in the international class struggle, and we call upon the workers in the nations involved not to resist the Soviet army, but to rise in revolt against their bourgeoisie and establish their own Soviet Republic."

As for the added clause, only the two remarks are recorded in the minutes: "He [Wijnkoop] has serious objections against it./ Comrade Rutgers also opposes the add. Fraina: Soviet Russia will never march into a country where there has not already a revolution developed. Our Russian friends want peace not only for their own reconstruction, but also because they do not believe in bringing about revolutions by outside interference"⁽⁶³⁾. And the clause is withdrawn.

In the following secret reports there are relevant remarks of Rutgers which are different from the above-mentioned official remark. Here I examine their reliability.

(1) Secret Police Report dated 6 February 1920, Intelligence Service, Ministry of Justice⁽⁶⁴⁾:

"Rutgers says that the Russians reject an aggressive policy, because they think that it is impossible to spread a revolution by means of force of arms." "Rutgers thinks that Soviet Russia would consider this resolution little esteemed. He thinks this resolution untimely. The situation so grave that Soviet troops may take several months beginning to undertake an offensive outside

(62) Agosti, 75.

(63) *Bulletin of the Sub-Bureau in Amsterdam*, No. 2, 5-6; **A-Doc. 2-1-1**, 52.

(64) Verbaalarchief en Kabinetsarchief van het Ministerie van Justitie 1915-1955, Geheime verbalen 1915-1931, Inventaris nr. 16453 (hereafter cited as Verbaalarchief Ministerie van Justitie, 16453), Nationaal Archief, Den Haag; **A-Doc. 2-2-1**, 60, 62.

Russia.”

In the first half of quotation Rutgers categorically denied the “Revolutionsexport,” but in the latter half he only denied it conditionally. Although this report is the most detailed report of the session [6 February], these two remarks of Rutgers are contradictory each other, so they are not reliable.

(2) Secret Police Report dated 11 February 1920, Intelligence Service, Ministry of Justice ⁽⁶⁵⁾:

“Rutgers stated that in the spring the Russian Soviet Republic will undertake an offensive towards the West with the purpose of bringing about the Soviet form of Government in the other countries of Europe. The task of the bureau in Holland is to work the countries in Western Europe in such a manner that on the arrival of the Soviet Armies no opposition shall be offered (See the relevant resolution.) and that in these countries themselves the Soviet Republic shall be proclaimed as the consequence of measures taken by the bureau.”

A. Kan took this quotation at face value and quoted it in his article ⁽⁶⁶⁾. I have to attempt a refutation of it.

The remark is not opposed to Fraina’s added clause. On the contrary, this can be interpreted to mean that Rutgers seems to agree to it. Indeed, after a half year, that is, in the summer of 1920, the Lenin Government switched its policy temporarily for the “Revolutionsexport” in the Soviet-Poland War. But viewed in a historical light, it is unthinkable that the Government had already planned to undertake an offensive towards the West in that spring. In addition to that, there would be no possibility that such a top secret Government plan was conveyed to Rutgers by a secret messenger. As a matter of fact, according to the above-mentioned letter of Trotter to Winter (**A-Doc. 1-2-3**), “....., habe ich [Rutgers] seit meiner Abreise (15 Oktober 1919) bis 9 May 1920, also in einem halben Jahre keinerlei Berichte erhalten.”

(3) [Report of “Doctor,” Nosovitsky to Scotland Yard] dated 14 February 1920 ⁽⁶⁷⁾:

“RUTGERS opposed that clause giving as reason that such a clause adopted by this Conference will give the capitalists a good weapon against Soviet Russia, confirming the capitalists statements which have appeared in the press that Soviet Russia has aggressive plans and imperialistic intentions and therefore, said RUTGERS, we know very well that there is a revolutionary movement in Poland, Germany, Austria, Hungary, France, England or any other country, and if the Soviet Army is in a position to help these countries, undoubtedly they will proceed to those countries and will help the proletariat to establish a Soviet Republic. Therefore, said RUTGERS, I insist that the clause shall not be inserted in the Resolution.”

In the first half of the quotation the opposition for the purpose of a precaution against capitalist reproach is underlined. But according to Report (1), Wijnkoop made the same kind of remark just before Rutgers’ one ⁽⁶⁸⁾. So Jakob H. Nosovitsky seems to have confused the latter with the former. In the latter half the remark is not clear whether it is for or against. Furthermore, the Report (1) says that Nosovitsky remarked in favor of Fraina’s addendum on the point of the “Revolutionsexport” ⁽⁶⁹⁾.

Originally, Nosovitsky was very cautious about the threat of “enemy” as shown in “Report of ‘Doctor,’ Nosovitsky”: “The Bureau of the Third International in Holland from now onward will play the dominating part in the direction of the policies and issues of the revolutionary movements in the various countries. The Bureau is subject to control to Moscow from whence it gets all

(65) Verbaalarchief Ministerie van Justitie, 16453; **A-Doc. 2-2-4**, 71; cf. Correspondence of MID, 10058-342-50; Records of FBI, OG349701.

(66) Kan, “Die Skandinavische Kommission,” 58.

(67) Correspondence of MID, 10058-342-50; Records of FBI, OG349701; **A-Doc. 2-2-8**, 90.

(68) **A-Doc. 2-2-1**, 62.

(69) **A-Doc. 2-2-1**, 60.

instructions and money”⁽⁷⁰⁾. It should be carefully noted that his Report was based on such a tendency.

7) Over Interpretations and Evaluations

I begin by examining some precedent interpretations and evaluations of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau.

According to a report of Zinoviev to the Second Congress of the Comintern, the reason why the Sub-Bureau was dissolved is that it was originally limited as “a technical auxiliary bureau,” but it exceeded its powers and convened at its own initiative the international conference at Amsterdam [“Conference of the 3d International”] which only served to increase the general confusion⁽⁷¹⁾.

That explanation, however, disregards the fact that the ECCI did grant extensive autonomous authority to the Sub-Bureau at the beginning stage (**A-Doc. 1-1-1**).

F. Svátek’s pioneering evaluation was as follows: “The efforts to stimulate the organizational separation of the revolutionary Left in the Western countries from the Social-democratic parties led the Bolshevik leaders of the Comintern to the foundation of a number of ‘foreign bureaus’ of ECCI The contacts between Russia and foreign agencies of the Comintern were however weak. This led to the contest between the bureaus and generally to a great confusion in organizational matters./ At that time the organization of the Comintern was still very indefinite, still in the stage of its birth”⁽⁷²⁾.

The real situation that the Foreign Bureaus did not remain only a technical organ and the point that the Comintern was in the midst of the formative period of organization are well grasped by him. It is, however, needless to say that the elucidation based on primary sources of “a great confusion” had to wait for the disclosure of archival materials in recent years.

In his latest study Voerman has made the following clear-cut argument: “With the end of Allied siege of Russia, a key *raison d’être* for the network of foreign Comintern bureaus no longer applied”; the ECCI radically changed its course for the Communist Parties in the West because the circumstances had altered for the better around the start of 1920, in stark contrast to the autumn of 1919 when the ECCI had granted a plenary power of attorney to S.J. Rutgers. The ECCI’s decision to liquidate the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau was inevitable on the grounds that the Sub-Bureau had failed to understand, and to adapt itself to, the ECCI’s policy shifts, due in part to imperfect communication networks⁽⁷³⁾.

But I do not agree with this interpretations, because, as mentioned above, I regard it as serious that the ECCI did not inform the Sub-Bureau of its sudden switching of policies.

Lazitch/Drachkovitch devoted 22 pages of their book to the activities outside Russia of the first Comintern emissaries such as A.E. Abramovich, N.M. Liubarskii, Reich (Thomas; James Gordon), Borodin and others. It is in order to try to regard their activities critically as former examples of the Comintern’s dominance “from above” that Lazitch/Drachkovitch took a serious

(70) Correspondence of MID, 10058-342-50; Records of FBI, OG349701; **A-Doc. 2-2-8**, 93.

(71) G. Zinoviev, *Report of the Executive Committee of the Communist International to the Second World Congress of the Communist International* (Petrograd, 1920), 19-20.

(72) F. Svátek, “The Governing Organs of the Communist International: their growth and composition, 1919-1943,” *History of Socialism. Year Book 1968* (Prague, 1969), 185.

(73) G. Voerman, “Proletarian Competition. The Amsterdam Bureau and its German Counterpart, 1919-1920,” *Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung 2007* (Berlin, 2007), 218; cf. Voerman, *De meridiaan*, 90-92, 95-97.

view of them. In their interpretation, however, lie the following problems concerned with the so-called “eye of Moscow”: (1) the emissaries were in contact with only a small numbers of the country’s communist leaders and always conscious of Moscow; (2) the emissaries had none of direct responsibilities to the communist party in the country concerned and often sent to Moscow the reports whose contents the national leaders were not permitted to know⁽⁷⁴⁾. In that meaning, emissaries’ influence on the spot was temporary and limited. Lazitch/Drachkovitch were inclined to regard the Foreign Bureaus as those controlled by the centralized Russian organization from the beginning and consequently assumed that the liquidation of the Amsterdam Sub-bureau, which had been out of control, was inevitable.

But the beginning of the centralization of powers by Comintern headquarters (the Bolshevisation) vis-à-vis the Foreign Branches only occurred with a change for the better of the situation involving foreign military intervention inside Russia in 1920. Drastic policy changes occurred in the summer of 1920, after the decision to dissolve the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau had already been made, when most of the remaining Foreign Bureaus were dissolved and replaced by “individual personal agents” through whom the Comintern could more easily carry out its intentions. The Politburo of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party on 6 August 1920 made a decision, “To abolish all the bureaus. To permit only individual personal agents exclusively for technical purposes”⁽⁷⁵⁾.

Two days later, on 8 August, the matter on the Foreign Bureaus was also discussed at the second conference of the ECCI⁽⁷⁶⁾. Zinoviev first introduced a motion to disband all the Bureaus and organize all the business based on direct, independent relationships with individual agents. Next, H. Maring (Hendricus J.F.M. Sneevliet) made a remark that, taking into consideration Shanghai, Tashkent, etc. as candidate areas, it was imperative for the ECCI to establish such centers both in the Far East and in the Middle East. Fraina also argued that, taking into account the fact that American imperialism was extending over the Far East, an American Bureau should be established in Mexico.

Following these multiple assertions, Zinoviev drew the conclusion that following the liquidation of the Bureaus in Europe it was imperative to have similar centers in America and the Far East. And he proposed to the ECCI that the following motion should be passed:

Interests of the Third International demand that in the row of the Executive Committee should not exist other bureaus with political tasks. By this decision the West-European bureau [*sic*] and also other similar bureaus are abolished. The Small Bureau nominates its own trusted persons and assigns them fully definite tasks with their personal responsibility. The Small Bureau must further attend to regularly organizing the services of couriers. Couriers are divided into 3 categories: (1) those who hand over literature, etc.; (2) those who hand over and accept various kinds of information as well; (3) those who execute political tasks⁽⁷⁷⁾.

The proposal was accepted, but as the “executing political tasks” was contained in the third category, the lack of clear distinction between political and non-political tasks was inevitable.

Based on that conclusion, the ECCI decided to liquidate the Bureaus in Europe and, at the same time, to establish new bureaus, with more limited tasks, in America and the Far East. It may

(74) Lazitch/Drachkovitch, 143-164.

(75) РГАСПИ, 17/3/100/1; cf. 495/2/1/22-23; Г.М. Адиев/Э.Н. Шахназарова/К.К. Шириня, *Организационная структура Коминтерна. 1919-1943* (Москва, 1997), 34.

(76) РГАСПИ, 495/1/8/64-65.

(77) РГАСПИ, 495/1/8/65.

safely be said that Fraina's convincing logic created an opportunity both for establishing the Pan-American Agency and for nominating his sworn friend, Katayama, as its chairman. Nevertheless, the Agency was also regarded as an organ composed of "individual personal agents," which implied that the ECCI could have easily liquidated it according to circumstance and in accord with its own judgment.

As I have made my interpretation and evaluation in other paragraphs, I make general ones here.

It may safely be said that the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau's criticism of the ECCI was appropriate. To tell the truth, the ECCI's decision on dissolution was made in the political background that the ECCI, which was deeply cautious of the rise of the left radicalism/left communism, broke away from the "leftism" and, on the contrary, aimed to promote a cooperation, or to form a coalition, with socialist mass parties which consisted of the Left and the rank and file without conservative leaders to be excluded. Far from taking consideration of conditions of every country and region (the so-called "periphery"), the intention of the "center" had priority and began to be imposed one-sidedly (occasionally hinting at the stop or reduction of providing funds for activities [cf. the next chapter] on the "periphery." It was the beginning of the Bolshevisation. The following ultimate conclusion has been drawn: These problems which have been examined in this chapter provide ample reasons to anticipate the difficulties present in the Comintern's direction of transnational activities. The history of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau from foundation to dissolution was the first antecedent example.

4 Problems with Early Comintern Subsidies to the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau

I have already published an article in Japanese, “An Essay on Early Comintern Subsidies to Foreign Communist Organizations” (2018) and put its revised version in my fourth book in Japanese, *The Way to the Third International: S.J. Rutgers and the Founding of the Comintern* (Fukuoka, 2021). Under the present conditions that the materials on early Comintern financial aid to foreign communist organizations, held in the RGASPI, have been closed again, this “essay” (in Japanese) on the theme for a limited period from 1919 to 1920 has aimed to define an attainable goal at the present time. First, this has aimed to make clear the process from decisions of the ECCI on providing funds to their receipts of intermediaries (or local members) by way of changes of amounts, items, etc. in raising funds. Next, it has aimed to grasp how the early Comintern provided subsidies to foreign organizations through its Foreign Bureaus and, above all, to clear up the problem with WES’s embezzling the funds from the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau.

And the principal research results have been gained as follows:

(1) Not only the Russian Communist Party and the ECCI, but also the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the People’s Bank worked together to provide subsidies to foreign organizations. The ECCI did not have full control over providing subsidies and had a fierce dispute with the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs over it.

(2) In the process from the ECCI’s decisions to its providing subsidies there were often changes of breakdown, among which large reductions and stops were not exceptional.

(3) When a Dutch civil engineer and socialist, Rutgers returned from Moscow to his country in the autumn 1919, he recorded the exchange rates of 5 major currencies in his account lists. Depending on the rates I have been able to calculate for the first time how much the funds provided for the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau were embezzled by the WES. Consequently, how the shortage of funds was grave for the Sub-Bureau has become clear.

(4) In the background that the ECCI did not provide additional funds, the ECCI made a political judgement on the recipient organization and decided to add, reduce, or stop subsidies. That is to say that the ECCI regarded the Sub-Bureau as disloyal follower of its policy at that time.

This work has also required the following further examination:

(5) that the process leading from decision, raising and intermediation to receipt had each story at every stage.

(6) that how the received funds were expended efficiently was deeply concerned with both elucidation and evaluation of the movement.

(7) that the ECCI’s political control over foreign organizations was inseparable from its financial aid to them.

This present work as a supplement of *Documents on the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the Comintern* aims to prove (3) and (4) concerning the Sub-Bureau and, at the same time, to add provisional research results of (5) and (6).

1) The List of Soviet Subsidies to Foreign Communists

Before taking up the main subject, out of historical documents introduced by a small number of historians who could get a chance to examine financial documents which the RGASPI opened

Soviet Subsidies to Foreign Communists, ca. May 1919-June 1920

	Pour qui	Par qui	Released to	Date	Doc. No.	Jewelry	D. M.	Swed. Kr.	Finn. M.	Russ. Rub.	\$	£	Morphine	[others]
1	PC hongrois	[E.] Rudnyánszky pour Ditch.	Hungarian Comm. Govt.	Rudnianok for Dige	19190901	1/7	250,000							
2	PC hongrois	Dverley	Hungarian Comm. Govt.	D. Zerlei	19191206	2	207,000							
3	PC hongrois	Brasler Kalusc	Hungarian Comm. Govt.	Brasler Kalush	19191215	3	194,000							
4	Tchéquie	Iv. Simski pour [J.] Handlír et Mus	Bohemia	Iv. Sinekom for Genglerzh and Mush	19201224 1920??24	4	288,000							
5	Tchéquie	(Nom illisible)	Bohemia	(illeg.)	19191119	5	215,000							
6	Allemagne	[J.] Reich pour Thomas	Germany	Reich for Thomas	19190530	1/2	300,500	100,000	100,000 3,000	6,500 [65,000]			7,500	
7	Allemagne	Promtofer-Thomas	Germany	Proletariat	19190909	1/8a	250,000							
8	Allemagne	Rudolph Rothege	Germany	Rudolf Roth[k]egel	19190928	6	639,000							
9	Allemagne	Rozovski pour Reich	Germany	Rozovski for Reich (all 3) for Thomas	19200220	7	275,000							
10	Italie	Liubarski-Carlo	Italy	[N.M.] Liubarskii-Carlo	19190530 19190520	1/2		15,200	13,000	331,800	300,000			
11	Italie	par Berzine	Italy	via [J.] Berzin (illeg.)	19190921	8	487,000							
12	Amérique	Kotliarovitch	America	Kotliarov [Котляров]	19190716	1/4	209,000							
13	Amérique	Khavkine	America	Khavkin [Хавкин]	19190930	1/9	500,000							
14	Amérique	[J.P.] Anderson [K. Beika]	America	Anderson	19200131	9	1,011,000							
15	Amérique	John Reed	America	John Reed	19200122	10	1,008,000							
16	Angleterre	Levine	England	Levin	19190705	1/3	500,000							
17	Angleterre	Levine	England	Levin via [B.I.] Kantorovich (undecipherable to whom)	19190705 19190715	11	1,039,000							
18	Angleterre	Krassine	[England]	See what is for Engl. [L.B.] Krasin	19190829 19190929	12	7,040,000							
19	Pays des Balkans		Balkan countries		19190730	1/5	1,000,000							
20	Yougoslavie	Belosevic	Yugoslav.	Beloshevich [Белосевич]	19191229	13	300,000							
21	PC Autrichien	Mikhail	(?) Comm. Part.	(Shchao?) Mikhail	19191226	14	503,000							
22	PC Autrichien	Ogourski	unknown to which country	Sgurski	19190813	1/6	298,000 297,000							
23	PC Autrichien	Balabanova	unknown to which country	Inoderev gr. Balabanov	19191001 19190901	1/8		[Austr.] Kr.? 83,300						
24	PC Autrichien	(illisible)	unknown to which country	Leo (illeg.) (undecipherable)	19191028	15	2,020,000							
25	PC Autrichien	(Sans mention)	unknown to which country	unknown to whom	19200505	16	5,239,000							
26	[S.J.] Rutgers		Roiters		19190914 19191019 [19191014]	17	4,050,000	5,000	10,000			50,000 50		
27	Bureau suédois	A. Ioffe	Swedish Office	A. Ioffe	19191202 191912??	18		25,000	52,000		4,000	4,000		
28	Pologne	(on dirait des bijoux mais pas de reçu)	Poland	looks as if values no receipts	—? [192003??]	19	10,000,000							
29	Groupe [F.] Lorient		Group Lorient Kost	(both) to A. Groshov	19191227	20	2,500,000 280,000							
30	Thomas		Thomas	to him also	19200618	21	1,000,000	1,600,000 1,600,000					(illisible) 150,000 roman. 150,000	
" " " "							35,600							
							41,322,500 39,102,500	1,786,800 1,780,800	175,000 78,000	331,800 336,300	306,500 [365,000]	4,000 4,050	7,500	150,000 150,000

[Austr.] Kr.? 83,300

to the public only temporarily, I introduce here the list of Soviet subsidies to foreign communists, “corresponding with Krumina’s Receipts” and present an overall picture early Comintern subsidies to foreign communist organizations.

The originals in Russian documents belonged to the Budget Commission of the ECCI⁽¹⁾. They have been published in the French and English versions and, moreover, reproduced in facsimile in the former⁽²⁾. However, the originals are very illegible due to handwriting and friction loss and, moreover, there are a considerable number of differences between two translations. In order to point out them both are put side by side. In case of the differences in figure between them, French translations are placed on the upper row and English translations on the lower. In case errors are ascertained in facsimile, they are crossed out with a line. Phrases in square brackets are annotations by the author of the present work.

In the list for a little over a year, financial aids by means of jewelries are of overwhelming majority and amount to a total value of about 40 million Rub. Out of instances I could carry out a follow-up survey on Nos. 6, 7, 10, 16, 17, 20, 26, 27 and 28 (30%) on the basis of almost all minutes of the ECCI conferences and its Bureau (later Small Bureau) conferences, a part of minutes of the Central Committee conferences of the Russian Communist Party (bolsheviks) and two published collections of documents⁽³⁾. I also tried to make clear the above-mentioned (2) and (5) in my fourth book in Japanese. No. 26 which is concerned with the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau is examined in the next paragraph.

2) The ECCI’s Financial Aid to the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau

In the Bureau conference of the ECCI on 16 September 1919 it was decided to allow Rutgers 40,000 Rub. as travelling expenses to his country and 500,000 Rub. for party works⁽⁴⁾. In the following conference on 28 September it was also decided to organize the Holland Branch and allocate 20 million Rub⁽⁵⁾. The decided amount was the highest in those days of the Foreign Bureaus. It shows how great the ECCI’s expectation was for the Sub-Bureau. According to a secret report of the Intelligence Service of the Dutch Ministry of Justice, however, Rutgers said at the “Conference of the 3d International” that he had not yet received any jewelries to a value of 20 million Rub.⁽⁶⁾ Even if the report should be not reliable, that subsidy would not be provided, judging from the following indirect evidence.

The breakdown of the funds (No. 26 in the above-mentioned list) which Rutgers actually received on 14 October 1919 (i.e., the day before his departure from Moscow) was drastically changed as follows: 10,000 Swedish Kr./5,000 Germany M./jewelries to a value of 4,050,000

(1) РГАСПИ, 495/82/1/?.

(2) V. Loupan/P. Lorrain, *L’argent de Moscou. L’histoire la plus secrete du PCF* (Paris, [1994]), 46-48, 254-255; H. Klehr/J.E. Haynes/K.M. Anderson, *The Soviet World of American Communism* (New Haven/London, 1998), 22-24.

(3) *Коминтерн и идея мировой революции. Документы* (Москва, 1998); *Политбюро ЦК РКП(б)-ВКП(б) и Коминтерн. 1919-1943. Документы* (Москва, 2004).

(4) РГАСПИ, 495/1/1/52.

(5) РГАСПИ, 495/1/1/78-79 (A-Doc. 1-1-1).

(6) Inlichtingendienst, A No 41 Geheim (11.II.1920), Verbaalarchief en Kabinetsarchief van het Ministerie van Justitie 1915-1955, Geheime verbalen 1915-1931, Inventaris nr. 16453, Nationaal Archief, Den Haag (A-Doc. 2-2-4, 71; 2-2-7, 79).

Rub./£50⁽⁷⁾.

Rutgers recorded the exchange rates of these currencies to Dutch guilder (f.) in his account lists dated 15 December 1919⁽⁸⁾:

1 Swedish krona (Kr.) = **f. 0.5615**

1 German Mark (M.) = **f. 0.084**

1 ruble (Rub.) = **f. 0.0696**⁽⁹⁾

1 Pound (£) = **f. 10.06**

Depending on these rates those provided funds are converted to guilder as follows:

10,000 Kr. = f. 5,615; 5,000 M. = f. 420; (jewelries to a value of) 4,050,000 Rub. = f. 281,880; £50 = f. 503; in total **f. 288,418**.

The above-mentioned decided amount, that is, 20,500,000 Rub. [f. 1,426,800 at the guilder rate] (except travelling expenses) would be reduced to f. 288,418 (**20.2%**). It would be the very amount at the guilder rate of the funds which the ECCI actually provided for the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau.

To tell the truth, a considerable amount of the funds which Rutgers received was embezzled by the WES, when he stopped in Berlin on his way home. The details are described in the two letters of G.L. Trotter (Rutgers) to Winter (Berzin) dated 20 December 1919 and 9 March 1920⁽¹⁰⁾. Let us examine them in the next paragraph.

3) Problems with WES's Embezzlement of Funds

First I summarize relevant parts in those letters:

I [Rutgers] arrived in Berlin at the end of October 1919 and first met Eduard Fuchs and next Paul Levi. As I thought that at least in the KPD financial affairs I could trust comrades like Fuchs and Levi and use money for international purposes, I decided to leave 400,000 Mark at once. For that purpose I had to convert my baggage [jewelries] into money. The remainder was arranged to be transmitted to Holland by our completely trustworthy courier in order to reduce the risk. In the beginning, two pieces [diamonds] (a bigger and a middler yellow) were transmitted to Holland by a courier who happened to be in Berlin and sold for f. 25,975. To my regret, I met James later and he thought at once that I was taken in [by Fuchs and Levi] and the sum handed over by me would turn exclusively the KPD for the better. [After we received two diamonds] we sent our absolutely trustworthy courier to Berlin and he came back with the report that Fuchs (in collusion with Levi) rejected to hand in gold or goods. James also does not take kindly to this misdeed and

(7) Loupan/Lorrain, 47-48, 254-255; Klehr/Haynes/Anderson, 22-24. The original written expression of £50 is "£50,000." The reason why I adopt not "50,000" but "50" will be mentioned later.

(8) "Meegenomen op reis 15 Oct. 1919.," Archief S.J. Rutgers, Map I-1, IISG.

(9) According to Rutgers' record concerning that rate, the ruble-guilder exchange rate as of 15 February 1919: 1 ruble = f. 0.25. It means that during less than year and a half the rate fell suddenly by one quarter. Although the ruble exchange rate got worse and worse, the value of jewelries from Soviet Russia would not have fallen sharply. So I would like to handle this rate only as a rough estimate.

(10) ПГАСПИ, 495/18/3/50-53, 495/172/59/6-9 (**A-Doc. 1-2-1**); 497/2/8/1-7, 581/1/95/33-39 (**A-Doc. 1-2-2**). No testimony from persons concerned on the other side was given and the receiver of those letters, the secretary of the ECCI, posed that problem at neither its conference nor the conference of its Bureau.

even he seems to have been obliged to pay a part of the cost of the [international] conference, for which I had already left 80,000 Mark.

Judging from the text, Rutgers placed great reliance on Reich, alias James. But Fuchs was also concerned in the WES as “cashier”⁽¹¹⁾ and Reich was to secede with the Comintern afterward. I wonder whether Reich was involved in the embezzlement.

How much amount did they embezzle? According to Trotter’s letter to “Doktor” [perhaps M. Bronski, the ECCI representative in Germany] dated 14 February 1920, they were supposed to get “at least 5 million marks”⁽¹²⁾. One more report of a secret agent (Nosovitsky) said that “the German comrades has sold them [stones] for four million M. and the money was being used for revolutionary propaganda in Germany”⁽¹³⁾.

Did it really amount to 5 million M. or 4 million? As mentioned above, out of the jewelries to a value of 4,050,000 Rub. (f. 281,880 at the guilder rate) which Rutgers carried with him in Berlin, only 2 diamonds, which reached to Holland and were converted to f. 25,975, were deducted and the balance, that is, the remainder in Berlin was supposed to be the jewelries to a value of **f. 255,905** (including jewelries to a value of 400,000 M. [f. 33,600] which Rutgers first offered Fuchs and Levi). In case only figures at the exchange rate are handled, it follows:

$$\text{f. } 255,905 \times x \doteq (5 \text{ million M.}) \text{ f. } 420,000$$

$$x \doteq \mathbf{1.64} \text{ (times)}$$

$$\text{f. } 255,905 \times x \doteq (4 \text{ million M.}) \text{ f. } 336,000$$

$$x \doteq \mathbf{1.31} \text{ (times)}$$

Considering that the value of jewelries from Soviet Russia would not have fallen so sharply as the ruble exchange rate, 5 million M. or 4 million which Rutgers wrote or said would be no exaggeration.

Here I will decide an unsettled question whether the pounds which the ECCI provided for the Sub-Bureau were 50,000 or 50⁽¹⁴⁾. In case of £50,000 (f. 503,000 at the above-mentioned guilder rate), total amount is f. 790,915 and in case of £50 (f. 503), it is f. 28,418. In case of the former, even if the diamonds to a value of f. 255,905 were embezzled by the WES, £50,000 (f. 790,915) would have been approximately treble as much as f. 255,905. So the Sub-Bureau would have funds enough and to spare. Considering that the Sub-Bureau was for lack of funds from the start, the pounds provided by the ECCI would have been **£50**.

Accordingly, the ratio of f. 255,905 embezzled by the WES among f. 288,418 at the guilder rate of total amount provided by the ECCI would be **about 88.7%**. The remainder of the funds is **f. 32,513**. Judging from the actual expenditure and Rutgers’ testimony (**A-Doc. 1-2-2**), the amount was only for three months’ activities.

What is worse, as soon as the strife between the ECCI and the Sub-Bureau on Parliamentarism and the Trade Union issue became apparent, the ECCI cut off additional funds for the Sub-Bureau. There was a striking contrast in the way in which the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau and the WES were treated by the ECCI, respectively. Only the WES continued working and being subsidized by the ECCI in spite of the decision of all Foreign Bureaus’ dissolution. In effect, the WES was treated in a still more sympathetic way and its embezzling the funds from the Sub-Bureau was passed over, because the ECCI regarded the WES as loyal follower of its policy at that time. Addition, reduction or stop of the funds was influenced by the ECCI’s political judgment on each occasion.

(11) РГАСПИ, 499/1/3/93.

(12) РГАСПИ, 497/2/4/29-31.

(13) Correspondence of MID, 10058-342-50; Records of FBI, OG349701; **A-Doc. 2-2-8**, 97.

(14) In the French version “50,000” and in the English version “50” are respectively adopted.

Voerman writes down both amounts. Voerman, *De meridiaan*, 493.

4) Great Disparity of Funds between the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau and the WES

As compared with the Sub-Bureau, I refer to the funds which the ECCI provided the WES⁽¹⁵⁾:

(1) Funds which were provided on 9 September 1919 for setting up are jewelries to a value of 250,000 Rub. (**f. 17,400** at the guilder rate).

(2) Additional funds on 29 October 1919 are jewelries to a value of 2,022,400 Rub. (**f. 140,759**).

(3) Funds on 30 May 1919 which were provided before the setting up the WES are jewelries to a value of 300,500 Rub. (f. 20,915), 100,000 M. (f. 8,400), 3,000 Kr. (f. 1,685), morphine to a value of 7,500 Rub. (f. 522) and 65,000 Rub. (f. 4,524) [in subtotal **f. 36,046**].

(4) Funds which the WES embezzled from the Sub-Bureau are diamonds to a value of **f. 255,905**.

In case they are added up one by one⁽¹⁶⁾, it follows:

(1) + (2) = f. 158,159

(1) + (2) + (3) = f. 194,205

(1) + (2) + (3) + (4) = f. 450,110

Funds which the Sub-Bureau received at the beginning were **about f. 288,00** and those of the WES (including those before its setting up) were **about f. 194,000**. All the funds available of the former were **about f. 33,000** and those of the latter were **about f. 450,000**.

Consequently, it has been ascertained for the first time how much the Sub-Bureau's funds was embezzled and how serious the embezzlement was for the Sub-Bureau.

(15) Nos. 6 and 7 in the above-mentioned list; РГАСПИ, 495/1/1/25; 495/1/1/31-32; 495/1/1/81; Loupan / Lorrain, 258; Ф. Фирсов, *Секреты Коммунистического Интернационала. Шифропереписка* (Москва, 2011), 118.

(16) Although Rutgers wrote that members of the KPD embezzled the Sub-Bureau's funds, Reich cooperated closely with the KPD before the setting up of the WES. So both funds are put all together here.

5 The Pre-history of the Establishment of the Pan-American Agency

At the end of November 1919, when the Mexican Communist Party (MCP) was founded under the leadership of Manabendra N. Roy, the Latin American Bureau of the Third International was also established provisionally at the suggestion of Borodin, who had just arrived in Mexico⁽¹⁾. Following the Bureau's founding, Borodin immediately set out for home, accompanied by Jesús Ramírez⁽²⁾, and at the beginning of January 1920 he reported from Madrid to the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau (Rutgers) about not only the establishment of the Latin American Bureau but also plans to establish an Information Bureau and Press Service of the Third International (Agencia Verdad, Servicio Internacional de Noticias) in Madrid⁽³⁾, both of which were to be supported by the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau⁽⁴⁾. Thus a far-reaching plan was devised to create a transnational network from Moscow to Madrid via Amsterdam and, even further afield, across the Atlantic Ocean by using the cultural and linguistic ties between Spain and Mexico with the rest of the Spanish-speaking Americas⁽⁵⁾.

At the "Conference of the 3d International" decisions were made to establish the American Sub-Bureau of the Comintern for the two Americas and to call the Pan-American Conference of Communist Organizations⁽⁶⁾. Shortly after that decision, through a go-between, Fraina who had played a active role in that Conference, the Pan-American Bureau was provisionally organized in New York by the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the CPA on 25 March 1920. Joseph Andrew(s) (Nicholas I. Hourwich), David Damon (Charles E. Ruthenberg) and A. Raphael (Alexander Bittelman) of the CPA were appointed members of the provisional Bureau and the following decision was added: "There will be added to the membership of the Bureau a representative of the South American parties as soon as connections are established to call a conference at which the permanent bureau will be established"⁽⁷⁾.

On the other hand, at the beginning of August 1920, the Latin American Bureau in Mexico started the first issue of its organ, *Boletín Comunista*, in which it proclaimed that it had received authority to call the Pan-American Communist Conference in Mexico with the support of the CPA and, moreover, sought to take over the task of making connections with Japan and the Far East. The task in question had, in fact, been inserted in the above-mentioned decision on establishing

(1) L. Kheyfetz/V. Kheyfetz, "Michael Borodin. The First Comintern-emissary to Latin America (Part One)," *The International Newsletter of Historical Studies on Comintern, Communism and Stalinism*, Vol. 2, No. 5/6, 1994/95, 148; cf. Л.С. Хейфец/В.Л. Хейфец, *Коминтерн и Латинская Америка. Люди, структуры, решения* (Москва, 2019), 85-86.

(2) Born Ch.F. Phillips, attended the Second Congress of the Comintern as delegate of the MCP and, after coming back, was to join the Agency.

(3) M. Borodin to [Rutgers], 4.I.1919 [1920], РГАСПИ, 497/2/1/1-4; cf. 495/120/250/5-6.

(4) G.L. Trotter [=] S.J.R[utgers]. (Amsterdam) to Borodin, 15.II.1920, РГАСПИ, 497/2/1/12-12 об.

(5) Cf. Л.С. Хейфец, *Коминтерн в Латинской Америке: формирование и эволюция организационных связей III Интернационала и его национальных секций (от зарождения коммунистического движения до создания Южноамериканского секретариата ИККИ)* (Санкт-Петербург, 2004), 35; Л.С. и В.Л. Хейфец, *Коминтерн и Латинская Америка*, 94.

(6) *Bulletin of the Sub-Bureau in Amsterdam*, No. 2, 8-9.

(7) "American Bureau of the International," *The Communist*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 5.IV.1920, 1.

the American Sub-Bureau as follows: “To obtain the cooperation of the Japanese companions with the object of extending and connecting propaganda in Japan and the Far East” ⁽⁸⁾.

Both Bureaus came to work separately without establishing a close connection with each other. In addition to that, the establishment of the Pan-American Agency of the ECCI was decided in Moscow in August-September 1920. That decision of the ECCI was necessarily superior to that of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau which had been dissolved several months before. Both Bureaus, which were far from calling the Pan-American Communist Conference on account of financial difficulty, were to be superseded by the Pan-American Agency which was amply funded.

(8) “La Conferencia Comunista Pan-Americana,” *Boletín Comunista. Organo del Bureau Latino Americano de la Tercera Internacional* (México), Año 1, No. 1, 8.VIII.1920, 7.

6 The Points at Issue of the Pan-American Agency

Following the decision on establishing again two Bureaus in America and the Far East respectively at the above-mentioned conference of the ECCI on 8 August 1920, the Small Bureau confirmed the former staffs, that is, “comrades Katayama, Fraina and Janson [Karlis Jansons]” in “4) On the bureau in Mexico” of the fifth agenda item (“Problems of the American movement”) at the conference of 29 September 1920 ⁽¹⁾.

The whole picture of the Pan-American Agency, from its establishment to its dissolution by way of its activities in New York, and then in Mexico City (including those in Canada and South America), is not presented here. I have presented, however, that picture in my books, articles and other publications (cf. Preface), in which some points at issue of the Agency have been revealed. In this chapter I examine them by tackling each problem separately.

1) Problems with a Decision on Dissolving the Newly-established Agency

No sooner had the ECCI dissolved the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau than it accepted the proposal to establish the Foreign Bureaus only in America and the Far East as an exceptional matter. Nevertheless, the authority of the Foreign Bureaus was more restricted, and the ambiguity on “executing political tasks” was present from the start, as mentioned above. The Pan-American Agency was to be summarily dissolved by the ECCI in order to resolve the ensuing confusion.

On 28 September 1921 Katayama with Fraina made a report to the Small Bureau of the ECCI: “Rumors have reached us from New York that the Comintern contemplates liquidating the American Agency. We do not know the source of these rumors, or how true they are. But if true, then we suggest that you send to Mexico a competent Communist comrade as your representative, to work here, with support; otherwise the whole movement will go to pieces” ⁽²⁾. Far from accommodating Katayama’s strong request to ensure functional continuity even after that dissolution, the Secretariat of the ECCI had already, in fact, started planning the establishment of a new, similar organization before ordering the liquidation: “Aufgaben u. Organisationsplan d. Lateinisch-amerikanischen Section im Secretariat d. Komintern” was drafted by “M. Jaroshevski/ Leiter d. Section” and accepted on that same day ⁽³⁾. According to the plan, Latin American countries were to be classified into three types (Argentina and Mexico whose communist parties had participated in the Comintern; Uruguay and Chile whose communist parties or groups did not yet; Brazil and most countries on the Pacific coast of South America where capitalism was

(1) РГАСПИ, 495/2/1/99-99 об.; 495/2/3/97-97 об.; cf. Адиев/Шахназарова/Шириня, 30.

(2) РГАСПИ, 495/108/11/42-46; 495/18/66/327-331 (**Doc. 1-12** in Part 1). Under the present conditions that almost all archives which held financial materials of the Comintern are closed in the RGASPI (РГАСПИ), we can make the best use of the financial materials on the Agency. For Katayama and Fraina made out some detailed financial statements, etc. and the related archives which held them are still open for us. Out of them I have compiled, edited and printed 51 documents in Part 1 (Doc. 1-1 ~ 10-9). Those 51 documents are cited hereafter as “Doc. 1-12.”

(3) РГАСПИ, 495/79/1/1-2; *Коминтерн и Латинская Америка. Сборник документов* (Москва, 1998), 30-31.

underdeveloped and the labor movement was hardly differentiated) and to be assigned to the task which corresponded to each type. Shortly after that, at the Presidium conference of the ECCI on 10 October 1921 the following was decided: “To dissolve Pan-american bureau [*sic*]” ⁽⁴⁾.

In the end, Katayama and Fraina were never informed of the decision on dissolving the Agency directly by the ECCI. Katayama, who had been summoned from Mexico City to Moscow, took it up as “a matter of Communist discipline” that only rumors of abolishing the Agency had reached his ears: “‘I am informed by the returning men, that in the Main Office [ECCI] sentiment prevails, that the Agency will be abolished.’ These rumors reflected in the attitude of the American Communist Party Executives, who treated the Agency with the most insulting tone. To the earnest and sincere requests sent by the Agency to the C.E.C. of C.P.A., were dealt with by them coldest and utterly uncomradely manner.” “It is grave matter of discipline in the Communist Party that it should stop the circulating rumors [including the rumors of suspicions against Fraina] by investigation and proper communication with the responsible authorities” (**Doc. 9-1**).

In the background of this problem stayed not only the above-mentioned problem of the Foreign Bureaus’ position initially given by the ECCI, but also problems with two chains of instructions from the ECCI.

2) Problems with Two Chains of Instructions from the ECCI

Although the Foreign Bureaus were in charge of playing the role of mediator between the ECCI and the communist organizations in the countries concerned, there were in fact two chains of instructions from the ECCI, that is, not only through the Pan-American Agency but also through the representatives in Moscow of the CPA and the United Communist Party of America (UCPA).

Soon after the decision on establishing the Agency in Moscow, for example, on 1 November 1920 a representative of the ECCI, “C” [John Carr = Ludwig E. Katterfeld], gave instructions on the issues of the trade union and so on to the CEC of the UCPA as follows: “they are to be carried out in conjunction with comrades Katayama and Jansen [Jansons]” ⁽⁵⁾. The instructions were issued on the basis of the existence of the Agency and, at that time, the chain of instructions was not yet confused. But, just after Katayama’s arrival in Mexico City, the second important instruction of the ECCI reached Charles E. Scott [Jansons] in New York. Without consulting Katayama, on 4 April 1921 Scott sent both the CPA and the UCPA the notification requiring the agreement about the conditions for the unification of two parties without giving them any choice (**Doc. 2-4**). On 16 April the CPA formed its judgement that “Comrade Scott is overstepping the [unity] ultimatum of the Agency itself” ⁽⁶⁾, furthermore, “the Am. Agency has overstepped its powers” and sent Comintern headquarters a statement, protesting against the change from proportional representation to equal representation to be based upon the number of delegates to the upcoming convention and so on ⁽⁷⁾. The CPA’s reply was sent by telegram to Katayama by way of Scott on 26 April 1921: “Received following from main office; *authorized by board of*

(4) РГАСПИ, 495/2/5/84; *Die Tätigkeit der Exekutive und des Präsidium des E.K. der Kommunistischen Internationale vom 13. Juli 1921 bis 1. Februar 1922* (Petrograd, 1922), 240.

(5) РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/2; 515/1/20/44; another document confiscated by the USA government on 29 April 1921, in: Records of FBI, BS202600-1775-368.

(6) РГАСПИ, 515/1/45/24.

(7) РГАСПИ, 515/1/45/25; cf. 515/1/46/29-29a.

directors [the ECCI] to state Agency has no authority to press five conditions. Equal basis and chairman joint stock meeting with voice but no vote enough and all is necessary. Other conditions are not pertaining to preliminary arrangements and are subject to the decision of joint stock meeting. Josef Andrews and Marshall [Max Bedacht] Co.” (**Doc. 1-4** [my *italics*]).

Receiving that reply, Katayama sent Rutgers a letter saying, “Thus you see again Agency dominated by somewhat partisan attitude was fortunately defeated by the second mandate, although it too shows a trace of partisan attitude bias in the hand of Andrews! Yet I am glad that this will shift entirely the responsibility of the coming convention on the shoulders of both parties, while the Agency’s responsibility is greatly lightened, being taken away the chairman’s casting or controlling power” (**Doc. 4-2**; cf. **Doc. 4-1**). In fact, the attendance of the chairman of the Agency, Katayama, which had been expected, was not required and on 15-28 May 1921 thirty delegates from each party assembled and held the joint unity convention at Woodstock, New York ⁽⁸⁾.

Indeed, the unification was achieved, incomplete as it was. ECCI’s instructions, however, were not given directly to the Agency, but first to the CPA (Andrews and Marshall Co.). It meant that the channels of instructions from the ECCI got crossed. In addition, the Agency’s authority over the party unification issue was weakened, though Katayama was pleased at the lightened responsibility. Those facts were to bring further troubles over the future activities of the Agency.

In case of Canada, those instructions were given by the Agency, to be exact, Scott alone. Indeed Marshall, who was a CPA delegate in the ECCI and served concurrently as Communist Party of Canada (CPC) delegate, returned home and visited Canada, carrying instructions from the Third Congress of the Comintern to organize a legal political party ⁽⁹⁾. But Scott worked in concert with Marshall, so the channel of instructions was not disordered.

3) An Influence of the Strife between American Communist Parties on the Agency

The strife between the two parties was bitter and, above all, the CPA led by the Russian Federation, which had not been merged into the UCPA, took a resolute stance which left no room for mutual concessions ⁽¹⁰⁾. This ongoing strife had not only a negative impact on the communist movement in the USA, but also became a major factor that was to make the Agency’s attempts to unite the two parties difficult.

It had already been expressed clearly in a document of the President of the ECCI, Zinoviev, to the Committees of the CPA and the CLPA dated 12 January 1920 that “a united party is not only possible but is absolutely necessary” in the USA: “The American Communist Party is principally

(8) *Official Bulletin of the Communist Party of America (Section of the Communist International) formed at the Joint Unity Convention of the UCP and CP* (n.p.), No. 1, V.1921, 1-4; cf. Correspondence of MID, 10110-1581-103.

(9) “C.E.C. Minutes. Special Meeting Sept. 22 [1921],” ПГАСПН, 495/98/4/34; cf. 495/98/4/30-31.

(10) When the UCPA was organized at a joint convention of the CPA and the Communist Labor Party of America (CLPA), held in Bridgman, Michigan on 26-31 May 1920, a fairly large member of the Slavic Federations (Russian, Ukrainian, Lettish, Polish and Lithuanian) did not participate in it and remained in the former CPA. cf. Greetings to the Communist International/Comrades of the ECCI, ПГАСПН, 515/1/25/1-2; 497/2/2/190-191. This document, which had been adopted at the joint convention, with a letter signed by Issac E. Ferguson reached Rutgers on 3 July 1920 after the dissolution of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau and was forwarded to M[oscow]. by Rutgers.

a foreign party embracing so-called 'national' federations. The American Communist Labour Party chiefly represents American or English-speaking elements. If the first is more developed theoretically and is more closely connected with the traditions of the revolutionary struggle of the Russian working class, it is on the other hand more isolated from the mass movement and mass organisations of the American workers who are gradually entering the broad path of the struggle between the classes. Thus both parties naturally supplement each other, and only by their unification is it possible to create in America an efficient Communist Party which must take the lead in the mass movement; and in the oncoming communist revolution" ⁽¹¹⁾.

When Maximilian Cohen (alias Henry Allen), who had been expelled from the CPA in January 1921, became a member of the Agency, the Agency was obliged to handle not only the vital issue of unification, but also the so-called Cohen case. Here I drop the explanation of the course of events ⁽¹²⁾, but take up only "an Appeal to the ECCI" which he drafted on 16 January 1921 for his expulsion from the CPA arising out of the problem with the unification of the Communist Parties ⁽¹³⁾. He grasped in it the focal point at issue as follows: "Behind the question of unity lies the fundamental question of the future form of organization which the united party shall take,— i.e., the old question of foreign language federations"; "And, unfortunately, 'federation control' is and has been inevitably accompanied by an instinctively 'left Communist' policy upon the American movement."

Harsh criticism of the CPA leaders was given by Katayama just before departing for Mexico: "They are, indeed, a good communist in so far as they understand the literal meaning of the documents given by the Third International. Their understanding and interpretation are often negative and passive and lack positive and active, hence miserably fail in practical world. The present leaders' mind is stiff somewhat fossilized and so no flexibility at all. Look at the unity question. The C.P. stand is right and logical through and through. so far so good but they forget the spirit of the mandate and entirely ignore the very urgency of the unity itself. The C.P. maintains its integrity and compactness by an extreme centralization, by expulsion and intimidation and by keeping members in dark ignorance. There is no free discussion, development and initiative in thought and action among the rank and file" ⁽¹⁴⁾. The hardening of the CPA's stance on the issue caused Scott to make the above-mentioned notification. It also led to double-tracking the channel of instructions from the ECCI.

But the strife between UCPA and CPA did not exert a deep influence on each section in Canada. Through leading members of both sections the CPC was founded in May 1921 and the founding of the Workers' Party of Canada (WPC) followed in February 1922 (cf. Paragraph 6).

4) The Strife between Katayama and Scott

The strife between the two parties significantly influenced on one member the Agency, Scott: He was backing up the UCPA to which he belonged.

On 1 March 1921 a meeting of the Pan-American Council of the Red Labor Union International (RLUI) was held and the motion that "\$500.00 be turned over to U.C.P. to be

(11) ПГАСПИ, 515/1/17/1-3; cf. *KH*, No. 11, n.d. [1920], 1887-1892.

(12) Cf. ПГАСПИ, 515/1/45/1-4.

(13) ПГАСПИ, 515/1/61/21-23.

(14) **Doc. 1-1.** By the way, Katayama's evaluation of the UCPA was more critical: "As to the U.C.P. I have very little to say./ The U.C.P. needs the strong leadership in men of principle and integrity to check and safeguard the party from going to [be] opportunistic."

applied for Defense [of comrades in prison]" was carried ⁽¹⁵⁾. But at the meeting of the Pan-American Agency of 5 March that motion was withdrawn and it was decided again that "the C.E.C. of the U.C.P.[A.] be called upon immediately to refund the \$500 advanced to it for 'defense'" ⁽¹⁶⁾.

The other members, Fraina and Katayama, however, were not so sympathetic to the CPA to which they belonged, because they were outside of its mainstream. Moreover, there was a contrast between Katayama and Scott, which can also be related to a difference between their temperaments: one was a thorough correspondent and was disciplined in financial matters, while the other wrote little and did not make out the financial report one by one; one tended to be optimistic about the outcome of their activities, while the other, who had been in the left position in the centrist group of Latvian socialists in the USA ⁽¹⁷⁾, was more of a realist.

Their antagonism weakened the authority of the Agency. After the unification of the American Communist Parties, especially the CPA took advantage of it: "Comrade[s] Yavki [Katayama] and Carter [Fraina], speaking in the name of the Pan-American Bureau [*sic*], complain about the poor connections between the Agency and the Party. This comes to us as a surprise. We are in direct and continuous touch with the Agency through its representative in the United States, Comrade Charles E. Scott" ⁽¹⁸⁾. Thus the CPA asserted that it continued contact with the Agency through its American member, Scott, while distancing itself from Katayama in Mexico and disavowing any responsibility for the Agency's malfunctions ⁽¹⁹⁾.

(15) Here I add a supplementary explanation of the Pan-American Council. Although the RLUI (Profintern) was founded at the same time of the Third Congress of the Comintern in June-July 1921, its provisional organization, the International Council of Trade and Industrial Unions, had already been organized at the same time of the Second Congress of the Comintern in July-August 1920. In parallel with the Comintern's establishing the Agency, the RLUI aimed at establishing the Pan-American Council and, furthermore, its subordinate organization, that is, the American Bureau in the USA, the Provisional Mexican Bureau in Mexico and the Canadian Bureau in Canada, respectively. A small numbers of members did not escape holding two posts concurrently and the chairmen of the Agency held that of the Council. They used different names for different purposes, so occasionally misusing names occurred. cf. The Chairman of the American Agency to [Mexican] Comrades, 15.VI.1921, ПГАСПИ, 495/18/66/16-17. The sphere of activity of both organizations, however, was originally different each other. Therefore, on 3 March 1921 the chairman of the Agency appealed in a "confidential" letter to each CEC of the CPA and the UCPA as follows: "It is imperative that no references be made in the Communist organs which you publish linking up the American Bureau of the R.L.U.I. with either of the two Communist Parties in this country, as the Bureau is acting legally. Such references may fall into the hands of the authorities and thus lay the Bureau open to the charge that it is a Communist 'affair.'" ПГАСПИ, 495/18/65/45.

(16) **Doc. 2-2.** That funding in advance was an idea of Scott and J. Harper (Julius Heiman [Hyman]) who attended the meeting falsely as agent of Thompson (Fraina) in charge of financial affairs. On Katayama's criticism of this advance, see Chapter 7-5.

(17) Cf. Yamanouchi, *S.J. Rutgers*, 138-139; *The New York Call*, Vol. 10, No. 105, Section II, 15.IV.1917, 4; Records of FBI, OG343419.

(18) Carr, Executive Secretary, CPA to Scott (Forwarded to Yavki by A. Bray [Scott], 8.IX.1921), ПГАСПИ, 495/18/66/109-110.

(19) This CPA's stance was partly derived from Scott's behavior: Katayama wrote to Bray on 16 September [1921] saying that "Your latest letter makes it quite clear that you recognize neither the authority of the Agency over you, nor its functions./ General authority is vested collectively in the Agency, and more in myself as its chairman. You are completely ignoring this authority" [**Doc. 5-4**].

The strife between Katayama and Scott was also the same in case of Canada: In contrast with Katayama's manner Scott told very little except the first report to Katayama on 19 April 1921 (**Doc. 5-1**). In spite of Scott's weakness, he could achieve more desirable results of his activities in Canada than in the USA (cf. Paragraph 6).

In the meantime Fraina was no longer a vital figure as when he had played an active role in the American Left Wing movement ⁽²⁰⁾. At the beginning of his activities in the Agency, his two stays in Berlin (mid-October 1920 – 18 January 1921; 1 April – 5 June 1921 (cf. **Doc. 10-7**) as courier of funds for activities were considered to have been exceedingly long (This will be examined in detail in Chapter 7). Even Katayama felt uneasy for a moment about when Fraina would come to Mexico: "I can't understand the movement of our Littlebit [Fraina]. What has he doing [*sic*] all those three months? I wonder!" ⁽²¹⁾

Moreover, it is difficult to find any positive attitudes in his activities after his late arrival in Mexico City. He may have begun thinking about leaving the communist movement, or (in accord with my previous analysis) Fraina, who had been a leader of the theoretical radicalization, may have been impractical in reality. This point needs further examination (cf. Chapter 7).

5) A Conflict over Funds of Activities

Although the Agency was most concerned about the relations with the two American Communist Parties, its authority was largely ignored. The only reliance that the two parties placed on the Agency was, in fact, for its financial aid. This was owing to the decision by the ECCI not to give any financial aid directly to communist organizations in each country but rather to give aid indirectly through the Foreign Bureaus of the ECCI. Financial troubles, however, often occurred through that process. They were also never stopped either inside or outside the Agency.

The financial troubles would have a decisive impact on the evaluation of the world movement of the Comintern. It is important to make clear the financial conditions of the Agency in order to examine its activities as a whole. I handle that key issue in the following Chapter 7.

6) Results of the Agency's Activities?

What were the results of the Pan-American Agency's activities?

In the USA, conditions conducive to good results were hard from the very beginning. As mentioned above, the strife between American Communist Parties significantly influenced the Agency's activities. Scott reported positive results of his activities in the USA and Canada in his letter to Zinoviev dated 15 October 1921 (**Doc. 8-1**). I will examine in Chapter 7 such a self-praise for his activities together with the question of suspicion about his dubious accounting.

In Mexico, the Agency attempted to make contacts with the local organizations and published organs, statements, etc. not only in English, but also in Spanish. On 21 April 1921 "Chairman of the Pan-American Council of the International Council of the Trade and Industrial Union" (New York) officially nominated José Rubio (a member of the Executive Committee of Confederación General de Trabajadores [CGT]), M. Paley (Herman M. Levin(e); the editor of the organ of the

(20) Cf. Yamanouchi, *S.J. Rutgers*, 237-238; B.D. Wolfe, *A Life in Two Centuries. An Autobiography* (New York, 1981), 230; Th. Draper, "Communists and Their History," *Political Affairs*, 1959, No. 5, 58-61.

(21) [Katayama] to Bray, 19.VI.1921, ПГАСПН, 495/18/66/21-22.

Mexican Executive of the IWW), José C. Valadés (a member of the Mexican Federation of Communist Youth) and Félix Leija Paz (a member of Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana [CROM]) as the members of the Provisional Mexican Bureau of the RLUI⁽²²⁾. On the next day, 22 April, a weekly, *El Trabajador; Organo del Bureau Provisional Mexicano del Consejo Internacional de Sindicatos y Uniones de Trabajadores (Internacional Roja)* was founded (cf. **Doc. 3-2**).

Under difficult circumstances that one and another radical foreign activists were arrested and deported from Mexico, Katayama himself was obliged to go underground temporarily in May 1921. Nevertheless he kept on sending local activists messages and proposals from June through August 1921⁽²³⁾. How much influence did the Agency's participation in local movement exert upon them? Although a comprehensive evaluation should be done only after examining all the historical materials on the Mexican side, these materials seem to be still limited in number under current circumstances.

The founding of a new Communist Party of Mexico was a vital mission of the Agency. Here I briefly explain how the work made only slow progress. Judging from the fact that each leader of both Mexican Communist Parties, Linn A.E. Gale and Roy, was outside Mexico together and both Parties were in name only, Katayama requested on 25 May 1921 the members of the Mexican Federation of Communist Youth to appoint a convention committee in order to organize a Communist Party of Mexico⁽²⁴⁾. After Fraina arrived in Mexico City at the beginning of July 1921, Katayama with Fraina sent fraternal greetings dated 18 July to the Congress of the Mexican Federation of Communist Youth and proposed "that your Congress elect a Committee of Three to start the work of organizing a Communist Party"⁽²⁵⁾. As a matter of fact, the [Organizing] Committee took much time to call and hold the Congress itself. It was held on 25-30 December 1921, that is, two months after Katayama's leaving for Moscow. For Katayama and Fraina began writing with the following opening paragraph on 19 September 1921, gave detailed directions to the Organization Committee, and argued that "the actual work of organizing a Communist Party must be carried out" by the Organization Committee. "For the past six months, up until now, the Communist work has been agitational only. It is now necessary that agitation be combined with definite organization activity./ We want to make clear to the Organization Committee its functions. the Agency has general direction of the work of organizing a Mexican Communist Party, this direction is general and advisory" (**Doc. 3-3**). In short, the Agency regarded the tactics employed by the Spanish comrades as prohibited ones and took pains not to repeat "the mistake made in Spain, where the Youth Federation automatically transformed itself into a Communist Party"⁽²⁶⁾. At the same time Agency proposed the Organization Committee that it should take over a part of the tasks of the Provisional Mexican (Labor) Bureau, because he had received instructions from the Executive Committee of the Profintern, newly elected at the Founding Congress of July 1921, that all the Bureaus of the Profintern in Germany, England, the

(22) РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/133; cf. 495/18/65/86.

(23) РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/2-4, 25-29, 39, 41-42, 53, 57-58, 83; 521/1/17/54-58, 87, 91-92, 112-115; cf. **Doc. 1-9**.

(24) РГАСПИ, 495/108/10/1-3.

(25) РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/41-42; 495/108/10/12-13; cf. **Doc. 1-15**.

(26) **Doc. 1-10**. On the way back from Mexico Borodin left Spain early in 1920 and Ramírez remained alone. One of the lines of action about which Ramírez came to an agreement with the local comrades was "the transformation of the Executive Committee of the 'Federación de Juventudes Socialistas' into the Provisional Executive Committee of the 'Partido Comunista Espanol'" without calling the Founding Congress of the Communist Party. РГАСПИ, 495/120/250/53-56.

USA, Mexico, etc. should be abolished ⁽²⁷⁾. Such “general and advisory” activities of the Agency, however, came to an end due to Katayama’s summons to Moscow, and the decision on dissolving the Agency, by the ECCI.

As for the case of South America, Mr. & Mrs. Allen, who had been dispatched to South American countries by the Agency, were not appropriate for fulfilling their mission. That is made clear in his financial statement and report (mentioned in Chapter 7).

In Canada, Scott demonstrated his initiative in founding the CPC. On Scott’s instructions Caleb Harrison (alias Henry Atwood) was dispatched to Canada and took the lead as chairman during the founding convention of the CPC ⁽²⁸⁾. The CPC and the Agency jointly sent the ECCI a letter for affiliation with the Comintern, which had a handwritten postscript as follows: “P.S. I am preparing draft for Legal Mass Party. This Legal Party will be launched within a month and of course, fully controlled by the underground Party./ Fraternally yours/ Scott” (**Doc. 7-5**). It may safely be said that the creation of the CPC was the most notable achievement of the Agency.

However, it should not escape our attention that there were favorable conditions in Canada, in contrast with troubles and delays, involved in the unification of both American Communist Parties and in the founding of the Communist Party of Mexico, respectively:

a) Canada and the USA are contiguous to each other and their common language is English. Both American Communist Parties had each section in Canada, which could take the lead together in founding the CPC. At that time the attitude of each section of them was not of antagonism as in the USA ⁽²⁹⁾.

b) “Foreigners” who had the great majority of the members of the CPC, i.e. Ukrainians, Finns, etc., did not play such an important role in the CPC as “pressure group” like the Russian Federation of the CPA. Criticism by the Ukrainian leadership was rarely heard prior 1924. This formed a suitable background that the early party leadership was largely fixed on recruiting members from English speaking comrades ⁽³⁰⁾.

Consequently, according to Atwood (and Scott), it was already conceivable as of the middle of April 1921 that a united party was “just as much as accomplished” (**Doc. 5-1**).

7) Difficulties in Setting Up a Network of the American Continents

The relations between the two communist parties in the USA and other parties in the American Continents were far from well-established, in spite of the Agency’s efforts. There were a variety of obstacles to setting up a network of American Continents. The communists in the USA, for example, often referred to the Pan-American Agency as the “American” Agency, because they sometimes did not pay attention to their “Pan-American,” that is, Central and South American comrades.

(27) **Doc. 3-3**; cf. РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/113.

(28) Cf. **Doc. 7-4**; “Minutes of the First Convention of the CPC,” РГАСПИ, 495/18/65/200-203.

(29) J. Mochoruk, “‘Pop & Co’ versus Buck and the ‘Lenin School Boys’: Ukrainian Canadians and the Communist Party of Canada, 1921-1931,” R.L. Hinthner/J. Mochoruk (eds.), *Re-imagining Ukrainian Canadians. History, Politics, and Identity* (Toronto et al., 2012), 338-339.

(30) Although among the WPC membership “foreign elements” (Finns, Ukrainians, etc.) were still much more than “English-speaking elements,” the former had only one fourth among its Executive Committee members. Scott’s Report from 15 Nov. 1921 to 5 Feb. 1922 to the Presidium of the ECCI, “Краткий отчет о Канаде,” РГАСПИ, 495/98/1/16-21; cf. CPC’s “Report to Presidium of Comintern,” VIII.1921, РГАСПИ, 495/98/3/15-24; 495/72/3/88-95.

To tell the truth, a contempt for Central and South America was within the members of the Agency. In case at the above-mentioned meeting of the American Council on 1 March 1921 Scott and Harper proposed the stop of both trips of Yavki to Mexico and Allen to Argentina (South America) on account of financial difficulty, Katayama wrote in the "Note" as follows: "The Proposal of Scott and Harper that Yavki and Allen not [*sic*] start on their trip shows a complete misunderstanding of the work of the Agency. Our work is Pan-American and only incidentally U.S.A." (**Doc. 2-2**; cf. **Doc. 2-3**).

On 24 September 1921 in a letter to Zinoviev, Katayama reexamined the whole activities of the Agency since 8 January 1921 when he had taken the present post, and wrote at the end as follows: "Mexico is, as I have been experiencing past six months, a very inconvenient place, especially looked from a practical standpoint, Because the commercial relations between North and South Americas are well established, the New York as a centre./ But South American proletariat is not so willing to listen to the American talk, owing to *a certain prejudice* that exists to-day between two continents. And then American (USA) comrades are accustomed to look down on the Latin American workers. Personally I think that the choice of the seat of the Agency is wise one in the long run" (**Doc. 1-11** [*my italics*]).

A similar indication was shown in a reply letter dated 14 July 1922 of Edgar Woog (alias Alfred Stirner) to Katayama in Moscow, informing the Agency's end from Mexico: "To the C.P. people in U.S.A. we have written several times with regard to closer collaboration, publishing in common of manifestoes etc. but never got any answer. *The people there look on Mexico as an absolute quantity negligible* [*negligible*]; surely Mexico plays no first role in world-politics, but the comrades of the USA should, with a view on the international work, care more for the countries of Central and South America" ⁽³¹⁾. Prejudices such as the sense of superiority of the CPA, were they to have gained more ground, would have aggravated the difficulties in setting up a network.

On 23 July 1921 Katayama and Fraina sent a letter to the American and Canadian Red Labor Bureaus, saying that they called out an immediate joint campaign against the Pan-American Federation of Labor, which was to hold a Congress sometime in autumn. The result was: "Above letter has been not answered by the Canadian. And the U.S. Red Bu. was abolished[,] so informed by the CEC of CPA, as if the work started by the Red Bureau were also entirely abolished!" ⁽³²⁾ The CPC as well as Scott took little interest in the significance of the *Pan-American* movement.

The importance of Central and South America was underlined by Katayama in the report dated 10 January 1922 (**Doc. 9-1**): "I think that the Communist movement of two Americas should be aimed at the first overthrow of American imperialism and its capitalism of America. Without a [*sic*] strong Communist Parties in Mexico and South American countries the American Communist movement even led by the powerful Communist Party of America will not be able to strike hard blow at the American capitalism because its capitalism and imperialism have been laying their foundation widely along those countries. Mexico is the key to Central and South America and she is the connecting link of two Americas. The Communist International needs a strong Communist Party of Mexico and make it the connecting link of American Communist International with which united front will strike at the American capitalist imperialism a death blow."

These various problems provide ample reason to anticipate the difficulties present in the Comintern's direction of transnational activities such as the Pan-American Agency. This would

(31) ПГАСИИ, 521/1/74/2-3 (*my italics*). Stirner, a Swiss immigrant, came back to Mexico after his attendance at the Third Congress of the Comintern.

(32) ПГАСИИ, 495/18/66/139-140.

also provide a frame of reference for examining how the Japanese Communist Party had contact with the Foreign Bureaus of the Comintern.

7 Some Problems with Funds for Activities of the Pan-American Agency

This chapter aims to tackle some problems with funds for activities of the Agency which arose over total sum of recipient subsidies and its distribution and expenditure in Canada, South America, Mexico and the USA, respectively. I have already handled that issue comprehensively in the supplementary chapter of *The Way to the Third International*. This present work is an abridged version in English (cf. Preface).

1) Total Sum of Recipient Subsidies and Its Distributions

From the ECCI Thompson (Fraina) received \$60,000 and £600 in total. The breakdown is as follows: “from [M. Kobetsky,] E.C. Moscow (October, 1920) \$2,000; from Barrodin [Borodin who escorted Fraina to Berlin] £600 & \$3,000 also a draft \$5,000; from James [Reich of the WES] (Berlin [where Fraina revisited on account of financial difficulties], April 1921) \$50,000” ⁽¹⁾.

Out of them Fraina distributed a total of **\$26,250** and £220 to Scott and \$360 to Ramírez, respectively. The breakdown of Scott’s recipient amount is as follows: (1) \$250 and £220 during his stay in Berlin toward autumn 1920; (2) the above-mentioned draft \$5,000; (3) “To Mendels at Berlin for Scott \$1,000”; (4) Out of \$50,000 which Fraina received from Reich, “To Hamburger (Scott) \$10,000” and “To Mendels (Scott) \$10,000” (The total of bank charges for remitting to two intermediaries is \$450); Out of \$20,000 which Scott received, \$3,000 was remitted again to Katayama.

At the beginning of July 1921 Fraina brought **\$27,200** with him to Mexico City except **\$6,800** of his expenses (including \$250 to Scott, \$360 to Ramírez, above-mentioned bank charges \$450, “All exp. paid to Scott [N.Y. Feb. 10-24]” \$214.57, etc.).

There were other subsidies from the ECCI. The above-mentioned funds from Fraina was not in time for the Agency’s beginning to work in New York in January 1921. To tell the truth, its work began with \$30,000. In order to track down a source of the funds, I take up the financial accounts for January-March 1921. It is the incomplete list of two sheets without signature and date, which is missing in the breakdown of expenses in January and February (hereafter cited as the March report) (**Doc. 2-2**). Only in it “30000.00” is given with no explanation as the figure from which expenses are subtracted. The following sentence in Katayama’s letter to the members of the Small Bureau of the ECCI dated 10 January 1922 is a supporting evidence: “The Agency spent already [about the beginning of March 1921] over fifteen thousand *out of thirty* appropriated for the Red International and Communist International works” [**Doc. 9-1** (my *italics*)]. In counting in \$30,000, up to this point, total sum of recipient subsidies is **\$90,000**, leaving pounds aside.

At the meeting of the Small Bureau of the ECCI on 12 October 1920 the draft on tasks of the

(1) **Doc. 10-7**; Report of the Federal Bureau Investigation’s Interrogation of Lewis Corey, 1949-1950, Lewis Corey Papers, Box 2, #5, typed p. 74, Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Columbia University, New York. Indeed, this testimony of Corey (Fraina) in his later years have mentions of funds for activities here and there. But the amounts in his testimony which are based only on his memory are correct in some cases but not in others, so I do not take up them here.

Agency was proposed by Fraina and Jansons and adopted. The following was planned in it: “Ameri. Agency is allowed **100,000** for 3 months, to which \$35,000 out of this sum is transferred just immediately.” That “\$35,000 transferred just immediately” would be supposed to be the start-up funds of the Agency, i.e., \$30,000 after expenses.

On that point the following important description is offered in a letter of Thomas [Reich] to “Liebe Genosse” [Zinoviev or Kobetsky?] dated 5 April 1921: “Gen. Fraina is vor einigen Tagen hier [Berlin] eingetroffen. Zweck seiner Reise wird mit dem Abholen des Geld motiviert. Laut seinerzeit gefasstem Beschluss des Kleinen Büros soll er noch 70,000 Dollar (30,000 hat er erhalten) bekommen. Sofort greifbar habe ich 50,000 Doll. Es wird möglich sein die volle Summe 70[,000] zu überweisen. Rest werde ich wahrscheinlich in allernächsten Tagen mobil machen” ⁽²⁾.

The amount of funds which Fraina received is not “30,000” but \$10,000 as mentioned above, and that not through the intermediary of Reich. Therefore Reich soon accommodated Fraina with \$50,000. The point is whether the “Rest” was provided really or not. Zinoviev’s letter to Fraina later on 15 August 1923 (mentioned below) reads as follows: “from Thomas [not \$70,000 but] \$50,000” was received by Fraina ⁽³⁾. As is often the case with subsidies from the ECCI, it may safely be said that there was a disparity between the approved amount (\$100,000) and the amount supplied (**about \$90,000**).

Next, I examine where the funds for activities were distributed. On 18 March 1921 Katayama left New York for Mexico, taking \$5,000 with him. “I [Katayama] took 5,000 leaving with Scott over ten thousand; later Scott got \$5,000 note brought by Fraina cashed, and Fraina sent Scott \$20,000 in two sums. Thus the Agency spent somewhere about \$45,000 for America and Canada, together with expenses for Allen[’s travel to South America].”

Speaking of “over ten thousand” left with Scott, “it was found [at the meeting of the Agency on 9 March 1921] that there was about 16,000 left in treasury” (**Doc. 2-3**). That is to say that the source of “over ten thousand” would be “about 16,000.” The point is how much “about 16,000” decreased at the time of Katayama’s departure. According to “My Personal Accounts for Jan., Feb. and March 1921” by Katayama (hereafter cited as Personal Accounts) (**Doc. 10-1**), he received \$5,000 on 17 March, that is, the day before his departure. So it would be natural for us to consider that the “Rest” for Scott was **about \$11,000**.

As for “about \$45,000 for America and Canada, together with expenses for Allen,” there is one more related document. It is the letter of “Y[avki].C[arter].” [i.e. Katayama and Fraina] to Bray dated 28 September 1921, which reads as follows: “You [Bray = Scott] have in six months disposed of about forty-two thousand without making a single report — except for the March report you have so much spoken about but which we never received,” (**Doc. 5-5**). Speaking of Scott’s receipts, they are \$23,250 (provided by Fraina but with exception of \$3,000 remitted again to Katayama in Mexico City) and about \$11,000 (left in New York by Katayama). That is, we can confirm up to **about \$35,000**. Therefore either “about \$45,000” or “forty-two thousand” would be rather exaggerated.

From the above, I can provide the following summary in round figures. Out of the start-up funds (\$30,000), **about \$14,000** was spent by Katayama and Scott in New York during the period from January through 9 March 1921. Out of the balance (about \$16,000), Katayama took \$5,000 (to be precise, \$4,771) with him to Mexico City and the remainder (about \$11,000) was left with Scott. Then, out of \$26,250 which Fraina provided to Scott, \$3,000 was remitted to Katayama. **About \$35,000**, which was added by the remainder (\$23,250) and the above-mentioned about \$11,000 together, was left with Scott as funds for activities in the USA and Canada, including

(2) ПГАСПН, 499/1/5a/30.

(3) The editor/author made a written error in the first edition of the present *Documents*, p. 188 as follows: “from Fraina [not \$70,000 but] \$50,000.” That error is corrected in the present edition.

Allen's travel to South America. The funds for activities in Mexico were **about \$35,000** which were composed of \$4,771 brought by Katayama, \$3,000 remitted by Scott to Katayama, \$27,200 brought by Fraina and exchange gains (\$22.50) (**Doc. 10-4**). The above is **about \$84,000** in total. When that amount is added by **\$6,800** of Fraina's expenses before his arrival in Mexico, it corresponds roughly to the total sum of recipient subsidies (\$90,000).

2) Expenditures of Funds for Activities in Canada

I examine how **about \$35,000** was expended by Scott. As for the case of Canada, Y.C.'s letter to Bray (**Doc. 5-5**) reads as follows: "..... you loaned American company [the reunited CPA (or the former UCPA)] two thousand, and that you have been giving Canadian company [CPC] one thousand." In actual fact, Scott gave the CPC much more than \$1,000 (The loan of \$2,000 to the CPA [or the UCPA] will be discussed later).

I have already examined the case of Canada ⁽⁴⁾, so I furnish only the principal research results here.

Scott's authority was always accepted by the Canadian comrades. Whenever the CPC had awaited instructions since the eve of its founding, Scott gave them in detail to it (cf. **Doc. 7-5**). Even in August 1922, six months after the founding of the the WPC, the Executive of the CPC sent the following letter to the Presidium of the ECCI: "We appeal to you to authorize Comrade Sc[ott]. to remain here for at least six months as your Field Organizer. Comrades Sc. is thoroughly familiar with the needs of our movement, and his experience coupled with his driving force make[s] him a valuable organizer whose presence here for another six months would benefit us greatly, as already he has considerable influence within our ranks" ⁽⁵⁾.

In addition, the CPC also depended on funds from the Agency from the beginning. "This has averaged \$1,000 a month for June, July and August" (**Doc. 7-6**). According to "Financial Report of Central Executive Committee of the C.P. of C. for 9 months from May 25th, 1921 to Feb. 20th, 1922," total receipts are \$5,512.97, out of which \$3,168 (57.5%) is from the Agency ⁽⁶⁾.

By the way, the remainder of receipts, \$2344.97 (42.5%) was covered by the Party itself. After every financial aid from the Agency was stopped at the end of August 1921, Canadian communists were obliged to make their own Party self-supporting. Considering that during the first three months their regular receipts from dues, literature, etc. come to only about 15% of Party's expenses, Party's endeavor toward self-supporting (including gratuitous acts) in and after September 1921 should be highly evaluated.

There were other Agency expenses. "Estimate of expenses for the founding CPC convention being \$3000, of which \$2000.00 was supposed to be covered by the Agency" (**Doc. 7-3**). And expenses for the Agency's dispatching Atwood to Canada were \$1,330 ⁽⁷⁾. The total of Agency's

(4) A. Yamanouchi, "The Forming of the Communist Party of Canada and the Pan-American Agency of the Comintern," *The Shien or the Journal of History* (Faculty of Humanities, Kyushu University), No. 152, III.2015, 51-106 [in Japanese].

(5) РГАСПИ, 495/98/4/109-112.

(6) G.S. Kealey, "The RCMP, the Special Branch, and the Early Days of the Communist Party of Canada: A Documentary Article," *Labour/Le Travail*, Vol. 30, Fall 1992, 183-187.

(7) **Doc. 10-9**. After his entry into Canada on 6 March 1921, Atwood worked hard to unify local communist organizations and finally managed to hold the founding convention of the CPC, being appointed chairman.

expenditure on the case of Canada is supposed to be **about \$6,500**. Expenses for Scott's activities in Canada, however, are unspecified and excluded here.

3) Expenditures of Funds for Travel to South America

The Agency dispatched Allen and his wife to South America, especially Argentina. The Agency decided on 5 March 1921 that "Allen be advanced \$1500 for his trip, and start at once" (**Doc. 2-2**). The total of expenses amounted to about \$3,500 which was over \$2,800 (including additional remittance) provided by the Agency. "Balance due (money borrowed on promise to return immediately)" was \$634 (**Doc. 10-8**). It is quite likely that Scott paid it, because Allen received strong backing from Scott. Therefore the total expenditure for South America is considered to be **about \$3,500**.

In the breakdown of those expenses the followings are listed: articles for travel (coat, shoes, underclothes, collars, etc.), salary [which is equal with that of regular members], 2 tickets, "Hotel and expenses," etc. Nothing like expenses for activities is listed. Indeed there were some problems such as adequate communication was not established and the existence itself of the Agency which had dispatched Allen was not recognized in those places ⁽⁸⁾. But Fraina's testimony that "the man accomplished absolutely nothing except to spend the money for expenses" seems to be reliable ⁽⁹⁾.

I reconfirm that in Allen's "Financial Statement" (**Doc. 10-8**) and his report, "The Situation in South-America" (**Doc. 6-1**) Mr. & Mrs. Allen made a trip of 6 months and a half, but the period of their practical activities was only 2 months. On their way to and from Buenos Aires it took 2 months and 2.5 months (including one week when they were waiting for additional funds), respectively.

His report seems to be inactive even on his practical activities in Buenos Aires: "Realizing all this, I [Allen] felt that my trip, if conducive to any good whatever, could not be in interfering in work which I was not fitted for and handicapped by a lack of the language, customs, psychology, etc., but by getting information and laying connections between the North and South American movements." "Under these circumstances I had nothing to do but to gather information."

Based on the very information which he could get, Allen made out a report on the current situation of movement almost only in Argentina, at the end of which he presented the following recommendations "which I [Allen] hope will be acted upon favorably." "1. Recommend that the C.E.C. of the C.P. of Argentine be entrusted, that is given a mandate, to carry on the work of propaganda and agitation in all South America, and that funds be supplied for this purpose. / 2. Recommend that a grant of five thousand dollars, at least, be made to the C.E.C. of the C.P. for their own domestic work. / 3. A similar grant to the C.P. of Uruguay."

As compared with the way of spending money in Canada and Mexico (mentioned later), Allen was extraordinarily lavish in recommending to provide "a grant of five thousand dollars." The point is especially the following: although locally-employed cooperators worked such as collecting information and the like in Canada and Mexico, Allen spent no funds for activities in employing local staffs and even translators. Could he really collect reliable information?

Excluding about \$10,000 of the expenditure on the cases of Canada and South America, total sum of Scott's expenditure limited to the USA amounts to **about \$25,000**. Before examining that expenditure, let us take up the remaining case of Mexico.

(8) Cf. Л.С. и В.Л. Хейфец, *Коминтерн и Латинская Америка*, 110-111.

(9) Report of FBI, typed p. 76.

4) Expenditures of Funds for Activities in Mexico

As mentioned above, total funds collected for Agency's activities in Mexico is \$34,993.50 (**about \$35,000**). As prices were lower in Mexico than in the USA, funds seem to be used sufficiently in its own way. Total funds expended or advanced on 1 October 1921 is \$12,190.40 (**about \$12,200**). The breakdown is as follows: "April, \$1,811/May, \$1,017.70/June, \$1,916.50/July, \$1,648.50/August, \$1,842.30/September, \$2,954.40/Advanced to four [Japanese] Coms. [Mosaburo Suzuki, Haruo Watanabe, Umekichi Nikaido and Seishi Nonaka] to the Far East P[ropaganda]. Bureau, \$1,000" (**Doc. 10-4**).

After Thompson (with his wife, Esther) took \$27,200 with him into Mexico, the subsidies from the ECCI were cut off. How much did he have funds on hand, when he was leaving Mexico for South America on 24 December 1921? It will be supposed with three financial statements, which have each different details, as a clue: (1) "General Financial Statements. From April 1 to September 30, 1921," signed by Thompson (**Doc. 10-4**), (2) "Abrechnung über die seitens des Pan-Amerikanishen Buros [*sic*] an die K.P. Mexico gegebenen Summen" (**Doc. 10-6**) and (3) "Pan-Amerikanishes Buro [*sic*] 1921 [Abrechnungen]" (**Doc. 10-5**).

According to **Doc. 10-4**, the balance at hand on 1 Oct. 1921 is \$22,803.10 (**about 22,800**), out of which Katayama took **\$3,000** with him at his departure for Moscow.

Doc. 10-6 is the financial statement of the limited funds (\$27,200) which Fraina brought with him to Mexico. The balance at hand on 1 Oct. 1921 is \$19,300, in other words, \$7,900 is expended. As a matter of fact, Fraina did not provide total sum of funds to Katayama at once. Fraina himself administered funds and, through 11 August into 28 September 1921, provided \$4,200 at the first time and \$255 or 252.50 bit by bit at the following 6 times (**Doc. 10-3**). The provided amount is \$5,722.50 in total, so \$5,722.50 and \$1,200 (overhead expenses, including his own salary, listed in **Doc. 10-5**) will not add up to \$7,900. That is to say that **\$977.50** is unaccounted for.

According to **Doc. 10-6**, Fraina who was "entrusted by Katayama with the final responsibility in winding up the Agency affairs" remained as acting chairman in Mexico City and provided to the Communist Party of Mexico several funds totaling **\$2,206.63** through 12 October into 31 December 1921. Furthermore, on 22 December before Fraina's departure, he also provided to Stirner \$1,115, which was spent for publishing central organs and booklets, sending delegations and running its secretariat.

There were other expenses after 1 October 1921: "To Pan[-American] Bureau [which would mean "to Fraina himself"] \$6,659." Although Fraina's work was inactive for October-December 1921, that expenses which would contain his salary \$585 [\$45 a week×13 weeks] seems to be too great, compared with total sum (\$3,321.63) provided by him to the Communist Party of Mexico. In sum, Fraina's expenses unaccounted for, that is, both above-mentioned \$977.50 and this \$6,659 were very open to question and criticism.

Here I work out rough figures of the Agency's income and expenses in Mexico. The income was **\$35,000**. On 1 October 1921 \$12,200 had already been expended and the balance was **\$22,800**. Out of the amount Katayama took **\$3,000** with him at his departure for Moscow and Fraina provided **\$3,300** to the Communist Party of Mexico, so the balance was **\$16,500**. Out of the amount **\$6,700** was expended "to the Agency" [to Fraina] and the final balance was \$9,800. I suppose that Fraina took **\$9,800** with him and left Mexico on 24 December 1921.

5) Expenditures of Funds for Activities in the USA

Finally I examine the expenditure in the USA. As mentioned above, out of about \$35,000 which was left with Scott at Katayama's departure, about \$6,500 and about \$3,500 were expended for Canada and South America, respectively. The balance (**about \$25,000**) was supposed to be the funds for activities limited to the USA (including expenses for Scott's activities in Canada). Was the total amount (about \$25,000) expended efficiently in the USA?

Before I handle the question, I would like to argue the following question: Although the ECCI brought out a suspicion on Fraina's embezzling funds for activities after his disappearance at the beginning of 1922, why did not a similar suspicion turn on Scott?

Indeed there is a cause for suspicion because it was supposed that Scott did not make out any financial statement. In spite of that, there is no trace that he was suspected. He asserted he had made out a financial statement only once, but "I [Scott] was in such a fix that I were compelled to destroy mine March financial statement. Please send me copy immediately to above mentioned address" (**Doc. 5-2**). To that request Katayama replied only as follows: "If you sent the march report it must be lost" ⁽¹⁰⁾. There is one more letter dated 10 January 1921 saying that "Last I [Katayama] heard is that he [Scott] sent his financial reports to you [the members of the Small Bureau of the ECCI] and me which *I do not get it yet*" (**Doc. 9-1** [my *italics*]). Indeed, the RGASPI holds two sets of the March report in the Pan-American Agency file of the Secretariat of the ECCI (**Doc. 2-2**). The following address was written on the back of the last sheet (л. 44 об.) of one of them: "Nathan Mendelsohn / 1729 Park Ave[nue] / Montreal / Canada"; "Inside envelop addressed / Josef Skala [L.C. Fraina] / Immediate delivery please." It would mean that the March report reached Fraina. It may be that it did not reach only Katayama or Scott did not send it to Katayama but to Fraina. Didn't Fraina actually show it to Katayama after his arrival in Mexico City? We cannot still get at the truth.

When the ECCI suspected Fraina, Scott's behavior displayed at that time raises a suspicion in my mind. First, changing the way of quoting, I introduce G.E. Zinoviev's letter to Fraina dated 18 April 1923 which is translated from Russian into English ⁽¹¹⁾.

To follow up on and regarding [communication] to you of 15 August 1922, no. 1720, we inform you that upon our receipt of a report from Comrade Scott, your accounts with us are as follows.

Received by you in Berlin for American Agency in 1921 from Borodin \$10,000 and from Thomas \$50,000, total \$60,000.

Out of that amount you gave Scott \$20,204.70 and 6,513.40 in Canadian dollars, which is about \$5,795.30.

In all you gave Scott the equivalent of \$26,000 which leaves you with the equivalent of \$34,000.

Regarding this amount we have received a report from you for the period [from] 1 October through 31 December 1921 for \$19,803, of which amount on 1 January 1922 you still had \$12,228.50. We do not have a report for the period from 5 June 1921 (the day you arrived in America [*sic*] from Berlin) through 1 October of the same year for the amount of \$14,196.50.

(10) РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/140.

(11) H. Klehr/J.E. Haynes/F.I. Firsov, *The Secret World of American Communism* (New Haven/London, 1995), 197-198.

In view of the above we request that you:

1. provide us with a report for the period June-September 1921.
2. send us the remainder, which you had in hand as of 1 January 1922 in the amount of \$12,228.50, since after 1 January the agency no longer existed, and for that reason there could not have been any more expenses charged to the agency.

At once I have to raise a doubt, because “a report from Comrade Scott” was only a basis for the calculation. It is very odd that Scott made out a report on the financial statement including that of Mexico. He had no right to do so. Did he report the financial statement of the USA as well? In Zinoviev’s letter, there is no mention of any statement concerning the USA, so there is a very fair possibility that Scott did not report any related statement. Although Katayama and Fraina made out some detailed financial statements, which did reach the ECCI, Zinoviev referred to neither them nor Katayama’s important letter dated 10 January 1922 to the Small Bureau of the ECCI (**Doc. 9-1**). If Zinoviev had read Financial Accounts by Katayama (**Doc. 10-2; 10-3**), that request would have been needless (Total amount of expenditure for the period from April through September 1921 is \$12,190.40 and that for June-September is \$9,361.70). If Zinoviev had wanted to get an effective report, a report for *July*-September 1921 should have been requested, because of Fraina’s arrival in Mexico City at the beginning of July 1921. Zinoviev did not consider that total amount of funds for activities (about \$35,000) in Mexico consisted of not only \$27,200 left over by Fraina but also \$4,771 taken by Katayama with him, \$3,000 sent by Scott and exchange gains (\$22.50). In addition, \$6,800, which Fraina had spent before his arrival, was not taken from “\$34,000” in Zinoviev’s calculation.

Next I introduce one more letter dated 18 December 1923 to Fraina, written in English by O.A. Piatnitsky who was both treasurer, and chief of the International Liaison Department (OMS), of the ECCI ⁽¹²⁾.

Yours of Sept. 14 [1923] through the CEC of the WP ⁽¹³⁾ has reached our hands. We note in your letter the intention expressed of getting into contact direct with the Comintern. Up to the present, however, we have received no communication from you and therefore must confine ourselves to the letter above-mentioned.

We wish to put several questions to you which we ask you to answer without any evasion:

1. When, where and how was the \$7,000 stolen from you?
2. What did you expend the \$3,000 on?
3. You admit having \$12,228.50 as of January 1, 1922. What has become of the balance of \$2,228.50?
4. What have been your activities since your departure from Mexico on Dec. 24, 1921?
5. / 6.
7. Why have you sent no report to the Comintern in these two years?

Upon receipt of an immediate comprehensive reply from you through the CEC of the Workers Party, we shall make a decision and duly inform you.

Although I have presumed that Fraina took about \$9,800 with him at the end of 1921, according to this letter, Fraina had **\$12,228.50** as of 1 January 1922. It is difficult to say that the amount was backed up by the ECCI only with the figures offered in these two letters. Things got still more complicated by the fact that Fraina revealed the stolen money for the first time. Beginning to tell the stolen case, Fraina might have tried to make a balance look like smaller one.

(12) Klehr/Haynes/Firsov, 198.

(13) The CPA was renamed the Workers Party of America in December 1921.

He did not even answer the question. He could not excuse himself in any way whatsoever.

Here I touch on an article on Fraina, recently published by one of the leading experts on intelligence & espionage history, R.B. Spence ⁽¹⁴⁾.

He begins to write as follows: "As this article will detail, the charge that Louis Fraina was an American Government agent was undoubtedly false. But that did not rule out him being someone else's." With Nosovitsky, who was not only an agent of the Department of Justice but also an agent of Scotland Yard, as a guide, Fraina went over to Europe and stayed in London for more than one month, before attending the "Conference of the 3d International." Then Nosovitsky "claims to have spent \$2800 of Scotland Yard's money in a calculated effort to undermine Fraina's 'communistic morale' via a steady regime of fancy restaurants and luxurious hotel suites. He even boasted of convincing the reluctant Red to buy a custom-made tuxedo!"

In final analysis, however, Spence cannot provide conclusive evidence that Fraina was a secret agent of the English government. This article rather persuades me that Fraina's luxurious experience, whose concrete examples were shown by Spence, would have surely given one of the causes of his breaking away from the communist movement.

This temporary experience seems to have exerted deep influence on him in less than a year when Fraina came back to Berlin from Moscow in order to start work for the Agency. Taking up his above-mentioned expenses (\$6,800), I would like to see that with **Doc. 10-7** clue to go on.

First of all, Fraina's two long stays are highly noticeable. One is a stay of 90 days in Berlin on his way to New York from the middle of October 1920 through the middle of January 1921 (expenses of £125). The other is a stay of 66 days in Berlin from 1 April through 5 June 1921 (expenses of \$237.50) after his staying in New York only for two weeks and leaving there for Berlin in order to get ample funds. In this case Katayama asserted as follows: "Comrade Fraina did not 'Loafing all the time in Germany,' as Comrade Scott wrote you. He is not a business man; other comrades are not. To handle that amount money took him a considerable time and he wrote some articles to the Comintern and made a proposal to the Agency on the establishment of a daily paper, printing house, books and pamphlets. The proposal the Agency voted to start but Comrade Scott did not carry them out" (**Doc. 9-1**). In spite of Katayama's assertion, Esther, who had served as translator and typist of Fraina staying in Moscow for attending at the Second Congress of the Comintern and gotten married with him, came to Berlin and they enjoyed their newly-married life. During his second stay in Berlin he also lived with her who had not gone to New York with him. That must have exerted a considerable influence on his long stay. Fraina also stayed at the expensive hotels in particular in Montreal on 6-9 February 1921 before arriving in New York and 25 February-14 March (18 days) after leaving there. The former expenses of hotel was \$70 only for four days and the latter ones of hotel and meal were \$119 and \$68, respectively. For all that he got a salary of 45 a week, he continued to include the money for his meal in necessary expenses on and after that time.

From the above, I must say that all the expenses of \$6,800 was not appropriate. Although Fraina criticized Mr. and Mrs. Allen's wasting money, that criticism would come back on Fraina to some extent.

To return, with full knowledge that the suspicion against Fraina must be brought to light, I would like to ask a question: Why did the ECCI lend its ears to Scott's side of the story from beginning to end and lay aside the question of suspicion about Scott's dubious accounting? ⁽¹⁵⁾

(14) R.B. Spence, "Catching Louis Fraina: Loyal Communist, US Government Information or British Agent?," *American Communist History*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2012, 81-99.

(15) The following would be an answer to that question: There was a striking contrast in the way in which the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau and the WES were treated by the ECCI. That is, the WES was treated in a still more sympathetic way and its embezzling the funds for Sub-Bureau's activities

Finally I examine Scott's expenditure which would give some grounds for my raising the question.

Katayama and Scott started the work of the Agency without unification of accounting. Total expenses of January and February 1921 was \$14,257.73, out of which \$13,525.94 was recorded in the March report and \$731.79 in Personal accounts respectively. Scott took charge of the American Bureau which the Agency had established separately to take up a task for trade unions. Harper who was appointed treasurer of its Bureau told Scott and Katayama "that he [Harper] will hold up the funds (he kept almost all the funds in his hands) and shall not surrender a penny without signing a receipt by three members — Scott, Fraina and Yavki (myself). To Harper's claim and action Scott acquiesced./ With Fraina's written proposals and my approval I persuaded Scott to see as we two thought right and after some difficulties we got hold of the funds held by Harper" (**Doc. 9-1**). So the March report is supposed to be made out by Scott and Harper.

Out of the expenses of the March report (**Doc. 2-2**) the greatest one was \$5,000 for sending 6 delegates to the First Congress of the Profintern and salaries to their wives. There were also other sending expenses: \$3,500 for Yavki to Mexico, \$1,500 for Allen to Argentina and \$500 for Atwood to Canada.

Second to sending expenses, the highest ones were the financial aid to comrades in prison: \$500 to [Harry M.] Winitzky, \$150 to Big B[ill]. [Haywood], \$100 to Ella R. Bl[oor] and \$200 to [Thomas J.] Mooney Defense [Committee], in total \$950.

Scott's wages followed: there were [a weekly wage of] \$45 on the first sheet and 5 weeks of \$200, Extra exp. of \$50 and "Forwarded to go home" of \$500 on the second sheet. Even though Katayama's weekly wages were the same amount, why did Scott get the special outlay of \$550?

In his letter to Zinoviev dated 15 October 1921 (**Doc. 8-1**), Scott reported positive results of his activities up to that time as follows: "The work in the trade-unions given by Com. [M.P.] Tomsky was too much for the agency, for this field is terribly complicated and conflicting./ Despite all these unfavourable conditions I [Scott] succeeded in carrying out the following work of organization. I succeeded in organizing an agitational centre among the trade-unions showing out our views. I published three of [A.] Lozovsky's pamphlets in 100,000 copies, and about a million copies of our appeal on the attitude towards the trade-unions; organized the publication of a trade-union weekly (The Voice of Labour [*sic*]); sent a union delegation to Moscow to the Red Labour Union Congress./ In sphere of politics I succeeded [1] in uniting the two C.P-s of America; [2] in taking the initiative and effecting a split in the Socialist Party of M. Hillquit; [3] in organizing an illegal C.P. in Canada; [4] in starting the publication of a legal weekly paper [*The Workers' World*] in Canada; [5] in preparing the ground for the legal release of five imprisoned communists in the U.S."

According to the report, the expenses for the work in trade unions were supposed to be great, but we cannot confirm the amount of expenses for want of financial accounts. Judging from the following expressions: "I [Katayama] got the first number of the Voice of Labor 10 copies but since I don't get any" ⁽¹⁶⁾ and "The Voice of Labor does not satisfy me [Scott]" ⁽¹⁷⁾, it seems to be rather difficult to say that "I succeeded in organizing an agitational centre among the trade-unions." As for [3] and [4], as mentioned above, Scott's contribution was recognized

was passed over, because the ECCI regarded the WES as loyal follower of its policy at that time (cf. Chapter 4-3). So the plausible reason why Scott was treated in a more sympathetic way than Fraina would be the same.

(16) РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/62.

(17) РГАСПИ, 495/18/66/140.

significantly. The amount of expenses, however, was not so great. As for [1] and [2] which were more important, was really his contribution significant? Especially [1] would have been very difficult without closer cooperation of two American communist parties. Considering the CPA's stance which was on the opposite side of Scott's pro-CLPA/UCPA one, it should be still treated with utmost caution to ascertain his contribution.

As far as I read through almost all documents on the Pan-American Agency held in the RGASPI, I found that loans to American communist parties were a marked characteristic of Scott's expenses, which was not clearly indicated in the March report. Scott's letter to Yavki dated 16 September 1921 reads as follows: "In view of the fact, that the Main Office did not granted any assistance for the time being, — the Comp.-here [CPA unified in May 1921 of UCPA and CPA], the Comp.-North [CPC] and I [Scott], we are all broke. I am broke because I have loaned to the Comp.-here \$2,000 long time ago. Besides that, the Comp.-here through me have made loan from Messrs. Mendel- & Bross.[sic] \$6,000." It would be hard, however, to consider that "Messrs. Mendel- & Bross." have no relation to Scott's intermediary, Mendels. There is also a phrase, "through me [Scott]." Therefore it is possible that Scott practically loaned the "Comp.-here" \$8,000 in total. "Furthermore, the Comp.-[here] have made several loans from Various concerns in total \$25,000. All I [Scott] got back so far as is \$500. The balance — \$1,500 the Comp.-[here] is not in position to repay at the present moment. Therefore please send me \$1,000 immediately" (**Doc. 5-4a**).

Part of the loans was made by Scott before Katayama's departure for Mexico City. According to Katayama's "Note," Scott and Harper advanced \$500 to the CEC of the UCPA for "defense." Katayama criticized them for that advance as follows: "It is outrageous to have advanced the U. C. P. money. What becomes of our impartiality? It is beyond the imagination of Scott and Harper to realize the use the C. P. will make of this advance when the news leaks out-- as it will leak out? Limit our work but finance the U. C. P.-- that is no policy for the Agency" (**Doc. 2-2**).

It was not only the problem with impartiality, but also the financially aiding to comrades in prison itself ([5]) was questionable, that is, "sidetracking from the work of the Agency" (**Doc. 5-4**). Because Katayama had the following criticism against them: "Here again Scott and Harper show no real understanding of the Agency business. The main office considers all the Negro affairs as fundamental" (**Doc. 2-2**). Therefore I cannot take Scott's evaluation of [5] at face value.

Even if the amount of loans made by Scott was not \$8,000 but \$2,000, considering that about 25,000 limited to the USA was at his disposal, it is hardly understandable that he requested a remittance of \$1,000 on the excuse that he found himself in a difficult position due to an unrepaid loan of \$1,500. Because he expended a great deal of funds in various fields of activity and he was supposed to regard loans themselves as entirely justifiable. In addition, before requesting a remittance, Scott should have prepared the breakdown of total expenses paid by himself.

There was the following question, too. Scott cabled Katayama on April 18, 1921: "Received fifteen barrels of magnesium from Lillebit (Fraina) company. How much you require." Katayama replied: "Ship me five barrels through company so and so." On 6 May 1921 Scott sent Katayama a cable: "Hamburger sent three barrels acknowledge receipt" (**Doc. 9-1**). As Katayama received \$3,000 in June, one barrel meant \$1,000. As Fraina remitted \$10,000 to Mendels and \$10,000 to Hamburger, respectively, did Scott receive not 15 barrels but 20 barrels? What did Scott do with 5 barrels (\$5,000)? As Katayama received not 5 barrels but 3 barrels, did Scott misappropriate 7 barrels (\$7,000), including 2 barrels (\$2,000)?

In conclusion, I take up the unsolved case. On 24 September 1921 Katayama wrote to Zinoviev as follows: "You appropriated us fifteen thousands while the Red International also fifteen [thousands] which Comrade Scott brought with him" (**Doc. 1-11**). If that description were true, the predecessor of the Profintern would be a supplying source of half of the initial funds for activities of \$30,000. But that supposition would be unreasonable, judging from the above-mentioned decision of the Small Bureau of the ECCI dated 12 October 1920. Rather

\$15,000 might be initially estimated to pay the expenses for the work in trade unions. There is also no evidence that Scott brought considerable funds with him from Berlin to New York. According to Bray's letter to Kelley (Katayama) dated 22 July 1921 (**Doc. 5-2**), however, there is an instance that funds were carried secretly from Moscow into the USA: "I [Bray] have had long conference with G[eorge]. Hardy, who is now also member of the Pan-American Council of the Red Labor Union International appointed by the Main Office./ G.H. have got five thousand dollars from Main Office for to create and to develop our business point of view within I.W.W." (underlined parts are deciphered). Scott's letter to Zinoviev might supply a clue for solving the question: "[5] in preparing the ground for the legal release of five imprisoned communists in the U.S., which, however, was held up due to the fact that you had not replied to any of my three telegrams *about the 25,000 dollars promised by you*" (**Doc. 8-1** [my *italics*]). In short, Scott might have had another route to get funds, whose matter I cannot approach under the present conditions.

Did Scott expend the funds for activities efficiently? The breakdown of total expenses which Scott paid is not still made clear under the existing circumstances. But then we would not be able to accept at face value the results of his activities especially in the USA for which he praised himself. We would have to gather extensively the related materials on the side of American communist parties as well, even if it would offer further difficulties to us.

List of Documents on the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the Comintern

1 DECISIONS, STATEMENTS, REPORTS AND LETTERS

1-1 Key Decisions of the ECCI on the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau

- A-Doc. 1-1-1** 28.09.1919 Minutes No. 28 of the Bureau Meeting of the ECCI
[РГАСПИ, 495/1/1/78-79]
- A-Doc. 1-1-2** 14.10.1919 Minutes No. 29 of the Bureau Meeting of the ECCI
[РГАСПИ, 495/1/1/80]
- A-Doc. 1-1-3** 01.02.1920 Minutes No. 45 of the Bureau Meeting of the ECCI
[РГАСПИ, 495/1/6/19]
- A-Doc. 1-1-4** 02.02.1920 Minutes No. 46 of the Bureau Meeting of the ECCI
[РГАСПИ, 495/1/6/21]
- A-Doc. 1-1-5** 25.04.1920 [Decision of the Bureau Meeting of the ECCI]
[РГАСПИ, 495/1/6/66]

1-2 G.L. Trotter (S.J. Rutgers) in Amersfoort to Winter (J. Berzin) in Moscow

- A-Doc. 1-2-1** 20/22.12.1919 Trotter to Winter
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/3/50-53 (signed); 495/172/59/6-9]
- A-Doc. 1-2-2** 09.03.1920 Trotter to Winter and others
[РГАСПИ, 497/2/8/1-7; 581/1/95/33-39]
- A-Doc. 1-2-3** 12.05.1920 Trotter to Winter and others
[РГАСПИ, 581/1/95/15-17 (signed); 497/2/8/8-10]

1-3 The Conflict between the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau and the Western European Secretariat

- A-Doc. 1-3-1** 03.02.1920 Statement about the Branch Buro [*sic*] of the Communist International and the February Conference in Amsterdam (handwritten by Rutgers)
[РГАСПИ, 497/1/1/68-69]
- A-Doc. 1-3-2** 14.02.1920 Br[onski]./P.F[rölich]./M[ünzenberg]. to the Amsterdam Bureau
[РГАСПИ, 497/1/1/70-72; cf. 495/293/6/10-13]
- A-Doc. 1-3-3** 15.02.1920 Rutgers to "Werte Genossen" [of the WES]
[РГАСПИ, 497/1/1/73; cf. (handwritten carbon copy notebook) 497/2/4/33-35]
- A-Doc. 1-3-4** 20.02.1920 Klara [Zetkin], "Bericht über die Konferenz in Amsterdam"
[РГАСПИ, 495/18/28/7-10]

1-4 Conflicts over the Decision on Dissolution of the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau

- A-Doc. 1-4-1** 09.05.1920 Fritz [Ström] to T[rotter].
[РГАСПИ, 497/2/5/18; РГАСПИ, 581/1/95/14]
- A-Doc. 1-4-2** 10.05.1920 "Erklärung" (signed by H. Roland Holst/S.J. Rutgers/D.J. Wijnkoop)
[РГАСПИ, 581/1/95/22-24 (signed); 497/1/9/7-9; (draft) 581/1/95/19-21]
- A-Doc. 1-4-3** 12.05.1920 Fritz [Ström] to T[rotter].
[РГАСПИ, 497/1/9/2; 581/1/95/18]

A-Doc. 1-4-4 14.05.1920 Trotter to the ECCI

[РГАСПИ, 495/172/60/21-23 (signed); 497/1/9/10-12; 581/1/95/26-28]

A-Doc. 1-4-5 n.d. [after 07.08.1920] A. Pannekoek/H. Gorter/H. Roland Holst to the ECCI

[РГАСПИ, 495/172/61/17 (handwritten; signed but not all in person)]

2 PROCEEDINGS AND POLICE REPORTS

2-1 Proceedings

A-Doc. 2-1-1 Conference of the 3d International, held at Amsterdam, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. Febr. 1920

[*Bulletin of the Sub-Bureau in Amsterdam of the Communist International* (Amsterdam), No. 2, III.1920, pp. 3-9; cf. (French draft) РГАСПИ, 497/1/1/6-35]

2-2 Police Reports

A-Doc. 2-2-1 Inlichtingendienst, A No 37

[Verbaalarchief en Kabinetsarchief van het Ministerie van Justitie 1915-1955, Geheime verbalen 1915-1931, Inventaris nr. 16453, Nationaal Archief, Den Haag]

A-Doc. 2-2-2 Inlichtingendienst, A No 38

[Verbaalarchief Ministerie van Justitie, 16453]

A-Doc. 2-2-3 Inlichtingendienst, A No 40

[Verbaalarchief Ministerie van Justitie, 16453]

A-Doc. 2-2-4 Inlichtingendienst, A No 41

[Verbaalarchief Ministerie van Justitie, 16453]

A-Doc. 2-2-5 Inlichtingendienst, A No 42

[Ministerie van Justitie, 16453] Verbaalarchief Ministerie van Justitie, 16453]

A-Doc. 2-2-6 Inlichtingendienst, A No 43

[Verbaalarchief Ministerie van Justitie, 16453]

A-Doc. 2-2-7 Translation of Police Report on Third Bolsheviks International

[Correspondence of the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff, 1917-1941, RG 165, File No. 10058-24-88, NARA, Washington, D.C.]

A-Doc. 2-2-8 [Report of "Doctor," J. Nosovitszky]

[Correspondence of MID, 10058-342-50; Records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation [1908-1922], RG 65, OG349701, NARA]

3 LEAFLETS

List of Leaflets distributed by the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau of the Communist International

3-1 Leaflets on: General/International

A-Doc. 3-1-1 Mitteilung, No.1

[РГАСПИ, 497/1/11/43; cf. 581/1/95/1. Reprinted in: *Bulletin des Provisorischen Amsterdamer Bureau der Kommunistischen Internationale*, No. 1, II.1920, S. 1]

A-Doc. 3-1-1a Announcement

[РГАСПИ, 497/1/1/1. Reprinted in: *Bulletin of the Provisional Bureau in Amsterdam of the Communist International* (Amsterdam), No. 1, II.1920, p. 1]

A-Doc. 3-1-2 Dear Comrades/Enclosed you will find the first copies of a series of reports on the revolutionary movement in different countries as a result from the February-

Conference in Amsterdam

[Kollektion Komintern, 10, IISG, Amsterdam]

- A-Doc. 3-1-3** Einleitung
[РГАСПИ, 497/1/1/61-66; Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0464, Fondation Jules Humbert-Droz, La Chaux-de-Fonds; cf. (English version) H. Roland Holst, "Documents concerning the International Conference at Amsterdam/Introduction," *Bulletin of the Sub-Bureau in Amsterdam of the Communist International*, No. 2, III.1920, pp. 1-3]
- A-Doc. 3-1-3a** Resolution über Soviet-Russland
[Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0465]
- A-Doc. 3-1-3b** Beschlüsse über das Internationale Bureau
[Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0466]
- A-Doc. 3-1-3c** Resolution über Einheit
[Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0467]
- A-Doc. 3-1-3d** Resolution das Subbureau Amerikas betreffend
[Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0468]
- A-Doc. 3-1-4** Communication with Moscow is possible at present via Stockholm
[(Typed draft) РГАСПИ, 497/1/1/5]
- A-Doc. 3-1-5** Appeal to the Workers of Europe and America
[*Bulletin of the Provisional Bureau in Amsterdam of the Communist International*, No. 1, II.1920, p. 2]
- A-Doc. 3-1-6** Appeal to the British, the French and the Belgian Proletariat
[The Papers of E. Sylvia Pankhurst, Inventory no. 260, IISG. Reprinted in: *Workers' Dreadnought*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 3.IV.1920, p. 2; *The Communist. Official Organ of the Communist Party of America* (Chicago), Vol. 2, Supplement to No. 6, 1.VI.1920, pp. 3-4]
- A-Doc. 3-1-7** Oproep voor een Steunfonds voor de slachtoffers der Internationale Reactie
[*De Tribune* (Amsterdam), Jrg. 13, No. 171, 23.IV.1920, p. 3]

3-2 Leaflets on: Governing Organs of the Comintern

- A-Doc. 3-2-1** Rapport über die Kommunistische Jugendinternationale
[Kollektion Komintern, 10; Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0474]

3-3 Leaflets on: Soviet Russia

- A-Doc. 3-3-1** Peace with Russia/Strike on Mayday 1920
[Papers of E. Sylvia Pankhurst, 260. Reprinted in: *The Voice of Labor* (New York), Vol. 1, No. 9, 20.IV.1920, pp. 2-3; *The Communist*, Vol. 2, Supplement to No. 6, 1.VI.1920, p. 3]
- A-Doc. 3-3-2** An die Arbeiter aller Länder/Neue Offensive gegen Sowjet-Russland
[Archief Louis de Visser, Inventaris nr. 3, IISG]
- A-Doc. 3-3-2a** New Offensive Against Soviet Russia/To the Workers of all countries
[*The Communist*, Vol. 2, No. 6, 15.V.1920, pp. 5, 8; No. 6 [sic], 22.V.1920, pp. 1, 8]
- A-Doc. 3-3-3** Qui prend part à l'appareil gouvernemental de la république des Soviets?
[РГАСПИ, 497/1/5/90-93]

3-4 Leaflets on: Great Britain/Ireland

- A-Doc. 3-4-1** Dear Comrades:/Comrade Johnson, secretary of the Independent Labour Party of Great Britain, had kindly sent us the copy of a letter addressed by the I.L.P. to the Swiss Socialist Party
[РГАСПИ, 497/1/5/97-98, 497/1/6/65-66. Reprinted in: *The Workers' Dreadnought* (London), Vol. 7, No. 4, 17.IV.1920, p. 6; *The Communist*, Vol. 2, No. 6, 15.V.1920, p. 2]

- A-Doc. 3-4-2** Report on the British Movement
[Kollektion Komintern, 10; Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0459]
- A-Doc. 3-4-3** Report on the Industrial Aspects of the Working Class Movement in Britain
[Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0470]
- A-Doc. 3-4-4** Report on the Movement in Great British (B.S.P.)
[Kollektion Komintern, 10; Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0458]
- A-Doc. 3-4-5** Report on the Present Conditions of the Political Movements in Britain
[Kollektion Komintern, 10; Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0472. Reprinted in: *The Communist*, Vol. 2, Supplement to No. 6, 1.VI.1920, pp. 2, 4]
- A-Doc. 3-4-6** Report on the Propagandist and Educational Developments in the Working-Class Movement in Britain
[Kollektion Komintern, 10; Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0471]
- A-Doc. 3-4-7** To the Communists in Great Britain
[Kollektion Komintern, 10; Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0455. Reprinted in: *The Communist*, Vol. 2, Supplement to No. 6, 1.VI.1920, p. 3]
- A-Doc. 3-4-8** The Political and Working Class Organization in Ireland
[РГАСПИ, 497/1/5/70-72]

3-5 Leaflets on: USA

- A-Doc. 3-5-1** Greetings to American Communists
[*The Communist*, Vol. 2, Supplement to No. 6, 1.VI.1920, p. 1]
- A-Doc. 3-5-2** Report on the Development of the Communist Party of America
[Kollektion Komintern, 10; Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0476]
- A-Doc. 3-5-3** The American Socialist Party and the International
[Papers of E. Sylvia Pankhurst, 260]
- A-Doc. 3-5-4** The Amsterdam sub-Bureau of the Communist International supports the request for rejecting the affiliation of the Socialist Party of America.....
[(Typed draft) РГАСПИ, 497/2/2/252]

3-6 Leaflets on: Germany

- A-Doc. 3-6-1** An alle Arbeiter Deutschlands, an die Reichszentrale der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands und an den Parteivorstand der Unabhängigen Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands
[Kollektion Komintern, 10; Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0460. Reprinted in: *Die Kommunistische Internationale*, 2. Jg. (1920), No. 9, S. 152-165]
- A-Doc. 3-6-2** Oproep om steun aan onze Duitse revolutionaire kameraden
[*De Tribune*, Jrg. 13, No. 151, 29.III.1920, p. 1; No. 155, 3.IV.1920, p. 3]
- A-Doc. 3-6-3** Das Westeuropäische Sekretariat (W.E.S.) der Kommunistischen Internationale (K.I.) in Berlin veröffentlicht in Die Rote Fahne von 22 April 1920 eine Erklärung.....
[РГАСПИ, 497/1/5/26-27; cf. 497/1/9/23-24; (Dutch draft) 581/1/95/50-51]

3-7 Leaflets on: Switzerland

- A-Doc. 3-7-1** Die Entwicklung und der gegenwärtige Stand der Kommunistischen Partei der Schweiz
[Kollektion Komintern, 10; Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0461. Reprinted in: *Die Kommunistische Internationale*, 2. Jg. (1920), No. 11, S. 160-167]

3-8 Leaflets on: Belgium

A-Doc. 3-8-1 La situation prolétarienne en Belgique
[РГАСПИ, 497/1/5/73-78; Kollektion Komintern, 10; Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0463]

3-9 Leaflets on: Spain

A-Doc. 3-9-1 Les jeunesses espagnoles et le parti socialiste
[Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0475; (handwritten English version [draft]) Papers of E. Sylvia Pankhurst, 260]

3-10 Leaflets on: Finland

A-Doc. 3-10-1 La situation en Finlande
[Kollektion Komintern, 10; Archives Jules Humbert-Droz, 0462]

3-11 Variant

A-Doc. 3-11-1 Trade Unionism, Industrial Unionism and Workers' Committees
[*The Voice of Labor*, Vol. 1, No. 9, 20.IV.1920, p. 12]

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- ф. 489 (Второй конгресс Коминтерна (1920))
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 - оп. 18 (Секретариат ИККИ (1915-1943))
 - оп. 72 (Англо-американский Лендерсекретариат ИККИ (1921-1937))
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 - оп. 108 (Коммунистическая партия Мексики (1919-1940))
 - оп. 120 (Коммунистическая партия Испании (1919-1947))
 - оп. 127 (Коммунистическая партия Японии (1916-1941))
 - оп. 172 (Коммунистическая партия Нидерландов (1918-1941))
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- ф. 499 (Западноевропейское бюро ИККИ (1919-1933))
- ф. 510 (Скандинавская коммунистическая федерация (1924-1928))
- ф. 515 (Коммунистическая партия США (1912-1944))
- ф. 521 (Катаяма, Сэн (1859-1933))
- ф. 533 (Коммунистический интернационал молодежи (КИМ) (1919-1943))
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