

the character of the revolution, the part played by the state. And all these ideas had a different content in 1848 when the proletariat had only begun to develop than they had later or have today. Of vital importance, however, are Marx's original scientific contributions. There is first of all the theory of historical materialism, according to which the development of society is determined by its productive forces that make for a certain mode of production, especially through the productive force of class struggles. There is the theory of the determination of all political and ideological phenomena of intellectual life in general by the productive forces and relations. And there is the presentation of capitalism as a historical phenomena, the analysis of its structure by the theory of value and surplus value, and the explanation of capitalism's evolutionary tendencies through the proletarian revolution towards communism. With these theories Marx has enriched the knowledge of humanity permanently. They constitute the solid fundament of Marxism. From these premises further conclusions can be derived under new and changed circumstances. Because of this scientific basis Marxism is a new way of looking at the past and the future, at the meaning of life, the world and thought; it is a spiritual revolution, a new view of the world. As a view of life, however, Marxism is real only through the class that adheres to it. The workers who are imbued with this new outlook become aware of themselves as the class of the future, growing in number and strength and consciousness, striving to take production into their own hands and through the revolution to become masters of their own fate. Thus Marxism as the theory of the proletarian revolution is a reality, and at the same time a living power, only in the minds and hearts of the revolutionary proletariat.

Yet Marxism is not an inflexible doctrine or a sterile dogma. Society changes, the proletariat grows, science develops. New forms and phenomena arise in capitalism, in politics, in science, which Marx and Engels could not have foreseen or surmised. But the method of research which they formed remains to this day an excellent guide and tool towards the understanding and interpretation of new events. The proletariat, enormously increased under capitalism, today stands only at the threshold of its revolution and Marxist development; Marxism only now begins to play its role as a living power in the proletariat. Thus Marxism itself is a living theory which grows with the increase of the proletariat and with the tasks and aims of the class struggle.

II

To return to the political scene out of which Marxism emerged, it must be noted that the revolution of 1848 did not yield full political power to the bourgeoisie. But after 1850 capitalism developed strongly in France and Germany. In Prussia, the Progressive Party began its fight for a state constitution, whose inner weakness became evident later when the government, in the interest of militarism, met the demands of the bourgeoisie for a strong national state. Movements for national unity dominated the political scene

of Central Europe. Everywhere, with the exception of England, where it already held power, the rising bourgeoisie struggled against the feudal-absolutistic conditions.

The struggle of a new class for power in state and society is simultaneously in its conceptional form always a struggle for a new world view. The old powers can be defeated only when the masses rise up against them or, at least, do not obey them any longer. Therefore it was necessary for the bourgeoisie to secure for itself the adherence of the proletariat to the capitalist society. For this purpose the old ideas of the peasants and of the petit-bourgeoisie had to be destroyed and supplanted with new bourgeois ideologies. Capitalism itself furnished the means to this end.

The natural sciences are the spiritual base of capitalism. On the development of these sciences depends the technical progress that drives capitalism forward. Science, therefore, was held in high esteem by the young bourgeois class. At the same time, this science freed them from the conventional dogmas incorporated in the rule of feudalism. The conclusion drawn from scientific investigations stimulated a new outlook on life and the world and supplied the bourgeoisie with the necessary arguments to defy the old feudal powers. The new world outlook was disseminated by the bourgeoisie among the masses. To the peasantry and the petit-bourgeois artisan belongs the inherited biblical faith. But as soon as the sons of the peasants or proletarianized artisans become industrial workers they easily accept the ideas of capitalist development; even those who remain in pre-capitalistic enterprises are lured by the more liberal outlook of the bourgeoisie.

The intellectual struggle was primarily a struggle against religion. The religious creed is the ideology of past conditions; it is the inherited tradition which keeps the masses in submission to the old powers and which had to be defeated. The struggle against religion was a social necessity. It had to take on varying forms with varying conditions. In those countries where the bourgeoisie had already attained full power, as for instance in England, the struggle was no longer necessary and the bourgeoisie paid homage to the established church. Only among the lower middle classes and among the workers did the radical movement find some adherence. But where industry and the bourgeoisie had to fight for emancipation they proclaimed a liberal, ethical Christianity in opposition to the orthodox faith. Where the struggle against a still powerful royal and aristocratic class was difficult and required the utmost exertion and strength the new world outlook had to assume extreme forms of radicalism and gave rise to bourgeois materialism. This was so to a large degree in Central Europe. It is no accident that the most popular propaganda for materialism (von Moleschot, Vogt, Buechner) originated here. It also found an echo in other countries as well. In addition to these radical pamphlets a rich literature of enlightenment and popularization of modern scientific discoveries appeared, all intended as weapons in the struggle to free the urban masses, the workers

and the peasantry from the spiritual fetters of tradition and to make them into followers of the progressive bourgeoisie. The bourgeois intelligentsia, professors, engineers, doctors, etc., were the most zealous propagandists of the new enlightenment.

The essence of natural science was the discovery of laws operating in nature. A careful study of natural phenomena disclosed recurring regularities which allowed for scientific predictions. The 17th century had already known the Galilean law of falling bodies and the new law of gravity, Kepler's laws of the planetary movements, Snell's law of light refraction and Boyle's law of the density of gas. Finally, towards the end of the century, came the discovery of the law of gravitation by Newton which to a far greater extent than all preceding discoveries, exerted a tremendous influence on the philosophical thought of the 18th and 19th centuries. While the others were rules that were not always absolutely correct, Newton's law of gravitation proved to be the first real, universally applicable natural law which made possible correct measurements of cosmic bodies despite all their irregularities. From this the conception developed that all natural phenomena follow definite, fixed laws. In nature causality rules: gravity is the cause of falling bodies, gravitation causes the movements of planets. All occurring phenomena are effects totally determined by their causes, allowing for neither free will, accident nor caprice.

This fixed order of natural science was in direct contrast to the traditional religious doctrines in which God as a despotic sovereign arbitrarily rules the world and disposes fortune and misfortune as he sees fit, strikes his enemies with thunderbolts and pestilence, rewards others with miracles. Miracles are contradictory to the fixed order of nature; miracles are impossible, and all reports about them in the Bible are fables. The biblical and religious interpretations of nature belong to an epoch in which a primitive agricultural mode of production prevailed under the overlordship of an absolute despot. The natural philosophy of the rising bourgeoisie with its natural laws controlling all phenomena belongs to a new order of state and society where the arbitrary rule of the despot is replaced by laws valid for all.

The natural philosophy of the Bible which asserts theology to be absolute, divine truth is the natural philosophy of ignorance that has been deceived by outward appearances, that saw the immovable earth as the center of the universe and held that all created matter was also perishable. Scientific experiment showed, on the contrary, that matter which apparently disappeared (as for instance in burning) actually changes into gaseous, invisible forms. Scales demonstrated that a reduction in the total weight did not occur in this process and that therefore no matter disappeared. This discovery was generalized into a new principle: matter cannot be destroyed, its quantity always remains constant, only its form and combinations undergo a change. This holds good for each chemical element; its atoms constitute

the immutable building stones of all bodies. Thus natural science with its theory of the conservation of matter, of the eternity of nature, opposed the theological dogma of the creation of the world 6000 years ago.

Matter is not the only substance science found to be imperishable. Since the middle of the 19th century, the law known as the conservation of energy came to be regarded as the fundamental axiom of modern physics. Here, too, a fixed and far reaching order of nature was observed; in all occurrences changes of the form of energy take place: heat and motion, tension and attraction, electrical energy; but the total quantity never changes. This principle led to an understanding of the development of cosmic bodies, the sun and the earth, in the light of which all the assertions of theology appeared like the talk of a stuttering child.

Of even greater consequence were the scientific discoveries concerning man's position in the world. The Darwinian theory of the origin of species, which showed the evolution of man from the animal kingdom, was in complete contradiction to all religious doctrines. But even before Darwin, discoveries in biology and chemistry revealed the organic identity of all human and living creatures with non-organic nature. The protoplasm, the albuminous substance of which the cells of all living beings are composed and on which all life is dependent, consists of the same atoms as all other matter. The human intellect, which was elevated by the theological doctrine of the immortal soul to divinity, is closely bound up with the physical properties of the brain; all spiritual phenomena are the accompaniment to or effect of material occurrences in the brain cells.

Bourgeois materialism drew the most radical conclusions from these scientific discoveries. Everything spiritual is merely the product of material processes; ideas are the secretion of the brain, just as bile is the secretion of the liver. Let religion — said Buchner — go on talking about the perishability of matter and the immortality of the mind; in reality it is the other way around. With the least change in or injury to the brain everything spiritual disappears, nothing at all remains of the spirit when the brain is destroyed, while matter, of which it is composed, is eternal and indestructible. All living phenomena, including human ideas, have their origin in the chemical and physical processes of the cellular substance; they differ from non-living matter only in their greater complexity. Ultimately, one must go back to the dynamics and movements of atoms, that is, explain everything on the basis of atoms.

Having reached these conclusions, natural materialism was of course no longer able to maintain itself. After all, ideas are different from bile and similar bodily secretions; mind cannot simply be put into the same category with force or energy. If mind is the product of the brain, which differs only in degree from other tissues and cells, then, it must be concluded, something of a mind must — as a matter of principle — also be found in every animal cell. And because the cellular substance is only an aggregate

of atoms, more complex but fundamentally not different from other matter, the conclusion must be that something of that which we call mind is already present in the atom: in every minute particle of matter there must be a trace of the spiritual substance. This theory of the "atom-soul" we find in the works of Ernst Haeckel, energetic propagandist of Darwin and courageous combatter of religious dogmatism, who was hated and despised by his reactionary contemporaries. Haeckel no longer considered his philosophical view as materialism but called it monism — strangely enough, for his philosophy sees the dual existence of mind and matter in even the smallest elements of the world.

Materialism dominated the ideology of the bourgeois class for only a very short time. Only so long as the bourgeoisie could believe that its society with its private property rights, its personal liberty, and free competition, through the development of industry, science and technique, could solve the life problems of every citizen — only that long could the bourgeoisie assume that its theoretical problems could be solved by the natural sciences without the need to resort to any supernatural and spiritual powers. As soon, however, as it became evident that capitalism could not solve the life problems of the masses, as was shown by the sharpening of the proletarian class struggles, the confident materialist philosophy disappeared. The world was again full of insoluble contradictions and uncertainties, of sinister forces threatening social stability. The bourgeoisie resorted once more to all kinds of religious creeds and superstitions. Bourgeois intellectuals and natural scientists submitted to the influence of mystical tendencies. They were quick to discover the various weaknesses and shortcomings of the materialist philosophy and made speeches about the "limitations of natural science" and the insoluble "mystery of life".

Only a small minority of the more radical members of the lower middle class still clung to the old political solutions of early capitalism and continued to hold natural scientific materialism in respect. Among the rising working class too, materialism found a fertile ground. The anarchists have long been its most convinced followers. Social-democratic workers received the interpretation of Marxism and the conclusions of natural materialism with equal interest. Capitalistic practices, daily experiences and theoretical discourses on the nature of society contributed greatly towards undermining traditional religion. The need for scientific enlightenment grew and the workers became the most zealous readers of the works of Buechner and Haeckel. While Marxist doctrine determined the practical, political and social ideology of the workers, a wider understanding asserted itself only gradually; few became aware of the fact that bourgeois materialism had long since been outdated and surpassed by historical materialism. This, by the way, accords with the fact that the working class movement had not reached a position enabling it to destroy capitalism, but that its class struggle only served to secure a better place for it within the capitalist society. Thus, the democratic solutions offered by the early bourgeois movement were still

considered valid for the working class also. The full comprehension of revolutionary Marxist theory is possible only in connection with revolutionary practice.

Wherein lies the contradiction between bourgeois materialism and historical materialism?

Both concepts agree in so far as they are materialist philosophies, that is, both recognize the reality of nature, and the primacy of the external world; both recognize that spiritual phenomena, sensation, consciousness and ideas, are derived from the former. Their opposition rests on this: bourgeois materialism bases itself on natural science, historical materialism is primarily the science of society. Bourgeois natural scientists observe man only as an object of nature — the highest of the animals — determined by natural laws. For an explanation of man's life and action they employ general biological laws and, in a wider sense, the laws of chemistry, physics and mechanics. With these means little can be accomplished in the way of understanding social phenomena and ideas. Historical materialism, on the other hand, lays bare the specific evolutionary laws of human society and shows the interconnection between ideas and society.

The axiom of materialism, that the mental is determined by the material world, has therefore entirely different meanings for the two doctrines. For bourgeois materialism it means that ideas are products of the brain, of the structure and composition of the brain substance, in the last instance, of the dynamics of the atoms of the brain. For historical materialism it means that the ideas of man are determined by his social environment. Society is his environment which acts upon him through his sense organs. This postulates an entirely different approach to the problem and a different direction of thought; consequently, also a different theory of knowledge. For bourgeois materialism the question of the meaning of knowledge is a question of the relationship of spiritual phenomena to the physico-chemical-biological phenomena in the brain matter. For historical materialism it is a question of the relationship of the ideas in our mind to the phenomena which we view as the external world.

However, man's position in society is not purely that of an observing being but that of a dynamic force which reacts on his environment and changes it. Society is nature transformed through labor. To the natural scientist nature is the objectively given reality which he observes and which acts on him through the medium of his senses. To him the external world is the active and dynamic element, while the mind is the receptive element. Thus it is emphasized that the mind is only a reflection, an image of the external world, as Engels expressed it when he pointed out the contradiction between the materialist and idealist philosophies. But the science of the naturalist is only a part of the whole of human activity, only a means to a much greater end. It is the preceding, passive part of his activity which is

followed by the active part: the technical elaboration, production and transformation of the world by man.

Man is in the first place an active being. In the labor process he utilizes his organs and aptitudes in order to constantly build and remake his environment.

For this reason he not only invented the artificial organs we call tools, but also trained his physical and mental aptitudes so that they might serve him as effective aids in the preservation of his life and in reacting effectively to his natural environment. His main organ is the brain whose task, thinking, is as good a physical activity as any other. The most important product of thought activity, the effective action of the mind upon the world, is science which, as a mental instrument, stands next to the material instruments and, itself a productive power, constitutes, as the basis of technology, an essential part of the productive apparatus.

Historical materialism sees the results of science, concepts, substances, natural laws and forces, although formed by nature, as first of all the products of the mental work of humanity. Bourgeois materialism, on the other hand, from the point of view of natural science sees all this as belonging to nature which has been discovered and brought to light only by science. Natural scientists consider the immutable substances, matter, energy, electricity, gravity, ether, the law of gravitation, the law of entropy, etc., as the basic elements of the world itself, as reality, that which has to be discovered. From the viewpoint of historical materialism, however, these are products which creative mental activity forms out of the substance of natural phenomena.

Another difference lies in the dialectic which historical materialism inherited from Hegel. Engels has pointed out that the materialist philosophy of the 18th century disregarded evolution; yet evolution makes dialectical thinking indispensable. Historical materialism and dialectics have since become synonymous. It is assumed that the dialectical character of historical materialism is best described when it is referred to as the theory of development. However, the process of evolution was also known to the natural science of the 19th century. Scientists were well acquainted with the growth of the cell into a complex organism, the evolution of animal species as expressed in the origin of species, and the theory of the evolution of the physical world known as the law of entropy. But their method of reasoning was undialectical. They believed their concepts were concrete objects and considered their identities and opposites as absolutes. Consequently, the evolution of the universe as well as the continued progress of knowledge brought out contradictions in the theory of knowledge of which many examples have been quoted by Engels in his "*Anti-Duehring*." Understanding in general and science in particular segregate and systematise into definite concepts and laws what in the real world of phenomena occurs in continuous flux and transition. By means of names, through which language sep-

arates and defines the sequel of events, all occurrences falling into a particular group are considered similar and unchangeable. As abstract concepts they differ sharply, but in reality they converge and fuse. The colors blue and green are distinct from each other but in the intermediary nuances no one can say definitely where one color ends and the other begins. It cannot be stated at which point during its life cycle a flower begins or ceases to be a flower. That in practical life good and evil are not absolute opposites and that the greatest justice may become the greatest injustice is acknowledged everyday, just as juridical freedom may be transformed into its opposite. Dialectical thinking corresponds to reality inasmuch as it takes into consideration that the finite cannot explain the infinite, nor the static the dynamic world; that every concept has to develop into new concepts, or even into its opposite. Metaphysical thinking, on the other hand, leads to dogmatic assertions and contradictions because it views conceptions as fixed entities. Metaphysical, that is undialectical, thinking considers concepts formulated by thought as independent concepts that make up the reality of the world. Natural science proper does not suffer much from this shortcoming. It surmounts difficulties and contradictions in practice insofar as the very process of development compels it to continually revise its formulations and concepts, to amplify them by breaking them up in greater detail, to further modify its formulations to account for the new changes and to find new formulas for additions and corrections, thereby bringing the picture ever closer to the original model, the phenomenal world. The lack in dialectic reasoning becomes disturbing only when the naturalist passes from his special field of knowledge towards general philosophy and theory, as is the case with bourgeois materialism.

Thus, for instance, the theory of the origin of species very often led to the notion that the human mind, having evolved from the animal mentality, is qualitatively identical with the latter and differs from it only quantitatively. On the other hand, the actually-experienced qualitative difference between the human and the animal mind was raised by theological doctrine, in preaching immortality of the soul, to the level of an absolute antithesis. In both cases there is no dialectical thinking according to which substances of similar origin and property become differentiated in the process of growth and acquire new properties commanding new definitions and exhibiting entirely new characteristics, though the original property does not completely disappear, nor are they transformed into the complete antithesis of the original pattern.

It is metaphysical and non-dialectical to identify thought because it is the product of brain processes with the products of other organs, or to assume that mind, because it is a quality of material substance, is a characteristic quality of all matter. It is also false to think that because mind is something other than matter, it must absolutely and totally differ from it, that there is no transition to and connection with both so that a dualism of mind and matter, reaching down to the atoms, remains sharp and un-

bridgeable. From the standpoint of dialectics, mind incorporates all those phenomena we call mental which, however, cannot be carried beyond their actual existence in the lowest living animals. There the term mind becomes questionable, because the spiritual phenomena disappear gradually into mere sense perception, into the simple forms of life. The characteristic quality "spirit", which is or is not there, does not exist in nature; spirit is just a name we attach to a number of definite phenomena, some of which we understand clearly, others only partly.

Here life itself offers a close analogy. Proceeding from the smallest microscopic organism to still smaller invisible bacteria, we finally come to very complicated albuminous molecules that fall within the sphere of chemistry. Where living matter ceases to exist and dead matter begins cannot be determined; phenomena change gradually, become simplified, are still analogous and are yet already different. This does not mean that we are unable to ascertain demarcation lines; it is simply a fact that nature knows no borders. The phenomenon life, which is or is not, does not exist in nature; again life is merely a name, a concept we form in order to comprehend the many different aspects of reality. Because bourgeois materialism deals with life, death, and mind as if they were independent realities it is compelled to work with insurmountable opposites, whereas nature consists of uncountable transitional processes.

The difference between bourgeois and historical materialism reaches down to basic philosophical views. Bourgeois materialism, in contradistinction to the comprehensive and completely realistic historical materialism, is illusory and incomplete, just as the bourgeois class movement whose theory was bourgeois materialism, represented a limited and illusory emancipation in contrast to complete and real liberation by way of the proletarian class struggle. The difference between the two concepts shows itself practically in their position towards religion. Bourgeois materialism intended to overcome religion. However, a particular view cannot be ended by mere argumentation; each argument finds a counter-argument. Only when it is shown why, and under what conditions a certain view was necessary can this view be defeated. It must be shown that its basis was merely historical. Thus the struggle of natural science against religion had sense only insofar as primitive religious beliefs were concerned, as for instance, the breaking down of ignorance and superstition towards such natural phenomena as thunder and lightning. The theory of bourgeois society could destroy the theories of primitive agricultural economy. But religion in bourgeois society is anchored in its unknown and uncontrollable social forces. Bourgeois materialism is unable to deal with these forces. Historical materialism, on the other hand, explains and shows why religion was for certain times and classes a necessary and indispensable way of thought. It lays bare the social basis of religion. Only thus may its power be broken. Historical materialism does not struggle directly against religion; from its higher position it understands and explains religion as a natural phenomenon within definite social

forms. It weakens religious thinking through this insight, and is able to predict that, with the formation of a new society, religion will disappear. In the same way historical materialism, too, explains the temporary appearance of materialism within bourgeois society, as well as the retrogression of this bourgeois class into mysticism and religious trends. These trends, to be sure, do not disturb the bourgeois aptitude for thinking in terms of sharp opposites, but they replace the former atmosphere of hope and assurance with a skepticism and pessimism that speaks of the insolvability of world problems. Historical materialism also explains its own growth among the working class as being due not to its anti-religious arguments, but to the developing recognition of the real powers in society. Thus the influence of religion is weakened and will disappear with the proletarian revolution, the theoretical expression of which is historical materialism.

J. Harper

MARXISM AND EMPIRICISM

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

Marx's understanding of the anatomy of bourgeois society and its trend toward decay was far superior to that of pre-Marxian socialism and to that of the radical labor movement itself. The ability with which Marx handled the enormous material that makes up the science of society commands the greatest respect. As a thinker he belongs to the era of classical economy that began at the end of the Renaissance and terminated with the Industrial Revolution. The historical position of Marx's ideas has not been sufficiently recognized, least of all by those writers who tried to "revise" or "supplement" Marx. Yet Marx's time-conditioned limitations must be recognized, especially with regard to questions concerning the technological side of the productive process and the role of the human factor within this process.

Let us assume that all the potentialities inherent in modern society have been fully realized. We may then say that the modern productive process comprehends the whole of society. To be or not to be a part of the productive process is, in such a society, no longer a matter of choice. Nor is it a question of the business cycle or of the labor market. Forced labor is predominant. All are subordinated to an industrial totalitarianism. The organic composition of capital rises in this era of monopolistic power policies as it did previously in *laissez-faire* competition. That is, the capital invested in the means of production advances faster than that invested in labor power, thus increasing their disproportional development. Technology, too, is further advanced. But the requirements of monopolistic struggles are high and the costs of monopolistic production are ever increasing. Consequently the technological possibilities can be only partially realized. The emphasis in

production is necessarily shifted once more to the productive possibilities inherent in the force of labor. Under the conditions we have assumed there exists, then, a shortage of labor. To compensate for it the quality of work must be improved in order to increase production. The changed character of the productive process itself provides an additional reason for the improvement of the quality of work. The old division of labor is displaced by the extension and coordination of working functions.

From this point of view we can deny the relevance of all categories that are divorced from work. The period of complete industrial monopoly in which work assumes a totalitarian character has its own categories, notwithstanding the individuals who remain outside the working process, or are even engaged in functions opposed to those processes. On the basis of our assumptions, there exists a total and mobile working order that tends to replace antagonistic ideologies and class consciousness with experiences and experimentations related to the working processes. With the dynamic extension of these new principles, with the elimination of elements foreign to work, or in opposition to it, and with the establishment of new values based on the quality of work, the social irrelevance of rule and control of the world by men become obvious.

Antagonistic modes of thought have become quite fetishistic; but this is not so clear with regard to dialectical thinking. From Kant to Max Adler, from Hegel to Georg Lukacs there prevailed a historical-scientific antagonism which, in its critical or dialectical form, bound the socialism of the workers in philosophical fetters. Only the Marxian followers of Kant distinguished between the science of the mind and the empiricism of the natural sciences. What the real "scientific" criterion for the "science of the mind" is, however, and how history could be dealt with as empirically as is physics — these questions remained unanswered. But this shortcoming belongs to the nature of things. If one takes it seriously, one will have to return to Kant.

Friedrich Engels was aware of the vicious circle to which the formation of historical (or historical-materialistic) non-Kantian concepts would lead. Thus he emphasized not history but materialism. And without seriously entering into the controversies about scientific method in the natural sciences, he recognized that proof for the correctness of a theory was to be found in its usefulness and in its experimentally established validity. This is important for a way of thinking that is concerned with categories derived from production and work functions.

Kant disclaimed an understanding of the whole. He related all practical knowledge to the realm of the natural sciences. The doctrine of human behavior belonged to metaphysics. Hegel tried to regain the lost paradise. In a gigantic thought-experiment he undertook to freeze the social reality at the medieval plane of unity, and then to extend it towards a fragmentary socialism of the future in which society would be once more united. But

history, that is, the concrete totality of the social phenomena, manifested itself to Hegel only as a unity because the "absolute spirit" was antagonistically enthroned over it. He was interested in all social forms of history that allowed for the construction of some sort of totality-consciousness. But he was not blind to the fact that the immediate social development was utterly shaken by various disrupting antagonisms. The miracles of the dialectic had to safeguard the monistic lucidity of "history" and hinder the dethronement of the "absolute spirit". Playfully the dialectic permits antagonisms, only to resolve them again in the higher unity of consciousness. Through the dialectic the "absolute spirit" is reconciled with ever-recurring disruptions of its universal manifestations. The dialectic syntheses become — so to speak — part and parcel of the "absolute spirit" just as human consciousness, finally, is but an incarnation of the "absolute spirit". In the end the blending of the "absolute spirit" and consciousness leads to a confusion of consciousness and reality so that reality resolves itself into consciousness — and thus it actually *does* resolve itself into consciousness.

Marx's genius shows itself at its best in his analysis of Hegel and in his overcoming of Hegelianism. In the theses on Feuerbach, he points out that first Hegel turns the world upside down by the primacy he attaches to the "spirit", and second, that thought-processes can never replace reality — can never be a substitute for a lost social unity. But he also says that it is not enough to interpret the world — the world must also be changed. More than once Marx points out that all the art of interpretation that follows its own logic, that all interpretations not positively fixed upon a specific and central sphere of the social reality must lead to nothing.

In the present-day antagonistic society, according to Marx, the process of production is the cardinal point of all change. The working class constitutes the revolutionary factor. Marx dealt, however, only in a very general manner with the revolutionary position of the laboring class. With regard to the concrete course of the proletarian class struggles that are to lead to the social revolution he postulated some hypothetical formulas such as that the productive forces of society stand in insoluble contradiction to the production relations, that the social character of production increasingly contradicts the exploitative form of capitalism, and that the working class develops into a class capable of revolutionary action. As regards the role and functions of the working class within the process of social change, Marx's explanations remained in the sphere of consciousness. His ideas no doubt stand on a different level from that of ideology. Still, they are only inductively connected with the progressive practice of the productive process. Occasionally Marx dealt with character differences between a social revolution and a mere political-bourgeois revolution. Yet, he is not ready to declare the political revolution inadequate for the requirements of the proletariat. The distinction between a social and a mere political revolution here means that the proletarian revolution has to accomplish social changes first of all,

whereas the bourgeois-political revolution only acknowledges and gives a political super-structure to changes already accomplished.

More than Marx himself, his opponents in the socialist camp stressed the need to deal with the social process more concretely; in such a manner, however, that finally the real concrete character of the social revolution was declared to be utopian. Empirically there was the strike, and when nothing absolute or final was said about the strike by Marx, his followers made a myth out of it. They believed that the strike would influence the economic dynamism in a particular way; that it would further class-consciousness and class organization; that the strike, transformed into the general-strike, would take on the character of a social revolution. However this may be, it is clear that the strike and the general strike divorce the workers from the productive process. In the old-fashioned as well as in the modern sit-down strike, as soon as the workers cease to work their relation to the productive process becomes a passive and negative one. The workers may now enter the sphere of political struggles, yet, whatever they may gain or lose in this field, their role in the productive process is resumed only with their return to work.

If Marx's contribution to this problem remained fragmentary, his contribution to the problems concerned with the inescapable revolutionization of the workers did not. With his theory of "relative pauperization" he points to the sharpening of the social antagonism that move in the direction of revolutionary struggles. Yet, he does not complete his gigantic conception that the key to the transformation of the world is to be found in the productive process and in the working class as the greatest productive force. It seems that Marx really thought that just as in previous revolutions the creative revolutionary act would have to occur in the political-revolutionary sphere.

It may be well to remember that Marx had seen the necessity for an investigation of the role played by the human productive force in the changing productive process long before he studied the classics of bourgeois economy. But the experience there was to draw from was limited. Marx expected to find in economics the answer to the question of how the working class could escape its proletarian position, develop its own consciousness, and unite theory and practice in its actions. Economics however did not provide a solution; all that could be discovered by economic investigation was the inevitability of the sharpening of existing class frictions. Economy laid bare the bone-structure of bourgeois society and introduced into the dialectic an empiricism that seemingly provided a tight frame for a revolutionary workers' philosophy. Marx's switch to economics was like an escape from the speculative spheres of the dialectic to the solid base of the world of facts.

One deals, however, with degenerated economics if one tries to deduce from it results that are not related to its proper sphere — if one deduces, for instance, the social revolution from the fact of "relative pauperization" or from the limitations of the capitalist accumulation process. Apparently

Marx himself could not always resist such temptations. Although he never reached the vulgar position in the search for "causality" that became the vogue with Karl Kautsky, yet in order to counteract vulgarization of this sort, he had always to return to the dialectic. It is thus no accident that during the writing of *Capital* he continually "flirted" with the dialectic, as he himself points out. And though he explains that he did this out of methodological necessity, it is clear that form or method is never secondary but often helps to shed light upon the material it encloses.

It seems that Marx was not at all satisfied with the empirical side of his work; at least not when he compared its results with the plans and aspirations that had moved him during his youth. And here we may find the reason why he never ceased to "flirt" with the dialectic. Because, as we have seen, Marx turned to classical economy as an escape from dialectic speculations to the solid ground of empiricism, we believe that his return to the dialectic must be explained out of his need and desire to maintain the starting point of his theory of revolutionary change. This starting point — the idea that the process of production and human productive forces form the basis for revolutionary change — had not been arrived at by experience, but had been philosophically conceived. However, the concept was in need of empirical verification and elaboration. But first, the productive forces had to unfold themselves further and manifest themselves in specific-actual situations before one could describe their consequences more concretely.

Here, then, we find the inconsistency in the Marxian system which many of its interpreters described as the contradiction between the "young" and the "old" Marx. This gap cannot be bridged, either by dialectical reasoning, or by the empiricism of the economists. Some have tried to save the whole Marxian system through its incorporation into the empirical natural sciences; others have attempted to develop it into a super-mythos. Both efforts are futile. It seems to us that only the developing total world of labor that makes the worker the dominant figure in society will allow for a really empirical approach to the problems that Marx envisioned.

Fred

THE HEYDRICH PATTERN

At all times a nation and a class that were aware of their history have been inclined to call those living outside their sphere "barbarians". In recent times it was predicted that the complete industrialization of society would entail either a socialist revolution or a decline to barbarism. Marx's prophetic words remained, however, dark and ineffective for seven decades. Furthermore, the predicted decline and its assumed alternative — the rise of socialism — happened to coincide in an entirely unexpected manner. Today, socialism can be used in opposition to barbarism only if the term is emptied of all its previous contents and is used to connote everything that at any time stands in opposition to barbarism. On the other hand, barbarism is no longer synonymous with all that is unacceptable. The awareness of history shares the predicament in which all other philosophy and ideology find themselves at present. The curses of the upholders of tradition have lost their terror — just as all other words have. It is for this reason that Marx's prophecy faded away before it had been understood. Only the fearful and terrified went on to use the empty word and carefully registered the dates of the "beginning of barbarism" in each nation: 1917 in Russia, 1933 in Germany.

For the purpose of evading the dynamism of a complete industrialization which is inherent in the totalitarian system and which undermines all political rule, at least under conditions of imperialistic competition, the politically ambitious restored to war its age-old virtue. The ancient despotism of the Orient, the Incan Empire, the slave holders of antiquity and the feudal lords of the Carolingian Empire ruled over conquered peoples. All through history it was military superiority that made slaves, serfs, and authority. It is quite difficult to understand the theoretical narrowness of people who do not realize even today that "democracy" was based on "feudal" and pre-capitalistic authority. The state in which democrats fought for suffrage and over taxes and war credits was the slave-state of warriors, taken over by the bourgeoisie and remodelled to fit its special purposes. The particular abstractness of the ideas in which the bourgeoisie expressed its actual aims was carried to complete blindness by later liberal philanthropy, especially before 1914. The arrogant claims of the ideologists of progress and civilization belong to a highly differentiated structure of society in which force and brutality were just as much the business of one special group as love of justice, tolerance, and humanitarianism were the business of another. The right hand did not know what the left was doing, but one hand was washing the other.

Given such a "division of labor", people could really imagine that tolerance, humanitarianism, liberty, and so on, would grow progressively

with the number of their believers. The particularity of the situation that nurtured such a belief was overlooked. This was nothing more than the arrogance of the philistines of education. The reality of history was something else. The much-heralded "awakening" of the people, when it finally happened, was an awakening amidst barbarism. The educators had not even been asked for their opinion. It was an awakening that saw new enslavers. Nevertheless, the change to a policy of military conquest and domination of oppressed peoples from the threatening development toward a completely industrialized and classless society was in line with all previous history. The abstract capitalistic way of thinking had highlighted only the pleasanter aspects of reality; the shadows had been retouched. But whoever lacks the ambition to become a slave-holder, or a slave-driver, must today be ready to step outside of "history".

Ignazio Silone has said that the fascist *coup d'état* is a substitute for a revolution; that its "socialism," "democracy", and so forth, are substitutes for socialism, for democracy, and so forth. This may have been true of the first phase of fascism, especially of Italian fascism. But enslaving by way of war is more than that. It actually replaces by a new antagonism, and transfers to a new plane, the existing antagonisms of bourgeois society.

The fascist slave-state is an attempt to arrest certain tendencies toward complete industrialization which would make superfluous, and ultimately dissolve, the class structure of society. Through its imperialism it aims at limiting the international basis and the interconnections of modern production. The simplification within the cooperation and division of labor, which resulted from the appearance of ever more equal or similar work processes, must be duplicated again. Because this is only partly possible, monopolists concentrate on attempting to hinder the further extension and interweaving of industrial production. They contrive to exclude certain territories from the process of complete industrialization. For example, the monopoly of armaments today is only another name for the monopoly of industry. Disarmament means a return to agrarianism. It is true that some of the conquered peoples are employed in the industries of the ruling fascist monopolies. Yet, whether there is more or less division of labor in the slave economy of fascism, the opposition between rulers and ruled is based on something unlike the previous form of economic differentiation.

Today there is no longer any sense in starting from the model of a "pure capitalism". All models that look upon war as an abnormality are useless; in brief, all the models of economists are insufficient.

Hitler first suppressed and destroyed the German nation. He is now busy destroying others. The imperialist destruction of nations destroys not only the democratic basis of their national consciousness, but their productive powers as well. The empire based on warfare is a slave state that is only partially industrialized. In it nationality is used arbitrarily and artificially,

just as anti-semitism is, to introduce new differences into the leveling process of complete industrialization.

Equality in a totalitarian state is not formal equality before the law, but the equal denial of rights to all. It is social equality, subject to totalitarian leader-hierarchy. Even this equality, the equality before the plan, the war, the Gestapo turns into an equality that interrupts and arrests the process of complete industrialization. The formal equality of state-controlled labor relations is broken up by arbitrary differentiations of the labor conditions of workers of various nationalities. Forced labor is first of all the forced labor of conquered peoples.

For example, according to a report from Berlin on November 22nd, 1941, in eleven German armament factories a polyglot mixture of workers from all Nazi controlled nations labor under the strict supervision of police agents. A high officer of the Elite Guard (S.S.) is the manager of these enterprises. Their factory kitchens serve the same food to Germans and all others. Non-German workers are contracted for one year by German labor offices established in the various conquered countries. Wages for male and female workers are the same. There are three shifts of eight hours each, or two of ten hours each. A bonus system serves as a work incentive. Fifty percent of the laborers are Poles. They have a letter "P" sewed on their coat-sleeves. Laborers from other countries are designated by their national colors. Living conditions are graded according to these designations, and that means according to the national status, especially as regards leisure time. The Poles occupy the lowest level.

A report from Leipzig says that Poles, French prisoners of war, Croats, Yugoslavs, Belgians, Hungarians, and women from Croatia and Poland are working in six armament factories in Saxony. The Poles are not prisoners of war but have been "hired" for a year of work. Each worker carries a number in addition to the symbol of his nationality. The company for which he works provides him with working clothes, room and board. Carriers bring the stew from the factory kitchens to the eating barracks in long queues. Foreigners and Germans receive the same pay; about 18 marks a week. But Croatia women receive only 14 marks. Room and board amount to ten and a half marks a week. Here, too, the Poles find least consideration. They are completely isolated and cannot go to places frequented by others. They have no ration cards for bread and are not permitted to buy saccharin for their substitute-coffee.

About half of the Jews of the world are under the control of the Nazis. In Alfred Rosenberg's ministry a gigantic concentration camp is planned to serve as a "Jewish State". Meanwhile hundreds of thousands of Jews work in the German industries. For example, in Litzmannstadt in what was formerly Poland, ten thousand Jews from Belgium sew on uniforms for the German army.

There are, furthermore, three million prisoners of war, 75 per cent of whom are working. From almost all European countries people have been brought to Germany in one way or another to work for her. From Czechoslovakia alone there are at present 400,000 people working in Germany. According to an estimate of the Polish Government in Exile, at the end of 1940 about one and a half millions from occupied Polish territory had been deported to Germany. Then there are still hundreds of thousands in German concentration camps, all engaged in working for the war. The variety of enslavement is indeed great.

Graded in pyramid fashion, the treatment of the various nations by the ruling totalitarian state obscures recognition of the fact that the state itself is in the process of becoming an empty institution. Yet it does not hinder the continuance of the process. Such distorted forms of an increasing interconnection and rotation of international labor only serve to revive a narrow nationalism clothed in anti-imperialistic ideologies. Yet these very ideologies can be used by the anti-fascists in their struggle for a further weakening of the state.

In no case can the rebellion of the nations against Hitler be a national or a political rebellion.

This war is the crisis of the "world revolution" which it proves to be only another form of imperialism. A defeat of Germany in the present war would only further establish the fact that neither the revolutionary nor the counter-revolutionary form of the imperialistic onslaught can be successful any longer because both imperialism and world revolution are inadequate for the real needs of society.

Both the pact with Hitler and the war against Hitler served only to further develop the parochial character of Stalin's regime. Stalin did not raise the issue of world revolution and thus did not even reach the level of the present day conception of imperialism. He only repeated the performance of the Spanish civil war.

Imperialism spelled the end of nationalism. The more perfect form of imperialism attained by totalitarianism gives the *coup de grace* to the last remnants of democratic impulses, institutions and ideologies. Therefore, all national as well as all revolutionary action comes to an end through the social process, now under way, that empties all political institutions and tactics of their former content. Revolutionary defeatism, for instance, was a political tactic against the imperialistic war. Its absurdity today is only a special case of the absurdity of all political slogans.

In the end war itself, as a specific action of the state, becomes undermined. The result of complete industrialization is the absurdity of "total war". The incongruity of all political goals with the increasing productive forces of industry becomes ever more obvious. For some time to come the new productive instruments may still be misused as instruments of war. But